Burma Newscasts

Expelled Hmong Imprisoned in Laos

2010-01-23T15:45:00.004+11:00

The Irrawaddy News
By ALEX ELLGEE

Around 50 Hmong refugees who were forcibly repatriated by Thailand to Laos on Dec. 28 have been imprisoned in Paksan jail, according to the Fact Finding Commission (FFC), an American based NGO.

It is suggested that the group may have been isolated because of their role as leaders in the camps and during the “secret war,” when the CIA hired the Hmong as foot soldiers to prevent the spread of communism during the Vietnam War.

Above Ph: Whilst in Thailand detention in May 2009

Hmong refugees sit inside a Thai police truck during an operation
to deport thousands of ethnic Hmong asylum-seekers
to Laos in December. (Photo: Reuters)

Using a secret network of undercover researchers called “blackbirds,” the FFC were able to get confirmation on Tuesday morning about the group’s imprisonment.

“We received confirmation from our contact that around 50 leaders have been imprisoned,” said Bhou Than of the FFC.

“We are very concerned about what is happening to them and expect that more will face similar detention in the coming months.”

Speaking to The Irrawaddy on Thursday, Amnesty International confirmed that one group has been separated from other returnees and expressed concern about their treatment by the Laos government.

“We are aware that some of the leaders have been separated from the group, taken out of Vientiane and remain unaccounted for,” said Benjamin Zawacki, a Bangkok-based researcher for Amnesty.

“Our primary concern for them is torture, which we know is often employed in Laos’ prisons and could be used as a punitive measure for them bringing shame to Laos or for information gathering.”

He went on to add that Thailand has not only broken refugee law by expelling the Hmong but has also gone against the UN treaty against torture, which Thailand has signed and ratified.

“Under that treaty they are obliged not to send anyone back to a country where they are at risk of torture,” he said.

In an opinion piece published in the Bangkok Post on Jan. 13, the US Ambassador to Thailand, Eric John, said the Thai authorities said they had conducted their own screening process and 800 of the Hmong refugees were identified as having protection concerns and “should not be returned involuntarily.”

However, the names of these people were never handed over to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) or any potential resettlement country, John said, and “the lack of transparency during the repatriation process made it impossible to determine if the return was voluntary.

“The US was disappointed at the Thai decision to deport 4,689 Laotian Hmong asylum seekers back to Laos on Dec. 28, 2009, despite clear indications that some in the group required protection,” John said.

One thousand of the refugees are reported to have been allowed to return to their villages and stay with their relatives. However, the remaining returnees are thought to be held in “camps” around Laos, according to eyewitnesses.

According to an undercover FFC researcher who recently made a clandestine trip to one of the camps in Phak Beuk, three thousand are being held there in terrible conditions.

“Our researcher went to the camp yesterday and told me that the people are only receiving small amounts of rice,” Bhou Than told The Irrawaddy.

“They aren’t being given any medicine, no clothes, no shelter, no doctors and he told us that 500 are sick with malaria...they are just living on the ground and being controlled by Lao soldiers with AK47s—we are very concerned by this news.”

According to a report in the Sydney Morning Herald on Jan. 12, reporters approached a camp at Paksan on the Mekong River, where “hundreds of Hmong hilltribes people stood barefoot in the dirt behind three metres of razor wire as loudspeakers ordered them to move away from the gate.”

“Blue tarpaulins blocked much of the view of the camp, but the tops of scores of tents could be seen in close rows. No grass or paved areas could be seen, and there appeared to be no permanent buildings,” the Herald said, adding that the reporters were escorted from the camp and told not to return.

Despite the information leaking out of Laos, the communist regime continues to claim that the refugees are being treated well. When the Lao Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Phongsavath Boupha met with ambassadors from the European Union, US and Australia on January 15, he told them the government had provided them with food, clothing and medicines.

“The government's long-term plan was to build a house for each family and allocate land for farming activities,” Phongsavath said, according to the Vientiane Times, a government mouthpiece.

Although the UNHCR continues to be denied access to the returnees, three US congressmen including Rep. Anh “Joseph” Cao of New Orleans visited Pha Lak, a separate camp south of Paksan and reported that the Hmong were being treated well.

Human rights groups have blasted their remarks, however, as being insensitive to the returnees and claimed their trip was staged by the Laos government.

“Their visit was nothing close to human rights monitoring,” said Joe Davy, a Hmong advocate in Chicago, who spoke to The Irrawaddy by phone.

“The Laos government told the refugees what to say before they arrived. There’s no way they would speak out and criticize the government for their living conditions. They’ve already seen how powerless the US is to help them so why would they speak out now and risk their lives?”

Responding on Thursday to the criticisms, which she described as unfounded and unfair, Cao spokeswoman Princella Smith said: “Accusations that Congressman Cao is insensitive to the needs of refugees or is somehow insensitive to victims of government abuse and persecution are not only wrong but absurd.”

Although most refugees came from Huay Nam Khao camp, one group of major concern for the UNHCR consists of 158 returnees (including 87 children) who, until they were sent back, were being held at an immigration detention center in Nong Khai on the border with Laos.

US Ambassador John said the refugees, who were detained for more than three years in the center, had been screened by the UNHCR prior to their detention and determined to have refugee status and were recognized as “Persons of Concern.”

The US was financing the care of the refugees while they were in detention in Thailand, John said, and the US and other countries were prepared to consider appropriate cases for resettlement in third countries.

"All the refugees we interviewed in Nong Khai told us on Dec. 28 that the did not wish to return to Laos, clearly indicating the return was involuntary,” John said.

Burma Newscasts - Expelled Hmong Imprisoned in Laos - January 22, 2010
http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=17641

Rights group concerned over Thai policy on refugees, migrants

2010-01-22T15:40:00.000+11:00

By Usa Pichai

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Deteriorating human rights records is in evidence in Thailand given the country’s policy on migrant workers and refugees, the Human Rights Watch said in its World Report 2010.

The HRW released a 612-page report on Wednesday, the organization's 20th annual review of human rights practices around the globe. It evaluated the situation in Thailand, and said that the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had largely failed to fulfill its pledges to make human rights a priority.

Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch said while Prime Minister Abhisit sometimes said the right things about human rights in 2009, his actions didn't match his words. "The government continually undermined respect for human rights and the due process of law in Thailand."

Abhisit's government blatantly flouted Thailand's obligations under international law to protect refugees and asylum seekers, the group said.

The expression of the hostile policy towards refugees and asylum seekers, was in evidence in January 2009, when in his capacity as chairman of the National Security Council, Abhisit approved a directive authorizing the military to intercept boats carrying ethnic Rohingya from Burma and Bangladesh.

The Thai Navy subsequently intercepted several boats transporting Rohingya and towed the rickety vessels back to the ocean with inadequate supplies of food and water. While Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, the Thai government has an obligation under international law of nonrefoulement (non-return) of persons to places where their life or freedom is at risk.

"Prime Minister Abhisit did not honour his pledge to uphold human rights principles and international law in 2009," Adams said. "Getting Thailand back on track as a rights-respecting nation in 2010 is crucial both for the country and the region."

The Thai government gave the green signal to the army to deport more than 4,600 Lao Hmong refugees and asylum seekers on December 28, despite international concerns including that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Secretary-General.

HRW also noted the failure to act against official abuses by the police. Despite the government's strong opposition to the violent approach to drug eradication by the exiled former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, it remained unwilling to bring to justice officials allegedly responsible for more than 2,500 unresolved extrajudicial killings and serious abuses committed during Thaksin's 2003 "war on drugs" and the ongoing drug suppression operations by the police.

“At the local level, the government continued to ignore systemic police violence and extortion targeting the over two million migrant workers from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos,” HRW noted.

In addition, the other human rights backslide in Thailand are the growing crackdowns on protesters and other political critics, including intensive surveillance of the internet and a failure to curb abuses by security forces in response to the longtime insurgency in the south.

Burma Newscasts - Rights group concerned over Thai policy on refugees, migrants
Friday, 22 January 2010 15:31
http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/3418-rights-group-concerned-over-thai-policy-on-refugees-migrants-.html

USDA woos Muslims in Kachin state ahead of elections

2010-01-22T15:31:00.000+11:00

By Phanida

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) is out to woo the Muslim community living in Myitkyina since early this month for the forthcoming 2010 general elections.

Though the 2010 Electoral Law is yet to be enacted and promulgated by the junta, some political parties and organizations including USDA have been allowed to start campaign.

A delegation led by Khin Maung Latt, elder brother of Burma’s Postal and Telecommunication Minister Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw, who is a candidate in the elections in Kahcin State, where a majority are Christians, is organizing Muslims at mosques in Myitkyina.

“He told the Muslim community that peace and religious equality has been achieved during military rule so they should vote for Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw representing the USDA and nominated by the junta,” an attendee at one of the mosques told Mizzima.
(JEG's: Is it because of peace and religious equality under the junta that the Rohingya are stateless?)

The campaign team comprised Myitkyina native Khin Maung Latt, BSPP party member and former Township (administrative) Council Secretary, Kachin State USDA Executive Committee member Dr. Khin Maung Tun, retired Maj. Myint Swe, and retired Lt. Col. Myo Swe, who is mobilizing minority Muslims in Myitkyina.

They concluded the poll campaign in three mosques of the officially permitted seven in seven Wards of Myitkyina. There are over 700 Muslim devotees at these mosques, it is learnt.

The team rounded off their election campaign in Aung Nan Ward on January 1, in Kyun Pin Thar Ward on January 8, in Khay Mar Thiri on January 15 respectively. A Muslim community member from Min Yat Ward said that campaign in this ward today had to be cancelled.

Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw is running the ‘Setana Pyee Phyo’ and ‘Parami’ free clinics for people in 18 wards and villages in Myitkyina including Sitapu, Dukathaung, Naung Nan, Shwe Set, Sha Daung, a local resident said. (JEG's: will the clinics run free after elections???)

The Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) is also planning to contest the elections. They have already conducted election campaign in 18 townships in Kachin State.

According to government statistics, there are 46 million Buddhists, three million Christians, two million Muslims and three million Hindus in Burma.

Burma Newscasts - USDA woos Muslims in Kachin state ahead of elections -
Friday, 22 January 2010 21:36
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/3422-usda-woos-muslims-in-kachin-state-ahead-of-elections.html

Final arguments heard in Burmese-American’s trial

2010-01-22T15:15:00.003+11:00

By Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – The final arguments by all lawyers in the trial against Burmese-born American citizen, Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka) Nyi Nyi Aung was heard by a special court in Rangoon’s notorious Insein prison on Friday.

Nyan Win, one of the defence lawyers of the American citizen said “Today we submitted our final arguments. The verdict will be given on January 27.”

Arrested on September 3, 2009, Nyi Nyi Aung is facing trial on charges of fraud, forgery, illegal possession of foreign currency and charges under the Immigration Act.

However, his international counsel in New York, Beth Schwanke earlier told Mizzima that the charges were baseless and were cooked up to arrest and sentence her client as he is a well known pro-democracy activist, advocating democracy and human rights in Burma.

The Burmese-American was a student activist, involved in the nation-wide pro-democracy uprising in 1988. He was forced to flee to neighbouring Thailand in the wake of the military’s brutal crackdown on protesters.

Later, he migrated to Maryland in United States, where he was naturalized as a citizen.

Burma’s state-run media, the New Light of Myanmar, however, accused him of having entered the country secretly in disguise eight times. He was also accused of having maintained contacts with underground activists, planning to instigate public unrest.

However, the charge-sheet against him in court does not include any of the newspaper’s accusations but merely accuses Nyi Nyi Aung of using a fake Burmese national identity card, lying to the immigration, and possessing foreign currency.

Schwanke denied the first two charges and said Nyi Nyi Aung was arrested as he stepped out of the Bangkok-Rangoon Thai Airways International (TG) flight, even before he could approach the custom’s desk to declare his foreign currency. (JEG's: he is a foreigner on a visiting trip he is to carry foreign currency on him...)

“We don’t know what will be the outcome of the trial. We will have to wait and see on January 27. The court will decide what we will be doing next,” Nyan Win said.

Supreme Court advocates, Nyan Win and Kyi Win, who jointly defended detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi last year, teamed-up to defend the Burmese-American at the Southern District Court.

Burma Newscasts - Final arguments heard in Burmese-American’s trial - 22 January 2010
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/3423-final-arguments-heard-in-burmese-americans-trial-.html

Constitutional Impunity for Generals in Burma

2010-01-04T15:53:00.000+11:00

By KAY LATT
The Irrawaddy News

"In the military everybody is liable for their failure to abide by the law. No one is above the law," said Gen Thura Shwe Mann shortly after Gen Khin Nyunt had been taken into custody on corruption charges.

But, Burma's 2008 Constitution states things somewhat differently: it is not about equality under the law and justice. It's about special exemptions granted to the generals and those working for the state institutions that control Burma.

In paragraph 445 in the chapter “Transitory Provisions” of the Constitution, it states: “No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils (the State Law and Order Restoration Council and the State Peace and Development Council) or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect of any act done in the execution of their respective duties.”

According to the above provision, no legal action can be taken for any act done by the members of SLORC or the SPDC in contrast to Gen Shwe Mann's statement. The generals are constitutionally above the law.

The need for constitutional impunity, is illustrated in some haunting stories that have followed generals for years.

In early July 1990, about a month after the election, U Kyi Maung, then de facto leader of the National League for Democracy, said in an interview with the now defunct Hong Kong-based Asiaweek magazine that Burma did not need a Nuremberg type tribunal.

However, he said some individuals such as Major-Gen Khin Nyunt might reasonably feel themselves insecure. In a SLORC press conference, Major-Gen Khin Nyunt made a personal challenge to U Kyi Maung, saying he could be tested in comparison with U Kyi Maung in terms of intellect, patriotism or moral character.

The general's remark psychologically reflected his personal sensitivity and insecurity about legal proceedings against him. Fourteen years after his challenge against U Kyi Maung, he was arrested and sentenced to 44 years in prison on corruption charges. But the real reason for his arrest was his tacit challenge against Sen-Gen Than Shwe.
(JEG's: yes sir, no sir but I disagree with you therefore U Kyi Maung is paying the price")

Gen Khin Nyunt is not the only general who has been victim of their own hypocrisy. In 1997, several generals who were members of SLORC, the first military clique who led the coup d'état in 1988, were expelled and arrested mostly due to their excessive corruption.

In fact, Sen-Gen Saw Maung, Than Shwe's predecessor and the coup leader in 1988, was also dethroned and died in oblivion not long after.

Gen Ne Win who was the pioneer of Burma's military coups and who ruled Burma for almost three decades died without a proper funeral ceremony under undeclared house arrest. His family, once the most powerful and influential in Burma, vanished and some were arrested and imprisoned.

In Gen Ne Win's era of 1962-88, a long list of military leaders from Major-Gen Aung Gyi, Major-Gen Maung Maung, Brig-Gen Kyaw Zaw, Brig-Gen Aung Shwe (now chairman of NLD) to Gen Tin Oo (now vice chairman of the NLD), Major-Gen Tin Oo (chief military intelligent), Col Kyi Maung, Col Maung Lwin, Col Chit Khaing and many others, were expelled or arrested for their potential threat to his power.

The current generals are aware of the history of generals in neighboring countries who try to rule by force.

In South Korea, former generals and presidents such as Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were jailed on charges of corruption in 1996 after they stepped down. Chun's family was accused of embezzling US $4 billion during his rule. He received a death sentence, which was later reduced to life.

In Indonesia, Suharto, the former president and coup leader, was put under house arrest and investigated for corruption, accused of embezzling US $571 millions. Suharto was not properly prosecuted due to deteriorating health, but many of his relatives, including his son, were sentenced to prison on corruption charges.

In the Philippines, after the “People Power Movement” in 1986, Marcos, then president, fled the country into exile. In the United States, he and his family were indicted for embezzlement. He died in the United States in 1989.

According to Transparency International, Marcos was the second most corrupt head of government ever, after Suharto.

There are many more stories of generals or self-proclaimed leaders who meet ignoble ends: Gen Noriega of Panama, Gen Pinoche of Chile, Gen Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and countless others in Africa continent.

Another reason the Burmese generals are trying to protect themselves is the fear of being indicted for “crimes against humanity” or “war crimes” committed during their rule.

In a report by the International Human Rights Clinic of the Harvard Law School titled “Crimes in Burma,” five of the world's leading international jurists analyzed scores of UN documents and reports from several different UN special rapporteurs, and suggested that abuses in Burma are potential crimes against humanity and war crimes and called for the UN Security Council to establish a Commission of Inquiry.

In August, 2009, a Paris-based INGO called the International Federation for Human Rights together with ALTSEAN Burma and the Burma Lawyer Council issued a report titled “Burma/Myanmar International Crimes Committed in Burma: The urgent need for a Commission of Inquiry,” which presented an overview of existing documentation on human rights violations perpetrated by the military regime.

In the report, the organizations called for the establishment of an international Commission of Inquiry mandated by the United Nations Security Council to investigate allegations of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other widespread systematic human rights violations.

In another report released in September by the International Center for Transitional Justice titled “Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its 2008 Constitution” called for the international community to work with the Burmese government to establish an independent Commission of Inquiry into serious human rights violations, including sexual violence, the recruitment and use of child soldiers and forced labor.

The reason for calling for a Commission of Inquiry is because the only way to get the case to the ICC is through a UN Security Council referral, since Burma is not a signatory to the ICC statute.

To date, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic which are member State Parties have referred cases occurring on their territories to the court. In addition, the Security Council has referred cases in Sudan, which is a non-State Party.

However, the Burmese generals may have an alternative to such trials should they attempt national reconciliation in the manner of South Africa, which established a truth and reconciliation commission.

After the abolition of apartheid, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up and witnesses, victims and perpetrators of human rights violations were invited to give statements about their experiences. Most of the people who committed abuses during the apartheid era were granted amnesty.

However, the Burmese generals are hedging their bets through the Constitution, which also grants them the right, during a State of Emergency, to abolish and take over the elected government.

In paragraph 432 of the Provisions on State of Emergency, it states that no legal action can be taken against the generals or any administrative body or any of its members when sovereign power are exercised by the National Defense and Security Council.

The generals are doing everything possible through the Constitution to prolong their hold on power and to protect them from the consequences of human rights violations and war crimes.

But clearly, if history is the judge, such efforts offer no real protection for those who abuse the rights of their fellow countrymen. The generals would be wise to pursue a course of national reconciliation as quickly as possible, including the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.

Burma Newscasts - Constitutional Impunity for Generals in Burma - Monday, January 4, 2010
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=17518

Burma constitution ‘provides impunity’ for abuses

2009-10-09T12:56:00.001+11:00

Oct 9, 2009 (DVB)–Burma’s redrafted 2008 constitution provides impunity for human rights abuses and should not be the bedrock for elections next year, a damning report has claimed.

Many of the provisions of the constitution suggest that “instead of being a true catalyst for lasting change, it further entrenches the military within the government and the associated culture of impunity,” the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) said.

Its report, Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its Constitution, says that within the constitution, the regime has granted itself impunity for sexual violence, forced labor and the recruitment of child soldiers.

Burma, it says, is “one of the most difficult challenges in the world in relation to making progress toward combating impunity.”

Khin Omar, coordinator of the Thailand-based Burma Partnership, said the constitution will “force military rule on Burma forever”.

“[It is] the most problematic element as to whether we move further toward being a failed state or whether we move towards national reconciliation,” she said.

The report says that “officers and troops systematically use rape and other forms of sexual abuse as a strategy of war.”

It then cites a clause within the constitution stating that: “No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils (the military) or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect to any act done in the execution of their respective duties.”

Burma expert Robert H Taylor told DVB however that “No one has proven that [rape] is public policy,” adding that “we don’t know how the military deals with instances of rape”.

He cited anonymous sources that claim the government has action against people accused of assault and rape, but added that the constitution “has its problems, but which doesn’t?”

In a sign that the regime responds to international pressure, the report cited an agreement between the junta and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to address forced labour and child soldiers.

The 2008 constitution was ratified in the weeks following cyclone Nargis last May, in which 140,000 people were killed and millions of acres of land destroyed. Despite the cyclone, the government claimed a 99 percent turnout, with 92.4 percent voting in favour.

A report released last year by Hong Kong-based constitutional expert, Professor Yash Ghai, said that “the cynicism with which the regime held the referendum and manipulated the results was on a par with the cynicism and coercion by which the draft was prepared”.

The ICTJ have called on the international community to withhold support for elections in Burma next year. Khin Omar echoed the calls, and said that a constitutional review must take place before the elections do.

Reporting by Joseph Allchin
Burma Newscasts - Burma constitution ‘provides impunity’ for abuses

Junta said to be supplying chemical mortars to army

2009-10-09T12:48:00.001+11:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - In what seems to be a sinister design, the Burmese military junta, while reinforcing its troops in Shan state for a massive offensive against ethnic ceasefire groups, is supplying its army with mortars laced with chemical ingredients, sources said.

According to the Thailand-based ethnic Kachin News Group (KNG), the junta’s troops since last month have been stockpiling a strange type of mortar shell, marked with red, yellow and green colours.

“We have our source in the army. Our source tells us that the army is bringing in these mortars, which are made of chemicals. But they have been strictly told not to use it without orders from higher ups,” said Naw Din, Editor of the KNG, quoting a military source.

Naw Din said, the mortars, according to an insider, were imported from North Korea and have a deadly chemical impact, once fired.

“When the mortars are fired, it contaminates the air and causes people to faint, results in bleeding of the nose, causes breathing difficulties and blurs the eye sight,” Naw Din said.

He added the army source told him that at least two military trucks carrying these mortars were sent to the Burmese Army’s No.1 Nyaung Pin military base on the mountain top near Mongkoe in Northeast Shan State, in early September.

While the supply and possible use of chemical mortars by the junta’s troops cannot be independently verified, sources on the Sino-Burma border said Burmese troops are being heavily reinforced.

Following the Kokang incident in late August, the Burmese junta has been directing its army to borders of the territory of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the strongest armed faction among the ceasefire groups, and Mongla areas, where the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) is based.

Sein Kyi, Assistant Editor of the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), said the junta while increasingly pressurizing the ethnic ceasefire groups to accept its proposal of transforming to the ‘Border Guard Force’ through negotiations and meetings, is also increasing its military presence in northern and eastern Shan state.

“In recent weeks, the Burmese military commanders have proposed meeting lower ranking officials of the UWSA, in order to split the group. But UWSA officials rejected the plan saying they should contact their headquarters,” Sein Kyi said.

In the meantime, Sein Kyi said, the junta is also reinforcing its bases with more troops, and stockpiling supplies, in what looks like a preparation for a massive offensive.

“I don’t have any updates on the possibilities of stockpiling chemical mortars, but earlier about a year or two ago, I had been told by our sources inside the military that they have chemical mortars made in North Korea,” Sein Kyi added.

While he said he did not know of the recent supplies of chemical mortars, he did not rule out the possibility.

“It would be very deadly if these mortars are used. It would impact not only soldiers but all the people, villagers and civilians alike,” he added.

With the Burmese military junta setting the deadline for ethnic ceasefire groups to respond to their proposal of transforming into Border Guard Force to October, sources said, fighting is likely to break out soon.

But with about a 20,000 armed force, the UWSA is unlikely to submit to the junta and a clash between the two could end in a bloodbath.

“The junta will attack the UWSA and other groups sooner or later, but we don’t know how and whether they will launch a direct military campaign or not. They might also rely on other tactics as they did in the Kokang incident,” Sein Kyi said.

But sources said, the junta is likely to look for Chinese signals and it would largely depend on China whether the junta would launch a direct military campaign because the Wa are largely seen as being backed by the Chinese.

Burma Newscasts - Junta said to be supplying chemical mortars to army
Friday, 09 October 2009 21:48

Article in private journal attacks Burma Campaigners

2009-10-05T21:14:00.001+11:00

by Salai Pi Pi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – An article published in the Rangoon-based “The Voice” journal on Monday made an unveiled attack on campaign groups such as the Burma Campaign UK, for misusing the name of Burma in lobbying western nations to impose sanctions on the Southeast Asian nation.

The article authored by “Aung Htut” a pen name on Monday said, the writer is extremely happy to see the US’s new policy of engagement with the Burmese regime, but fears that the US might revert to its old policy as these so-called activists are continuing to lobby to isolate Burma.

“It is not western governments but those individual foreigners who tried to formulate their own strategy in systematically isolating Burma,” the article said, “Most of misunderstandings (over Burma) came from them.”

The article also said these campaigners including members of the Burma Campaign UK and Institute of Democracy for Asia in the past had lobbied western countries for sanctions against Burma. As result Burma was isolated for several years.

Groups like the Burma Campaign UK have a limited number of Burmese people in the organisation, yet they have been effectively lobbying as representatives of the Burmese, the article said.

“The writer wonders how groups like the Burma Campaign UK have the right to represent the Burmese people. But what is certain is that they have misused the name of Burma and its people,” added the article.

But Mark Farmaner, Director of the Burma Campaign UK denied campaigning for the isolation of Burma but stressed that the BCUK is supporting sanctions against members of the Burmese junta and their business cronies, who are benefiting from the sufferings endured by the Burmese people.

He, however, viewed the attack as a natural reaction because of the nature of work that the BCUK has been committed to doing and the influence it has on government’s policies in telling the truth about human rights violations committed by the military junta.

“They attack us because we have been effective in raising awareness about what they are doing and getting the international community to increase pressure,” Farmaner said.

He said, the BCUK is not only committed to push for sanctions against the military regime, but is also pushing for a United Nations Security Council referral of Than Shwe and members of the military junta in the International Criminal Court for their crimes against humanity.

“Probably they attacked us as we are telling the truth about what is happening in Burma. We exposed human rights abuse, what is going on in jails with political prisoners in Burma and what is happening in ethnic areas where the Burmese Army is raping women and children,” Farmaner added.

The article in the Weekly also said, since the campaigners are mostly foreigners, the writer does not expect them to understand the Burmese peoples’ feelings and sufferings and will not sympathize with the life and condition of the country.

The writer said “as a strong advocate of engagement, it is encouraging to see key stakeholders are now showing signs of their willingness for engagement. If this could have been understood earlier, we could have seen good results. But it is only regrettable that much time had been wasted.”

But Farmaner said sanctions have been useful as a tool in reminding the Burmese generals that they are accountable for their actions and a reminder of the need to implement meaningful political reforms.

“We always support a combination of sanctions and engagement. So, the US policy is exactly what we have been campaigning for,” said Farmaner adding that the BCUK will continue campaigning for effective sanctions against the Burmese military regime.

Burma, under military rule since 1962, is contending with financial and economic sanctions by the United States, European Union and Australia for their human rights abuses and failure to implement democratic reforms.

But the US, after concluding its policy review on Burma last week, announced that it is changing track and will use a combination of sanctions as well as engagement.

The new policy comes at a time the Burmese regime, is particularly seen as keen to develop a new relation with the US, in the run up to their planned elections in 2010, which is a part of the junta’s seven-step roadmap to democracy.

While articles in privately owned journals are mostly written by authors unrelated to the Burmese regime, the journal, as per the junta’s law, has to go through the censorship board, which conducts a thorough check of the contents.

Occasionally, Burma’s military junta forces private journals to publish articles and commentaries written in favour of the junta, which the editors of the journals cannot refuse to publish as the consequences could cost their license to run the publication.

Burma Newscasts - Article in private journal attacks Burma Campaigners
Monday, 05 October 2009 22:33

Ostensible verdict against Aung San Suu Kyi

2009-10-05T19:44:00.000+11:00

by Tint Swe

Mizzima News - If a ruling of a court is called a verdict, it has to be called a legal judgment and the judgment has to be made by a judge. So far it seems ostensibly fine with the verdict announced on October 2 in Rangoon. However a judge is not a judge and the law is not law at all in military ruled Burma. A judge has to read out the pre-written decision from higher authorities. The law is what comes out of the mouth of military officers.

When Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal was rejected, no one was surprised. But the legal team of Daw Suu was disappointed because the legal argument read out by the divisional judge was contrary to the true sense of law. The court accepted the argument of non-existence of the 1974 constitution but referred to the 1975 provision which is based on that nullified 1974 constitution. The township level court’s decision of last month was said to be partly wrong according to the divisional court. But the divisional judge said it was partially right. So the legal system in Burma is partial and prejudiced.

The entire month before the news regarding Burma showed of different tones by allowing Americans to visit and meet two top leaders – one none-other-then the Senior General himself and one the icon of pro-democracy struggle Aung San Suu Kyi. The professional staff of the Congressmen met NLD representatives. The foreign minister was also allowed to visit from New York to Washington, DC and a minister met senior US officials from the State department. All followed by the release of an American intruder who was obviously guilty.

The guilt-ridden foreigner was freed and innocent citizen of the country were unjustly punished. The punishment for an innocent person is an additional example of the regime showing tolerance to foreigners while it is total fanaticism for the people of its own country. It was not in accordance with the law but purely a political decision.

Since General Ne Win who governed Burma for 26 years and gave birth of dictatorial rule by the Burmese Army was portrayed as a xenophobic. Now this regime becomes obsessive to foreigners and clinically it is termed as a bipolar disorder.

The substance or lesson from this episode is that underestimation of the true nature of the regime should not be repeated by the international community.

The rejection of appeal came about a couple of days after Aung San Suu Kyi wrote an important letter to the Senior General, the sole decision maker Than Shwe. Her letter was a request cum proposal on how to deal with western sanctions. The sanctions are what the junta desperately wanted to be lifted. In 2007, the General hinted that he could engage in dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi if she dropped calling for sanctions and abandoning confrontation. As a matter of fact Aung San Suu Kyi has been calling for national reconciliation. Now she officially and publically said she was serious about lifting the sanctions.

But the Rangoon divisional court was ordered to turn down the appeal. So it is evident that the regime wants neither sanctions nor Aung San Suu Kyi. Meanwhile the regime will float the sanction issue. But they will not make any serious change to be able to lift sanctions. As the section of the west is too theoretical rather than practical, the junta may collect some aid. However small, it is just fine for them. For the military rulers the assistance from World Bank, IMF and ADB are not real wants like the successful roadmap.

The United Nations, the Secretary General, the General Assembly, the Security Council continued annual routine calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Habitually Russia and China continued blocking the strong statements at the UN. The ASEAN bloc stepped back from letter writing campaign for her release.

The UN diplomats politely commented that the junta missed the opportunity to prove its commitment in holding inclusive elections next year. In fact, for generals, it was not regarded as opportunity but the hurdle to overcome as in a military training. They are also prepared to pass through all hurdles before 2010 election. As long as all veto powers at UNSC do not change their minds, as long as neighbours maintain controversial non-interference and if the oppressed people of Burma can’t flex its muscles though feeble, dictatorial control will remain as it is.

(The author Dr. Tint Swe is the elected Member of Parliament and the Information Minister of the exiled government National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma or NCGUB)

Burma Newscasts - Ostensible verdict against Aung San Suu Kyi
Monday, 05 October 2009 13:00

Thaw in US-Burma ties

2009-10-05T19:28:00.004+11:00

By Chua Chin Hon
The Straits Times

The unexpected thaw in US-Burma ties in recent months has raised a host of intriguing questions.

The most obvious are perhaps the trickiest: Why do Burma's military rulers want to engage the Obama administration in dialogue, and why now? What do they hope to gain?

Diplomats familiar with the issue say it is futile to try to second-guess the thinking of the secretive military junta. Yet, the answers to these questions will shape the negotiation strategies of the United States.

At first sight, there does not seem to be any urgent or compelling reason for Burma's generals to engage their biggest critic, Washington. After all, they have successfully weathered all the criticisms and economic sanctions that the US and other Western countries have imposed since the 1990s.

And Burma's growing importance in providing resources and energy for regional powers like China and India will ensure that foreign investments continue to roll in. So why bother?

Experts who track Burma, however, say that it is wrong to assume that the junta is satisfied, or completely assured, by the status quo. They add that a combination of domestic and external factors probably prompted the generals to seek talks with Washington.

For starters, next year, Burma will hold its first election in two decades, a move widely seen as an attempt by the military to legitimise its rule. Much remains unclear about the participation of the opposition in the elections, and whether international election monitors would be admitted.

Even the date for the election has not been officially announced. But what would be abundantly clear to the junta is that any attempt to garner international recognition would be futile without some level of acceptance from the US, experts say.

"I do think that the (Burmese government) is very anxious to have international recognition and some sort of legitimacy," says Dr Bridget Welsh, a Southeast Asia scholar with the Singapore Management University (SMU).

"And when people talk about the issue of acceptance, they are really referring to this recognition from the US."

The question of whether bilateral talks - and election assistance should Burma request it - could lend legitimacy to the junta-run elections could become a political hot potato for the Obama administration, given the nature of US politics. Hence, US diplomats have hedged their recent contacts with Burmese officials with numerous caveats.

"We will continue to stress to the (Burmese) authorities the baseline conditions that we consider necessary for any credible electoral process," US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told a Senate hearing last Wednesday.

"They include the
release of political prisoners,
the ability of all stakeholders to stand for election,
eliminating restrictions on media, and
ensuring a free and open campaign."

Campbell met U Thaung, Burma's minister of science, technology and labour, in New York last week in what was termed the highest level contact between the two sides in nine years. The negotiators did not set a date for a second set of talks, but Campbell said he sensed from the Burmese officials "a very clear determination that dialogue was possible".

Beyond the search for international acceptance, experts say Burma's willingness to engage the US could also be prompted by the rapidly changing international environment, particularly since President Barack Obama came into office.

Obama's approach to foreign policy has been markedly different from that of his predecessor, George W. Bush, who refused direct contact with countries deemed to be rogue regimes.

It would not have escaped the attention of Burma's military rulers that other countries on Washington's blacklist - Iran and North Korea - have all had increased contact with the new US administration lately. There is little strategic value in being the odd man out in what is already the small and unpopular club of rogue nations.

But the bigger strategic issue on Burma's radar is likely to be the growing ties between the US and China, experts say. Whereas it could play one against the other before, that is no longer a given, as the two global powers see a growing convergence in their interests.

And despite Burma's close economic ties with China, the relationship is not necessarily problem-free.

"On China, we have to remember that the present army leadership grew up fighting the Communist Party of Burma, a well-armed Chinese-supported insurgent force that once threatened huge parts of the eastern uplands," historian Thant Myint-U told Wednesday's Senate hearing.

"Many see their present dependence on China as an anomaly, a tactical move that needs correction."

With all these shifting plates in motion, Burma likely has to recalibrate its position.

Said Dr Welsh of SMU: "They have to find a new configuration...and dialogue is the first step in that process."

For the US, the impetus for the talks goes beyond its traditional concerns about human rights, civil society and the imprisonment of democracy-icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

Burma's growing ties with North Korea and the uranium deposits in the central and northern parts of the country have raised fears that the junta will try to play a similar game of nuclear brinkmanship as Pyongyang has done since 2003.

So far, there has been no smoking gun evidence of Burma contemplating such a move. But that is not likely to assure Washington, which already has its hands full dealing with Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

Said Campbell: "Let me be clear: we have decided to engage with (Burma) because we believe it is in our interest to do so."

Burma Newscasts - Thaw in US-Burma ties
5 October 2009

Regional implications of US policy on Burma

2009-10-05T19:20:00.003+11:00

Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation (Thailand)

The carefully crafted 490-word US policy on Burma is aimed at all players in the region and afar, directly and indirectly, involved in the Burmese quagmire. Coming as it did at this juncture, the policy will be used as a new benchmark to gauge Rangoon's genuine desire for dialogue and openness. It also seeks to rejuvenate international engagement with regional dynamics. This represents another much-needed effort to break the current impasse that the regime can take after Australia made the first attempt—with a long list of demands-at the 1994 Asean ministerial meeting in Bangkok.

Washington realises now that the new approach is likely to be "slow and incremental." In other words, it will be a step by step process. This time a more concerted international effort is required to ease the Burmese crisis after decades of sanctions. The Obama Administration should be lauded for seizing this unique opportunity to formulate a new policy that some regional players can identify with.

The US softer approach has short and long-term objectives. In the next 15 months, pressure on Burma would be a step up building on existing progress accomplished since August including increased US-Burmese high-level meetings and dialogues, as well as ongoing communications between General Than Shwe and the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi on ways to loosen up sanctions. After the US completed its policy reviews, Suu Kyi reiterated her readiness again to help end sanctions against the regime, which she first outlined two and half years ago.

Washington also wants to lay groundwork for inclusive, free and fair elections next year in Burma. Judging from the tone of US senior officials, any positive response from the junta on Suu Kyi's unconditional release or electoral process in coming weeks or months would immediately help to build up mutual confidence and widen the communication channels between the two capitals. Cooperation on counter-narcotics, health, environmental protection, and the recovery of World War II-era missing-in-action (MIAs) could be new incentives.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell made clear that lifting or easing sanctions at the outset of a dialogue without meaningful progress on the US concerns would be a mistake. "We will maintain our existing sanctions until we see concrete progress, and continue to work with the international community to ensure that those sanctions are effectively coordinated," he told a Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs last week.

In the medium and long term, the US policy seeks to break up the twin influence of China and India over Burma. In the policy statement, the US says it will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with the UN, Asean, the EU, China, Japan, India, Australia, the Burmese opposition and others. In reality, the US targets China and India—the two key players which have propped up and strengthened the military junta. The US new positions are more or less closer to those held by key players which prefer more contact,with sanctions still intact, or backing easing of sanctions with more humanitarian assistance.

Since Cyclone Nargis, the EU has picked humanitarian options for the Burmese people albeit growing criticism that it would benefit the regime. For decades, Japan has limited its assistance aid to humanitarian and human resource development, especially in economic planning. Australia also tried without much success to increase awareness on human rights and democracy inside Burma.

With the US new policy, Asean will find it easier to work with the US on Burma—a new element under the Obama administration and Asean. Asean opposes sanctions against Burma, since it was admitted into the grouping in 1997. Apart from sharing common objectives of seeing a united, prosperous and democratic country, now the two sides are moving closer on sanctions. Asean argues sanctions must stop as it hurts the Burmese people.

Ironically, the Asean-US closer cooperation on Burma effectively put an end to the Aseanisation process of Burmese conundrums that began in earnest in Luxembourg in 1991, fuelling the longstanding feud between EU and Asean over Burma. Even before the country joined the grouping, Asean leaders believed they could handle the Burmese issue better than the outsiders through peer pressure and the Asean way. The polarisation reached its peak in 1997 when Burma was admitted to Asean with strong support from former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammad and Indonesian ex-President Suharto.

The US-led "internationalisation" process could overtake the Asean-initiated or even the UN framework, if Burma responds positively to Washington's overtures in a timely manner. In that case, Rangoon has lots of explaining to do for its Asean colleagues and international community. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya's decision to give up the joint Asean appeal on Suu Kyi's freedom, citing the existing international efforts, confirmed this inevitable trend. Like it or not, Asean future positions on Burma would have to take in broad-based international sentiments.

The first US-Asean summit in Singapore, scheduled on November 15, will include Burmese Prime Minister Thien Sein. It was no longer a taboo for the leaders of US and Burma to meet. The summit—whether it is institutionalised-would further deepen the US role played in regional issues. With its Asean ambassador in residence in Jakarta (the first in Asean) to be announced soon, Washington will also have a senior official follow up on this issue with the Asean Secretariat. Later this month, at the Asean summit in Cha-am, Asean expects to see more positive signs from Burma related to the electoral process and relations with the opposition partners.

Closer to home, the US policy will impact on the porous Thai-Burma border. Issues related to attacks on minorities, drugs and human smuggling would be placed high on the US watch lists. More than before, both Thailand and Malaysia—not to mention China over the Kokang conflict- have all suffered from the influx of Burmese refugees.

Recent attacks on minorities along the Thai border by the Burmese troops again displaced thousands of minorities inside the Thai territory.

In years ahead, the US policy serves to enhance Thailand's position vis-a-vis Burma over its nuclear ambition. US senior officials have reiterated the UN Security Council's resolution 1874 (as well as 1718 during testimonies) which deals with nuclear proliferation as part of the Burmese policy gist. Washington has been very concerned about the nature and extent of Burma's nuclear ties with North Korea. During recent testimony, Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana continued to question Burma's motives in dispatching hundreds of its officials to Russia for nuclear technology training. He pointed out the number of persons travelling to Russia for specialised training seemed to be far beyond the number needed for the eventual operation of a nuclear reactor for medical research purposes, intended to be built by the junta with Russian government assistance Thailand has yet to treat with seriousness this explosive issue.

Except for selective army intelligence officials working closely with Australian and American counterparts, the rest of Thai society has been kept in the dark on Burma's nuclearisation program and its implications on the country's future security. The Thai policy makers, in particular the National Security Council, tend to view Burma's quagmire and security concerns through myopic bilateral prisms, which immediately mitigate any serious strategic evaluation of potential nuclear threats to Thailand.

Burma Newscasts - Regional implications of US policy on Burma
5 Oct 2009

Beijing and Burma no longer best of friends

2009-10-04T19:47:00.001+11:00

by Larry Jagan

Bangkok (Mizzima) - There is a growing rift between the two close allies and neighbours, China and Burma over their border problems, with relations at an all-time low. The Burmese junta have cooled towards their main benefactor, Beijing, with increasing public signs of their dissatisfaction. Beijing has even issued some unusually forthright criticism of their neighbour in the past few weeks.

China has also reacted with a diplomatic flurry of activity – in Beijing, Naypyidaw and New York. The Chinese are so concerned about the clouds over their relationship, that they dispatched one of their most seasoned negotiators, the vice-minister for foreign affairs, Wang Yi to Burma on a secret mission within the last ten days, according to senior Burmese officials.

The first signs of the cracks in the relationship appeared when the Burmese army launched an offensive against the Kokang ethnic rebels who have had a truce with the regime for twenty years. Thousands of refugees fled across the border for safety, raising fears of a fresh civil war along Burma’s northern border and alarming China. Beijing’s attitude to Burma has also been compounded by concern over the junta’s future relations with the United States – Beijing is wary of Washington’s offer to the junta of a dialogue.

“Beijing has been taken aback by the Burmese junta’s cavalier approach to their normally strong relationship,” said Win Min, a Burmese academic based at Chiang Mai University. “But it is likely to prove to be a hiccup, rather than a major shift in relations.”

China has several major concerns, including their massive economic investment in the country, especially the planned oil pipeline, pumping oil from the Arakan Sea off the west coast of Burma into China’s southern province of Yunnan. But Beijing is also concerned about the growing unrest along their common border, and the safety of the Chinese living in Burma. Around a quarter of a million Chinese have crossed the border and sought work and economic opportunities in northern Burma in the last ten years.

Concerns are now mounting for their safety with the deteriorating situation in the border areas. Last weekend a government-controlled provincial television channel, which is based in Kunming – the capital of Yunnan -- broadcast a Chinese government announcement advising all Chinese citizens in eastern Burma to return home quickly.

This followed a formal complaint from China to Burma days earlier over the way Chinese citizens living in a border region had been treated during recent clashes between the Burmese army and the ethnic Kokang militia last month. In statement issued last week, China's Foreign Ministry said the recent conflict with the Kokang, in a north-eastern Burmese region bordering China, had "harmed the rights and interests of Chinese citizens living there." It also said the Burmese government should make sure similar incidents do not happen again.

Burma insists that peace has been restored to the area in question, and most of the refugees who fled to China had returned. But there has still thousands seeking refuge across the border, not just from the Kokang areas, according to residents living in China along the border with Burma. Nearly forty thousand refugees, many of them Chinese businessmen fled into China when the fighting erupted. They were housed in makeshift camps provided by the Chinese authorities. Officially these refugees have since been dispersed, and returned to Burma. “The Kokang capital Laogai, remains a ghost town,” a recent foreign visitor there told Mizzima. Most of the main cities and towns are also empty, including the main border city in the east of Shan state, he added.

Right along the border, from the Kachin areas in the west to the Shan areas in the east, people have fled into China for fear of renewed fighting between other ethnic rebel groups, especially the Kachin and the Wa and the Burmese army, according to Indian entrepreneurs who travel along this area doing business. “Everyone fears that the twenty-year old ceasefire agreements have been torn up by the Burmese generals, and a return to fighting is imminent,” said a Kachin student living in the Chinese border town of Ruili.

“At moment it does not look as though the Burmese army is about to attack any of the other ethnic rebel groups that have ceasefire agreements, though there is a lot of posturing going on,” said Win Min. “There is no doubt that the regime means to have all the ethnic rebel armies disarm before next year’s elections and become part of the border guards under the control of the Burmese army.” The ceasefire groups told Mizzima that they have until the end of October to comply with the government order to disarm, and join the Border Police Guard under the control of the Burmese military, and take part in next year’s planned elections.

Earlier this year the junta sought the assistance of the former intelligence chief and prime minister, General Khin Nyunt – who was deposed in October 2004 and is now under house arrest in Rangoon – to help negotiate with these rebels groups, especially the Wa. Khun Nyunt had mater-mined these ceasefire agreement some twenty years ago, and was still trusted by many of the ethnic leaders. He agreed on condition that his men – some 300 military intelligence officers who were jailed in the aftermath of Khin Nyunt’s fall – be freed.

The government refused to accept his condition, and turned to the Chinese – who have extremely close relations with the key ethnic groups along the border – the Kachin, Kokang and the Wa. The Chinese reluctance to help has angered the Burmese junta’s leaders.

It is now increasingly evident that a significant rift exits between the two countries that could have crucial implications for other countries in the region, and any approach the international community may take to encourage the Burmese military regime to introduce real political change.

The implications of this growing divergence could have significant affects on the border region, as the most of the ethnic groups – especially the Kachin, Kokang and Wa – in this area have ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta, but also have traditionally close ties with the Chinese authorities. Economically and culturally the area is certainly closer to China than the Burmese regime.

Many of these ethnic leaders go to Chinese hospital across the border for medical treatment and send their children to school in China. The Chinese language and even the Chinese currency the Renminbi is used throughout the Kokang and Wa areas in northern Shan state.

Anything which forces Beijing to choose between their ethnic brothers inside Burma—the Kokang are ethnically and the Wa, a Chinese ethnic minority -- and the central government will cause the Beijing immense problems. And in the end will bring into sharp focus the real nature of the Burma-China axis.

Beijing is now more worried about Burma’s longer-term allegiance. The junta has been a China’s key ally and strategic partner in south-east Asia in the past few years. So the current overtures between Washington and Burma have dismayed the Chinese leaders, who remain suspicious of the US interest in re-engaging with the region and increasing its influence – also fearing it is a return to the old US strategy of containing China. The region is seen by Beijing as its back-yard, and any competition for influence is far from welcomed.

China fears that its influence in south-east Asia is waning. Vietnam has never been a strong supporter, and as far as Beijing is concerned, for sometime Hanoi’s main interest has been to cosy up to Washington. Recently Cambodia and Thailand have strengthened their ties with the US, increasing China’s strategic concerns.

Now its rock-solid ally has begun to flirt with improving relations with Washington. “China will react with measured nervousness to this unwelcomed encroachment into Burma,” Justin Wintle, a British expert on Burma and biographer of Aung San Suu Kyi told Mizzima.

Beijing’s current concerns stem from the unstable basis of their bilateral relationship. The Chinese government remains suspicious of the Burmese military junta. “When we meet the Thais, they look Chinese and speak Chinese, but when we see the Burmese leaders, they don’t speak Chinese and they look South Asian,” said a senior Chinese government official.

‘Burma and China are not ‘real’ friends – as with Thailand for example,” he said. “It’s a Machiavellian relationship: we are in for what we can get out of it, and they are also in it, for what they can get out of it,” he said.

So according to Chinese diplomats, it is a relationship that could shift easily. “But it is not likely to become antagonistic anytime soon,” said Win Min. “Burma is far too economically dependent on China for the government to really consider ditching Beijing as its main ally.”

More than ninety percent of direct foreign invest in Burma last year was Chinese. While the western-led sanctions remain in place, that is unlikely to change in the near future. Sanctions of course now more than ever rankle with the regime.

"Sanctions are being employed as a political tool against Myanmar and we consider them unjust," the Burmese prime minister, General Thein Sein told the UN’s annual General Assembly meeting in New York last month. Undoubtedly Burma’s interest in a dialogue with the US is motivated by the regime’s main concerns, to have sanctions lifted, for international humanitarian and development assistance to flow into the country, and to attract foreign investment.

“Though generals are certainly unhappy about being too dependent on one supporter, and will be trying to balance Chinese influence with better relations with the US as well as other countries –like ASEAN and India, they will not be looking to cut the umbilical cord with China in the near future,” said Win Min.

But there is no escaping from the fact that Burma’s military leaders are upset with Beijing. The Chinese embassy put on a lavish reception for the massive 60th anniversary of the founding of the Peoples’ Republic of China. The coverage in the official New Light of Myanmar the next day paid scant notice to the importance of the occasion or the ambassador’s address, Instead it noticeably focused on Secretary One’s attendance. This comes after the Myanmar Times recently was allowed to refer to the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama when he visited Taiwan, last month. Both these incidents are clearly signs that the junta wants to rebuke China.

But thinks may already be on the mend after the Chinese envoy’s secret mission to see Than Shwe recently. China is desperately trying to mend fences with the junta. One example of this is the diplomatic initiative China took at the UN Security Council to make sure Burma is not on its agenda – at least this month.

It looks like the trouble between Burma and China maybe on the wane. Nevertheless Beijing will be watching with growing concern, any further overtures between Burma and the US. So far it seems to have been a spat between two close partners – siblings or even husband and wife, according to Asian diplomats who have also been following the situation closely.

But in the end it is Burma that may hold the upper hand. China’s economic, trade and military involvement in Burma gives the junta the upper hand rather than making them more subservient to Beijing. The issue now is how far will the junta leaders go in flexing their muscles.

Burma Newscasts - Beijing and Burma no longer best of friends
Sunday, 04 October 2009 18:05

Peace in Name only

2009-10-03T18:12:00.003+10:00

By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
The Irrawaddy News
OCTOBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.7

War and refugees will remain a fact of life in Burma as long as the root causes of conflict in the country’s borderlands remain unaddressed.

The rout of the ethnic Kokang militia, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, in northern Burma in late August has brought into stark relief what millions of people live with in Burma every day: conflict between the central state and non-state armed militias. For decades, clashes between the Burmese regime’s army and its myriad enemies have been forcing people into hiding or across borders. What is different about the recent fighting is that it involved China—not usually a country that tolerates refugees from Burma or instability along its borders.
Enlarge Image

The cause of the latest outbreak of hostilities is the decision of Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to pressure cease-fire groups to transform their armies into border security guard forces before next year’s election. Under the SPDC plan, which was first proposed in April, the militias would be split up into battalions consisting of 326 soldiers, mostly from ethnic militias, but with a number of Burmese government army troops and officers. The deadline for a response to the plan was June, with training to begin in October.

Many groups have refused, and with good grounds. How could an armed group such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), with an estimated 20,000 soldiers, practically accept such a demand under such a tight timeframe? The Kachin Independence Organization seems to have diplomatically rejected the junta’s demand by conditionally agreeing to it, but other groups have declined outright, leading to fears of a resumption of armed conflict.

Yet as negative as the potential consequences of the SPDC’s demands are, the status quo is equally bad, not just for national political reforms, but also for civilian protection. Burma’s hinterlands have for most of the past 20 years been ordered into a network of semi-autonomous cease-fire zones, run by politico-military armed groups often financed by investments in the narcotics trade, illegal logging, smuggling, transport and casino capitalism. From Mon State up the eastern borderlands and around Shan State to Kachin State, a string of “special regions” has emerged, often in an uneasy coexistence with central state forces based on verbal agreements with Burmese military leaders.

For the cease-fire groups, the dividends of this arrangement included some form of autonomy in future constitutional changes, as well as national and international development assistance. In return, they agreed to stop fighting. This pact has paid off handsomely for the leaders of the various groups, many of whom have amassed substantial fortunes. But for many of their “constituents,” the cessation of active conflict has only produced a tenuous peace.

Paradoxically, the number of armed groups in Burma has actually increased since the cease-fires, because of factionalism and local security requirements.

Burma has been through all of this before. In the 1960s, the Tatmadaw created Ka Kwe Ye (Home Guard) units, sometimes called “anti-insurgency forces,” from the private armies of local warlords. Pyithu Sit (People’s Militias) have also increased, especially in Shan State, where, as local motley bands of militia under the direction of Tatmadaw battalions, they often exist as the bottom feeders of the Burmese drug trade, acting little better than modern dacoits.

The Kokang showdown was preceded in a more peaceful, if not more productive, format, in early 2005, when the SPDC forced the surrender of the Palaung State Liberation Party. According to the Palaung Women’s Organization, the surrender dramatically increased suffering among the civilian population.

Two years later, in 2007, the small Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization split into three factions as a result of intensified pressure from the SPDC to surrender their weapons. One of their military leaders who broke the cease-fire and returned to active hostilities, Col Hkun Thu Rein, said, “We got nothing from the cease-fire. Even when international development agencies came to our area, the SPDC warned us not to tell the truth.”

The one seemingly avid convert to the border guard scheme, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), was not surprising, marking the group’s gradual transformation from a splinter faction of the Karen National Union with some genuine political and social grievances to a snarling criminal gang with somewhat unconvincing appeals to nationalism. The DKBA’s growing business empire along the Thai-Burmese border shows the economic returns of cooperation: agro-business, people smuggling, illegal car importation, cattle smuggling, mining, transportation concessions, and local methamphetamine production and trafficking. In return, the DKBA has continued to attack Karen communities inside Burma, and now acts as little more than a willing auxiliary of the SPDC.

Non-state armed groups such as the DKBA are being primed by the SPDC to act as border militias under a future civilian government, and if recent fighting is any indication, many groups could act with the same ferocity and disregard for civilian protection as the Burmese army.
Weapons seized from Kokang rebels are displayed by the Burmese police in laogai on Sept. 8.

War has displaced millions of civilians in Burma. Currently there are nearly half a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Burma alone. Around 150,000 refugees live in nine camps along the Thai-Burmese border, even though more than 46,000 have been resettled to third countries since 2005. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Shan struggle for survival in northern Thailand, unregistered and unrecognized as anything more than migrant workers. India has more than 50,000 ethnic Chin refugees and thousands more Burmese refugees in Mizoram and New Delhi. Some 28,000 Rohingya Muslims from Arakan State live in dire conditions in camps in Bangladesh, with about 200,000 more living in surrounding areas. Burmese refugees also live either as migrant workers or UN-recognized asylum seekers in Malaysia, Singapore and scores of other countries around the world.

The fate of the displaced varies vastly, depending on a host of factors. Sometimes even groups that are located in close proximity to each other can be worlds apart in terms of their access to assistance.

Take, for example, the camp for Shan IDPs across from Mae Fah Luang in Thailand. Home to nearly 3,000 civilians, the village of Wan Loi Saw Nien is made up of assorted Shan, Lahu, Akha, Palaung and Chinese from throughout eastern Shan State who were displaced by more than 10 years of fighting between the Shan State Army-South and the UWSA and Tatmadaw. Much of the fighting started because the UWSA forced some 100,000 civilians from its northern area to resettle along the Thai border to create a new enclave called Mong Yawn, basically to provide a civilian cover for intensified methamphetamine production.

This disastrous experiment in mini-state creation also produced the UWSA-controlled town of Yawngkha, just 9 km from Wan Loi Saw Nien. However, the experiences of the two towns couldn’t be more different. Yawngkha receives UN assistance, funding from Thailand’s Mae Fah Luang Foundation, and visits from Western academics in Tatmadaw helicopters. Wan Loi Saw Nien, on the other hand, is shunned by UN and international relief agencies because the UN doesn’t “do” borders. This could, however, change if the SSA signs a cease-fire agreement with the regime.

Abuses against civilians in conflict areas and around cease-fire zones have been exhaustively documented in the annual internal displacement surveys of the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), as well as by several grassroots documentation organizations, such as the Karen Human Rights Group and the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, among others.

Although there is some truth to the argument that there are fewer human rights violations in ethnic areas as a result of decreased hostilities, it is more accurate to say that the patterns of human rights violations have changed.

While horrific numbers of abuses were perpetrated by all sides in the conflict during active hostilities, many civilians living in or near cease-fire zones must now bear the burden of heavier militarization, with the attendant demands for forced labor, food and anything else that Burmese government forces “living off the land” require. Meanwhile, other abuses normally associated with open conflict, such as rape and summary executions of civilians, continue, as evidenced by the recent attacks in the Kokang region and central Shan and Karen states.

Under the Second Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention, attacks against civilians, the destruction of things indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food, crops and water supply, and the forced removal of civilians unless it is for their own safety or for imperative military reasons, are prohibited. Furthermore, parties to the conflict must facilitate immediate and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.

The Tatmadaw and its proxy forces have blatantly violated these principles of customary international humanitarian law for years. In a remarkable and rare public denunciation in June 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cited what it called “major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law” by the “Government of Myanmar” against civilians in eastern Burma between 2000 and 2005.

The only thing more remarkable than the ICRC’s highly unorthodox public statement was the apathy with which it was received by the international community. It was as if the world shrugged and thought, “Heard it all before.”

Well, in fact, the world has heard it all before, and refused to act. The recent report by the Harvard Law School Human Rights Clinic, “Crimes in Burma,” used United Nations documents to demonstrate that since 2002, crimes in conflict areas have been widespread and systematic, especially in regards to forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. And yet, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon refused to discuss the matter either within the UN Security Council or during his fruitless visit to Burma in July this year. Ban did give a strong speech (at the Rangoon Drug Eradication Museum, of all places) on Burma’s deplorable human rights record, but the UN has done precious little to address it.

The willful refusal to acknowledge the scale of human rights violations in Burma’s conflict zones is absolutely inexcusable. And yet, a muttering cabal of academics, international relief workers and erstwhile Western investors is seeking to roll back years of documentation proving the extent of the suffering in IDP and refugee zones. Some even preface these exhaustively documented human rights violations with the word “alleged,” as if there were any doubt about the atrocities being committed in the name of Burma’s “national reconsolidation.”

Much of the new wave of denial is linked to an endorsement of next year’s planned elections, which some see as an opportunity to create a small opening for change inside Burma. Yet one layer of these reforms—the long postponed incorporation of ethnic armed groups—suddenly looks to be in jeopardy after two decades of relative stasis.

For the international media, the recent Kokang fighting has evoked comparisons to Darfur, the Congo, Sri Lanka and other countries that have disintegrated into war zones of disorder. But the best guide to Burma’s future is its own past: if the cease-fire areas descend into conflict again, they will resemble the situation before the cease-fires of 1989. That was a period of intense warfare on several fronts throughout the country, with dozens of armed groups of varying legitimacy. At the time, human rights documentation was rudimentary and refugees spilled across borders unheeded, or were pushed back mercilessly.

Should war resume in parts of Burma’s borderlands, the country will simply return to its pre-1989 situation, and the challenges of national reconciliation and local sustainable development will begin again.

David Scott Mathieson is the Burma Researcher for Human Rights Watch.

Burma Newscasts - Peace in Name only
OCTOBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.7

Burma’s 2010 elections to test new US policy

2009-10-02T17:40:00.001+10:00

by Brian McCartan

Mizzima News – The United States is seeking to more actively engage with Burma’s military rulers, but made it clear they will not repeal sanctions unless the regime shows that it is taking concrete steps to address American concerns over human rights and democratic reform. A key test of this policy will be elections scheduled for next year.

The United States neither endorsed nor dismissed the electoral process in Burma in its policy announcement. Instead, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged countries to “take a measured approach” until electoral conditions are assessed and it becomes clear whether opposition and ethnic groups will be allowed to participate.

In effect, the US is asking the regime to make concessions to the opposition and ethnic political organizations to allow them to actively engage in the election process rather than the token participation that many observers expect. Most Burma analysts believe that the military has already worked out the percentage of seats to award the opposition and ethnic groups in the final vote tally, expected to be nowhere near enough to influence policy in the ensuing parliament.

Attempts by ethnic leaders to put forward changes to the constitution were ignored by the regime during the constitution drafting National Convention which concluded in 2007. A nationwide referendum held in 2008 approved the constitution, but was widely condemned as rigged. The political opposition and ethnic leaders have called for the constitution to be amended before the vote is held next year, but the government insists that can only be done after elections. Activists argue that any amendment to the constitution after the elections will be impossible due to the military’s heavy role in any new government.

Ethnic ceasefire organizations are currently under heavy pressure to join the electoral process and hand over control of their military wings to the government as part of a new Border Guard Force. Yet, the groups contend that without their troops they will have no bargaining power against a government that regularly uses force to impose its will. Several groups such as the New Mon State Party and the Kachin Independence Organization have allowed members to resign in order to form political parties.

Junta pressure was backed up by action in August when Burmese Army troops attacked Laokai, the headquarters of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), routing the Kokang-based ceasefire group. Although fighting has largely subsided, tensions are high in Shan and Kachin States. The deadline for acquiescence to the junta’s border force demand is only days away and there is a genuine fear that fighting could erupt across the region.

A government offensive, and the inevitable corresponding human rights abuses, would surely run counter to American demands of ending ethnic conflicts and putting a halt to gross human rights violations in ethnic areas. Fighting in the area in the 1970’s and 1980’s resulted in thousands of casualties and the displacement of tens of thousands of villagers. Human rights groups accuse the government of using various forms of forced labor, including portering supplies for government troops and using civilians as human minesweepers, during current counterinsurgency operations in Karen State and southern Shan State.

The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has said that it will not participate in the elections until amendments are made to the constitution that gives the military less of a controlling role. The junta’s insistence that amending the constitution is impossible until after the election has virtually shut down dialogue between the NLD and the regime.

The US, however, has made it clear in its policy announcement that it wants to see engagement not only between itself and the regime, but also between the regime and the political opposition and American representatives and the opposition. Suu Kyi, herself, seized on this theme in a statement made through her lawyer welcoming US intentions to diplomatically engage the generals, but restated that the opposition should also be consulted. A letter written by her to Senior General Than Shwe has asked for permission to meet with ambassadors from foreign countries to get their opinions on sanctions and what can be done to end them.

The NLD’s other main precondition for joining the electoral process is the release of all political prisoners and their participation in the electoral process. The US has similarly identified the freeing of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, as one of its “core concerns.” A prisoner amnesty two weeks ago included 128 political prisoners among the 7,114 released, however key leaders including Suu Kyi, NLD chairman Tin Oo, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy leader U Khun Tun Oo and 88 Generation Student leader Min Ko Naing, still remain in prison or under house arrest. Most observers believe the junta intends on keeping political leaders in detention until after the elections are finished to remove any chance of their serving as rallying points for the opposition.

Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said on Monday, “We are skeptical that the elections will be either free or fair, but we will stress to the Burmese the conditions that we consider necessary for a credible electoral process.” For most observers of the Burmese regime, it is doubtful that they will be willing to make the concessions to the political opposition or ethnic groups needed to make the elections credible in the eyes of Washington.

Unless the generals are serious about reaching out to the US, then the whole exercise risks becoming simply another of the junta’s diversionary tactics aimed at drawing attention away from other issues in the lead-up to the all-important elections. The same tactic has been used with the UN on numerous occasions to deflect criticism until international attention shifts elsewhere. The generals have spent decades consolidating their hold on power and are not likely to be willing to accept any compromise that may weaken their grip.

Burma Newscasts - Burma’s 2010 elections to test new US policy
Friday, 02 October 2009 12:33

Rejection of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal ‘legally flawed’: Defence lawyer

2009-10-02T17:34:00.001+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyer on Friday said the Rangoon division court’s decision to reject the appeal against her sentence is “legally flawed” as the court arrived at its verdict on a constitution that it acknowledges being non-existent.

Kyi Win, a member of Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team, said the divisional court acknowledged that the 1974 constitution is no longer in effect, but said the 1975 law, which is based on the constitution, is still in effect and under which the lower court’s verdict on August 11 is legally binding.

“It is a serious legal fraud. If the constitution is no longer in effect, the law based on that constitution cannot be alive, and thus Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be detained,” Kyi Win told Mizzima on Friday.

According to the law enacted in 1975, Aung San Suu Kyi had been deprived of her fundamental rights, which are stated in the 1974 constitution.

The district court in Rangoon’s Insein prison on August 11 sentenced the Nobel Peace Laureate to three years, on charges of violating her detention regulations, which is prescribed in the 1975 law.

Despite the argument by defence lawyers that the 1974 constitution is no longer in vogue, the district court did not acknowledge it and handed down the verdict, Kyi Win said.

Following the sentence, the defence team appealed to the divisional court, citing mainly that Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be sentenced and must be acquitted as the law, under which she was charged is no longer in effect.

“It is bizarre. I am a high court lawyer and I have also served as a judge but I do not understand how the 1975 law can restrict the fundamental rights prescribed in the 1974 constitution, which is no longer in effect,” Kyi Win said.

He added that the defence will continue appealing to the high court and will focus on the flaws of interpreting the law and the constitution.

After independence from the British, Burma had its first constitution in 1947, but following a military coup led by General Newin in 1962, the constitution was scrapped. Under the Newin regime, a new constitution was drafted and approved in 1974. But in 1975, the Newin regime promulgated a set of laws based on the constitution.

“The division court’s argument is that though the 1974 constitution is dead, Aung San Suu Kyi is charged with the 1975 law,” said Kyi Win.

Burma Newscasts - Rejection of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal ‘legally flawed’: Defence lawyer
Friday, 02 October 2009 20:10

US embassy to put up lawyers for detained citizen

2009-10-02T17:27:00.001+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – The US embassy in Rangoon has got in touch with lawyers to defend its detained citizen, Aung Kyaw Zaw, arrested on arrival in the former Burmese capital’s international airport on September 3.

Kyi Win, a high court advocate, on Friday told Mizzima that he was contacted by the US embassy to defend Aung Kyaw Zaw (alias) Nyi Nyi Aung, currently detained in Rangoon’s notorious Insein prison.

“The embassy contacted us to defend him and offered us a fee equivalent to the amount paid to the lawyer they had hired for John William Yettaw. But we said we are willing to provide ‘Pro Bono’ [free of charge] service,” Kyi Win said.

Kyi Win said the embassy had contacted him and his colleague Nyan Win, with whom he teamed up to defend detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to take up Nyi Nyi Aung’s case.

Both Kyi Win and Nyan Win are advocates practicing in the high court.

“I don’t know if Nyi Nyi Aung has been charged yet. I am yet to receive a reply from the embassy,” Kyi Win said.

While it is still not clear whether he has been charged and on what grounds, a report in the state-run media the New Light of Myanmar newspaper last week accused Nyi Nyi Aung of trying to instigate civil unrest in cahoots with underground activists inside Burma.

The report also accused Nyi Nyi Aung of working together with several Burmese organizations in exile including the Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB), the Student and Youth Congress of Burma (SYCB) and alleged that he had provided financial assistance to activists inside the country.

Nyi Nyi Aung was a student activist and was involved in the 1988 student-led uprising. He along with several other students fled to Thailand in the wake of the military crackdown on protesters. Later he was resettled in United States from Thailand and was naturalized as a US citizen.

Nyi Nyi Aung holds a valid US passport and had a legal social visit Visa to Burma. He flew from Bangkok to Rangoon on September 3 on a TG flight.

Since his arrest, Nyi Nyi Aung was taken to several interrogation centres, where he allegedly endured torture. He was finally taken to the Insein prison. The US embassy spokesman said, Nyi Nyi Aung had complained of ill-treatment during their meeting.

Burma Newscasts - US embassy to put up lawyers for detained citizen
Friday, 02 October 2009 21:28

ENC wants ethnic groups to contest 2010 elections

2009-10-02T17:22:00.001+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - A group of Burma’s ethnic political organizations in exile – the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) - has urged US Senator James Webb not to condemn the junta’s 2010 election before it takes place but to call for more inclusiveness and for it to be free and fair.

In a letter to Sen. Webb, a strong advocate of engagement with the Burmese regime, two days before he hosted a Congressional hearing on Burma, the ENC urged the Virginian Senator that the US can best help by “Not condemning the 2010 elections before they are held.”

“But instead call for a more inclusive election process that will be free and fair. Electoral assistance can be offered either directly or indirectly through neighbouring countries,” said the letter dated September 28, 2009.

The letter, a copy of which is in Mizzima’s possession, was sent to Senator Webb in appreciation for his interest in the Burma issue and as an explanation on the nature of the complex problems of Burma’s diverse ethnic minorities.

Webb on Wednesday hosted a Congressional hearing on Burma where four experts gave their testimony on what should be the policy of the US towards Burma and the potential role that the US can play in bringing change in the military-ruled Southeast Asian nation.

The letter signed by Saw David Thaw, General Secretary of the ENC, states that ‘in principle’ ethnic nationalities in Burma cannot accept the junta’s 2008 constitution and does not believe that the 2010 elections will lead to democracy.

But the ENC argues that since the ethnics are left with little or no choice, they will have to participate in the elections, because “If there are no opposition parties, the military’s candidates will win by default. The military (and the majority ethnic ‘Burman’) candidates will then become the “elected representatives” of the seven ethnic states.”

Besides, the ENC said, if the ethnic armed ceasefire groups refuse to participate, they will be forced to revert to armed struggle, which will then cause further complications.

Burma under the current administration has seven states, which are home to seven major ethnic groups, and seven divisions, which have no particular attachment to any ethnic groups but are mostly known as habitats of the majority Burmans.

In view of the ENC’s policy of ethnic groups having a voice in Burma’s national politics, participating in governance and development of their homelands, the letter urged Senator Webb not to condemn the 2010 elections until it takes place but to urge the Burmese junta to make it more inclusive and free and fair.

The letter also states that the US can best help the people of Burma by providing assistance in civic education on elections and helping civil organizations that are educating potential political candidates on how to run for office and on democratic governance. And also to support groups that are educating the people about their rights and preparing local organizations on how to monitor the forthcoming elections.

The letter, which for the first time reveals ENC’s policy, states that ENC’s short-term policy is to support eligible ethnic groups in running for office in the 2010 elections.

It also said the ENC’s long-term policy is to develop a robust civil society that will be capable of holding an elected government accountable to the people.

“While the Burmese military will remain in control after the 2010 elections, it is our hope that representatives elected by the people will be able to help hold the military accountable to their own constitution,” said the letter.

“It is also our hope that the new government will be more open to negotiating a political solution with the ethnic groups that are still engaged in armed struggle,” added the letter.

In contrast to the ENC’s policy, the Committee Representing Peoples’ Parliament (CRPP), a group formed with 1990 election winning parties, said unless the regime amends the 2008 constitution, the elections would be meaningless and the CRPP would not contest.

Aye Thar Aung, Secretary of the CRPP, told Mizzima on Friday, “Without amending the 2008 constitution, the ethnics can do nothing even if they participate and are elected. They would just end up as puppets of the junta.”

He said the CRPP as well as Aung San Suu Kyi’s party – the National League for Democracy – have both demanded that the junta release political prisoners, amend the 2008 constitution, and recognize the 1990 election results.

“Unless these demands are met, we the CRPP and the ALD, will not participate in the elections,” Aye Thar Aung, who is also secretary for the Arakan League for Democracy, said.

“And without the junta fulfilling these demands, I would like to urge ethnic groups and others not to participate in the elections,” he added.

The CRPP, formed in September 1998, is an alliance of ethnic political parties that won elections in 1990, which the junta refused to honour. Its members include the NLD, ALD, Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) and Zomi National Congress (ZNC).

Burma’s military rulers, as the fifth step of its seven-step roadmap to democracy, said it will hold general elections in 2010, that will elect a semi-civilian government based on the 2008 constitution, which according to the junta was approved by over 90 per cent of voters in May last year.

Critics said the junta’s roadmap is to buy-time and to cement the role of military in Burma’s future politics.

Burma Newscasts - ENC wants ethnic groups to contest 2010 elections
Friday, 02 October 2009 23:31

Burmese-American Tortured in Prison: AI

2009-09-25T18:07:00.000+10:00

By KO HTWE
The Irrawaddy News

Amnesty international has issued a statement of grave concern about Burmese-American activist Nyi Nyi Aung (aka Kyaw Zaw Lwin), who it says has been tortured and suffered other ill-treatment while in detention in Insein Prison in Rangon.

Nyi Nyi Aung, who has dual citizenship, was arrested in Rangoon on Sept. 3 after returning from exile.

While in detention he has been tortured including beatings and kicking, lack of food for seven days, no sleep and denial of medical treatment for injuries sustained while tortured, said the report.

The New Light of Myanmar, the state-backed newspaper, reported in detail on Thursday on Nyi Nyi Aung’s arrest. The report included photographs of Nyi Nyi Aung, explosives and a satellite phone he was alleged to have had in his possession.

The story described underground activities allegedly undertaken by Nyi Nyi Aung and connections between dissidents inside and outside Burma.

Nyi Nyi Aung’s mother, San San Tin, is severing a 5-year prison sentence and his cousin, Thet Thet Aung, is serving a 65-year prison sentence for participating in the anti-government demonstrations in September 2007.

Meanwhile, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) released a statement on Thursday that welcomed the amnesty of prisoners and noted reports of torture undergone by some detainees during interrogation and imprisonment.

The AHRC said torture and abuse of prisoners is endemic across Burma and singled out Myo Yan Naung Thein, Bo Bo and Aung Myint as having been tortured after their arrest and imprisonment followed by a lack of appropriate medical treatment.

The statement called on the junta to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit detention facilities in Burma without further delay.

Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia) issued a statement criticizing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) silence on Burma at the recent UN Human Rights Council meeting and called on Asean to stand with victims of human rights abuses in Burma.

Yap Swee Seng, the executive director of Forum-Asia, said “While we appreciate the efforts of some governments to make a joint appeal of the Asean at the General Assembly for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, we deeply regret that the same effort has not been taken at the Human Rights Council nor has any Asean member country spoke out on Burma in its own national capacity.”

Burma Newscasts - Burmese-American Tortured in Prison: AI
Friday, September 25, 2009

Engaging Naypyidaw

2009-09-25T17:48:00.000+10:00

By AUNG ZAW
The Irrawaddy News

If the United States believes engaging the repressive regime in Burma will change the behavior of the generals, I would just like to say, “Good luck, but I’m afraid that leopards don’t change their spots!”

In fact, the “new” US policy on Burma comes not so long after the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act 2008, the US’s attempt at a strong-arm policy on the generals.

The 2008 act has three aims:
1) to impose new financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the leaders of the junta and their associates;
2) to tighten the economic sanctions imposed in 2003 by outlawing the importation of Burmese gems to the US;
3) and to create a new position of special representative and policy coordinator for Burma.

The proposed US special envoy would have the task of working with Burma’s neighbors and other interested countries, such as those within the EU and Asean.

The envoy’s mission would also involve developing a comprehensive approach to the Burma crisis, including pressure, dialogue and support for nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian relief to the Burmese people.

It remains to be seen if the Obama administration is going to appoint the special US envoy to Burma anytime in the near future.

Burmese dissidents and observers by and large think that the generals in Naypyidaw may be more receptive to a US envoy than someone from the UN or EU—after all, we all witnessed how generously Snr-Gen Than Shwe treated US Senator Jim Webb in August.

In any case, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act was a mixture of sanctions and engagement. Unsurprisingly, the new US policy on Burma is a mixed bag of sticks and carrots.

In her most recent statement, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “Engagement versus sanctions is a false choice in our opinion.

“Going forward we will be employing both of those tools,” Clinton said, but added that lifting sanctions would send the wrong signal.

On the surface, the substance of the policy is to encourage credible, democratic reforms and the immediate release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and serious dialogue with opposition and ethnic minority groups.

Speaking on behalf of detained democracy leader Suu Kyi, party spokesman Nyan Win said that she accepted the concept of engagement by the new US administration.

In fact, the Nobel Peace Prize winner’s message to the US is clear and well-calculated.

“She said she has always espoused engagement,” Nyan Win said. “However, [she] suggested that engagement has to be done with both sides—the government as well as the democratic forces.”

The statement forces the US to ponder whether it can be seen to betray or abandon the pro-democracy camp in Burma and the issue of human rights.

In any case, several pundits and scholars have voiced their opinions on the “new US policy”; however, I think it is important to listen to Burmese who continue to live under the regime.

I believe the main skeptics of the new US policy are the oppressed Burmese citizens, and political dissidents and Buddhist monks who remain in prison.

On the international front, the generals’ powerful allies China, India and Russia will be carefully eyeing the US’s new approach.

I believe an extra dimension to the Obama government’s new engagement policy is the issue of China.

China remains the junta’s major arms supplier and trading partner. It offers security guarantees at the United Nations Security Council, investment and trade links, as well as development assistance.

However, Beijing was displeased by the instability on its border when the Burmese government forces attacked ethnic Chinese and the Kokang ethnic rebel group recently.

China’s repeated requests to solve the issue peacefully went ignored. Beijing must have seen this as a breach of their fraternal relationship and time to reassess its own Burma policy.

In a rare move by China, the foreign ministry spoke out urging Burma to “properly handle domestic problems and maintain stability in the China-Burma border region” and to “protect the security and legal rights" of China’s citizens in the country.

“The insular and nationalistic generals do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing,” said Robert Templer, International Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director.

Regarding China-Burma relations, Templer warned: “By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead in solving the problem, a workable international approach to Myanmar [Burma] will remain elusive.”

The ICG also said that the West should emphasize to China the unsustainable nature of its current policies and continue to apply pressure in the Security Council and other fora.

The joke among Burmese dissidents is that Beijing has been left broken-hearted after seeing Washington’s move on Naypyidaw.

China definitely doesn’t want to be left out in the cold, but, simultaneously, it should feel some form of victory as it has for years pushed the US and its allies not to punish or isolate the Burmese regime.

Common ground between the US and China would appear to lie in their approach to the 2010 election in Burma.

“The Burmese election should not be dismissed at this time,” said Clinton in New York. “At the same time, we should continue discussions with the Burmese authorities to emphasize that the international community will only recognize the planned 2010 elections as a positive step to the extent that the Burmese authorities allow full participation by members of Burma's opposition and ethnic minority groups.”

To sum up, the US and China may both be repositioning and trying out new policies with Burma. And both will know that while they may not have suffered a defeat, they most certainly have had to make concessions.

The intransigent, stubborn, brutal regime in Naypyidaw, however, maintains its grip on power and does not need to make a concession to anyone.

Burma Newscasts - Engaging Naypyidaw
Friday, September 25, 2009

Arrested Dissident Accused of Terrorist Intentions

2009-09-24T18:01:00.000+10:00

By SAW YAN NAING
The Irrawaddy News

The Burmese regime’s official newspaper The New Light of Myanmar accused arrested dissident Nyi Nyi Aung on Thursday of being a terrorist and planning to create unrest.

Nyi Nyi Aung (aka Kyaw Zaw Lwin) was arrested in early September after returning from exile in Thailand. A second Thailand-based dissident, Ko Htut, was also arrested after crossing separately into Burma.

Nyi Nyi Aung aka Kyaw Zaw Lwin

The New Light of Myanmar reported in detail on Thursday on Nyi Nyi Aung’s arrest. The report included photos of Nyi Nyi Aung, explosives and a satellite phone he was alleged to have used.

The report described underground activities allegedly undertaken by Nyi Nyi Aung and connections the paper said existed between dissidents inside and outside Burma.

The arrests of Nyi Nyi Aung and Ko Htut were followed by crackdowns on Burmese dissidents in Burma and Thailand.

Shortly after the two were taken into custody, 16 ethnic Arakan youths were arrested—seven in Rangoon and the others in Sittwe, capital of Arakan State. They were accused of maintaining links to the Thailand-based All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress (AASYC).

Activists belonging to Generation Wave and Best Manure, members of the opposition National League for Democracy and several Buddhist monks were arrested in the crackdown.

In neighboring Thailand, the offices of several Burmese exile groups were raided by Thai police— including the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, where Ko Htut used to work.

In Chiang Mai, 10 Burmese women activists were arrested and held in custody for several days. Other dissident groups closed their offices, and several remain shut in the Thai-Burmese border towns of Mae Sot and Sangkhlaburi according to dissident sources.

Sources reported that staff of Burma’s Bangkok Embassy are photographing activists attending demonstrations and other functions in Thailand.

Win Min, a Chiang Mai-based Burmese analyst, said a Burmese military attaché in Bangkok is active in requesting Thai security officials to harass Burmese opposition groups in exile.

Burmese opposition groups last faced close Thai scrutiny during the administration of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Many offices closed for several weeks, fearing official crackdowns.

Burma Newscasts - Arrested Dissident Accused of Terrorist Intentions
Thursday, September 24, 2009

At least 104 political prisoners released

2009-09-20T11:28:00.005+10:00

(Mae Sot – Thailand) -The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) (AAPP) can confirm that so far 104 political prisoners have been released from 22 different prisons in Burma.

The 104 released include 37 members of the National League for Democracy, including 3 MPs; 18 women; 11 former political prisoners; 4 monks; 4 journalists; 9 members of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters Network; 6 members of the 88 Generation Students; and 1 lawyer.

On the evening of September 17, 2009 in Rangoon, state-run MRTV carried a news bulletin announcing that 7,114 prisoners were to be released “on humanitarian grounds.”

The list of political prisoners released will be continually updated at our web site www.aappb.org as AAPP receives more information. In alphabetical order:

1. Angaelay (Mandalay prison) - student
2. Aung Gyi (Insein prison) - student
3. Aung Gyi @ Aung Thwin (Shwebo prison) – journalist, former political prisoner, 88 Generation Students
4. Aung Ko Oo (Tharawaddy prison) - student
5. Aung Lwin (Thandwe prison)
6. Aung Myint (Myaungmya prison) - NLD member; Human Rights Defenders and Promoters member
7. Aung Myo (Shwebo prison) – NLD Township Organiser
8. Aung Naing (Insein prison) – NLD member
9. Aung Swe (Shwebo prison) - NLD member
10. Aung Tun (Tharawaddy prison) – student; member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions
11. Aye Min (a) Aye Min Min (Tharawaddy prison) – private tutor
12. Ba Chit (Tharawaddy prison) – Ex-captain in the army
13. Ba Min (Kale prison) – NLD member
14. Bo Bo (Myingyan prison)
15. Bo Gyi (Pegu prison)
16. Cho Mar Htwe, (Female) (Moulmein prison) – NLD member
17. Eimt Khaing Oo, Female (Insein prison) – journalist; Cyclone Nargis volunteer
18. Hlaing Aye (Kale prison) - NLD MP, Former Political Prisoner
19. Hla Shein, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
20. Htay Win (Thayet prison) – NLD Township Organizer
21. Khaing Kaung Zan, (Thayet prison) – Arakan League for Democracy in exile member
22. Khin Khin Lay (a) Khin Lay, (Female) (Pegu prison) – NLD member
23. Khin Maung Chit (Meiktila prison) - NLD Local Secretary
24. Khin Maung Thein (Shwebo prison) – NLD member
25. Khin Moe Aye (a) Moe Moe (Female), (Myingyan prison) – 88 Generation Students member; former political prisoner
26. Kyaw Kyaw Thant (Insein prison) – journalist; Cyclone Nargis volunteer
27. Kyaw Lwin, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
28. Kyaw Maung (Myitkyina prison) – NLD MP
29. Kyaw Thu Htike (Taunggyi prison)
30. Kyaw Win (Tharawaddy prison) – All Burma Students Democratic Front
31. Kyi Kyi Min, (Female) (Insein prison) – NLD member
32. Kyi Lin (Myintkyina prison) – NLD member
33. Ma Ei (female) (Paungde prison)
34. Ma Htay (a) San San Myint, (Female) (Insein prison)
35. Ma Mi Mi Swe (female) (Henzada prison)
36. Maung Maung Htwe (Shwebo prison)
37. Maw Si (Shwebo prison) – NLD Youth member
38. Mi Mi Sein, (Female) (Insein prison) – NLD Township Joint-Secretary
39. Michael Win Kyaw (Kale prison) – 88 Generation Students member; former political prisoner
40. Min Min (a) La Min Tun, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
41. Min Min Soe (Myingyan prison) – 88 Generation Students member
42. Moe Hlaing (Moulmein prison)
43. Moe Kyaw Thu (a) Bo Bo (Mandalay prison)
44. Moe Lwin (Moulmein prison) – individual activist
45. Monywar Aung Shin (a) U Aye Kyu (Insein prison) - Member of NLD and poet
46. Mya Sein, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
47. Myint Oo (a) Ni Ni (Mandalay prison) – NLD Township organizer; former political prisoner
48. Myint Oo (Thayet prison) – NLD Township Joint Secretary
49. Myo Min Lwin (Moulmein prison)
50. Myo Yan Naung Thein (Thandwe prison) – 88 Generation Students member, former political prisoner
51. Nay Win (Myintkyina prison) – NLD Township Organizer
52. Nine Nine (Insein prison) – NLD MP, Former Political Prisoner
53. Nu Nu Swe @ Pauk Pauk (female) (Myaungmya prison)
54. Nyi Nyi Min (Buthidaung prison) – NLD member
55. Nyo Mya (Kale prison) – NLD member
56. Pe Tin (Pegu prison) – NLD member
57. Pyae Phyo Aung (a) Hnan Mue (Pa-An prison)
58. San Pwint (Kale prison) – NLD member; teacher
59. San Ya (Tharawaddy prison) – NLD member
60. Sandar Min (a) Shwee, (Myaungmya prison) – 88 Generation Students, Former Political Prisoner
61. Sandar, (Female) (Myingyan prison) – NLD member
62. Saw Myo Min Hlaing @ James (Thaton prison) - Private Tutor
63. Saw Taw Kyi (Thayet prison) – Karen National Union member
64. Shin Sandaw Batha, Monk (Insein prison) – All Burma Monks’ Alliance
65. Shwe Thar (a) Tin Win (Tharawaddy prison) – Karen National Union member
66. Soe Han (Lashio prison) – lawyer; Chair of the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) legal advisory body
67. Soe Wai (a) Than Zaw (Myitkyina prison)
68. Than Min (a) Tin Tun Aung, (Taungoo prison) – NLD member
69. Than Than Htay, (Female) (Insein prison) – student
70. Than Than Sint, (Female) (Insein prison)
71. Than Tun (Shwebo prison)
72. Than Zaw Oo (Tharawaddy prison) – NLD member
73. Thar Cho, (Thayet prison) – NLD Township Organizer
74. Thein Zaw (Tharawaddy prison)
75. Thet Oo (Taungoo prison) – Human Rights Defenders and Promoters member
76. Thet Zin (a) Maung Zin (Kale prison) – journalist; former political prisoner; member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions and the Democratic Party for a New Society
77. Thin Min Soe, (Female) (Insein prison) – labour activist
78. Thura Win @ Thura Lin (Buthidaung) – Student
79. Tin Mar Swe (female) (Mandalay prison)
80. Tin Maung Nyunt (Shwebo prison) – NLD Township Organiser
81. Tin Mya (Insein prison) - National League for Democracy Township chairperson, Former Political Prisoner
82. Tin Myint (Insein prison) – NLD member
83. Tin Myint (Tharawaddy prison)
84. Tin Myo Htut (a) Kyaw Oo (Insein prison) – Generation Wave; former political prisoner
85. Tin Tin Myint, (Female) (Insein prison) – third year chemistry student
86. Tin Tun (a) Kyaw Swa (Tharawaddy prison) – UN Development Program staff (New Era journal distributor)
87. Tun Hla (Tharawaddy prison)
88. Tun Oo (a) Ngar Kalar (Taungoo prison)
89. Tun Tun Nyein, (Thayet prison) – NLD Youth member
90. Tun Tun Oo (a) Nanda Malar (Taungoo prison) – monk
91. Tun Tun Oo (Thandwe prison)
92. U Han Sein (Tharawaddy prison) – NLD member
93. U Myint, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
94. U Pannita (a) Myint Aye (Taungoo prison) – monk; Human Rights Defenders and Promoters member
95. U Peter (Loikaw prison)
96. U Win, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
97. U Zawana (a) Soe Myint (Taungoo prison) - monk
98. Win Myint (Insein prison)
99. Wunna Soe (Pa-An prison) – Democratic Party for a New Society member
100. Yan Aung Shwe (Thayet prison) – All Burma Students Democratic Front member
101. Yan Naing Min (a) Nan Wai (Mandalay prison) – student
102. Zaw Htet Aung (Kale prison) - student
103. Zaw Tun (Taungoo prison)
104. Zin Mar Aung (female) (Mandalay prison) – student; NLD member

-ENDS-

For media interviews please contact:

Tate Naing, AAPP Secretary +66(0)89-899-7161
Bo Kyi, AAPP Joint-Secretary +66(0)81-324-8935
19 September 2009 18:45 Thailand Standard Time

Burma Newscasts - At least 104 political prisoners released
as at 19 September 2009

Don’t Let the Junta off the Hook

2009-09-20T11:19:00.002+10:00

The Irrawaddy News - Editorial

On the eve of the 21st anniversary of the bloody coup that crushed the 1988 student-led pro-democracy uprising, Burma’s junta announced plans to free 7,114 prisoners. MRTV, the state-owned television station, announced on Thursday night that the prisoners were being released on “humanitarian grounds.”

Previous mass releases have mostly involved petty criminals, with just a handful of political detainees among those freed. No details were provided about the identities of the prisoners included in this latest amnesty, so it is difficult to even confirm if the regime has actually released the number of prisoners it said it would. But according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 87 political prisoners have so far been set free, while other sources estimate that the total could reach as high as 250.

This is good news for the prisoners and their families, and we should welcome it. However, we should also note that this apparent act of magnanimity comes as Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein prepares to travel to New York to attend this year’s United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, it has been widely expected for several months. In July, Burma’s ambassador to the UN, Than Swe, promised the Security Council that his government would grant an amnesty to an undisclosed number of political prisoners to allow them to participate in democratic elections scheduled for 2010.

Thein Sein will be the highest-ranking Burmese official to attend a UN meeting in over a decade, so it should come as no surprise that the regime decided to do something to deflect criticism of its abysmal human rights record ahead of his visit. Releasing some of the country’s estimated 2,100 political prisoners was an obvious course of action, as there are growing concerns over the dramatic increase in the number of activists detained since the monk-led Saffron Revolution was crushed almost exactly two years ago. Human rights watchdogs estimate that the political prisoner population has doubled since late 2007, when Burma witnessed its largest anti-regime protests in nearly two decades.

Conspicuously absent from the list of those released so far are the names of some of Burma’s most prominent activists. Far from considering leniency towards these prisoners, the regime appears to be intent on making their lives as miserable as possible. U Gambira, one of the leaders of the All Burma Monks Alliance, the group that spearheaded the 2007 uprising, has been moved to a remote prison, making it harder for his family to visit him. Other prisoners, including Shan ethnic leader Khun Tun Oo, activist-comedian Zarganar, labor activist Su Su Nway and 88 Generation Students group leader Min Ko Naing, are also suffering from physical and mental health problems due to their mistreatment, according to AAPP.

Political prisoners have always been treated like pawns in the junta’s political game. The regime continues to insist that there are no political prisoners in any of the country’s 43 prisons and more than 50 labor camps, but the fact is that the generals do not hesitate to imprison anyone who speaks out openly against their brutal misrule. Even as the junta makes a show of releasing some prisoners, it continues to round up new ones, including several democracy activists and monks who were arrested just last week.

With this in mind, the international community must continue to confront the regime and demand the release of all political prisoners in Burma, including pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Until this happens, and until all activists are allowed to participate freely in the country’s political process, we can only assume that the generals’ occasional release of political prisoners is just part of a cynical game.

Burma Newscasts - Don’t Let the Junta off the Hook
Saturday, September 19, 2009

More Political Prisoners Released: AAPP

2009-09-20T11:15:00.003+10:00

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

At least 87 political dissidents were among the more than 7,000 prisoners released by Burma’s ruling junta on Friday, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners—Burma (AAPP).

The AAPP announced on Saturday that it had confirmed the release of 87 political dissidents from 16 prisons across Burma. They include 36 members of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) and six members of the 88 Generation Students group. Three of the NLD members were elected to serve in parliament in 1990.

According to the AAPP, there were 15 women, four monks, four journalists and one lawyer among the released prisoners.

Bo Kyi, joint-secretary of the AAPP, told The Irrawaddy on Saturday that the release of the prisoners, though welcome, still falls far short of international demands.

“It is still too early to say that this signifies any real change in Burma,” he said, noting that some of the political prisoners who had been released had nearly finished their prison terms.

“We continue to call for the immediate release of all the more than 2,100 political prisoners still behind bars,” he added.

Critics of the regime say that the latest prisoner release is little more than an attempt to deflect international criticism ahead of trip to New York by Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein, who will attend the UN General Assembly next week.

Thet Zin, the editor of the Myanmar Nation weekly, was one of four journalists released on Friday.

He was arrested in February 2008 for possessing a video of a crackdown on pro-democracy protests in September of the previous year, as well as a report by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN special rapporteur for human rights in Burma.

Shortly after receiving a seven-year prison sentence in November 2008, he was transferred from Insein Prison in Rangoon to a remote prison in Kele, Sagaing Division.

When the Burmese state-run media announced an amnesty for 7,114 prisoners on Thursday evening, his family was hopeful that he would be among those released. Late Friday evening, he called them from Kele Township to let them know he had been freed.

“We are very happy to know that he has been released,” said one family member, adding that Thet Zin was now on his way back to Rangoon to be with his teenage daughter and son.

Another released political prisoner is Moe Kyaw Thu, also known as Bo Bo, who was serving a 20-year sentence for anti-junta activities at Mandalay Prison.

“When we heard that he was released, the whole house was noisy with happiness. His son was very, very happy about his father’s release,” a family member told The Irrawaddy on Saturday.

“When he was arrested, his son was just a few months old,” she said. “I am very happy to see that they will finally be reunited after nearly 12 years apart.”

On Friday, a high-ranking official of Burma’s Corrections Department told reporters at a press conference at Insein Prison that about 250 political prisoners would be released. However, so far only 87 political prisoners are confirmed to have been among the 7,114 prisoners included in the amnesty.

The junta has announced several mass amnesties in the past, but usually includes only a small handful of political prisoners among those granted early release. In February, 6,313 prisoners were released for “humanitarian reasons” and to enable them “to participate in fair elections to be held in 2010.” only 31 were political prisoners.

In September 2008, the regime freed 9,002 prisoners, saying it wanted to “turn them into citizens to be able to participate in building a new nation.” But only nine political prisoners, including Win Tin, a prominent NLD leader, were included in the amnesty.

In an amnesty in November 2007 to mark the conclusion of the National Convention, the junta released 8,585 prisoners. Twenty political prisoners were among them.

“Release of political prisoners is good. But many other political dissidents, including ethnic leaders, are still in prison. For national reconciliation, all of them must be freed,” said NLD spokesperson Nyan Win, speaking to The Irrawaddy on Saturday.

Meanwhile, as some families celebrate the release of loved ones, many others were disappointed to learn that their relatives remain behind bars.

One girl whose father was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 2002 said she was saddened to see that he was not on the list of released prisoners.

“I am sad that my father did not receive an amnesty, but I am happy for the other political prisoners who were released,” she said.

Burma Newscasts - More Political Prisoners Released: AAPP
Saturday, September 19, 2009

Tensions slightly easing on the Sino-Burma border

2009-09-14T11:00:00.001+10:00

S.H.A.N.- The siege by joint Wa-Mongla forces to the Burma Army garrison at Mongyang, 260 km north of Maesai since 26 August, was lifted on 9 September last week following a number of official requests by the Burma Army, according to sources on the Sino-Burma border.

People who had fled from Panghsang (the Wa capital), Mongyang and Mongla, as a result, are slowly trickling back since. “The transport fare between Tangyan (west of the Salween) and Panghsang, up to K 120,000 ($120) the previous week, is almost back to normal (K 40,000),” said a local official in Panghsang. “Now about 50% of those people have returned.”

The siege was prompted by the disappearance of 3 Burma Army officers and men who were found moving suspiciously around Khosoong, the border between Wa and Mongla late last month. “Maj Kyaw Soe Aung, the 2IC (second-in-command) of IB 279 (based in Mongyang) was reported to have demanded the immediate release of his men or else,” said an informed source from Mongla.

The Burma Army’s Kengtung-based Triangle Command officers and Lt-General Ye Myint, Naypyitaw’s chief negotiator on the controversial Border Guard Force (BGF) plan, had in person and by letter to Mongla, requested the released of the said three saying the latter had no cause for worry about an impending attack.

While it wasn’t clear if the Wa and Mongla were convinced about the Burma Army’s intentions, both had finally decided to call off the siege, said the source. “I believe China must have a hand in the alliance’s decision,” commented a Burma watcher from Thailand.

A 15 member Chinese delegation had visited Panghsang on 8 September, the day before the lifting of the siege.

Thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops backed by armored vehicles and artillery were seen in Meng Lien (Monglem), opposite Panghsang, according to a source who was recently visiting the Wa territory. “ ‘We will fight to the last man or woman,’ the Wa was reported to have told the delegation,” he said. “But it wasn’t clear how the Chinese representatives had responded.”

Peng Jiasheng, the deposed Kokang leader, who was reported by Global Times to be taking asylum in the Wa State, is believed to have left it, according to a reliable source in Panghsang. “He’s not in Mongla, where his daughter and his son-in-law Sai Leun are, either,” he said. “To both the Wa and Mongla, he’s a Ho Hsang (the Brahma head, meaning too hot to handle). The farther he’s away from them, the better it is for him and themselves.”

The Burma Army had earlier demanded his extradition, to which the Wa replied he had not been seen since 30 August, a day after the fall of Qingshuihe, the Kokang stronghold.

Burma Army forces laying siege to the Wa territory since late last month, meanwhile, have so far remained in place. “So despite the lifting of the siege Mongyang, the alert is still on,” said another source close to the leadership.

The UWSA has deployed 3 divisions plus supporting units for the defense, he added: the 318th commanded by Bao Ai Roong in the north; the 418th, commanded by Zhao Saidao in the west; and the 468th, commanded by Sai Hsarm in the South.

Along the Thai border, the UWSA’s southern 171st Military Region command has 5 “divisions”, commanded by Wei Xuegang, according to a UWSA publication: 772nd (Mong Jawd), 775th (Hwe Aw), 778th (Khailong), 248th (Hopang-Hoyawd) and 518th (Mongyawn).

Burma Newscasts - Tensions slightly easing on the Sino-Burma border
Monday, 14 September 2009

Opposition-backed Constitutional Amendments will be Difficult

2009-09-14T10:44:00.000+10:00

By KAY LATT
The Irrawaddy News

"If a girl is short, she just needs to wear high heels." Those are the well-known words of Kyi Maung, the late leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in a press conference just after the elections in 1990 responding the needs of constitution for transfer of power proclaimed by the military junta.

The NLD prepared a temporary constitution to be used during the transitory period to take over power from the ruling military government, but the military government then led by Snr-Gen Saw Maung did not accept the temporary constitution.

In the absence of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, Kyi Maung, a de facto NLD leader, said that the constitution could be amended in response to the military leaders' claim for the necessity of a new constitution before the transfer of power.

Any efforts to amending the constitution would be a challenge since ethnic nationalities wanted to change the form of the Union to that of a federation.

The late dictator Ne Win made a coup d'état in March 1962 while contending that he was saving the Union from disintegrating, when ethnic nationalities, various political parties and U Nu, then the prime minister, agreed to amend the 1947 Constitution.

In the 1947 constitution, any provision could be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. After an amendment bill had been passed by each of the chambers of Parliament, the bill had to be considered by both chambers in joint sessions. And then the bill could be passed by both chambers in joint sittings with votes in favor of not less than two-thirds required by members of both chambers.

Therefore, the constitutional problems of the 1947 constitution could be solved within the framework of negotiations among stakeholders.

In the 1974 constitution, some provisions could be amended with the prior approval of 75 percent of all the members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament) in a nation-wide referendum with a majority vote of more than half of eligible voters. The rest of the provisions could be amended only with a majority vote of 75 percent of all the members of the Pyithu Hluttaw. No major amendment had been made to the 1974 constitution.

Before Kyi Maung made his quip, Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the United States, said in a letter to Samuel Kercheval, written in July, 1816, "I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind."

He continued, "We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors," clearly reflecting the need to interpret a constitution in light of changing circumstances.

Constitutions can generally be classified as “rigid” or “flexible.” A rigid constitution provides difficult procedures to modify at least some part of the constitution. A flexible constitution allows simple procedures to amend its provisions.

The US constitution is rigid. It requires a supermajority in the amendment process. The most common method of amendment is for a bill to pass both houses of the legislature by a two-thirds majority in each body followed by ratification by three-fourth of the states.

This is the method used for all current amendments. Nevertheless, 27 amendments have been made to the U.S constitution over a 200-year period. An interesting point is that the president has no role in the formal amendment process.

In Switzerland, it requires a majority vote in a national referendum to approve an amendment of the federal constitution proposed by the legislature or by a petition of 100,000 citizens. Then it requires ratification by a majority of voters in each of a majority of the cantons. The Swiss constitution has been amended significantly over the years.

The United Kingdom’s constitution is flexible. Its constitutional institutions and rules can be modified by an act of Parliament.

The great majority of countries have rigid constitutions. Nevertheless, a rigid constitution does not by itself guarantee the stability and continuity of a country’s constitutional law.

The constitution of South Africa is also flexible and can be amended by an act of Parliament by introducing a bill amending the constitution in the National Assembly. Most amendments must be passed by an absolute two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly. However, amendments of some important provisions must be passed by the National Council of Province with a supermajority of at least six of the nine provinces.

Although the amending process in the United States is difficult, it is easier than the process in other countries with rigid constitutions. Provisions of a rigid constitution are over time subject to interpretation by the courts or by the legislature or the executive.

Pro-election groups in Burma are advocating a process of embracing the constitutional system and proposing gradual change by amendments to unfavorable provisions in the constitution.

“The military presumably wants to use the elections to ensure its continued dominance, but this is the most wide-ranging shake-up in a generation,” said Jim Della-Giacoma, Southeast Asia project director of the International Crisis. “The government, opposition, neighboring countries and the wider international community must all prepare for the possibility of change they may not be able to control.”

The 2008 constitution requires careful study of the process of amendment to assess whether it is rigid or flexible, and whether there are any loopholes in the constitution that could result in positive or negative consequences.

According to constitution, it requires 20 percent of the members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, (Union Parliament or the two houses combined) to submit a bill of amendment with approval requiring a vote of more than 75 percent in favor.

For important provisions such as basic principles, state structure, qualifications for the presidential and vice presidential candidates and the National Defense and Security Council and a state of emergency, it further requires a nationwide referendum with more than half of eligible voters in favor.

It is clear that the 2008 constitution is rigid requiring difficult procedures to amend its provisions.

In the present constitution of Indonesia, the country which the Burmese military once looked to as a model for the dominance of the military, it requires only a simple majority for any proposed amendment in the People's Consultative Assembly with two-thirds of its members in support.

Suharto, who officially became president in 1968, did not allow any changes to the constitution. Under the rule of Suharto, it required a nationwide referendum with a 90 per cent turnout and approval of 90 percent of the voters to change the constitution.

With the fall of Suharto and the New Order regime in 1998, the amendment process was simplified in order to make it more democratic. The People's Consultative Assembly made constitutional amendments a flexible procedure and as a result, only 11 percent of the original articles remain unchanged from the earlier constitution.

In the 2008 Burmese constitution, the military is given 25 percent of the seats in every state legislature and both national assemblies. The constitution requires more than 75 percent of all the representatives of Union Parliament to amend the constitution important provisions.

To amend the constitution would require the support of all civilian representatives plus the support of at least one military representative in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.

Because of the rigidity of the constitution, there appears to be little chance for opposition members of parliament to look to the amendment process as a way to influence the future course of government. As a result, a theory of gradual change through the constitution also appears unrealistic.

Kay Latt can be reached at kaylatt((@)gmail.com

Burma Newscasts - Opposition-backed Constitutional Amendments will be Difficult
Monday, September 14, 2009

Beijing’s Influence on Junta ‘Overstated’: ICG

2009-09-14T10:39:00.000+10:00

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

A leading political think tank, the International Crisis Group (ICG), said on Monday that although many believe China is the key to pushing the Burmese junta toward political reform, its influence is overstated.

In a new report covering Sino-Burmese relations, the Brussels-based NGO said that Beijing’s influence on the Burmese junta is clearly limited, a fact highlighted by the Burmese government forces’ invasion of the Kokang region, an act that caused some 37,000 refugees to flee to China.

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, left, holds a welcoming ceremony in honor of Gen Maung Aye, right, vice-chairman of Burma’s ruling junta at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 16, 2009. (Photo: www.english.cpc.people.com.cn)

Titled “China’s Myanmar Dilemma,” the ICG report was written by ICG staffers in Beijing, Jakarta and Brussels.

“Simply calling on Beijing to apply more pressure is unlikely to result in change,” the ICG report said. “The insular and nationalistic leaders in the military government do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing.”

It said that “after two decades of failed international approaches to Myanmar [Burma], Western countries and China must find better ways to work together to push for change in the military-ruled nation.”

The Kokang conflict highlighted the complexity of China’s relationship with Burma, and that Beijing was unable to dissuade the Burmese generals from launching their bloody campaign, said the report.

It also noted that the relation between Beijing and Naypyidaw is “best characterized as a marriage of convenience rather than a love match.”

ICG, which is frequently contracted to advise world bodies such as the UN, the EU and the World Bank, said that while China sees major problems with the status quo [in Burma], particularly with regard to economic policy and ethnic issues, Beijing’s preferred solution is a gradual adjustment of policy by a strong central government, not federalism or liberal democracy, and certainly not regime change.

The ICG noted in its report that unstable Burmese factors on the Chinese border, such insurgency, drugs and diseases, affect China’s interests in the country.

It said that Beijing’s interest in Burma was mainly economic.

However, to highlight the close ties, the report said that from 2003 to June 2009, leaders of the Chinese government and the Burmese junta met 30 times, 15 of which were after the Burmese regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in September 2007.

ICG has published two reports regarding Burma within the last two months. A report titled, “Myanmar: Towards the Elections” was released on August 20. It said the 2010 elections are likely to create opportunities for generational and institutional changes despite major shortcomings.

However, it questioned whether the elections could solve the conflict in Burma, including the clashes at the Sino-Burmese border.

Burma Newscasts - Beijing’s Influence on Junta ‘Overstated’: ICG
Monday, September 14, 2009

Chinese Blood on Burmese Soil

2009-09-14T10:18:00.000+10:00

By Tom Kramer
The Irrawaddy News

Peng Jiasheng is the Kokang leader whose residence was raided by government troops on August 8, setting off a regime offensive and leading to the loss of the Kokang region to junta troops. He was interviewed by The Irrawaddy on the reasons for the offensive, the role of China, the allegations of illegal drug trafficking, the borders guard force and the future of ethnic minorities in Burma.

Question: How would you describe the current situation in the Kokang region?

Answer: The incident on August 8 was the junta’s excuse. It wanted to do away with the local ethnic minority army a long time ago. A larger nationality wants to eliminate a smaller one. This is typical nationalistic chauvinism. This was a massacre.

Peng Jiasheng (Photo: Tom Kramer)

In order to avoid further harm to the Kokang people, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) retreated. This is not what we wanted and also it is not what the people in the international community who support our people would like to see.

Now the situation in Kokang is even more complicated. Currently, the situation is very bad.

The government troops took over the Kokang area for about 10 days, but there were many reported cases where their soldiers committed robbery, rape and killed civilians. Many people are still afraid to go back home. Most of the shops owned by Chinese businessmen were either destroyed or robbed. This is a calamity. The prosperous environment of Kokang of only a few months ago no longer exists. People are living in deep distress.

This conflict has brought great trauma to the Kokang people. The war will be long. It will be impossible to end soon.

Q: The ceasefire agreement you signed with the regime in 1989 has collapsed. What do you believe was the motive behind the offensive and the regime’s attempt to arrest you?

A: In March 1989, the Kokang people agreed to peace and development. In the same year, 17 other local ethnic armed forces also started peace talks with the junta. This brought to an end the large scale of armed conflict in the country.

The alliance army is also one of the legal ethnic armed forces that were recognized by the military government. Over the past 20 years of peace and development, the Kokang was the first group in the country to promise the international community that we would stop drug production. We enforced the ban on poppy cultivation in 2002 in our area. The anti-drug production effort and success were recognized by the UN and the international communities.

With help from the World Food Programme, the Chinese government and other international aid agencies, we implemented a lot of poppy substitution projects, mainly to grow sugar crane, tea, walnuts and other crops. We achieved very good progress in the poppy substitution.

Step by step, the people in our area began to work their way up from poverty. This can be seen by everybody. However, as the military government wants to achieve their goal of controlling the whole country, it felt it needed to take action against the peace and the ceasefire groups.

Q: Soon after the government troops captured Laogai, the state-run-media repeatedly accused you of involvement in illegal arms factories and drugs. How do you respond to those allegations?

A: Burma is still a country without a real government. The army cannot represent the government. After the election in 1990, the junta usurped power in the country. Ever since then, there has been no proper government in our country. The international community has never officially acknowledged them as the government. Burma is currently a country managed by a temporary council that was set up by the junta. It was called the State Law and Order Restoration Council and was later changed to the State Peace and Development Council. The government army is also an ethnic armed force, so it can not represent this country.

In 1989, for the sake of the peace and welfare of the country, the Kokang people took the initiative to approach the junta-controlled council. This was to protect peace in the country, and to let the people live in peace. Over the past 20 years, we trusted the junta and have been respectful of them. Our political proposition is always the same: support the central government, take the road to peace and development, maintain nationality unification, guard national unity and strive for the autonomous rights of the Kokang people. We never wanted to separate from the country; we only wanted a recognized position for the Kokang people among all of Burma’s nationalities.

Q: How many people were killed in the latest conflict?

A: In this conflict, the Kokang people suffered great loss. We had 14 alliance army soldiers killed in battle, but what we do not know is the number of civilians killed. For example, some na?ve young people joined with the traitor Bai Suocheng and his army. In the battles, they were to be used by the government troops to fight against us. These young people refused because they were Kokang and could not kill their own people. The government troops took their weapons away and shot them with machine guns. On Aug. 27, 27 Kokang youth were killed together.

Q: Why did the junta decide to single out your group? Was there any reason other than the regime’s allegation of your involvement in opium and illegal drugs?

A: A lot of things happened over the past month that we never thought could happen. The Kokang alliance army is one of the legal armed forces in the country. All our weapons are old and the ammunition is left over from the days of the Burmese Communist Party. Many of these weapons are in need of repair. It is reasonable to have a factory to repair weapons. This factory is well known by all the SPDC officials in Kokang. They have visited it before. But now they used it as an excuse to take action against us.

The motivation behind this is obvious. They want to eliminate the Kokang and other ethnic armed forces and achieve their goal of a junta-managed “unified” country. It goes without saying that the junta will not stop with the Kokang.

They will take the war to other groups with all kinds of excuses. If you want to condemn something, you can always find a charge. The government army is the strongest in the country. It can crack down on whichever ethnic groups it wishes. It can accuse any ceasefire group of drugs, or weapons…anything. The current situation on drugs, for example, in the four special regions in Shan State is that there is no poppy cultivation, according to investigations by the international agencies. However, in SPDC-controlled areas, there is more than 250,000 mu [Chinese land unit: 667 square meters] of poppy cultivation. This is the work of the junta, and this is how it behaves.

Q: Several ethnic ceasefire groups including the MNDAA rejected the junta's proposal for a Border Guard Force (BGF). Why did you reject the BGF plan?

A: We are not really against the idea of transferring the army to a BGF, but the terms and conditions were too rigorous. For example, all the officers above 50 would be forced to retire and find their own livelihood. The key leaders of the local government and the commanders of the army would also be appointed by the junta. These proposals are not acceptable to any of the ceasefire groups. It is also not acceptable to the local people. Our requirements were simple: we want to have a high level of national autonomy to protect the interests of the Kokang people.

Q: The Kokang and other ethnic groups are unhappy with the 2008 constitution. What do you see as its faults?

A: Regarding the constitution proposed by the junta in 2008, it is all about the power and interest of the junta. We do not believe that any rights and interests of the minorities are ensured in the constitution. How can we accept such a constitution that does not represent the people of the country? on the approval of this constitution, there are things that happened that few people know about. For example, in some of the Kokang villages, the junta sent people to vote in the referendum. The local people did not want to participate, so the junta officials themselves wrote [out] all the votes. There were villages where about 100 people voted No, but on their ballots it was reported that more than 3,000 people voted Yes. This is how it was approved.

Q: You merged with the CPB in the past and led the successful mutiny in 1989. You went to Beijing and you were closely associated with Chinese officials in the past. Today, China is the closest ally of the regime as well as a good friend of ethnic groups along the Sino-Burmese border. What was China's role in the recent conflict in the Kokang region?

A: During the Aug. 8 incident planned by the junta and the armed conflict afterwards, the Chinese government did not give us assistance. We could not talk to the Chinese government about protection and asylum. However, as the Kokang are in fact Chinese, when the refugees fled to China the local authorities took very good care of them. That we really appreciate.

Q: What is your message to Chinese leaders who plan to build a gas pipeline through the Kokang region?

A: What I want to say here is no matter what happens in Burma, we are ethnic Chinese and our roots are in China. This we will never forget. For the sake of the rights and position of the Chinese in Burma, we will continue our struggle.

Q: How do you see the future of Burma and the ethnic minorities?

A: Regarding the future of the ethnic minorities in Burma, this is a complicated issue. If Burma does not set up a democratic government that is elected by the people and therefore really represents the people, the future of the minorities in Burma will get worse.

Q: Did you receive any political backing or military support from other ethnic groups along the border? Are they united in their goals?

A: All the minority ceasefire groups along the China-Burma border areas have good relations with each other and have supported each other over a long period of time. Our fate and experiences are the same. But due to certain difficulties, our alliance is not as strong as it should be. Therefore the junta had its opportunity, and now the Kokang area is under junta control.

Q: Are you worried about losing your personal property and your businesses in Burma and China?

A: Currently, all my personal property has been confiscated by the junta. My property in China was also taken away by the relevant department of the Chinese government. This is a problem that I can not solve by worrying about it.

Q: Please describe the refugee situation. There were reports of government officials and soldiers attacking Chinese nationals? Was the recent attack designed to demonstrate that the government is not a puppet of China?

A: I think the reason why the junta attacked the Kokang is because of the following:

First, the junta wanted to develop better relationships with America, India and some Western authorities, in particular with America. In order to improve the relationship with America, the junta is eager to prove that the junta is not a puppet government supported by the Chinese government. That is why the junta chose the Kokang to fight against.

They also wanted to test the response of the Chinese government. The Kokang and the Chinese have a blood relationship. The Kokang people are basically Chinese; they are part of the Chinese family. The Chinese in Burma were not officially recognized by the Burmese and therefore for centuries they lived in a very low economic and social position. Only after the meeting in Ninakan in 1947, after the national government’s recognition, were the Chinese living in these areas called Kokang. But as a matter of fact, the Kokang people are Chinese. We are the descendants of the Yellow emperor. The anti-Chinese movement in 1967 in Burma feels like yesterday.

Even today, many Chinese living in Burma still do not dare to declare that they are Chinese. In 1989, when the Kokang Alliance Army was established, all the Chinese in Burma looked at the Chinese armed forces as the “lighthouse.” Now the ‘”lighthouse” has gone off.

The second reason I think is that the SPDC forces were already in Kokang for more than 10 years, and they understood the situation in Kokang, including the relationships among the Kokang leaders.

They therefore bought off the traitors Bai Suocheng and Wei Chaoren. This resulted in an internal split in Kokang before the war broke out. Bai Suocheng and Wei Chaoren betrayed their people and surrendered to the junta.

Now the junta has taken over the Kokang area, and it is clear about the response of the Chinese government. So their next step will be to reinforce the policy of cracking down on other minority groups along the border. The junta will act recklessly and become more unbridled.

Q: Where are you living now?

A: For many years, I worked in Kokang. I never had a chance to travel to the big cities in Burma. Now that I have more time, I am travelling in the big cities in Burma. I really feel that my country is beautiful, and it deserves a government that can represent the people by building and developing the country. I currently have no plans to go back to Kokang.

Burma Newscasts - Chinese Blood on Burmese Soil
Monday, September 14, 2009

Crackdown on Burmese Dissidents in Chiang Mai

2009-09-14T10:14:00.001+10:00

By THE IRRAWADDY

Thai police officers on Sunday raided the offices of several exiled Burmese opposition groups including the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, the Burmese Women’s Union and the National Health and Education Committee.

A Burmese source confirmed that 10 Burmese women from the Burmese Women’s Union who were attending a capacity-building workshop in Chiang Mai were apprehended and are now in custody.

The police came with information and photos of the locations of Burmese offices. The arrests took place on Sunday when many offices were closed for the weekend.

The offices of several Chiang Mai-based Burmese opposition groups and media organizations have remained temporarily closed on Monday. The motive for the arrests and the reason why Burmese human rights workers and dissidents have been targeted is not yet known.

Several exiled Burmese and foreign groups have opened NGOs and advocacy offices in Chiang Mai in recent years.

Burmese groups faced the most repressive times under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s administration in the early 2000s. Many offices were shut down for several weeks due to fears of intimidation and crackdowns.

International human rights groups and Western governments expressed concern for the safety of exiled Burmese dissidents living in Thailand at the time.

Under the current Thai government, Burmese groups in Thailand have enjoyed relative freedom without any major harassment.

According to diplomatic sources, Western embassies in Bangkok are closely watching the situation.

Burma Newscasts - Crackdown on Burmese Dissidents in Chiang Mai
Monday, September 14, 2009

Retired Military Personnel to Form Political Party

2009-09-14T10:08:00.001+10:00

By AUNG THET WINE
The Irrawaddy News

RANGOON — The Myanmar War Veterans Organization (MWVO) will meet on Oct. 6-9 to form a political party to field candidates in the 2010 general election in Burma.

Members will reportedly be selected to run campaigns in every division and state, said sources in Naypyidaw, the capital.

Sources said that those selected are likely to be high-ranking retired officers, such as retired generals and colonels.

MWVO has more than 3,800 members who are former officers, more than 80,000 from lower ranks and more than 50,000 auxiliary members.

The MWVO has divisions devoted to politics, national defense and security, economics, social welfare and welfare.

The meeting will focus on preparing for the election and will be attended by retired Burmese officials who have represented states or divisions, according to sources.

“After the meeting, a list of retired officers who could contest elections will be released,” said a retired Burmese official in Rangoon.

Also, the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) will meet in late October to iron out preparations for the 2010 election, including the selection of candidates, said sources.

The junta will form numerous proxy parties to increase their chances of sweeping the election, said a Rangoon journalist.

The Burmese people have both positive and negative perspectives on the upcoming election. Some view it as the beginning of positive change in Burma while others see it as an extension of military rule.

A resident in Pegu said, “We were forced to vote ‘Yes’ in the national [constitutional] referendum. If we look at the example of the referendum, there is no way that the election will be fair.”

Ethnic ceasefire groups also have different perspectives on the election. Some Kachin and Mon leaders have already formed political parties field candidates while others say they will not take part in the election.

Burma Newscasts - Retired Military Personnel to Form Political Party
Monday, September 14, 2009

China’s Failed Foreign Policy

2009-09-14T09:54:00.000+10:00

By NYO OHN MYINT/MOE ZAW OO
The Irrawaddy News

The recent breakdown of a two-decade-old ceasefire between Burma’s military junta and ethnic militias in the country’s north demonstrates the failure of China’s outdated foreign policy, according to Burmese political analysts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has aggressively pursued a path of rapid economic development as the surest way to avoid a similar fate. Although it has dramatically expanded its trade ties with the rest of the world, the principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

However, as the situation in Burma attests, this principle may no longer be sufficient to protect China’s national interests.

Beijing certainly enjoys the economic benefits of being the Burmese junta’s best friend. Since 1989, China has been the regime’s most important supplier of military aid, providing jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels, as well as extensive training to Burmese military personnel. In exchange, it has been given access to Burma’s abundant natural resources.

A joint statement on “Future Cooperation in Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Federation of Myanmar,” issued in June 2000, indicated the future direction of Sino-Burmese relations, which were to be based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the consolidation of mutual relations for wider regional stability and development.

Despite Beijing’s willingness to be more direct in persuading Burma to enhance its economic reforms and to push for political reconciliation at home, China still regards Burma’s poor human rights record as an “internal affair.”

At the same time, the United States has continued to denounce the Burmese generals’ human rights records and refusal to honor the 1990 election results. Washington’s harsh criticism, especially during the Bush administration, gave the Burmese generals no other choice but to turn to the Chinese government for support. In 2003, when the US imposed tougher sanctions against the regime under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Beijing was highly critical of the move.

China’s foreign policy is completely divorced from the harsh realties of life under military rule in Burma. Without taking this suffering into consideration, Beijing has used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions designed to push Burma toward genuine political reform. This has allowed the junta to simply move forward with its efforts to orchestrate a political transition from an absolute dictatorship to a faux democracy within the framework of a militarized constitution.

China has continued to back the Burmese regime as part of its policy of extending its influence within the region. However, Burma’s long history of ethnic conflict and political dissent presents serious challenges to Chinese policy, which may not be viable in the long run.

Another problem facing Beijing is that the Burmese regime is deeply distrustful of China. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Burma’s armed forces fought hard against the Burmese Communist Party, which was backed by China’s ruling Communist Party. This experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Burmese generals and continues to affect the thinking of the current military leadership.

China’s current dual-track policy of supporting both the junta and the ethnic groups living along the Sino-Burmese border has helped to keep these memories alive. It has also raised the specter of renewed conflict with China. In a 2006 quarterly report, Burma’s ruling military council said that it needed to brace for an invasion from the northeast—obviously referring to China.

According to a reliable source, officials from China’s Yunnan Province have recognized the significance of developments inside Burma and are seeking to minimize the negative impact of Beijing’s policy. However, China can’t change its foreign policy within a few years; it will take decade, said a high-ranking diplomat from Beijing.

However, other China watchers have argued that Beijing is less interested in dealing with the Burmese junta since it purged Gen Khin Nyunt, the former intelligence chief, in 2004. Chinese leaders know that the current rulers in Naypyidaw have little interest in engaging with the outside world, but believe that the generals would not dare to turn their guns against China.

China may also feel that it is paying too high a price for backing Burma politically. Some analysts suggest that Beijing could move away from its long-held position on Burma in international forums to protect its broader geopolitical interests. China realizes that defending Burma may have triggered a more aggressive US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is carefully observing the current US administration’s reengagement in the region to decide whether Burma should be a center of China’s foreign policy.

China is aware that regional countries have supported a new Burma policy by the US government in terms of their constructive engagement and economic interests. China could be isolated by its Burma policy, proving its policy is still inferior to that of the US.

In the post-Cold War era, China should have more pro-active and tangible fairness to the citizens of the region, rather than putting its emphasis on ruthless authoritarian rulers. Beijing’s ignorance may have impacted the understanding of the Burmese generals. All the socialist states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are willing to yield to the US political engagement while they enjoy China’s limited favor in economic prosperity.

In recent years, Burma has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan within Asean shows a shift in Burma’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China.

Chinese analysts closely observed the Kokang incident in August and questioned whether the Sino-Burmese relationship was really impacted. In line with the 2008 constitution, the regime was attempting to ensure the stability of border areas by neutralizing armed forces that are independently standing outside the framework of the constitution.

“They (the Burmese military) don’t always heed China’s advice. China has so little leverage against them because China, in some sense, depends on them,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

Chinese officials were not only extremely upset over the lack of forewarning about the border clash but were also worried about the future political consequences.

China-Burma relations may be at a crossroads. Only demanding ethnic rights and showing concern about the situation at the border cannot reflect China’s foreign policy in terms of its status in the international arena. China should bring the role of Aung San Suu Kyi and a settlement of the general political crisis to the forefront of its Burma policy in order to show China’s role in finding a solution along with the US and the international community.

Nyo Ohn Myint is a chairperson and Moe Zaw Oo is secretary of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs Committee.

Burma Newscasts - China’s Failed Foreign Policy
Thursday, September 10, 2009

China and West need coordinated approach on Burma: ICG

2009-09-14T09:46:00.000+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - With Beijing having limited influence over Burma’s military rulers, the West needs to find a way to work together with China to push for changes in the Southeast Asian nation, the International Crisis Group (ICG) said in a new report.

The ICG, a non-profit group working in conflict areas around the world, in a new report “China’s Myanmar Dilemma” said Beijing’s influence over Burma is often overstated while it is limited, and may not be able to deter the junta from attacking ethnic armed rebels along its border with China.

“The insular and nationalistic generals do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing,” said Robert Templer, ICG’s Asia Program Director, in a statement on Monday.

“By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead in solving the problem, a workable international approach to Myanmar will remain elusive,” Templer added.

The ICG also warned that China, which is known to have influence over Burmese generals, might not be able to deter the junta from launching yet another attack on ethnic armed rebels long its border with China.

The late August offensive against the Kokang rebels in Burma’s North-eastern Shan State, which resulted in the influx of about 30,000 refugees into China, according to the ICG, is an indication of the limited influence of China on the Burmese junta.

“Beijing was not even forewarned about the late August raid against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Kokang ceasefire group,” the ICG said.

Should the junta launch attacks against the Wa and the Kachin rebels, China would have to deal with another humanitarian crisis on its border, and “yet it is unclear whether Beijing will be able to dissuade the generals from undertaking further offensive,’ the ICG said.

“Both Chinese and international policies towards Myanmar [Burma] deserve careful reassessment,” said Donald Steinberg, ICG’s Deputy President for Policy in the statement.

“An effective international approach also requires a united front by regional actors as well as multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the UN,” he added.

Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, North East Asia Project Director of the ICG, in an email interview with Mizzima said, the Burmese junta balances the influence of China as well as other countries with its non-alignment foreign policy and multilateralism.

“It is not a matter of simply using one country to check the influence of another. The [Burmese] government uses this relationship just as it uses its ties with other Asian countries - to prevent any one country from gaining too much influence,” Kleine-Ahlbrandt said.

But in the absence of coordinated regional or UN response, Kleine-Ahlbrandt said, the stalemate will continue and “from China's perspective, not only is instability on the border a serious concern, but if this situation continues, it will certainly negatively impact Yunnan’s trade and economic development.”

While China shares the aspiration for a stable and prosperous Burma, it differs from the West on how to achieve these goals. The ICG said, in order to bring Beijing on board, the international community will need to pursue a plausible strategy that takes advantage of areas of common interest as well as China’s actual level of influence.

“The West should emphasise to China the unsustainable nature of its current policies and continue to apply pressure in the Security Council and other fora,” the group said, adding that at the same time, international pressure should not exclude other regional states pursuing their own narrowly defined self interests in Burma.

Burma Newscasts - China and West need coordinated approach on Burma: ICG
Monday, 14 September 2009 20:20

Offices of Burmese groups in Thailand raided

2009-09-14T09:40:00.001+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Unprecedented security checks has led to Thailand’s police raiding the offices of some Burmese opposition groups based in northern Thailand’s Chiang Mai city on Sunday, opposition members said.

The police, according to Burmese opposition members, came with a list of addresses of Burmese offices and took photographs.

“Since there was only our office worker in our office, we did not have any problem, but the police took photographs of the office,” a Burmese activist, whose office was also among those visited by the police, told Mizzima.

While Thailand’s Royal Police could not be reached on Monday for comment, a Burmese activist said, “This is the first time in many years that this kind of widespread search and interrogation has been made. I believe there is something behind this. “It is a targeted search, because it has been carried out only on Burmese organizations. It could be politically connected,” he further speculated.

The Thai police have often raided the offices of Burmese organizations in the past. But the source said it was never conducted in such a widespread manner.

“They have the list of most of the Burmese groups including some of the media offices in exile,” said a Burmese activist, who requested not to be named for security reasons.

Aung Myo Myint, Director of the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB), whose office was also among those searched, said interrogating a human rights office is in violation of the basic rights of the people and condemned the action of the police.

“We are working to promote human rights and coming to our office and interrogating us is violating our basic rights,” he said.

According to the Migrant Assistant Program (MAP) and other NGOs, currently Thailand hosts about two million Burmese migrant workers and about 140,000 refugees in nine camps along the Thai-Burma border.

Burma Newscasts - Offices of Burmese groups in Thailand raided
Monday, 14 September 2009 16:46

China’s Failed Foreign Policy

2009-09-11T22:51:00.001+10:00

By NYO OHN MYINT/MOE ZAW OO
The Irrawaddy News

The recent breakdown of a two-decade-old ceasefire between Burma’s military junta and ethnic militias in the country’s north demonstrates the failure of China’s outdated foreign policy, according to Burmese political analysts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has aggressively pursued a path of rapid economic development as the surest way to avoid a similar fate. Although it has dramatically expanded its trade ties with the rest of the world, the principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy. However, as the situation in Burma attests, this principle may no longer be sufficient to protect China’s national interests.

Beijing certainly enjoys the economic benefits of being the Burmese junta’s best friend. Since 1989, China has been the regime’s most important supplier of military aid, providing jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels, as well as extensive training to Burmese military personnel. In exchange, it has been given access to Burma’s abundant natural resources.

A joint statement on “Future Cooperation in Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Federation of Myanmar,” issued in June 2000, indicated the future direction of Sino-Burmese relations, which were to be based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the consolidation of mutual relations for wider regional stability and development.

Despite Beijing’s willingness to be more direct in persuading Burma to enhance its economic reforms and to push for political reconciliation at home, China still regards Burma’s poor human rights record as an “internal affair.”

At the same time, the United States has continued to denounce the Burmese generals’ human rights records and refusal to honor the 1990 election results. Washington’s harsh criticism, especially during the Bush administration, gave the Burmese generals no other choice but to turn to the Chinese government for support. In 2003, when the US imposed tougher sanctions against the regime under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Beijing was highly critical of the move.

China’s foreign policy is completely divorced from the harsh realties of life under military rule in Burma. Without taking this suffering into consideration, Beijing has used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions designed to push Burma toward genuine political reform. This has allowed the junta to simply move forward with its efforts to orchestrate a political transition from an absolute dictatorship to a faux democracy within the framework of a militarized constitution.

China has continued to back the Burmese regime as part of its policy of extending its influence within the region. However, Burma’s long history of ethnic conflict and political dissent presents serious challenges to Chinese policy, which may not be viable in the long run.

Another problem facing Beijing is that the Burmese regime is deeply distrustful of China. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Burma’s armed forces fought hard against the Burmese Communist Party, which was backed by China’s ruling Communist Party. This experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Burmese generals and continues to affect the thinking of the current military leadership.

China’s current dual-track policy of supporting both the junta and the ethnic groups living along the Sino-Burmese border has helped to keep these memories alive. It has also raised the specter of renewed conflict with China. In a 2006 quarterly report, Burma’s ruling military council said that it needed to brace for an invasion from the northeast—obviously referring to China.

According to a reliable source, officials from China’s Yunnan Province have recognized the significance of developments inside Burma and are seeking to minimize the negative impact of Beijing’s policy. However, China can’t change its foreign policy within a few years; it will take decade, said a high-ranking diplomat from Beijing.

However, other China watchers have argued that Beijing is less interested in dealing with the Burmese junta since it purged Gen Khin Nyunt, the former intelligence chief, in 2004. Chinese leaders know that the current rulers in Naypyidaw have little interest in engaging with the outside world, but believe that the generals would not dare to turn their guns against China.

China may also feel that it is paying too high a price for backing Burma politically. Some analysts suggest that Beijing could move away from its long-held position on Burma in international forums to protect its broader geopolitical interests. China realizes that defending Burma may have triggered a more aggressive US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is carefully observing the current US administration’s re-engagement in the region to decide whether Burma should be a center of China’s foreign policy.

China is aware that regional countries have supported a new Burma policy by the US government in terms of their constructive engagement and economic interests. China could be isolated by its Burma policy, proving its policy is still inferior to that of the US.

In the post-Cold War era, China should have more pro-active and tangible fairness to the citizens of the region, rather than putting its emphasis on ruthless authoritarian rulers. Beijing’s ignorance may have impacted the understanding of the Burmese generals. All the socialist states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are willing to yield to the US political engagement while they enjoy China’s limited favor in economic prosperity.

In recent years, Burma has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan within Asean shows a shift in Burma’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China.

Chinese analysts closely observed the Kokang incident in August and questioned whether the Sino-Burmese relationship was really impacted. In line with the 2008 constitution, the regime was attempting to ensure the stability of border areas by neutralizing armed forces that are independently standing outside the framework of the constitution.

“They (the Burmese military) don’t always heed China’s advice. China has so little leverage against them because China, in some sense, depends on them,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

Chinese officials were not only extremely upset over the lack of forewarning about the border clash but were also worried about the future political consequences.

China-Burma relations may be at a crossroads. Only demanding ethnic rights and showing concern about the situation at the border cannot reflect China’s foreign policy in terms of its status in the international arena. China should bring the role of Aung San Suu Kyi and a settlement of the general political crisis to the forefront of its Burma policy in order to show China’s role in finding a solution along with the US and the international community.

Nyo Ohn Myint is a chairperson and Moe Zaw Oo is secretary of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs Committee.

Burma Newscasts - China’s Failed Foreign Policy
Thursday, September 10, 2009

Kokang Crisis Disrupts Border Trade

2009-09-11T22:44:00.001+10:00

By KYI WAI
The Irrawaddy News

Rangoon — The conflict in the Kokang area near the Sino-Burmese has disrupted border trade and caused shortages of Chinese goods in markets as far away as Rangoon and Mandalay.

The shortages will lead to price rises, according to local traders.

A shopkeeper who sells popular brands of Chinese-made snacks at Rangoon’s Yuzana Plaza in Rangoon said: “If we don't get fresh supplies by the end of this month, prices will jump.”

Other major Rangoon markets such as Mingala, Nyaung-bin Lay and Thein-gyi also report shortages of Chinese goods. One trader said supplies of food, medicine and electronic equipment had dropped in the past 10 days by one-third.

A Chinese trader in Nyaung-bin Lay market said supplies of Chinese-made formula milk powder, biscuits and dry noodles had run out. Suppliers were reluctant to travel to the Kokang area, he said.

"No one dares to go to the border, because we are still receiving information that the situation in that area is still not good,” said a Mingala market trader. “So, there are no new imports. We are buying supplies from other local traders from Muse and Mandalay. I am sure prices will rise.”

In Mandalay, a trader said 70 percent of the consumer goods in local markets came from China.

"We still have some consumer goods in storage to last the next two or three months,” he said. “But we don't know when we can get fresh supplies. So, we have to sell things very carefully."

The trader also thought prices were bound to rise.

Some traders with long experience of market conditions fear that the Kokang conflict could have long-term effects on the Burmese economy.

One Mandalay trader said the Kokang crisis was being followed with concern by Burmese-born Chinese.

"If the Wa group gets involved in this conflict, it will get much worse,” he said. “My relatives in Lashio live in fear, because Burmese government troops are collecting people at night and forcing them to be army porters. Half the population in Lashio are Kokang and Wa.”

The trader said government forces in Northern Shan State are selectively conscripting only Chinese, Kokang and Wa people as porters to be used in the front line.

Meanwhile, the state-run newspaper Myanma Alin reported on Thursday that the Kokang area is now peaceful and stable. The refugees who fled into neighboring China are returning and 14,253 had so far crossed back into Burma, the newspaper said.

Myanma Alin also reported that the authorities are selling chicken and fish cheaply to residents of Laogai, the Kokang capital. Local stores, shops and market are open for business as usual.

The newspaper said government troops were digging new drains and working on other municipal projects for Laogai.

Burma Newscasts - Kokang Crisis Disrupts Border Trade
Friday, September 11, 2009

The Junta’s Twin August Offensives

2009-09-11T22:31:00.001+10:00

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

After more than four decades of rule, the Burmese military government is confronting the two main centers of domestic opposition to its power in a bid to increase security and prolong military rule before the elections next year.

Having effectively kept pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi out of the elections by sentencing her to a further 18 months of house arrest, the military regime’s forces broke the ceasefire with ethnic groups by seizing the Kokang capital of Laogai on August 24.

Since the military regime’s attack, instability has been reverberating through Kachin State, Shan State and the towns along the Sino-Burmese border in China’s Yunnan Province.

Other ceasefire groups in northern and northeastern Burma, such as the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Army and the eastern Shan State-based National Democratic Alliance Army have been building up defenses against a potential attack by regime troops.

“The [Burmese] government would like to assert more authority over the ethnic minorities in the highlands, leading to the problems of the past few days,” said Michael Charney, a Burma expert from London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies, in an email to the The Irrawaddy. The ceasefire agreements between the ethnic groups and the junta left potentially volatile situations in place, he said.

According to journalists and political observers in Rangoon, the junta is not yet ready to promulgate the election law, though the elections are scheduled to be held in 2010. With only three months remaining this year, time is running out.

If the junta wants to hold elections under the 2008 constitution, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, it has to demonstrate that there is only one commander-in-chief and that the regime’s army is the only armed force in Burma, observer’s say.

“We can see that by sentencing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on August 11, the military regime made sure there would be no worthy political challenger in the 2010 elections. After removing her from the picture, the generals turned on their other main enemies,” said Chan Tun, a veteran politician from Rangoon.

The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Suu Kyi, and the Wa, Kokang and Mongla ethnic ceasefire groups have called for the constitution to be reviewed before the elections.

In 2005, Wa, Kokang and the Mongla delegates to the National Convention called for full autonomy and separation from Shan State, as well as guarantees that their armed militias would remain under their control.

At the end of the fourteen-year-long national convention process in 2007, however, the junta ignored all their demands when the handpicked Constitution Drafting Committee finalized the constitution.

“After the junta ignored their demands at the national convention, the ethnic groups knew a showdown had to come soon,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a former communist who observes Burma military affairs from China’s Yunnan Province.

“But ceasefire groups, particularly the Kokang, failed to prepare properly, which is why Laogai fell to regime troops so easily,” he said.

The junta generals, meanwhile, must be wondering whether the simultaneous offensives against urban political opposition and ethnic ceasefire groups have been wise.

“I wonder why the regime is risking conflict with the ethnic militias now. They may want to get control before the elections—but the junta could destabilize the whole country,” said Mikeal Gravers, a Burma expert from Aarhus University, Denmark.

Charney said the Burmese junta will face many similar problems in the coming year, because the generals want ethnic and political stability in order to hold elections and conclude the domestic problems that are bringing so much international attention.

Burma Newscasts - The Junta’s Twin August Offensives
Friday, September 11, 2009

Webb to hold congressional hearing on Burma

2009-09-11T10:11:00.002+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - US senator Jim Webb announced on Thursday that he will hold a congressional hearing on the impact and effectiveness of United States policy on Burma, according to a statement released by his office.

“Senator Webb intends a comprehensive hearing to examine Burma’s current economic and political situation and to seek testimony regarding that country’s long history of internal turmoil and ethnic conflicts,” the statement said.

The announcement came after Webb’s two week long visit to five Southeast Asian nations including Burma, where he became the first US official to visit the military-ruled country in a decade.

During his visit, Webb met the Burmese military supremo Sn. Gen Than Shwe, and was allowed a rare meeting with detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. He also obtained the release of the American, John William Yettaw, who was sentenced to seven years in prison with labour, for intruding into the house of detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in early May.

Webb, who is the chair of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, is a strong advocate for lifting US sanctions against the Burmese generals.

During his Southeast Asian trip Webb also told leaders of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam that they and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations should join together in calling on the Burmese junta to free Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and allow her to fully participate in the 2010 elections.

“The hearing will evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. policy towards Burma, with a focus on U.S.-imposed economic sanctions that have not been matched by other countries, will discuss what role the United States can and should play in promoting democratic reform in Burma, and hear testimony on how to frame a new direction for U.S.-Burma relations,” the statement said.

Meanwhile on Thursday, the New York-based Human Rights Watch said the US should wrap up its policy review on Burma immediately and urged it to take the initiative to make the US policy of Diplomacy, Sanctions and Humanitarian aid more meaningful.

HRW, in a report, said delays in announcing its policy could encourage the Burmese generals to think that the US is weakening on its commitment to human rights and pluralism.

The HRW, however, said the US should reconsider generalized sanctions as it hurts the common people and phase it out at an appropriate time but carefully implement targeted sanctions on the military generals of Burma.

Burma Newscasts - Webb to hold congressional hearing on Burma

HRW urges US to wrap up Burma policy review

2009-09-10T10:18:00.002+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - The United States should immediately wrap up its Burma policy review and adopt policies of diplomacy, sanctions and humanitarian aid more effectively, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) said on Thursday in a letter sent to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

HRW, the New York based organization said, delay in announcing a new policy on Burma could encourage the military leaders to believe that the US is becoming weak in its commitment to human rights and pluralism.

HRW is a group defending and promoting ‘Human Rights’ violations around the world and has extensively studied and released several reports of rights violations in military-ruled Burma, including the use of child soldiers by the Burmese Army.

Earlier in February, Clinton said the US is reviewing its policy on Burma adding that its current policy of sanctions has failed to bring about changes in the behaviour of the Burmese junta.

But she also said that the ‘constructive engagement’ policy by Burma’s neighbouring countries including China, India and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), of which Burma is a member, has failed to usher in changes.

Though the US state department had indicated that the review is about to be concluded, the HRW said it is important for the US government to conclude the policy review immediately, so that the American policy and strategy towards Burma is clear to all concerned.

HRW, in a press release on Thursday said, although the situation in Burma seems intractable, an energetic and revitalized approach to Burma from the Obama administration could help bring positive changes.

“We suggest that the policy review should, therefore, aim at making more effective all three prongs of US policy - diplomacy, sanctions and humanitarian aid - and not place one ahead of the others,” Kenneth Roth, executive director of the HRW said in his letter to Secretary Clinton.

Roth said, with regard to making diplomatic pressures have an impact the US should appoint its own special envoy for Burma, who would have a direct line to the secretary of state and specific instructions to engage in a principled way with the Burmese government and key bilateral and multilateral actors.

“Vigorous diplomacy is specifically needed with China, India,Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan,” the letter said.

The HRW said generalized sanctions are less likely to be effective and may hurt large numbers of ordinary people, and have no significant impact on the governments. Therefore, the US should consider targeted sanctions.

“Targeted sanctions don't impose hardship on ordinary people, but do provide leverage if effectively implemented,” Roth said in the letter.

Roth, however, said in the light of the sham trial of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the lack of political reforms, “we do not think now is the right time to change these sanctions, as it would send the wrong signal to the SPDC, suggesting that the United States or others have lost their will or commitment to keep up the pressure for democratic reform.”

While vigorously campaigning among regional and the international community and maintaining targeted sanctions, the HRW said, it is also important to increase humanitarian aid support to Burma.

With acute humanitarian needs in Burma, the HRW said, “US funding should increase.”

“The US and other donors offer to provide more humanitarian aid with appropriate oversight, but they should also insist that their contributions are matched by a genuine commitment from the military government to use its vast revenues from natural resources to help the Burmese people,” said Brad Adams, HRW’s Asia director, in a press statement.

The letter said, while “Development aid is a very important incentive for change in Burma”, it should not be made available until there is significant political reform, progress on human rights, better governance, and the possibility of consulting civil society and local communities in setting development goals.

The HRW said, while helping the Burmese people is one of the most difficult and intractable problems the world has faced in recent decades, a renewed approach led by the US could bring a significant change.

“We don't underestimate the challenge, but we think a revitalized approach with strong US leadership can make a significant difference in the years ahead,” Roth said in the letter.

Burma Newscasts - HRW urges US to wrap up Burma policy review

An 'Election' Burma's People Don't Need

2009-09-09T21:54:00.001+10:00

By U Win Tin

(Washington Post) -Much attention has been focused on Sen. James Webb's recent visit to my country and his meetings with Senior Gen. Than Shwe and incarcerated Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi. I understand Webb's desire to seek a meaningful dialogue with the Burmese ruling authorities. Unfortunately, his efforts have been damaging to our democracy movement and focus on the wrong issue -- the potential for an "election" that Webb wants us to consider participating in next year as part of a long-term political strategy. But the showcase election planned by the military regime makes a mockery of the freedom sought by our people and would make military dictatorship permanent.

In our last free election, the Burmese people rejected military rule in a landslide, awarding our National League for Democracy party more than 80 percent of the seats in parliament. Yet the military has refused to allow the NLD to form a government. In the 19 years since that election, Burmese democracy activists have faced imprisonment, intimidation, torture and death as they have peacefully voiced demands for justice, individual and ethnic rights, and a democratic form of government that is representative of all Burma's people.

While never ending our struggle for democracy, the NLD has continually sought to engage the regime and open a dialogue -- based on peace and mutual respect -- that could address Burma's critical political as well as social problems. Make no mistake -- these two issues are linked. Burma was once the rice bowl of Asia. Today, because of the regime's destructive economic policies and its use of oppression to maintain military rule, Burma is a shattered, poverty-stricken country.

The regime is seeking to place a veneer of legitimacy on itself through showcase "elections" and claiming that "disciplined democracy" will be instituted next year. Yet in May 2008, just days after a massive cyclone devastated Burma and killed more than 100,000 people, the regime used a farcical process to claim that 93 percent of voters chose to adopt a constitution that permanently enshrines military rule and prevents those with undefined "foreign ties" from holding public office -- catch-all provisions that would bar Suu Kyi and democracy activists from seeking office.

Some international observers view next year's planned elections as an opportunity. But under the circumstances imposed by the military's constitution, the election will be a sham. We will not sacrifice the democratic principles for which many millions of Burmese have marched, been arrested, been tortured and died to participate in a process that holds no hope whatsoever for bringing freedom to our country.

The demands of the NLD are reasonable. In April we issued another declaration to encourage engagement with the military that called for the release of all political prisoners, a full review of the constitution, reopening of all NLD offices and the right to freely organize. The regime's answer is the continued jailing of Suu Kyi and 2,000 other activists, massive military offensives against ethnic groups and the enforcement of rules to gag democracy.

How can the international community play a meaningful role? First, officials such as Webb should stop fear-mongering about China. His language about containing China, and working with Burma's regime to do so, is based on an outdated and unrealistic thesis. Suu Kyi rejected such notions by informing Webb that "we will not deal with anyone with fear and insecurity. We will deal with anyone, China, America, India, equally and friendly. As we can't choose our neighbors, we understand that we need to have a good relationship with China." Second, the NLD encourages other countries and international organizations to engage with Burma's military leaders to persuade them to engage with us and Burma's ethnic groups. The United States and many other nations have imposed sanctions on Burma. That is their decision and in keeping with their justified solidarity with the democratic values that we all hold so dear. If the regime genuinely engages with the NLD and ethnic representatives, releases political prisoners, ceases attacks against ethnic minorities and takes additional steps to build a true democratic state, these sanctions will be repealed at the right time.

In the meantime, let no one doubt our resolve. The NLD is a reflection of Burmese society. We will not be cowed or coerced into participating in a fatally flawed political process that robs the Burmese people of the freedom for which we struggle. We stand ready to engage, but we are more than willing to continue our struggle for the democratic values that so many have given their lives and their freedom to achieve.

U Win Tin is a member of the Central Executive Committee and a founder of Burma's National League for Democracy party. He was a political prisoner from 1989 to 2008.

Burma Newscasts - An 'Election' Burma's People Don't Need
Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Burma’s New Constitution Privileges Soldiers above Civilians

2009-09-07T18:10:00.002+10:00

By HTET AUNG
The Irrawaddy News

For decades, politics in Burma has been in crisis and the eventual outcome is often violence and oppression. Subjected to extreme poverty, armed conflicts and natural disaster, the people, like it or not, approved a new constitution in 2008.

The average Burmese citizen probably expects life to be less oppressive under a new civilian government. However, there is no escaping the fact that Burma’s third constitution was designed by the junta to institutionalize its role in politics.

Born with the nation’s independence struggle and believing its role is to safeguard the country from disintegration—a conventional excuse by military leaders to claim legitimacy—the Burmese military has constructed a legal fortress in the new constitution, which it calls its “national political leadership role of the State.”

This is the heart of the military-designed constitution and exemplifies its distrust of civilian politicians, and the role of the public in forming a consensus in society.

In democratic theory, if a single party wins a majority of seats in parliament, a country can enjoy stability and development with the support of the majority of the population. It can also avoid a coalition form of government that can often create instability in politics.

But Burma’s constitution is different, and it is constructed to avoid the dominance of a single civilian party, which could provide a viable opposition to the military rulers.

Soldiers and the Making of Laws

Therefore, the constitution was built around a theory of “disciplined democracy” with 25 percent of the bicameral parliament comprised of military representatives—a maneuver that is intended to avoid another 1990-style election in which the opposition party won a landslide victory.

The military is guarantied 110 out of 440 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament) and 56 out of 224 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (Nationalities Parliament). Also, military officials will hold the same share in state and region Hluttaws as well as the leading bodies of self-administrative areas. Section 121/j bans all civil service personnel from contesting in the Hluttaw elections.

Even though it has only 25 percent representation in parliament, the military becomes the dominate block in the legislative process, because to approve or reject a constitutional amendment or legislative bill requires the approval of more than 75 percent of parliament.

In this scenario, there a single political party, even if it had 100 percent unanimity, can not pass its proposed legislation without the approval of the military representatives in parliament. Thus, political parties are forced to seek a coalition or compromise with the military.

However, the constitution stipulates that the military doesn’t need the approval of parliament for legislation related specifically to defense and security affairs. Section 20/b stipulates that “the Defense Services has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces.”

Moreover, Hluttaw committees, commissions and bodies for defense and security affairs must be comprised of a majority of military-appointed representatives, according to Section 115 and 147.

Soldiers and Ruling a Nation

The 2008 constitution stipulates that the president is elected by a Presidential Electoral College, as stated in Clause 60.

The Electoral College is formed into three groups—one each from the Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaw, and a third entity of appointed representatives of the military drawn from both Hluttaws. The groups will elect three presidential candidates and the military will nominate one candidate.

Like the NLD’s landslide victory in the 1990 election, a political party could win the majority of 330 seats in Pyithu Hluttaw. But it can’t expect their candidate to be elected president and form a government because one of the criteria for the president, as stated in Clause 59/d, is that the president has to be “well acquainted” with military affairs, which limits the chances of a non-military approved candidate being elected but does not make it impossible.

Therefore, the president’s power has been limited in the affairs of defense and security. Without seeking the consent of the president, the commander-in-chief of the military can independently appoint and operate three ministries: Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs.

Some constitutional observers may argue that this is a fair sharing of power between the military and a civilian government. But the constitution also offers absolute powers to the military that go against any normal democratic-based constitution.

National Defense and Security Council: A Supreme Power

The most powerful body created by the constitution is the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The body is composed of 11 members with the military granted six positions, ensuring that all the important affairs of state brought to the NDSC will be under the effective control of the military.

The NDSC’s four major tasks are: first, the president has to “appoint the commander-in-chief of Defense Services with the [NDSC’s] proposal and approval” as stated in Section 342;

Second, if declaring a state of emergency nationwide, the president must transfer “legislative, executive and judiciary powers to the commander-in-chief,” as stated in Section 417 and 418; third, the commander-in-chief can rule the country a maximum of two years under the state of emergency, and after the period, the NDSC will exercise the three powers under the name of the president, as stated in Section 421, 427 and 431; fourth, Section 429 stipulates that the NDSC will hold the general election in accord with the provisions of the constitution within six months from the day of withdrawing the state of emergency.

In spite of the above-mentioned constitutional rights, the military generals further cemented their power with one more important clause in Section 20/f: “The Defense Services is mainly responsible for safeguarding the Constitution.”

Translation: at any time, Burma can return to total military rule if the generals believe there is a threat to the constitution.

Htet Aung can be reached at htetaung69(@)gmail.com

Burma Newscasts - Burma’s New Constitution Privileges Soldiers above Civilians
7 September 2009

Prelude to a Civil War?

2009-09-07T18:00:00.003+10:00

By HARN YAWNGHWE
The Irrawaddy News

Many were surprised by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) attack against the Kokang forces.

Some had been so preoccupied with the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi that they were not even aware of the impending crisis. Others could not understand why the Burmese military would turn against their allies who have had a cease-fire agreement for more than 20 years.

Yet others thought that the Burma Army would never dare to incur the wrath of China. After all, had the Chinese not, in June, requested Vice-Snr-Gen Maung Aye to maintain stability on the border? This development was especially surprising to those who were convinced that Burma is a client state of China.

This failure to anticipate events underscores the weakness of the Burmese democracy movement, in particular, and the international community, in general.

We have often failed to understand the strategy and plans of the ruling military government. We have looked at their actions through our own prisms and misinterpreted their intentions. We have tended to see SPDC pronouncements as propaganda and have not paid enough attention to what it is planning to do.

Nobody is happy with military rule in Burma so we dismiss the SPDC “road map” to democracy and its constitution. But how many of us have actually studied the constitution in detail, not to criticize it, but to see how the military actually plans to implement its “road map” policies and how we can use its plans to our advantage?

In 2004, the SPDC announced the “road map,” and last year it announced plans for an election in 2010. We were outraged when the referendum was held two weeks after Cyclone Nargis had devastated the delta and Rangoon. We would not have been surprised had we realized that Snr-Gen Than Shwe takes the “road map” seriously.

He will not allow anything to stand in its way. A series of recent events has also taken some of us unaware—he release of U Win Tin; the first ever post-1990 congress of the National League for Democracy (NLD); Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial, the unseasonable attack on the Karen National Union; the attack on Kokang and now possibly an attack on the Wa.

These seem to be the random acts of a paranoid and unpredictable leader—the image we like to portray of Snr-Gen Than Shwe. But in reality, all these events have a common goal: the success of the 2010 elections. They are the rational outworking of a well-calculated and orchestrated operation plan of the SPDC.

The proposal to the ethnic cease-fire groups to transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the control of the Burma army is also an attempt to clear the decks before the 2010 elections. It was meant to either provoke the cease-fire groups to reject the proposal and be destroyed or frighten them into submission and acceptance of the SPDC road map.

It is clear that the BGF proposal was a provocation. This is because during the past 20 years, nothing of this matter was ever discussed with the cease-fire groups. They were told they could keep their arms and could negotiate with the newly elected government on the political terms they wanted.

Suddenly, in April they were told they had until October 2009 to decide. Analyzing the ceasefires, it is clear that the SPDC never meant to negotiate. The plan was to stop hostile action, provide incentives to entice individual commanders to split from the main groups and slowly weaken the ethnic groups to the point where they could be easily eliminated.

The cease-fire groups cannot accept the BGF because it is actually a plan to destroy the groups by attrition. But if they refuse to accept the proposal, they will be destroyed now, before the elections. The Kokang (MNDAA), the Wa (UWSA) and the Mongla (NDAA) groups rejected the BGF proposal and also refused to accept the SPDC’s road map and constitution. They do not want any changes. Therefore, if nothing changes, the SPDC will move against the UWSA and the NDAA. Which group will be attacked first will depend on the tactical advantage.

What about China? Is the SPDC not beholden to China? The short answer is—no. Whatever we may think about the SPDC, the Burma Army is very proud of the fact that it is “patriotic.” The SPDC has never danced to the tune of a foreign power. It has, rather, made foreign powers big and small dance to its tune. Since the SPDC has been largely ostracized internationally, it has had to depend on China.

But it was never happy about it. When Burma was discussed at the UN Security Council and it had to depend even more on China, the SPDC began to cultivate Russia, so that it would not be at China’s mercy. But Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s problem was solved when John Yettaw decided to take a swim. He enabled the SPDC to ensure that Aung San Suu Kyi would have no role in the election, and he also enabled Than Shwe to raise the stakes and create a direct link with the Obama administration.

This in turn gave Than Shwe the card he needed to ignore China’s wishes and move against the Kokang and Wa.

If Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s calculations are correct, the SPDC will be able to wipe out the Wa and Mongla groups, and the 2010 elections can be held on a less contentious playing field according to schedule.

The unpredictable factor, of course, is how much resistance the Wa army will offer. And what the reaction of the other cease-fire groups will be. Some like the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) are in the process of negotiating with the SPDC over the BGF issue.

Other groups like the KNU and the Shan State Army (South) are watching closely to see how the battle develops. If Than Shwe’s calculations are wrong, Burma could face a period of serious instability and the 2010 elections will be jeopardized.

But on the other hand, the SPDC may have decided that the elections could actually lead to democratization, and it is trying to create a pretext to postpone the elections indefinitely.

Harn Yawnghwe is executive director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office.

Burma Newscasts - Prelude to a Civil War?
7 September 2009

A Roof Over Their Heads

2009-09-07T17:56:00.002+10:00

By SOE LWIN
The Irrawaddy News

DEDAYE, Irrawaddy Delta—Forty-two-year-old Khin Htay was promised a house within two or three months. Six months later, she has not heard anything more about it, far less receiving any building materials.

“We don’t feel safe whenever a strong wind blow through this makeshift house,” said Khin Htay, a mother of five from Dedaye Township in the Irrawaddy delta.

Young boys collect water from a fresh-water pond near Laputta Township in Irrawaddy delta. (Photo: Reuters)

Adding to her fears is the memory of losing her husband and seven-month-old daughter when Cyclone Nargis wreaked havoc on her village in May 2008.

“Where shall we all stay if another cyclone destroys our home?” she asked despairingly.

Khin Htay and her young family are just a few of the hundreds of thousands of cyclone survivors who are still living in inadequate shelters some 16 months after the disaster.
The worst natural disaster in the country’s modern history killed close to 140,000 people and severely affected over two million.

About 360,000 homes were destroyed outright by the cyclone, according to official data.

According to UN-HABITAT, which takes a leading role in rebuilding houses for the cyclone survivors, more than 450,000 people are in still dire need of shelter aid.

In a recent statement, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar [Burma] Bishow Parajuli said, "Up to 130,000 families remain exposed and are suffering under severe weather conditions due to a lack of sustainable shelter."

However, humanitarian agencies have claimed that a shortfall of funds has hampered their efforts in rebuilding adequate shelters for the cyclone victims.

According to UN-HABITAT it has received only one-third of its requested amount of funds to rebuild adequate shelters for the displaced survivors.

UN-HABITAT said it requested some US $150 million for repairs and reconstruction under the Post Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP). But only about $50 million has been received.

So far, humanitarian agencies have reportedly rebuilt about 25,000 houses. For its part, the Burmese military government claims to have built more than 10,000 houses to date, a very small percentage considering the magnitude of the crisis.

According to the UN, about 209,000 families have reportedly rebuilt their own homes with their own hands over the past year.

But while some families wait for housing materials, others expect housing material and new land.

In Mhawbi Village in Pyapon Township, some families have been told they will be given housing materials, but that they have to find their own land to build on.

“We very much thank the agencies for saying they will build houses for us,” an elderly man from the village said. “But how can we afford the land to build a house on when we don’t have any money?”

Burma Newscasts - A Roof Over Their Heads
7 September 2009

Junta Targets Ethnic Rebels to Forge Unity Ahead of Polls

2009-09-07T17:49:00.003+10:00

By MARWAAN MACAN-MARKAR / IPS WRITER
The Irrawaddy News

BANGKOK — Burma’s military regime is turning to a familiar strategy—sending in troops—to impose its will on the northeastern corner of the country that shares a border with China’s Yunnan province in the east. The move shatters a 20-year peace deal with an armed ethnic rebel group that controls part of that mountainous terrain.

This eruption of hostilities has much to do with a promised general election next year that the oppressive rulers of Burma, also known as Myanmar, are marching towards. The junta wants a "discipline-flourishing democracy" to take root with the 2010 polls, the first such election after the results of the last one, in 1990, were annulled.

Soldiers from the United Wa State Army patrol a street of Nandeng, in the Wa region of Burma, on September 3. (Photo: AP)

Clashes between Burmese troops and the Kokang, one of four ethnic rebel groups that signed a ceasefire deal in the 1988-89 period, began in early August and escalated by the end of the month in an area close to the Chinese border. Casualty figures are still uncertain.

"About 7,000 troops with tanks, armored vehicles and heavy cannons are trying to control the region," says the US Campaign for Burma, a Washington DC-based group of Burmese political exiles. "The junta is sending 3,000 more troops from other parts of Burma to the region."

By Thursday, an uneasy calm had returned to Laogai, the Kokang capital, now in the hands of the Burmese troops, according to an aid worker in Burma, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Some of the 37,000 people who fled across the border to China after the fight broke out have begun to return," she says.

Sporadic sounds of gunfire were heard, she reveals, adding that the locals were not sure if the defeated Kokang rebels will resort to "guerrilla attacks" on the Burmese troops who have poured into Laogai. This capital has a substantial presence of Chinese businessmen, involved in the border economy of logging, mining and casinos for gambling.

The fighting resulted in an abrupt halt of the agriculture programs being run by the World Food Programme (WFP), the only United Nations (UN) agency that has a permanent presence in a region known for being a poppy-growing area and having a booming narcotics trade.

"Our operations have been suspended," Chris Kaye, the head of the WFP’s operations in Burma, confirmed during a telephone interview from Rangoon, the former capital. "The people in that area are inherently poor and depend on our programs as an alternative to growing poppy."

The UN agency’s work involves assisting the ethnic Kokang to grow tea, paddy and maize as an alternative source of income and to help the locals overcome food insecurity. It followed an announcement by leaders of the ethnic groups to end poppy cultivation by 2005 in the terrain that had been part of this region’s infamous ‘Golden Triangle,’ one of Asia’s largest opium-producing areas.

There are concerns, however, that the attack on the Kokang may not be a limited strike, but part of the junta’s broader plan to go after other armed ethnic groups along the country’s northeastern border. Among those are the Wa, the most armed of the ethnic rebels, with a force of some 25,000, and the smaller Kachin.

They are concerns shaped by the political developments in the ethnic areas of Burma, which has never been able to control all of its borders since gaining independence from the British over six decades ago. The country has 135 registered ethnic groups, of which the Burmans are the largest. Scores of ethnic rebels began separatist battles with the Burmese army to create independent countries.

Peace returned to Burma’s north-eastern border in the late 1980s after the Wa, Kachin and Kokang joined 14 other ethnic rebel movements to sign ceasefire agreements in exchange for greater political autonomy, freedom for their ethnic communities and more economic independence.

"The attack against the Kokang is an attempt to intimidate the other ceasefire groups to fall in line with the regime’s plans for the elections next year," says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert at Payap University in Chiang Mai, located in northern Thailand. "They are going to deal with them one by one to impose what the junta thinks will be unity in the country. But this is only a military-imposed unity."

"It will not be easy for the Burmese army," Win Min added during a telephone interview. "Going after the Wa will result in many casualties because it is the strongest armed ethnic group in the country."

It is a view echoed by others familiar with this region of Burma, which is part of the Shan state and home to the large Shan ethnic community. "If the Burmese regime thinks they will be able to subdue the ethnic rebel groups before next year’s election, they are dreaming," Khuensai Jaiyen, editor of the Shan Herald Agency for News, told IPS. "The fighting on the border is bound to escalate."

Already the attacks against the Kokang have left the ethnic Kachin worried that they may be next in the firing line. "The attacks are a violation of the ceasefire and we are worried about who will be targeted next," says Col James Lum Dau, deputy chief of foreign affairs for the Kachin Independence Organisation. "They want us to change militarily and be under complete Burmese control before the elections. We are against this kind of thing."

"It may be good for them but not for us. This is a military solution and not a political solution," he said in a telephone interview. "We are ready to support the elections that will ensure freedom for us."

Under Burma’s new constitution, approved in a May 2008 referendum plagued with fraud, the country can only have one armed group—the military. And to bring the country’s many armed ethnic groups in line with this provision, the military regime has ordered all rebel groups to become part of a border guard force ahead of the 2010 poll.

The border guard force, which was announced in April, will strip the ethnic rebels of their troop strength and their military independence, since each of these border battalions will come under the wing of a Burmese officer. It was a disarmament plan that the Kokang rejected as did the Wa and Kachin fighters, among others.

"It is unthinkable to expect the Wa to conform to the border guard plan," says a European diplomat who regularly visits Burma. "They have a hatred towards the Burmese; it is deeply rooted."

"There is also opposition to this new force because none of these ethnic groups know what political concessions they will get after the elections," the diplomat, who requested anonymity, told IPS. "The next weeks will reveal if the attacks on the Kokang will force the Wa and others back to the negotiating table about the border guard force."

Burma Newscasts - Junta Targets Ethnic Rebels to Forge Unity Ahead of Polls
7 September 2009

Inevitable US policy shift on Burma: why and how

2009-09-07T17:42:00.003+10:00

by Min Zaw Oo

Mizzima News - The recent visit of US Senator Jim Webb has stirred up speculation and criticism of what the visit could mean for Washington’s Burma policy, especially from traditional supporters of the opposition movement residing in the West. A common, critical sound bite belittles Webb’s visit as a personal trip. But all detractors and critics largely ignore the fundamental facts related to the visit and the inevitability of a US policy shift on Burma.

There are three major underlying reasons encompassing the US’s new policy towards Burma.

Strategic Paradigm Shift

Under President Obama the most fundamental deviation from the Bush administration’s foreign policy is the recognition of the limit of US power in the world. The Bush administration’s neo-conservative worldview called for the use of US power to bring about freedom and democracy. In contrast, Obama and his strategic advisors acknowledge that the extension of US power has reached a critical threshold.

The US has become a declining power in the face of a rising China, Russia and India. Although the US is still the most powerful nation militarily, the US economy is largely interdependent with the Asian economy. China holds the largest percentage of US debt. The combination of Japanese and Chinese ownership of US debt has reached 45 percent of US Treasury securities.

In addition, the military gap is narrowing. A recent study conducted by the RAND Corporation, an influential US think-tank, concludes the Chinese military could defeat US forces in the Taiwan Strait if the US attempted to deter a Chinese offensive to reclaim Taiwan. Meanwhile, Russia has fielded its latest S-400 air-defense system which it claims to be superior to the US’s second-generation Patriot missile system.

During this onset of US power decline the strategic goal of the Obama administration has become the restoration of US dominance in the world. But Obama realizes that the most effective approach to this end will be the utilization of ‘soft power,’ which calls for friendliness rather than coercion.

Under a new strategic paradigm, Obama will deliberately drop democracy promotion from the US’s major foreign policy agenda. He carefully avoided the word ‘democracy’ in his inaugural speech. In contrast, he explicitly proclaimed the US will reach out to non-democracies rather than preaching to them the merits of political transformation in the interests of the US.

This new strategic perspective will shape the US’s policy shift on Burma as well.

The Role of ASEAN

Another strategy shift from the Bush administration has been the US’s perspective on ASEAN. The former administration considered it a non-priority strategic region except in the case of the War on Terror.

The Bush administration refused to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), requiring all signatories to refrain from using military force against other member states. Additionally, the issue of Burma used to be an obstacle between the US and ASEAN. The Bush administration promoted more bilateral relations with non-NATO allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, rather than multilateral cooperation with the region as a whole.

While the US kept its distance from ASEAN, China launched an efficacious charm offensive in the region. After ASEAN was hit by the financial crisis in 1997, Chinese economic assistance to countries in the region surpassed US aid, even to traditional US allies Thailand and the Philippines.

China’s ratification of the TAC pacified the fear of ASEAN countries concerning the rise of the dragon. ASEAN, as a consequence, has grown increasingly comfortable with China over the last ten years. China’s total trade with ASEAN has grown by 1,034 percent since 1995, whereas the same figure for the US stands at a mere 75 percent.

The new administration in Washington feels China’s heat in the region. Bilateral relations cannot simply preserve waning US influence in Southeast Asia, in the view of the new administration, with non-NATO allies; the US has to embrace ASEAN as a whole. As a result, Washington acceded to the TAC on July 22nd, 2009.

If the US aims to move closer to ASEAN, Burma cannot be allowed to be a stumbling block between Washington and rising Asian power blocs.

China Factor

The third reason is the strategic role of China in the region. The Burma-China relationship will enter a new chapter after China completes an oil pipeline connecting the Andaman Sea with China’s Yunnan province. The move is alarmingly strategic.

Past Chinese interest in Burma was less critical than many observers have speculated, with trade accounting for a fraction of one percent of overall Chinese exports, while China has failed to transfer any strategic weaponry to Naypyitaw.

However, the 2.9-billion dollar Chinese oil pipeline will drastically transform the role of Burma in China’s strategic calculus. China has been geographically vulnerable to a naval blockade, being confined by Japan to the east, Taiwan to the south and South Korea to the north of China – all US allies. In addition, China lacks a naval force capable of protecting its sea lines.

Chinese security analysts from the Energy Research Institute (ERI) and China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) have long been advocating the construction of overland transnational oil pipelines to China to overcome its energy insecurity in the face of a possible military confrontation with the US.

The projected oil pipeline from Burma will reinforce China’s long-term strategic energy initiative. The pipeline will be much more significant than any existing China-Burma engagements. China may even consider protecting its interest in Burma under a nuclear umbrella.

The pipeline in Burma will be a plausible reason for China to send its advanced submarines, China’s major naval assets, to the Andaman Sea to protect its strategic interest, simultaneously restricting the regional power projection of the US Navy’s 7th fleet.

Although the US is militarily capable of attacking China’s land-based pipelines and pumping stations in Burma, any military action involving a third-country in an event of direct confrontation between the US and China will be politically complicated – especially since the US’s recent accession to the TAC effectively limits Washington’s potential counter measures.

Burma used to be a moral issue for the United States. At this time, however, Washington’s renewed interest in Burma is derived from US security and national interests.

United States’ Policy Review on Burma

In recent weeks the CIA, Pentagon and Department of Energy have been ordered to intensify research on Burma with an aim of compiling a comprehensive report for policy review.

To this extent, Jim Webb is not a lone wolf. Senior senators such as John Kerry and Richard Lugar, a key figure in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, acknowledge the shortcomings of the current US policy on Burma. Lugar previously broke ranks with his Republican Party on Cuba, calling for normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

As the moral dimension of the Burma policy still looms large in Washington, advocates of new initiatives prefer behind-the-scenes approaches. Although the official position of the State Department is still intact, analysts within the policy circle are busy calculating the pros and cons of the US’s policy on Burma.

The moral dimension of the current policy is set to fade, albeit not entirely dissipated. If US national interest becomes the backbone of its new policy on Burma, Washington’s policy shift concerning Naypyitaw will be unstoppable.

How will the US engage Burma?

Regardless of policy perspectives, the US’s engagement with Burma’s military government will be quite different from the way ASEAN does business.

Democratization and human rights will still be a part of US policy goals in Burma. But the US will drop some major preconditions for engagement, such as the release of Aung Sun Suu Kyi and all political prisoners.

In the near future the two countries will likely experience quid pro quo engagement, ranging from counter-narcotics to political prisoners. Among all initiatives, however, the focus of US policy will be on the 2010 elections.

This is a major shift from the Bush administration, which adamantly demanded that transition in Burma must come through a negotiated settlement between the government and the NLD. While the US’s new policy will hail any conciliatory settlement between the opposition and the government, Washington will no longer hold its breath on a dialogue-driven transition in Burma. The US, in the wake of successful elections, will very likely embrace a military-led transition in the country if the new government manages to free Aung San Suu Kyi and remaining political prisoners after 2010.

The most crucial aspect of the US’s policy on Burma will probably be the legitimacy of the 2010 election. Washington does not want to altogether abandon its moral code, and thus will need a plausible reason to facilitate its policy shift on Burma. The legitimacy of the 2010 election will be the best ticket for the US to move closer to Burma in the near future.

The international community, including the US, has asked the Tatmadaw government to hold an inclusive election. Inclusiveness calls for the political participation of opposition parties, especially the NLD. To legitimize the election the Tatmadaw government has to allow the NLD and other opposition parties to contest. On the other hand, the NLD’s voluntary boycott, per se, will not de-legitimize the election as long as the government formally allows it to participate. Historically, opposition boycotts to elections sponsored by ruling regimes, such as in Bangladesh in 1991 and in Ethiopia in 1995, have proved fruitless.

As long as the elected representatives reflect the actual vote, the 2010 election will be internationally perceived as legitimate.

The election will strategically alter Burma’s political landscape for decades to come. Concurrently, Burma’s relationship with the US will depend on the legitimacy of the election and civilian representation in the post-2010 government reflective of electoral results. If, then, the new government is capable of addressing international concerns on human rights issues, Burma’s relationship with the West will gradually strengthen.

(Min Zaw Oo is a PhD candidate writing a dissertation on the study of 115 transitions to democracy at George Mason University. He holds a MA in security studies from Georgetown University and MS in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University.)

Burma Newscasts - Inevitable US policy shift on Burma: why and how
7 September 2009

Halt war on ethnic nationalities immediately

2009-09-05T12:27:00.002+10:00

Mizzima News - The Burmese military junta is relentlessly mounting pressure on ceasefire groups to amalgamate them under the total control of the Burmese Army. The regime ought to stop using its military might and the law of the jungle against the ceasefire groups, but find political solutions to the issue.

After successfully putting the Burmese pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi behind bars in a step to move her out of their planned 2010 general elections, another victim in their plans of elimination of all obstacles on its way to the seven-step roadmap is the Kokang ceasefire group known as Shan State Special Region No. 1 led by Peng Jiasheng. The generals from Naypyitaw attacked and captured the Kokang group territories in end August.

Clashes broke out in Kokang areas on August 27 after the junta’s troops raided and searched the house of the Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng on the pretext of searching for narcotic drugs. According to the defeated Peng Jiasheng’s sources, the two-day war left nearly 200 including civilians dead. The Burmese Army lost 26 men while 47 were injured.

Many houses were destroyed in the Kokang capital Lao Kai and over 30,000 civilians became war refugees and fled to neighbouring China within days.

The leader of the Kokang Army also known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), once put on a pedestal and highly revered by the ruling generals, has now turned into a drug-warlord in the eyes of the junta. Meanwhile, the group's deputy leader Bai Souqing has became a temporary ally of Naypyitaw.

It is rather ironic and interesting, to see the extremely nationalistic ruling generals, who have been in deep slumber for the past 20 years over drug production and trafficking in this region, suddenly waking up and implementing a drug eradication programme. Now the generals can afford to forget what these drug lords had contributed to them in terms of legitimacy and the financial support through their black money. Though these contributions were once crucial for the regime to consolidate power, it no longer seems to be as important for them as having control over the territories of the ceasefire armed groups.

The junta’s exploitation of the rift among ceasefire groups is a lesson to be learnt by all other ceasefire groups including Wa, Kachin, Mongla, Mon and Karen.

There can be no lasting peace in Burma unless the ethnic issues are resolved through negotiation and peaceful means. Equality, justice, peace and development can be best achieved only through political negotiation and not by repression.

Burma Newscasts - Halt war on ethnic nationalities immediately
5 September 2009

Junta Continues its Campaign against Burmese Diversity

2009-09-03T17:11:00.005+10:00

By SIMON ROUGHNEEN
The Irrawaddy News

Recent fighting in northern Shan state, between the junta’s army and the ethnic Kokang militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, has fuelled speculation that the regime intends to coerce Burma’s 17 ceasefire groups into accepting a plan to incorporate them into the state security apparatus as border guards.

The ceasefire groups are ethnic militias—most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army—that have fought on and off, in various guises, against central rule since Burma became independent in 1948. They are part of Burma’s remarkably diverse ethnic, religious and cultural demography—40 percent of the country’s population is comprised of non-Burman minorities. In total, the state recognizes 135 different ethnicities.

However, the Burmese regime’s army has fought brutal campaigns against these groups, with long-documented human rights abuses, including mass displacement, forced labor and conscription, as well as countless cases of rape and murder targeting civilians. Some analysts believe that the level of abuses ranks alongside or even exceeds that of Darfur in western Sudan.

In some cases, the junta has successfully co-opted proxy or splinter movements from ethnic insurgent groups as part of its ongoing strategy of “divide and rule” to weaken ethnically based opposition. But far from bringing peace to the country, this approach has served only to perpetuate ethnic tensions.

Indeed, some observers believe that the regime has little interest in resolving a problem that has long been its raison d’etre. “Burma’s ethnic diversity has been one of the main justifications for continued military rule,” said Win Min, an analyst of Burmese affairs based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, adding that the army has long seen civilian government as too weak to prevent potential secession by ethnic minorities.

Going back to the 1947 constitution, the military has always believed that civilian solutions to the problems posed by Burma’s ethnic divisions, such as local autonomy or federalism, with the option of secession in some cases, threaten national unity and foment instability.

The army goes by the maxim that diversity equals disunity, something seen in military-civilian political vehicles such as the National Unity Party, the junta-backed party that ran against the National League for Democracy in the 1990 elections, and the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass organization established in 1993 that is expected to be transformed into a pro-junta political party in time for elections in 2010.

The regime’s efforts to undermine ethnically based expressions of identity in Burma are also evident in the 2008 constitution, which circumscribes ethnic autonomy and is a digression away from the establishment of anything resembling a federal union—a demand of many ethnic groups.

“The constitution/election process is driving this policy to marginalize the ethnic groups,” said Sean Turnell, an economist at Australia’s Macquarie University whose research focuses on Burma. “This may come back to haunt the junta, as it has with previous governments,” he added.

If the junta proceeds with its military build-up in Shan State, close to the well-armed UWSA, it may be revisited by the ghosts of insurgencies past very soon. The prospect of renewed ethnic civil war in Burma’s borderlands has caused concern in neighboring countries, particularly China, which remains a key ally of the regime.

The Burmese generals issued an apology to Beijing after being reprimanded over the fighting in Kokang, which saw an estimated 30,000 refugees from this ethnically Chinese region cross into China’s Yunnan Province. The junta risks undermining its relationship with Beijing, as instability is perceived to be contrary to China’s interests.

As K. Yhome, an analyst at the Observer Research Foundation in India, put it: “Political stability in Myanmar [Burma] is a major concern for Beijing, particularly in the border regions.”

China’s port and pipeline plan linking the Burmese coast with Yunnan is due to get underway this month, and Beijing doubtless does not want the timeframe jeopardized by the junta’s domestic concerns. The pipeline will extend 1,200 km and allow Beijing to bypass the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea when bringing oil imports from Africa and the Middle East into China.

Given that China has “run interference for the junta at the UN Security Council”—in the words of Walter Lohman, an Asia expert at the Heritage Foundation—sending refugees streaming into China seems a bitter payback. Only three weeks ago, Beijing told critics that the August 11 decision to return Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest was an internal Burmese matter.

Ironically, the junta’s offensive along the Sino-Burmese border may have been intended to send the same message—that the regime manages its internal affairs autonomously—to Beijing. It could also be a hint that there are other options available, should the junta want to diversify its networks of foreign partners.

The regime certainly has reason to believe that Beijing is not its only friend. While China’s tally of oil blocks in Burma is 16, India has seven and Thailand five. Meanwhile, India, South Korea and half of Burma’s fellow members in the Association of Southeast Nations are investing in the country’s vast natural resources and competing with China for trade links with the generals.

According to Turnell, the regime may even be paying China back for entering into a series of gas contracts with Bangladesh over offshore fields in disputed seas between Burma and Bangladesh.

However, it remains to be seen how far the junta could push this attempt to needle China, or to diversify its foreign trade and investment relations. “Myanmar needs to remain focused on Chinese concerns,” said Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of international studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

If the regime seeks to pick a fight with the UWSA or any of the other larger ethnic militias, it could be stirring a hornet’s nest. This type of political instability could threaten Chinese investments in Burma, and Beijing’s growing economy cannot afford that.

Just as it does not want an unstable Burma, Beijing is almost certainly on the alert for any rapprochement between the US and the junta. It is not clear whether the Kokang offensive is linked to the recent visit by Senator Jim Webb to Burma, but the growing military presence in Shan State has taken place while international attention has been focused on Webb’s visit, and the Suu Kyi trial circus that preceded it.

“In the long term, if the US improves its ties with Myanmar, it will have strategic implications for Beijing, which wants to reach the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and the oil and gas pipeline projects that it plans through Myanmar,” said K. Yhome.

3 September 2009
Burma Newscasts - Junta Continues its Campaign against Burmese Diversity

Kokang Conflict Highlights Tatmadaw Xenophobia

2009-09-03T17:06:00.000+10:00

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

The Tatmadaw of Burma, one of the most nationalistic armies in the world, demonstrated its xenophobia during the past two weeks following its capture of Kokang-Chinese territory.

According to reports from the region on the northeastern frontier of Burma, following the seizure of Laogai, the Kokang capital, on August 24, government soldiers questioned civilians about whether they were Burma-born Chinese or immigrants from China.

“After answering, Chinese from mainland China were beaten by soldiers,” said a source in Laogai.

Refugees who fled to China told reporters that shops, stores and other properties owned by Chinese had been looted in various towns in the Kokang region where an estimate 90 percent of businesses are owned by Chinese businessmen.

Anti-Chinese elements among government soldiers are not new. In 1967, an anti-Chinese riot in Rangoon and other cities led to dozens of deaths. Observers said late dictator Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party used the Chinese as a scapegoat to deflect public anger at the government over a rice shortage in the country.

Anti-Chinese sentiment among Burmese has increased after the Chinese and Burmese governments signed border trading agreements in 1988, and the military junta signed ceasefire agreements with ethnic militias on the Sino-Burmese border in 1989.

After the opening of border trade and the ceasefire agreements, Chinese business interests and immigrants moved into Burma in large numbers, observers said. From the northern Shan State capital of Lashio to Madalay, the second largest city, to Rangoon, Chinese migrants and businesses along with the ethnic ceasefire groups, such as the Kokang and Wa, have taken on a higher profile among Burmese.

“They say they are Wa or Kokang, but we know they are actually Chinese,” said a businessman in Mandalay, citing his experience.

During two decades, Chinese have taken over businesses owned by Burmese in northern Shan State and Mandalay. Signs on many department stores, restaurants and shops in Mandalay and Lashio are printed in the Chinese language.

Intentionally or unintentionally, the special favors granted ethnic groups by Gen Khin Nyunt, the former Burma spy chief, produced a backlash against Kokang-Chinese and other ceasefire groups among the Tatmadaw’s soldiers.

From 1989 to 2004— before Khin Nyunt’s downfall—the Kokang and Wa were allowed to take their weapons to Rangoon and Mandalay. Kokang and Wa soldiers were untouchable under Khin Nyunt’s instructions even though they committed crimes.

When vehicles from Wa and Kokang groups passed army and police checkpoints, they were not searched.

In one incident in 1999, a member of the Wa army killed a businessman in downtown Rangoon after a business conflict. The police arrested the man but he was not charged, and later Wa officials took the man from police custody.

According to Mandalay residents, members of ceasefire groups such as the Wa and Kokang were known to use pistols in personal conflicts with local people in the early 2000s.

Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said that after ceasefire agreements were signed, the Wa and Kokang caused many problems in cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, and many officers and soldiers in the regime’s army have developed a negative image of the two groups as a result.

The recent military conflict between the government and ethnic groups has divided public opinion in Rangoon and Mandalay, according to journalists.

“Some people here say it is the government bullying the Kokang-Chinese. But most people support the government,” said an editor of a Rangoon-based private journal.

A Childhood Spent Scavenging

2009-09-03T16:53:00.000+10:00

By SOE LWIN
The Irrawaddy News

RANGOON —Twelve-year-old Maung Chan Thar has only known poverty despite having a name that means “master of wealth.”

His parents gave him the name in the belief that it would bring good fortune to their eldest son.

With a meager household income, Maung Chan Thar's family of eight has to struggle to put enough food on the table each day, let alone buy clothes or things needed for school by his three younger brothers and two younger sisters.

The piles of rubbish in Rangoon are children’s sources of income. (Photo: The Irrawaddy)

Four years ago, when Maung Chan Thar was just eight, his parents sent him onto the streets to earn money because they could no longer afford to keep him at school.

Carrying a sack on his back, he has been working in the streets ever since, looking through the piles of rubbish on the streets, roaming the railway tracks, collecting empty water bottles, plastic bags—whatever he can resell.

The piles of rubbish at the markets and railway stations are his sources of income. On a good day, he can make the equivalent of more than US $1, but normally Maung Chan Thar only earns about 70 or 80 cents.

“I am so happy to see my mother smile when I put cash in her hands,” he said.

Maung Chan Thar is the second income earner in his family after his father, who makes about $1.50 a day pedaling a trishaw.

Though he is an important source of income for his family, his parents cannot take care of him.

Like tens of thousands of other street children in big cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, Maung Chan Thar’s clothes are filthy and in tatters. His hair has not been washed for months, and his nails are long and dirty.

Maung Chan Thar thinks things are alright, however. He knows that in his job what matters is collecting as much recyclable material as possible.

"I hate seeing my younger brothers and sisters crying in hunger, so I work hard," he said, sifting through a pile of garbage near Kyimyindaing Railway Station. “I don’t want them to ever do work like this. I want them to keep going to school.”

When he started on the street, he was often bullied by stronger street children, who would sometimes steal what he made.

"I will never forget when three larger boys beat me up and took all my money,” Maung Chan Thar said. “When I got back home, my father beat me up again for being so weak."

Maung Chan Thar has learned how to avoid such incidents, and he has many friends who will come to his help him if someone picks on him.

His worries are far from over, however. The municipal police and staff from the Yangon [Rangoon] City Development Committee are constantly making arrests.

The risk of arrest is higher when he sleeps at railway stations or bus stops in the downtown area, he said. Since his home is located in Shwepyithar in the outskirts of Rangoon, he often sleeps downtown with his friends if it is too late to go back.

“I’ve never been arrested,” he said. “I’m good at avoiding the police.

“People look down on street children like us, thinking we are thieves,” he said. “When we go around below large buildings picking up plastic bags, residents sometimes threaten us. We have to switch collecting sites quickly when that happens.

“I don’t understand why they look down on us like that,” Maung Chan Thar said, adding that he always followed his mother’s advice.

“My mother always told me never to steal or beg, but to work hard and be honest,” he said.

Though Maung Chan Thar seems destined to keep doing his lowly job, he firmly believes he will be rich one day.

“Every night my mother has this dream in which I am a rich man,” he said, squatting on the rubbish.

“Perhaps I will find something very precious in this rubbish one day,” he said. “Who is to say that I won’t?”

UWSA will be in a spot if Wei sides with junta

2009-09-03T16:49:00.002+10:00

by Brian McCartan

Mizzima - Much has been made of the junta’s ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics, but often overlooked is the fact that Burma’s military rulers do not create many of these situations, but exploit existing divisions. One that could have potentially serious consequences to follow-on moves against the ceasefire groups is that between the northern and southern Wa under Wei Xuegang.

The territory under the control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is split between a northern region along the Sino-Burma border and a southern region on the Thai border. The northern region is the former operating area of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) from which the Wa mutinied in April 1989 before signing a ceasefire with the government later in the year.

The southern area was originally the operating area of a non-communist Wa group that eventually joined northern Wa after the mutiny. The southern Wa was led by Maha Sang, a former Wa prince and his lieutenant, an ethnic Chinese from the Sino-Burma border area, Wei Xuegang. Designated the 171st Military Region, the area eventually came under the firm leadership of Wei and his brothers Wei Xueyin and Wei Xuelong.

In addition to the leadership of the southern Wa, Wei and his brothers are considered by many Burma watchers as the bankrollers of the UWSA. Appointed a central committee member of the group’s political wing, the United Wa State Party, in 1996, Wei was also the UWSA’s finance head from July 2006 until December 2007.

Wei’s financial standing in the UWSA comes largely from his control of heroin and methamphetamine production facilities along the Thai border and international trafficking connections. The huge profits made by Wei and his associates enabled the UWSA to greatly expand its control over areas of Shan State as well as increase its number of soldiers and quality of equipment and weapons.

Further reinforcing Wei’s position was the forced relocation of tens of thousands of Wa villagers from the China border to the southern Wa area in 1999. The Wa came to dominate the area, establishing new villages and towns and largely forcing the original Shan inhabitants out. Many of the old strongholds of former opium warlord Khun Sa, which the Wa had fought against for years, were absorbed by Wei’s group after his surrender in 1996. Many of those areas were along the Thai border giving the organization increased opportunities for trade in various forms of contraband including narcotics.

Where Wei and the rest of the UWSA leadership differ is in their political outlook. While many of the ethnic Wa leaders of the UWSA have definite nationalist interests as well as business, Wei is known to be dismissive of politics and interested more in ensuring the continued expansion of his business interests.

An outbreak of fighting with the Burmese Army would certainly not be good for business from Wei’s standpoint. Most of his more legitimate businesses are in central Burma and he would stand to lose them. Hostilities could also potentially disrupt narcotics production and trafficking, particularly if Thai security forces support Burmese moves on their side of the border.

The junta certainly understands this as well and has made several attempts to persuade Wei to make his own peace and transform his forces into a government-backed militia. Although details are sketchy, it can be assumed any arrangement would include a provision wherein Wei would be granted non-interference in his narcotics production and trafficking.

Should Wei cast his lot with the junta, it would put the UWSA in serious financial difficulty. Lost would be access to Thailand and the large amounts of cash generated by Wei’s narcotics business. Cross-border trade to China would not be able to make up for the shortfall and a prohibition on narcotics trafficking to China is reportedly a condition for Chinese assistance on development projects and other forms of cross-border aid as well as political support against Burma’s generals. While victory would by no means be as swift as against the Kokang last week, without Wei’s forces and financial backing, the UWSA would find it all the harder to resist the Burmese Army.

So far, the southern Wa have resisted the junta’s overtures saying that all negotiations must be with Panghsang and Wa troops are reportedly on standby for any outbreak of hostilities. The rapid fall of the Kokang last week and the replacement of Peng Jiasheng with a rival backed by the government, however, may give Wei reason to rethink his options. After all, a precedent has already been set by the retirement of Khun Sa in 1996. The old warlord went on to live very comfortably in Rangoon until his death in 2007.

Monk accused of suicide produced in court

2009-09-03T16:43:00.002+10:00

by Phanida

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Ashin Sanda Dika, who was charged with attempted suicide by setting himself on fire, was produced in court on Thursday, sources in the court and opposition said.

The monk Ashin Sanda Dika (36) was disrobed and had to face trial in court inside the Insein prison. Sub-Inspector of Police Zaw Phone Win acted as prosecutor at the Bahan Township court in the case under section 295(a) of the Penal Code (insulting religion). The monk sojourned at Laykyun Mannaing monastery, Daesun pagoda in Pegu Division.

“The four witnesses were called and three of them were examined. The prosecutor also testified,” the High Court source told Mizzima. According to another source, all the witnesses were police personnel.

Nyi Nyi Lwin-turned-Ahsin Sanda Dika defended himself.

“Restriction of movement of a monk in this place is not in accordance with the Canon Law of Buddhism. The Sayadaw (abbot) came here with permission during Buddhist lent. He did not insult the religion. He asked these questions and raised these issues in the court himself,” a person close to the accused said.

The Bahan police station personnel arrested him on August 11, after he visited places near the National League for Democracy (NLD) headquarters and the Insein prison to find about the court’s judgment on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial on that day.

The three men took Ashin Sanda Dika to the police station in Rangoon North District and at least two policemen beat him up with bamboo poles, the Asia Human Right Commission (AHRC) said.

According to the examination by both prosecution and defence lawyers in court, there was no material evidence such as kerosene found at the scene of the crime. And there were no independent witnesses, the AHRC said.

Meanwhile other monk-related incidents have taken place in Chauk, Yenanchaung and Pakokku townships in Magwe Division on August 27 and August 31. These places were searched and some arrests were made, the All Burma Monks Organization said.

“In fact, the SPDC (junta) is insulting the religion. Our monks are living under the order of Dhama. Arresting monks and charging them with various sections of various laws make us suffer from inferiority complex in comparison to other religions. We are losing face in the world,” U Dhama Wuntha from the monk organization said.

According to War Office sources in Naypyidaw, the junta is expecting another uprising led by monks and it has ordered tightening of security and is closely watch monasteries.

Burmese Army might be targeting UWSA: Observer

2009-09-03T16:41:00.000+10:00

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - After having overrun and occupied the Kokang area in north-eastern Shan State and driving away its leader, the Burmese military junta might have initiated its move against one of the largest ceasefire groups, the United Wa State Army, an observer said.

Khuensai Jaiyen, editor of the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), who is close to UWSA, said Wa leaders in Panghsang in eastern Shan state have received a letter from the Burmese Army demanding the extradition of Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng and three others. The junta had issued arrest warrants against them.

“Nobody is sure where Peng and his group are staying right now. It is absurd that the Burmese Army has demanded that the Wa hand over Peng. It seems to me that the junta is starting to pick on the Wa,” Khuensai said.

The letter dated September 1, 2009 was received by Wa leaders in Panghsang on September 2. Worried over the issue, the Wa leaders sat at a meeting on Thursday morning and decided not to respond to the letter, he added.

“The Wa leaders believe that the demand could be a point to pick by the junta and so decided to remain silent without replying to it,” said Khuensai.

He said, whichever way the Wa replies, the junta could find fault. Even by remaining silent, the junta could still find fault and find reasons to launch an attack.

Peng Jiasheng, the once supreme leader of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Kokang Army, was forced to flee Loa Kai, capital of Kokang region, after the Burmese junta issued an arrest warrant for him along with three others including his brother on charges of running an arms and ammunition factory and trafficking.

Peng’s flight left his deputy Bai Suoqing and a few other MNDAA soldiers, who support the junta. The MNDAA was later reformed with the help of the Burmese Army and Bai was appointed the new leader.

“When I asked Wa leaders about the whereabouts of Peng, they told me that he would most probably be with his son-in-law but did not deny or agree that Peng might be in Wa controlled area,” Khuensai said.

According to the Wa leader’s response, Peng and his troops are most likely to be with the Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mongla, whose leader Sai Leun is Peng’s son-in-law.

While the information on the junta’s demand to the Wa to extradite Peng cannot be independently verified, a Sino-Burma border based military analyst Aung Kyaw Zaw said, he does not believe any such demand has been made.

“I have not heard of the demand but I think it is unlikely and Brig Gen Win Maung commander of the Regional Operations Command (ROC) in Lao Kai has no such power to make the demand as the case is to be handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs,” he added.

But he said, in connection with the conflicts last week in Kokang region, Burmese Deputy Home Minister Phone Shwe and a team of delegates, earlier this week, visited Kun Ming, capital of China’s North-western province of Yunnan, and met regional Chinese officials.

Aung Kyaw Zaw said, while the junta is determined to neutralise ethnic armed groups, particularly the ceasefire groups, in eastern Shan State, the UWSA might not be the first target to choose.

Observers agreed that the junta is unlikely to declare war on the UWSA, which is believed to have up to 20,000 soldiers, but use different tactics including ‘divide and conquer’ by exploiting the differences between the leaders, Wei Hsueh-kang and Bao You-Xiang.

The Coils of Custom

2009-09-01T20:21:00.002+10:00

By AYE CHAN MYATE
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

As tourism drops, many Padaung abandon the tradition of putting bronze coils on the necks of their daughters

Though likened to “human zoos” whose residents are seemingly caged like exotic birds, the Padaung tourist villages of Mae Hong Son Province used to be relatively prosperous.

U Ladu, the Padaung headman of Ban Nai Soi, said they can no longer count on tourists coming to see their “long neck” women, who are famous for the bronze coils wound around their necks, since the numbers of foreign visitors coming to the province has dropped sharply.

Padaung women are a major tourist attraction in Mae Hong Son Province in Thailand.

“The tour companies have stopped contributing to the individual monthly incomes of 1,000 to 1,500 baht (US $30-$45) received by our women,” said U Ladu. “They no longer provide food rations of beans, pulses and cans of fish.

“We’ve got enough rice for six or seven months, but we no longer get any regular income or food donations. We haven’t been provided for on a regularly basis for almost eight years. Sometimes supplies come, and sometimes they don’t. The worst is when we get sick—we can no longer afford medical care,” he said.

A sub-tribe of Burma’s Karenni people, the Padaung were among almost 200,000 refugees that left Burma for Thailand by 2005, according to estimates by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Driven from their homes in the Demawsoe area between Loikaw and Kyaphogyi in Karenni State by economic distress and military oppression, they migrated to Thailand over a 20-year period.

The 500 Padaung who settled in Thailand came as a windfall for Thai businessmen and provincial authorities, who placed them in three fenced-off villages—Ban Nai Soi, Ban Sua Thao and Huai Pu Keng—near Mae Hong Son in northwestern Thailand. The Padaung were not given official status, but they were free to leave the villages provided they did not go too far, though in practice this was discouraged.

Foreign tourists wanting to see and photograph the Padaung women wearing their iconic bronze coils had to pay 250 baht ($7.30) to enter the villages.

During the boom years of Thailand’s tourism in the 1990s business was good. The Padaung women could earn up to 3,000 baht ($120 at that time) per month by having their photographs taken and selling handicrafts. A 2008 report in the The Irrawaddy said Ban Nai Soi, the largest Padaung village, attracted around 1,200 tourists annually.

Travel writers observed that the Padaung were better off in the tourist villages in Thailand than they would have been in Burma. The local authorities who promoted them as a tourist attraction and the tour operators were happy.

In 1998, however, a scandal broke out when a Thai businessman was charged with luring some Padaung to Thailand, promising to take them to their relations in Mae Hong Son Province, but allegedly forcing them to live as virtual prisoners in a camp in Thaton, a small tourist town in the north of Chiang Mai Province.

The scandal died down when they were sent to join their relatives in Mae Hong Son, but the taint of “human zoos” tarnished Thailand’s reputation.

In 2008, the Thai government was accused of denying exit visas to 20 Padaungs who were being offered opportunities for resettlement in Finland and New Zealand. Observers accused the Thais of keeping the Padaungs because they did not want to lose tourist business.

The Thai authorities were reluctant to give an explanation for denying the Padaungs exit permits, but according to U Lay Maung, the chairman of the Karenni Refugee Committee, the Thais are now saying the Padaung can qualify for resettlement provided they live in a UNHCR camp. A UNHCR source said that to get an exit permit the Padaung women must also remove their neck rings.

“Even though they are not providing regular food, the Thai authorities are giving them [the Padaung] a choice: they can move into the refugee camp, in which case they must hold a UNHCR refugee card, or they can get legal permits to stay in Thailand. If they stay in Thailand, the Thai authorities are saying their children will be able to enroll at the village schools,” U Lay Maung said.

With regional competition, political disturbances and the global economic crisis causing a dramatic decline in numbers of tourists entering Thailand—in the first four months of 2009 numbers fell by almost 20 percent from the same period in 2008—the Thai offer may not be enough to keep the Padaung.

“Only 20 tourists came to the village in the last 10 days,” said U Ladu, adding that these had been the busiest days all month. As he spoke, three Chinese tourists were wandering around and taking photographs. “The villagers will only get money if they can sell their handicrafts,” he said.

U Lay Maung said, “Many of the villagers have been totally without income for the whole year,” adding that they had to eke out an existence by farming small plots. When the Padaung villagers asked for food from the Karenni refugee camp, they were refused because supplies were already insufficient and there was no additional budget, he said.

The children, however, can get an education. “Many of the village children go to the school in Karenni Refugee Camp-1, which is an hour’s walk from the village,” U Lay Maung said, “and more and more Padaungs are no longer putting the coils on their daughters’ necks if they go to school.”

U Ladu’s wife, Ma Hu Htee, wears the bronze coils, but she says they are not putting them on their daughter, a 9th grade student at the school in the refugee camp.

“Originally, about 50 of us wore coils in this village,” Ma Hu Htee said, “But now only 23 still wear them. The older ones can deal with the looks when we go out, but we don’t want our children to suffer when they go to school.

“We don’t really know how we came to wear them. My parents began putting them on my neck when I was 6-years old, just as their mothers and fathers had done before,” she said.

Some think the coils made the women look more beautiful and were a display of wealth, others that the coils protected them from abduction by other tribes by making them look ugly. A tribal myth suggested that the coils protected the women from tigers, but whatever the reason for wearing them, the coils are injurious to the wearer.

As a child grows, more coils are added each year, pushing down the collarbones and squashing the vertebrae, and making the neck look longer. A full set worn by an adult may have more than 20 coils and weigh 5 kilograms.

In the three Padaung tourist villages, fewer women wear the traditional coils, according to U Lay Maung.

“In times of robust tourism, private Thai companies used to take care of [Padaung] education and provide scholarships for their children,” U Lay Maung said, adding that every tourist brochure for Mae Hong Son Province would have a picture of a Padaung woman wearing coils in it.

“But many of the younger generation want to abandon the coils to get an education,” he said, saying that some of the young girls were adept at learning languages and could make money working as tourist guides.

A few Padaung families live outside Mae Hong Son Province in at least three small tourist villages in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. How long they will be willing to stay remains to be seen, however, especially when they hear their kin in Mae Hong Son are being resettled in third countries.

U Ladu knows what he wants for his daughter. “She could marry someone from around here in the next three or four years and be stuck here,” he said, “but I want her to resettle in a third country where she can continue her education.”

The Grass is Greener

2009-09-01T20:09:00.003+10:00

By SAW YAN NAING
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Despite the difficulties and challenges facing Shan migrants seeking work in Thailand, their numbers are increasing

I feel my life in Thailand is more secure than in Burma. It is easier to make a living here,” said Sam Htun, a 56-year-old Shan construction worker, who said he left Burma because of oppression, dangerous working conditions and dismal economic circumstances.

Many Shan migrant workers in Thailand live in makeshift camps. (Photo: Saw Yan Naing/The Irrawaddy)

Sam Htun earned 10,000 to 20,000 kyat (about US $9 to $18) a month—barely enough to get by—working on construction sites in Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State. For this, he risked injury daily from hazards like falling objects, exposed wiring and unsafe scaffolding.

“Safety standards on Thai building sites can vary from poor to very high, but in Burma safety is a joke,” Sam said.

In Thailand, Sam can earn around 4,500 baht ($130) a month, from which he usually manages to send back 17,000 kyat ($15) every month to his family.

Some Shan workers do relatively well. Sai Maung, who works as a building subcontractor in Chiang Mai, said he transfers about 100,000 baht ($1,940) each year to his parents in Lang Kho in Shan State.

Of the 2 to 4 million Burmese migrants currently living in Thailand, 500,000 are thought to be ethnic Shan living and working in northern Thailand, according to Burmese and regional labor rights groups.

The Shan in Thailand are one of the largest groups remitting money to their families in Burma. How much they are sending back home is hard to estimate as they tend not to use hundi agents—go-betweens who transfer money to workers’ families in Burma—preferring to entrust their savings with close friends who go back, or take it themselves.

Jackie Pollock, a founder of the Migrant Assistance Program (MAP), a Chiang Mai-based NGO, said migrant workers leave Burma because of poor economic prospects and human rights abuses committed by the Burmese regime.

Sam Htun, center, at a workshop for migrant workers in Chiang Mai, Thailand. (Photo: Saw Yan Naing/The Irrawaddy)

“Even though the migrants are paid less than the minimum daily wage (about $4.75) and do not have very much freedom in Thailand, it is still more than they would earn in Burma.

“In Thailand, if you get a decent employer, then you may make quite a reasonable salary. There is no chance of this in Burma,” she said.

Migrants have the chance to complain and can resort to the Thai legal system, but if they are exploited and abused by their employers in Burma, “they can do nothing,” Pollock said, adding that abuse in Burma can include extortionate taxes, forced labor and land confiscation.

Labor rights observers say that, while Shan workers want to escape oppression in Burma, the availability of work and the higher wages offered in Thailand are major incentives, and migrants are prepared to pay considerable amounts to get across the border.

Sai Maung said four relatives who had arrived in Chiang Mai in late 2008 had to pay 100,000 kyat ($90) each to authorities and militias for their trip to Thailand.

Sein Kyi, editor of the Chiang Mai-based Shan Herald Agency for News, said at least 200 Shan migrant workers with border passes cross daily into Thailand, using the bridge between Tachilek in Shan State and Mae Sai in Thailand’s Chiang Rai Province. Many others, however, cross illegally.

Illegal migrant workers not only have to bribe the Burmese army, but also the armed groups whose territories they must cross on their journey to Thailand. Both the Shan State Army and United Wa State Army are said to be involved in the smuggling process. A one-way trip reportedly costs around 10,000 to 11,000 baht ($290 to $320). When they get to Thailand the migrants then have to pay the Thai authorities.

Andy Hall, the migrant justice program director of the Human Rights and Development Foundation, which focuses on migrant safety in the workplace, said, “The migration will surely go on as Thailand still needs workers—perhaps another 2 or 3 million more.”

Culture also plays a role. “Shan migrant workers are very special for Thai employers because their language is similar to Northern Thai, and their culture is very close to the Thai culture,” Hall said.

However, once the migrants have arrived in Thailand, their troubles are far from over.

“Some of the riskiest work for migrants in Thailand is in the construction industry, where substandard safety procedures often lead to accidents,” said Hall, adding that little if any compensation is paid in such circumstances.

Sai Leng, who is the chairman of the Kuang Gor camp for Shan refugees in Chiang Mai’s Wieng Heng District, said Shan migrants take jobs that Thai people do not want because the work is difficult, dirty and dangerous, and the pay is low.

Kuang Gor camp is home to more than 600 Shan who are not officially refugees, but who are allowed to work outside the camp. Kuang Gor is assisted by the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), which supplies basic foods such as rice, cooking oil, salt and yellow beans to the migrants.

Sally Thompson, the deputy director of the TBBC, said the camp’s Shan occupants do not have proper protection and risk arrest and repatriation.

Unlike refugees in the nine other camps along the Thai-Burmese border, the Shan in Kuang Kor are not treated as refugees and have no chance of resettlement in third countries because they are not registered with the Thai Ministry of Interior and the UNHCR, Thompson said.

“They aren’t just vulnerable to arrest, detention and deportation at any time. Unlike properly registered refugees, they have no access to health care, and their children don’t get any education,” said Thompson.

Jackie Pollock described how MAP had helped a Shan migrant after he was caught in a police sweep at a building site in Chiang Mai.

“First, his wife had to go to her husband’s employer to get his papers, but he wouldn’t give them to her unless she paid him 2,000 baht [$60]. When she showed them at the police station, the police weren’t interested.

“They kept him in jail for 48 days, which is the legal maximum they could hold him without charges, before releasing him—and he was a registered migrant worker, not an illegal,” said Pollock.

Pollock described how it was common practice for the police to round up all workers in a sweep, whether registered or not, and put them in jail. The migrant workers are encouraged to pay “fines” if they want to get back quickly to their families and work.

Sai Leng said arrest is a big threat facing migrant workers in daily life. If arrested, they have to pay relatively large amounts of money to be released.

“We want the Thai authorities to make it easier for the migrant worker to travel from one place to another. If they treated us migrants better, they would get more work out of us,” he said.

Despite enjoying a better life in Thailand, Sai Leng said he still hoped to go back to his hometown in Burma when conditions improve.

Cracks in the Castle Wall

2009-09-01T20:02:00.002+10:00

By MIN ZIN
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Loopholes in the new Burmese constitution could be exploited by opposition groups to win influence after next year’s election

In politics, a direct, frontal attack is rarely wise; co-opting the opponent’s game plan for one’s own purposes is a more powerful ploy. Opponents of Burma’s military junta should bear this in mind as they consider their strategy for dealing with next year’s election.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism. A longer version of this article is available on www.irrawaddy.org

Most mainstream opposition groups, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced that they will not take part in the 2010 election unless the constitution is revised and the political process is made more inclusive. They say they can’t accept the constitution as it stands because it denies fundamental ethnic rights and allows the military to seize power again “if there arises a state of emergency.”

A closer examination of the junta’s constitution reveals, however, that it is not the impregnable fortress that it at first appears to be. There are a number of weaknesses in the castle battlements that opposition groups can exploit if they are prepared to take a multi-pronged approach.

The first vulnerability lies in the fact that after the 2010 election, there will be two power centers, the military and the government, which will inevitably be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. No matter who pulls the strings, this new power arrangement will lead to either a serious internal split or the inefficiency of the ruling body.

Another Achilles’ heel is the constitution’s de facto demotion of regional military commanders. Although the constitution enshrines ultimate power in the commander in chief of the military, it fails to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities. As key pillars in the military regime’s power structure, the regional commanders are like warlords in their domains. However, under the new constitution, they are under the control of the chief ministers of the regions or states, who in many cases may be civilians. This could result in a situation where regional commanders oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw’s control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the 75 percent of seats not reserved for the military, a non-military candidate could become president. Failing this, non-military parties could gain control of the legislative agenda, giving them influence over everything from defense and foreign affairs to the economic and social sectors. Thus Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who leads the ruling junta, appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party based upon the membership of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass organization formed by the junta in September 1993.

Snr-Gen Than Shwe votes in the referundum election on the new constitution.

However, this leads to the fourth problem facing the regime. As a political party, the USDA’s existing nationwide organizational structure (and its thuggish reputation, which could be used to intimidate voters) would give it a great advantage in the 2010 election. The problem is that the new constitution bars parliamentary candidates from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it would run afoul of the regime’s own constitution if it sought to field candidates in the election. Therefore, if the military wants to create a new political party or parties, it must ensure that they do not bear any resemblance to the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or intimidating power.

Perhaps these concerns are the reason the regime keeps delaying the promulgation of the electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year: Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power. Meanwhile, however, the credibility of the election and the legitimacy of the new power arrangement it is intended to put in place have already been hurt by the likely non-participation of the NLD and the refusal of several ethnic ceasefire groups to disarm or participate.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage by remaining outside the regime’s election process while opening a new proxy front within the regime’s game plan. Even if opposition groups don’t take part in the election using their current organizational identities, they could set up proxy political parties to participate in the 2010 election. Through these proxy parties, the opposition could attempt to maximize civilian control of the post-election parliament.

At the same time, opposition groups such as the NLD, the New Mon State Party and others must stand strong in opposing the “illegitimate” constitution and election and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 election will help prevent a split within the opposition groups. Otherwise, policy disagreements between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. Proxy tactics could also help bring new recruits to the opposition movement.

However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxy parties in the 2010 election will spark a magical power shift to civilian control. That will happen only if there is sufficient public pressure to challenge the military-dominated status quo, forcing the military to negotiate with the opposition, which would then be in a position to push for a genuine transition to democratic rule.

Another factor that could determine the success or failure of the approach outlined here is the ability of non-military MPs to maintain a sense of common purpose. There is a danger that parochial interests will blind non-military MPs to broader issues, or that self-interest will lead them to compromise their reform agenda. Non-military MPs would not necessarily form a monolithic bloc or be unanimous in their approach to the military’s domination. Vote rigging and intimidation in the election could further undermine the chances of a genuine opposition presence in the parliament.

That said, however, the contradictions embedded in the constitution will provide unprecedented opportunities for those who seek to break the military’s hold on power. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. In the event of mass demonstrations on the streets, proxy parties will be well-placed to play a role.

The opposition should be creative in opening a new proxy front as part of a multi-pronged strategy to exploit the cracks in the junta’s fortress.

The Yunnan Connection

2009-09-01T19:57:00.003+10:00

By LARRY JAGAN
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Closer ties between Burma and China’s southwestern province raise concerns in Beijing

Yunnan, China’s southwestern province bordering Burma, has always taken the lead in forging closer relations with its neighbor, usually with Beijing’s blessing. But in recent years, this special relationship has caused some irritation among China’s political leaders in the north.

In the past, China’s political supremos were happy to leave trade to those based in the southwestern region, while taking responsibility for all political issues. This relationship between Burma and China’s border areas has a long history.

The Joint Check Centre of Ruili on the northern Sino-Burmese border is an important economic zone where trade is increasing. (Photo: Kyaw Zwa Moe/The Irrawaddy)

Long before becoming chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization in 1975, Brang Seng moved thousands of Kachins into Yunnan for safety after declaring war on the Burmese government.

The Wa leaders, who formed a significant section of the Burma Communist Party, were all trained in the Yunnan capital, Kunming, and fondly remember those times.

At the start of Mao Zedong’s disastrous “Great Leap Forward” in 1958, more than 100,000 Chinese fled across the border into Burma for safety, according to a senior Chinese official. Most of them may never have returned, he added. In the past 10 years more than 200,000 Chinese have crossed into northern Shan State in search of work and financial opportunities. In Panghsan, the Wa capital, the local authorities run a casino school which trains young Chinese from across the border how to become croupiers.

Around 50 pupils at a time pay the school 300 yuan (US $45) for one month’s training; they qualify for jobs on graduation in the casinos along the border and some even find work in Cambodian casinos along the border with Thailand.

A quarter of Panghsan’s population are Chinese who have settled in the Wa area since 1997, according to a senior Wa leader. An entire Chinese Wa village even relocated in Burma six years ago to take advantage of the UN’s rice cultivation scheme—part of the organization’s support for alternative crop programs intended to replace opium production. In Mong La, further along the border, more than one in eight residents within the city limits are recent Chinese arrivals, according to the city’s mayor.

The business life of hundreds of small towns and villages along the Burmese border with China is dominated by Chinese immigrants who migrated to the area in the last 10 years.

Families often send their children across the border to China for education, and many of the Wa leaders’ sons and daughters study in Kunming. The daughter of the former Mong La mayor recently graduated from a university in Shanghai. Many others are receiving higher education in Chengdu, Guilin and Kunming.

While traditional links have helped fuel this close cross-border relationship, in the past 25 years it has been trade that has been the main locomotive.

Since 1993, according to local Chinese officials, cross-border trade has mushroomed. Trade between Yunnan and Burma represents around half of the total bilateral trade between the two countries. Official Burmese government figures put this at $2.4 billion in the 2007-2008 fiscal year, almost double the previous year’s.

This trade, however, has primarily benefited the Chinese—almost all the increase has been the result of the massive rise in the volume of Chinese imports, as the value of Burmese exports has remained relatively constant since 1988.

As part of plans to further promote trade between the two countries, special economic or free trade areas are also being set up. The border crossing between Muse and Ruili is the biggest trade route at present. The Yunnan provincial government has recently proposed setting up a Ruili cross-border economic cooperation zone, while the Dehong zone county government, in which the area falls, proposes to construct a Ruili-Muse free trade area. The Burmese government is also in favor of the plans, so the project is expected to move ahead in the near future.

Burma agreed more than three years ago in principal to establish a tax-free trade area near Muse. Nearly 300 square kilometers have been designated for the zone, known now as “Muse 105 Ma.” Chinese exports are free to enter Burma through Muse, Jiugu and Nankang, and are processed in the zone. Although yet to be officially announced, according to Chinese officials, this has already made Muse and Jiugu a very special economic zone, which offers Chinese goods extremely preferential treatment.

A border export processing base has also been established at Kunming, Honghe, Dali, Baoshan and Dehong, forming the main trade hubs in the zone. Many enterprises which produce export products have set up offices and factories near the border areas to directly benefit from the growing border trade.

The Yunnan authorities understand that protecting the growing trade with their neighbor is extremely important to the province’s long-term economic future. The provincial government recently drew up detailed plans to further promote border trade with Burma. This has included favorable customs and visa procedures, and streamlined bureaucracy. But there are fears that because of the low level of trade, there may be central government interference in the future.

“The preferential policies protecting cross-border trade [which had been approved by Beijing in 1996] are vitally important to Yunnan Province, although the trade is relatively small,” a senior Kunming customs official told The Irrawaddy.

“Yunnan would be seriously affected should the preferential policies be removed by the central government,” he said.

The central authorities are currently concerned that the system may contravene World Trade Organization rules. But local officials at the Yunnan commerce department reject this view, pointing out that the US and Mexico, adjacent to each other, have preferential policies.

While Beijing may not be concerned about the official trade between the province and Burma, the central government there is more concerned about the unofficial and illegal trade that is taking place, in the form of drugs, timber, wildlife and human trafficking.

Local Chinese merchants once benefited from the abundant supply of high grade timber imported from Burma. “We love Myanmar [Burmese] timber because it is good quality,” a businessman in Fujian province, on China’s southeastern coast, told a Chinese academic. “We can process it into furniture and then sell it on to Japan and the US.”

Between 2001 and 2005, imports of timber represented around one-fifth of the volume of Burma’s bilateral trade with Yunnan. But that ended abruptly when Chinese President Hu Jintao intervened after several Chinese loggers were arrested in Burma. If Chinese lives are at risk, national and political considerations overrule local economic business interests. Illegal logging has been effectively banned by the Chinese and very little now makes its way across the border, timber merchants in Kunming told The Irrawaddy.

Fears that unofficial cross-border trade—especially in arms, drugs and people—was getting out of hand a few years ago also prompted the central authorities to intervene. In late 2003, in a move to tighten border controls, Beijing assigned the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to replace the border police along the Sino-Burmese border. In December 2004, the Burmese junta’s No 3, Gen Thura Shwe Mann, and Gen Ge Zhenfeng, the PLA’s deputy chief of staff, signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a mechanism of meetings, talks and contacts between the Chinese and Burmese armies to deal with border affairs.

This seems to be the new pattern. Yunnan and other border areas may be pushing for greater trade and contacts between Burma and China, but Beijing wants to limit anything that may be unintentionally promoting corruption and crime, including drugs smuggling and human trafficking.

The overall concern in Beijing is that Chinese policy in practice should not indirectly make the border areas unstable and insecure. The divergent interests of Kunming and Beijing may yet be put to the test if the Burmese military government’s attempts to disarm the ethnic rebel ceasefire groups, especially the United Wa State Army, and form a force of guards on the Burmese side of the border fail and the danger arises of renewed armed conflict.

China’s Troublesome Little Brother

2009-09-01T19:53:00.002+10:00

By AUNG ZAW
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Behind displays of friendship, Beijing is showing signs that it is losing patience with Burma’s politically inept ruling generals

When Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, the second most powerful figure in Burma’s ruling junta, led a high-level delegation to Beijing in mid-June, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency dutifully reported that the visit—the general’s third in six years—was aimed at strengthening friendly and cooperative ties between the two neighboring countries.

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, left, holds a welcoming ceremony in honor of Gen Maung Aye, right, vice-chairman of Burma’s ruling junta at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 16, 2009.
(Photo: www.english.cpc.people.com.cn)

Behind the scenes of the outwardly amicable visit, however, the story was not so simple. According to businessmen close to the regime in Naypyidaw, before departing for Beijing, Maung Aye complained that China was meddling in Burma’s affairs. A former commander of the Burmese army’s northern region who once fought several fierce battles against the Chinese-backed Communist Party of Burma in the 1970s and 1980s, Maung Aye has never really trusted Beijing. Now, he grumbled, Chinese leaders were trying to tell Naypyidaw how it should deal with Aung San Suu Kyi, who was facing imprisonment on charges of violating the terms of her house arrest.

On the Chinese side, too, feelings were far more ambivalent than the Xinhua report would have us believe. Since the 2004 ouster of former Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt, Beijing’s relations with the Burmese regime have been on a less secure footing. Unlike the relatively open-minded Khin Nyunt, the current leadership in Naypyidaw consists entirely of dyed-in-the-wool xenophobes. Even a friendly word of advice was likely to strain the relationship carefully built up over the past two decades.

In the end, Maung Aye’s visit passed without incident. Although Beijing had earlier joined Burma’s other neighbors in calling for the release of Suu Kyi, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told the Burmese regime’s No 2 that he hoped the military would help to promote democracy in Burma, the pro-democracy leader herself was not mentioned directly in discussions between the two sides. Significantly, however, news of the international outcry over the trial of Suu Kyi aired on Beijing television during Maung Aye’s visit, perhaps sending a message that world opinion could not be ignored, even in Communist-controlled China.

Despite such subtle hints, however, it is clear that Beijing is not about to depart from its long-held policy of noninterference in Burma’s political affairs—a policy that it has maintained even under more trying circumstances.

Chinese workers seal the pipeline along the 1,272-kilometer transnational natural gas pipeline in Luoyang in central China’s Henan Province on Dec 11, 2008. China’s demand for oil and gas has expanded rapidly in recently years to fuel its double-digit economic growth, as the country imported nearly 200 million tons of oil in 2007, up more than 10 percent from 2006. (Photo: AFP)

When Burmese troops and security forces were killing monks on the streets of Rangoon in September 2007, provoking international outrage, Beijing made it clear that it wasn’t going to join in the chorus of criticism. Instead, it reacted by issuing an anodyne statement calling on all parties to exercise restraint—and for the rest of the world to mind its own business. Soon after the dust settled, the Burmese regime’s leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, returned the favor by sending an envoy to Beijing to explain the situation. And so the whole episode was reduced to a mere bump in the road of Sino-Burmese relations.

It came as no surprise, then, that when a Burmese court sentenced Suu Kyi to a further 18 months under house arrest on August 11, Beijing did not deviate from its script.

“International society should fully respect Myanmar’s [Burma’s] judicial sovereignty,” said a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry, adding that Beijing would not back any calls for UN action against the Burmese regime. Two days after the sentence was announced, the UN Security Council, of which China is a permanent member with veto powers, expressed “concern” over the court’s ruling and reiterated its call for a “genuine dialogue” aimed at achieving national reconciliation.

During Maung Aye’s visit to China, Burma’s state-run press noted with evident satisfaction that Beijing is the regime’s staunchest defender on the international stage. But why has China remained such a faithful patron of this miscreant regime? The answer, quite simply, is that Burma is a resource-rich country with the means to help China satisfy its hunger for energy and raw materials.

Maung Aye’s visit highlighted this key aspect of the bilateral relationship. While he was in China, the two countries signed three documents—an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the development, operation and delivery of electricity from hydropower projects in Maykha, Malikha and upstream of the Irrawaddy-Myitsone river basin, and an MoU relating to the development, operation and management of the Burma-China crude oil pipeline project.

Around the same time as Maung Aye’s trip, Burma’s Ministry of National Planning and Development released a report showing that foreign investment in Burma had jumped from $172.7 million in the 2007-2008 fiscal year to $984.9 million in 2008-2009. The ministry said 87 percent of the total invested in Burma came from China.

China’s investment in Burma is focused mainly on energy and natural resources—hydropower, mining and oil and gas projects. Construction of the pipeline, which will transport gas and oil from the port town of Sittwe on the Arakan coast to China’s landlocked southwestern province of Yunnan, is set to begin in September.

In exchange for access to Burma’s resources and strategically important ports, China provides not only diplomatic cover, but also soft loans for the regime and weapons for its oversized army. It hopes in this way to ensure that Burma remains a part of China’s long-term strategy for economic growth. Although Beijing professes to refrain from interfering in Burma’s political affairs, it is clearly determined to protect its interests by providing the regime with the military means to maintain stability. If the junta proves incapable of containing unrest, Beijing will reconsider its backing; but until then, the generals can count on Chinese support.

China has little interest in promoting Burma’s democratization, but it has been happy to play along with UN efforts to end the country’s political stalemate. When UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon traveled to Naypyidaw in June, Chinese officials said they welcomed the move. But when the regime refused to allow Ban to meet with Suu Kyi, China’s deputy UN ambassador, Liu Zhenmin, said it was “understandable” under the circumstances. He also said that the Burmese regime should be treated with less arrogance and prejudice, and ruled out any possibility of Beijing using its influence to persuade the regime to change its ways.

By the time Maung Aye returned from his visit to China, his misgivings about Beijing’s reliability as an ally appeared to have vanished. Soon after his trip, he visited the Sino-Burmese border and announced plans to build an international airport there. He also reportedly told local businessmen and accompanying ministers that if Burma’s relationship with China continued to grow, Burma would have no need for Western—particularly US—assistance.

This must have been music to Beijing’s ears, but it seems to have done little to allay Chinese concerns about potential US rivalry for influence in Burma. Despite its policy of isolating the Burmese regime, Washington has played a very active role in Burma, primarily through its support for Suu Kyi and pro-democracy groups inside and outside the country. Chinese officials who regularly travel to Thailand to meet exiled Burmese groups often ask them questions about the support they receive from the US.

To offset Washington’s role as the primary sponsor of the democratic opposition, China has expanded its network of contacts within the exiled dissident community. Chinese officials from various government departments based in Yunnan Province, which borders Burma, have been meeting with exiled Burmese groups in Thailand with increasing frequency. More remarkably, they have even allowed conferences and seminars on Burmese issues to take place in China. This is something the Chinese have learned from watching exiled Burmese civil society groups operating in Thailand.

For their part, Burmese dissidents realize that although they already have strong political backing from the West, they also need to lobby China to reconsider its policy toward the repressive regime. The National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma’s main opposition party, has sent several letters to the Chinese embassy in Rangoon, signaling that it sees China as a potentially positive influence. However, there has been no official response to these letters, which were signed by NLD Chairman Aung Shwe, and which expressed a desire to forge a “fraternal relationship” with China and asked for Beijing’s support in Burma’s stalled national reconciliation process.

This lack of a response contrasts starkly with China’s overtures to the NLD in 1990, when the party had just won a landslide victory in Burma’s last democratic elections.

Chinese leaders were among the first to congratulate the NLD on its convincing win and called on the Burmese regime to release Suu Kyi from house arrest. But when it became clear that the junta had no intention of honoring the results of the election, China changed its tune, remarking on the military’s role in winning Burma’s independence from colonial rule—implying that this gave the junta a mandate to hold onto power.

Nearly 20 years later, Beijing may have few regrets about its decision to throw its weight behind the junta, but it is growing increasingly wary of the cost of backing a regime that has failed to resolve any of the potentially explosive issues that continue to threaten stability on China’s doorstep. As Chinese analyst Wen Liao wrote in a recent issue of Foreign Policy magazine, Burma is an unreliable client for China. The fact that the Burmese regime is morally reprehensible is not an issue for Beijing, but the overwhelming evidence of the ruling generals’ incompetence is a serious cause for concern, Wen wrote.

Beijing is not only worried about being dragged through the mud every time Burma’s rulers commit a new outrage. Naypyidaw’s secret missions to Pyongyang and its shady nuclear ambitions are emerging as a new threat to regional stability, and Burma’s restive ethnic ceasefire groups, many based along the Sino-Burmese border, are becoming a major headache for Beijing. As Wen wrote, despite Burma’s importance as part of China’s so-called “string of pearls” policy, which attempts to build naval and intelligence bases around the Indian Ocean, the benefits of those strategic assets have come at a price.

While Washington’s review of US policy on Burma has attracted considerable attention in recent months, perhaps it is time to ask if Beijing is also re-examining its approach. According to Wen, Chinese leaders are now considering the possibility that Suu Kyi’s party may be a more reliable partner for long-term bilateral cooperation after all.

It seems unlikely at this stage that Beijing will actually make another dramatic shift like it did in the 1980s, when it withdrew its all-out support for the Communist Party of Burma. But don’t be surprised if Beijing begins to introduce subtle policy changes that could undercut the alliance that has been the junta’s main lifeline for the past two decades.

Is China Two-timing the Generals?

2009-09-01T19:47:00.002+10:00

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Burma’s military junta has to compete with ethnic groups such as the Wa, the Kokang and the Shan to win Beijing’s favor

China is the Burmese military junta’s most influential partner—economically, politically and militarily. But despite the close relationship, Beijing has long enjoyed a discreet affair—a private relationship with the ethnic groups along Burma’s northeastern frontier.

As far back as the 1960s, Mao Zedong’s revolutionary government armed and funded several Shan, Kachin, Kokang and Wa ethnic armies, drawing them into the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and backing their struggle against the socialist government of Gen Ne Win.

The United Wa State Army is among the strong ethnic armies in northern Burma that Chinese officials are courting.
However, the anticipated opening in 2012 of a gas pipeline from Burma to China, which will traverse many of the ethnic areas, and the regime’s need to consolidate its power over unruly factions before next year’s election, might force the generals in Naypyidaw to confront the superpower about its relations with the ethnic insurgents.

Many Chinese businessmen, for their part, would rather continue to enjoy the profits they are able to generate from the mostly illegal trade—such as narcotics, jade, exotic animals and timber—from Shan and Kachin states.

And Beijing has shown recently that it is willing to exert a subtle—and not so subtle—influence on behalf of the ethnic groups.

On August 8, about 10,000 villagers fled to the Sino-Burmese border to escape a possible skirmish between the Burmese army and the Kokang troops of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).

Tensions had been brought to a head when a unit of Burmese government soldiers attempted to raid a warehouse—probably thought to be an arms cache—belonging to Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng.

When Chinese and Burmese officials met the following day to discuss the issue of the fleeing villagers, the Chinese delegation reportedly scolded their Burmese counterparts and told them it was their responsibility to resolve the matter peacefully.

It was a slap in the face for the Burmese generals who, more than ever, needed their friends in Beijing to stand on their side.

In the last few months, Burmese military commanders have been busy traveling to the mountainous jungle terrain of Kachin and Shan states to meet the leaders of the ethnic armies deemed least likely to conform to the junta’s plans to transform their soldiers into “border guard forces”— the MNDAA, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the Shan State Army-North.

Although the five ethnic armies are among 17 groups that have signed ceasefire deals with the junta, they have refused to accept the border guard role, which would include placing their troops under the control of Burmese regional commanders.

A deadline for the ceasefire groups to respond to the regime’s border guard plan went unanswered at the end of June.

“On July 29, Maj-Gen Aung Than Htut and his deputy, Brig-Gen Hla Myint Aung of the Northeast Command went to the Kokang region [home of the MNDAA] and two days later, traveled to Wa territory,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst on the Sino-Burmese border. “However, they failed to convince the ethnic leaders to join them.”

In an attempt to intimidate the ethnic armies, the junta sent three additional battalions to areas near the Wa and Kokang territories in late July.

However, with an estimated 20,000 armed men, the UWSA is a force to be reckoned with. As a standoff continued into August, the matter of Chinese favoritism came significantly into play.

In December 2008, Wa and Kachin leaders wrote a joint letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao requesting their support in the struggle for autonomous rights for ethnic groups on the Sino-Burmese border.

“We solemnly ask the Chinese government to relay our request to the Myanmar [Burmese] government: first, we support the constitutional reform. When the new government forms in 2010, the leadership based on national public elections should promise to leaders of the autonomous states that they will be part of the high leadership of the new government… and build upon the method of management of China’s autonomous regions,” they wrote.

The Burmese junta, in turn, also reportedly asked Beijing to help resolve the tension with the ethnic groups. Chinese negotiators sat in the privileged position of being able to hold separate meetings with representatives of both camps.

One ethnic leader who asked not to be identified said Beijing had assured him that his group will not have to disarm.

However, China well understands that the generals in Naypyidaw are their highly valued and consistent business partners, and they hold the key to strategic interests in the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, many of the commanders of the armed ethnic groups, in particular the Wa, the Kokang and the NDAA, have long been allies of the Chinese Communist Party and, in some cases, fought alongside the Chinese People’s Liberation Army decades ago.

When the Wa, Kokang, the NDAA and other ethnic troops split from the CPB in 1989, Communist insurgency came to an abrupt end in Burma.

The UWSA, the MNDAA and the NDAA signed ceasefire agreements later that year with the Burmese regime, which was fronted by former spy chief Gen Khin Nyunt.

Then, in 1994, another major armed faction, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese generals.

In hindsight, the Burmese leaders may feel that their ceasefire agreements with the Wa and Kokang in particular were too focused on temporary strategies rather than being based on political agreements aimed at long-term stability.

However, it seemed at the time that the traditionally pro-Chinese ethnic insurgents were being lured into Rangoon’s sphere of influence.

The Burmese regime has often turned a blind eye to the trafficking of heroin and opium from the northern states. With the freedom to conduct a trade in narcotics, many warlords in Shan state modernized their operations by shifting production to amphetamines and methamphetamines, the drugs of choice for the younger generation.

The proliferation of the drugs trade has forced Beijing to rethink its drugs policy along the Yunnanese border because drug addiction has exploded in the past decade in its southwestern province.

Beijing introduced its Green Drug Prevention Plan to encourage opium farmers in the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Laos and Thailand to grow alternative crops. In 2006, the Chinese State Council approved 250 million yuan (US $36.5 million) for a plan that widened its support for opium farmers in Laos and Burma.

In response to Beijing’s anti-narcotics policy, the Kokang followed suit by suppressing poppy farming in 2003 while the Wa declared their state an opium-free zone in 2005.

China proudly declared that—thanks to its initiatives—poppy farms had been reduced in the Golden Triangle region from 36,000 hectares in 2004 to 13,000 hectares in 2006.

However, according to an official report from Yunnan Province, between 2005 and 2008, Chinese police seized 12.9 tons of heroin, 4.5 tons of opium and 9.3 tons of crystal methamphetamine (known on the street as “ice”), which had been smuggled from Burma.

Chinese officials and experts recognize that the Sino-Burmese border issues have wider implications.

Although Chinese diplomats had steadfastly repeated at the United Nations Security Council that the Burma issue was an internal affair, they began criticizing the junta leadership privately during bilateral talks in 2007.

“Decades of turmoil in Myanmar have shown that the problems the country have today are not only political, but also economic, and above all, ethnic,” said Xiaolin Guo, the author of “Towards Resolution: China in the Myanmar Issue.”

“The Chinese government, which itself completed the necessary steps of state-building within half a decade after the founding of the PRC [People’s Republic of China], now sees the imperative of national reconciliation in Myanmar as a necessary step in achieving political integration,” she said.

According to an official statement, China’s current policy on Burma is specifically oriented toward three goals—stability, development and national reconciliation.

What Beijing’s strategists are undoubtedly weighing up at the moment is whether their traditional allegiance to the ethnic groups along their Burmese border is worth jeopardizing the relationship with their fickle mistress in Naypyidaw.

An ‘Evening with Rohingya People’

2009-08-31T20:30:00.001+10:00

KPN - An ‘Evening with Rohingya People’ was an event organized by the London based Burmese Rohingya community with the help of the Burma Campaign UK to share the dilemma of the Rohingya and discuss other Burmese multi-ethnic conflict topics on August 27, at 28 Charles Square London, said Tun Khin, the president of Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK).

An Evening With Rohingya People

Kokang campaign still on

2009-08-31T20:14:00.002+10:00

Shanland - Despite victory over rebellious Kokang army announced yesterday through state-run media, the Burma Army has yet to slow down its war machine, reported sources from Shan State.

People in Muse, opposite China’s Ruili, and northwest of Kokang, were still being snatched by the official porter collectors yesterday and in Lashio, the capital of Shan State North, southwest of Kokang, civilian trucks were still in demand.

The Burma Army is proceeding with a mopping-up operation against isolated Kokang fighters who are still putting up a guerrilla resistance in the 22,000 sq.km territory, according to a source on the Sino-Burma border. Up to 30% of the original Kokang force (estimated strength, 800) loyal to the deposed leader Peng Jiasheng are believed to be still on Burma’s side of the border.

On the Thai-Burma border, militia units placed under full alert two days ago have been allowed to relax. “Civilian trucks requisitioned by the Army in Monghsat (opposite Thailand’s Mae Ai) have also been permitted to return home,” reported a local.

The United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s Thai-border based 171st Military Region, comprising 5 brigades, under the command of Wei Xuegang, however, have yet to come down from their mountain bases. “Unlike in the past, when Wa trucks passed by Burma Army checkpoints without being searched, they are now being subjected to thorough going-overs,” said another local source.

On the other hand, sources in eastern Shan State are betting that the next target for the Burma Army should be Mongla, the UWSA’s southern neighbor and ally. Kokang that fell on 29 August is the Wa’s northern neighbor and ally.

Even Mongla, 80 km northeast of Shan State East’s capital Kengtung, has become edgy, according to them.

Yesterday, some 470 Burmans working or seeking work in Mongla were rounded up by the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) officials, loaded in trucks and dumped at Taping, the Lwe crossing that marks as the border between the NDAA and Burma Army controlled areas. “We used to have about 100 people working here,” explained one of the officials, on condition of anonymity. “But the number had jumped up to over 400 in a matter of weeks. We believe many of them, not all, must be spies.”

The Shan State Army (SSA) ‘South’, that has been fighting against Naypyitaw, meanwhile is yet to issue any official statements on the latest developments in Burma. “We are still closely following the developments,” said one of the senior officers.

One Thai border source reported that the UWSA has begun liaising with the SSA South. “There has been no such thing as yet,” replied the same SSA source.

Tension between the ceasefire groups and the ruling military junta has been growing since April when the former were demanded to transform themselves into Burma Army run Border Guard Forces.

The fall of Kokang raises questions

2009-08-31T20:07:00.002+10:00

Shanland - After three days of heavy fighting, 27-29 August, the bulk of the anti-Naypyitaw Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the name given to their armed force by the Kokang, moved yesterday into China where they were disarmed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The biggest question raised by the fall of Qingsuihe (Chinshwehaw), opposite Namteuk (Namtit), where the Kokang’s strongest ally United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s 318th Division is headquartered, may be: What were the Wa doing when the Kokang were being attacked at Qingsuihe?

At first, both the Wa and other sources reported that at least 500 UWSA fighters had been deployed to assist the embattled Kokang. However, on the 29 August evening, the Wa source told SHAN Qingsuihe had fallen, as the UWSA had decided only to make a stand along the Namting that forms as a boundary between Wa and Kokang territories in order to prevent any spillovers from the fighting.

What happened to the ‘all for one and one for all’ agreement reached earlier among the Wa, Kokang and Mongla? SHAN asked. But Panghsang has yet to answer the question, which has naturally prompted more questions:

• How strong is the Peace and Democracy Front (PDF), now that it has done practically nothing against the Burma Army’s attack on Kokang?

• Now that the UWSA has allowed Kokang its northern ally to go, is it ready to let go other allies, namely the Shan State Army (SSA) ‘North’ in the west and Mongla aka National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA) too?

• Does it think the UWSA will be able to make a lone stand against the Burma Army, after its allies have gone?

• What was China’s role in the Kokang debacle? Has the UWSA been advised that the Burma Army will not be allowed to make further attacks against it and its remaining allies?

Kokang’s deposed leader Peng Jiasheng has also voiced similar doubts in his special statement issued late in the evening of 28 August, a day before Qingsuihe’s fall:

• We have vowed that we would together overthrow the common enemy, the ruling military dictatorship clique. I request that we put our vow into practice starting today.

• If the Kokang force has been swallowed, the other allies armed forces will also be swallowed not long after. We therefore request you to counter attack the SPDC forces starting today.

Another big question arose when a report by a usually reliable source said that the mutiny in early August against Kokang’s supreme leader Peng Jiasheng was masterminded by a Liu Guoxi, a disgruntled member of the Kokang leadership, in cooperation with the deputy police of Burma.

With details lacking, SHAN as yet has no way to confirm the report, though Liu has been known in the past to be a colleague of Mong Hsala, the leader of now defunct Mongkoe Defense Army (MDA). MDA went into oblivion and its top leaders either jailed or executed in 2000 by the Burma Army during a mutiny against Mong Hsala.

Granted that the report is true, questions arise:

• Are there more Liu Guoxis among the ranks of the UWSA and its allied armies?

• Is the Burma Army in cahoots with them?

• Wei Xuegang, Commander of the UWSA’s Thai-border based 171st Military Region, is said to be close to Prime Minister Thein Sein. How close are they?

At present, the questions are hard to answer.

But investigations by the media and concerned agencies in the next few weeks will find whether the ideal goal of forming a grand alliance against the hated military regime is too late or can still be a dream come true.

China seals Myanmar border

2009-08-30T11:50:00.001+10:00

One person on Chinese territory has been killed by a bomb flung across the border

LINCANG (Yunnan) ST- FRESH fighting in north-east Myanmar erupted yesterday morning after days of clashes that killed at least one person on Chinese territory and sent dozens of wounded to hospitals along the Chinese border.

Tens of thousands of people have fled to the border town of Nansan in China's Yunnan province this month after clashes in Kokang in Myanmar's Shan state, following the deployment of Myanmar government troops in the area.

'Our information is that as many as 30,000 people may have taken shelter in Nansan since Aug 8, saying they were fleeing fighting between Myanmar government troops and ethnic minority groups,' said spokesman Andrej Mahecic for the UN refugee agency.

Chinese soldiers are guarding the border area, which has been sealed off, said a staff member at the Zhenkang County Public Security Bureau, who gave only his surname, Hui.

One person was killed and several people were injured by a bomb thrown across the Chinese border on Friday, Mr He Yongchun, deputy president of Yunnan branch of the Chinese Red Cross, told the China Daily.

'We have received at least 22 injured people sent from Nansan. Most of them are from Myanmar,' a woman working at the surgical department of Zhenkang People's Hospital told Reuters by phone.

Nansan is a town in Zhenkang county.

China has called on Myanmar to maintain stability in the border region and sought more measures to protect the security and legal rights of Chinese citizens there.

Beijing is one of Myanmar's few diplomatic backers, often coming to the rescue when it is subjected to pressure by Western governments over issues such as the imprisonment of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The leader of the Kokang Group which is fighting Myanmar's army said his forces had captured at least 50 soldiers as well as killed more than 30 troops on Thursday and Friday, the Chinese-language Global Times newspaper reported on its website. -- REUTERS, AP

Rebel leader says more than 30 junta soldiers killed in Burma

2009-08-30T11:48:00.001+10:00

(ABC Radio) -In Burma, the leader of rebel ethnic forces claims they have killed more than 30 government soldiers.

Chinese state media says fresh fighting broke out on Saturday in the country's remote northeast between the military and rebel ethnic forces.

The United Nations says clashes in Burma's remote northeast have also driven up to 30-thousand refugees across the border into Nansan in China's Yunnan province.

It says this has led to China issuing a rare warning to its neighbour and ally to resolve the conflict.

Battles that erupted this week in Kokang, a mainly ethnic Chinese region of Burma's Shan state, have violated a 20 year ceasefire.

There are fears the fighting could escalate into full-scale civil war.

Aussie ship held for gun running

2009-08-30T11:14:00.002+10:00

The Sunday Telegraph

AN AUSTRALIAN-owned cargo ship has been caught shipping a cache of banned arms from North Korea to Iran.

The Financial Times reported yesterday the ANL Australia was seized in the United Arab Emirates under new UN Security Council sanctions meant to derail North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Chris Schultz, general manager of business development at ANL Australia, said he was unaware an ANL vessel was involved in any seizure.

"This is the first I have heard of it," Mr Schultz said.

He admitted the ship was the property of ANL but refused any further comment.

ANL is the Australian-based subsidiary of the CMA CGM Group, the third largest container shipping line in the world. Built in 1991, it was previously named Australian Endeavour and is owned and operated by ANL.

The UAE, a hub for Iranian goods, reportedly seized the ship several weeks ago. Diplomats claimed the ship was carrying rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons disguised as machine parts.

A spokesperson from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said it was unaware of the incident.

The ship's seizure and reported violation of the arms embargo was reported by the UAE in a confidential letter two weeks ago to the council's sanctions committee for North Korea that is comprised of diplomats from all 15 nations on the Security Council.

Turkey's deputy UN ambassador, Fazli Corman, who chairs the sanctions panel, confirmed the incident and said council members are examining the seriousness of it.

"The committee received information from UAE authorities and the committee is processing the information," he said.

The Security Council imposed new sanctions on North Korea on June 12, strengthening an arms embargo and authorising ship searches on the high seas to try to rein in its nuclear program after Pyongyang's second nuclear test on May 25, violating a council resolution adopted after its first nuclear blast in 2006.

The council also has ordered an asset freeze and travel ban on companies and individuals involved in the country's nuclear and weapons programs and put five North Korean officials, four companies and a state agency on the sanctions list. Three other companies were put on the list after Pyongyang launched a rocket on April 5, a move seen as cover for testing long-range missiles.