Burma constitution ‘provides impunity’ for abuses

Oct 9, 2009 (DVB)–Burma’s redrafted 2008 constitution provides impunity for human rights abuses and should not be the bedrock for elections next year, a damning report has claimed.

Many of the provisions of the constitution suggest that “instead of being a true catalyst for lasting change, it further entrenches the military within the government and the associated culture of impunity,” the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) said.

Its report, Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its Constitution, says that within the constitution, the regime has granted itself impunity for sexual violence, forced labor and the recruitment of child soldiers.

Burma, it says, is “one of the most difficult challenges in the world in relation to making progress toward combating impunity.”

Khin Omar, coordinator of the Thailand-based Burma Partnership, said the constitution will “force military rule on Burma forever”.

“[It is] the most problematic element as to whether we move further toward being a failed state or whether we move towards national reconciliation,” she said.

The report says that “officers and troops systematically use rape and other forms of sexual abuse as a strategy of war.”

It then cites a clause within the constitution stating that: “No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils (the military) or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect to any act done in the execution of their respective duties.”

Burma expert Robert H Taylor told DVB however that “No one has proven that [rape] is public policy,” adding that “we don’t know how the military deals with instances of rape”.

He cited anonymous sources that claim the government has action against people accused of assault and rape, but added that the constitution “has its problems, but which doesn’t?”

In a sign that the regime responds to international pressure, the report cited an agreement between the junta and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to address forced labour and child soldiers.

The 2008 constitution was ratified in the weeks following cyclone Nargis last May, in which 140,000 people were killed and millions of acres of land destroyed. Despite the cyclone, the government claimed a 99 percent turnout, with 92.4 percent voting in favour.

A report released last year by Hong Kong-based constitutional expert, Professor Yash Ghai, said that “the cynicism with which the regime held the referendum and manipulated the results was on a par with the cynicism and coercion by which the draft was prepared”.

The ICTJ have called on the international community to withhold support for elections in Burma next year. Khin Omar echoed the calls, and said that a constitutional review must take place before the elections do.

Reporting by Joseph Allchin
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Junta said to be supplying chemical mortars to army

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - In what seems to be a sinister design, the Burmese military junta, while reinforcing its troops in Shan state for a massive offensive against ethnic ceasefire groups, is supplying its army with mortars laced with chemical ingredients, sources said.

According to the Thailand-based ethnic Kachin News Group (KNG), the junta’s troops since last month have been stockpiling a strange type of mortar shell, marked with red, yellow and green colours.

“We have our source in the army. Our source tells us that the army is bringing in these mortars, which are made of chemicals. But they have been strictly told not to use it without orders from higher ups,” said Naw Din, Editor of the KNG, quoting a military source.

Naw Din said, the mortars, according to an insider, were imported from North Korea and have a deadly chemical impact, once fired.

“When the mortars are fired, it contaminates the air and causes people to faint, results in bleeding of the nose, causes breathing difficulties and blurs the eye sight,” Naw Din said.

He added the army source told him that at least two military trucks carrying these mortars were sent to the Burmese Army’s No.1 Nyaung Pin military base on the mountain top near Mongkoe in Northeast Shan State, in early September.

While the supply and possible use of chemical mortars by the junta’s troops cannot be independently verified, sources on the Sino-Burma border said Burmese troops are being heavily reinforced.

Following the Kokang incident in late August, the Burmese junta has been directing its army to borders of the territory of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the strongest armed faction among the ceasefire groups, and Mongla areas, where the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) is based.

Sein Kyi, Assistant Editor of the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), said the junta while increasingly pressurizing the ethnic ceasefire groups to accept its proposal of transforming to the ‘Border Guard Force’ through negotiations and meetings, is also increasing its military presence in northern and eastern Shan state.

“In recent weeks, the Burmese military commanders have proposed meeting lower ranking officials of the UWSA, in order to split the group. But UWSA officials rejected the plan saying they should contact their headquarters,” Sein Kyi said.

In the meantime, Sein Kyi said, the junta is also reinforcing its bases with more troops, and stockpiling supplies, in what looks like a preparation for a massive offensive.

“I don’t have any updates on the possibilities of stockpiling chemical mortars, but earlier about a year or two ago, I had been told by our sources inside the military that they have chemical mortars made in North Korea,” Sein Kyi added.

While he said he did not know of the recent supplies of chemical mortars, he did not rule out the possibility.

“It would be very deadly if these mortars are used. It would impact not only soldiers but all the people, villagers and civilians alike,” he added.

With the Burmese military junta setting the deadline for ethnic ceasefire groups to respond to their proposal of transforming into Border Guard Force to October, sources said, fighting is likely to break out soon.

But with about a 20,000 armed force, the UWSA is unlikely to submit to the junta and a clash between the two could end in a bloodbath.

“The junta will attack the UWSA and other groups sooner or later, but we don’t know how and whether they will launch a direct military campaign or not. They might also rely on other tactics as they did in the Kokang incident,” Sein Kyi said.

But sources said, the junta is likely to look for Chinese signals and it would largely depend on China whether the junta would launch a direct military campaign because the Wa are largely seen as being backed by the Chinese.

Burma Newscasts - Junta said to be supplying chemical mortars to army
Friday, 09 October 2009 21:48

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Article in private journal attacks Burma Campaigners

by Salai Pi Pi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – An article published in the Rangoon-based “The Voice” journal on Monday made an unveiled attack on campaign groups such as the Burma Campaign UK, for misusing the name of Burma in lobbying western nations to impose sanctions on the Southeast Asian nation.

The article authored by “Aung Htut” a pen name on Monday said, the writer is extremely happy to see the US’s new policy of engagement with the Burmese regime, but fears that the US might revert to its old policy as these so-called activists are continuing to lobby to isolate Burma.

“It is not western governments but those individual foreigners who tried to formulate their own strategy in systematically isolating Burma,” the article said, “Most of misunderstandings (over Burma) came from them.”

The article also said these campaigners including members of the Burma Campaign UK and Institute of Democracy for Asia in the past had lobbied western countries for sanctions against Burma. As result Burma was isolated for several years.

Groups like the Burma Campaign UK have a limited number of Burmese people in the organisation, yet they have been effectively lobbying as representatives of the Burmese, the article said.

“The writer wonders how groups like the Burma Campaign UK have the right to represent the Burmese people. But what is certain is that they have misused the name of Burma and its people,” added the article.

But Mark Farmaner, Director of the Burma Campaign UK denied campaigning for the isolation of Burma but stressed that the BCUK is supporting sanctions against members of the Burmese junta and their business cronies, who are benefiting from the sufferings endured by the Burmese people.

He, however, viewed the attack as a natural reaction because of the nature of work that the BCUK has been committed to doing and the influence it has on government’s policies in telling the truth about human rights violations committed by the military junta.

“They attack us because we have been effective in raising awareness about what they are doing and getting the international community to increase pressure,” Farmaner said.

He said, the BCUK is not only committed to push for sanctions against the military regime, but is also pushing for a United Nations Security Council referral of Than Shwe and members of the military junta in the International Criminal Court for their crimes against humanity.

“Probably they attacked us as we are telling the truth about what is happening in Burma. We exposed human rights abuse, what is going on in jails with political prisoners in Burma and what is happening in ethnic areas where the Burmese Army is raping women and children,” Farmaner added.

The article in the Weekly also said, since the campaigners are mostly foreigners, the writer does not expect them to understand the Burmese peoples’ feelings and sufferings and will not sympathize with the life and condition of the country.

The writer said “as a strong advocate of engagement, it is encouraging to see key stakeholders are now showing signs of their willingness for engagement. If this could have been understood earlier, we could have seen good results. But it is only regrettable that much time had been wasted.”

But Farmaner said sanctions have been useful as a tool in reminding the Burmese generals that they are accountable for their actions and a reminder of the need to implement meaningful political reforms.

“We always support a combination of sanctions and engagement. So, the US policy is exactly what we have been campaigning for,” said Farmaner adding that the BCUK will continue campaigning for effective sanctions against the Burmese military regime.

Burma, under military rule since 1962, is contending with financial and economic sanctions by the United States, European Union and Australia for their human rights abuses and failure to implement democratic reforms.

But the US, after concluding its policy review on Burma last week, announced that it is changing track and will use a combination of sanctions as well as engagement.

The new policy comes at a time the Burmese regime, is particularly seen as keen to develop a new relation with the US, in the run up to their planned elections in 2010, which is a part of the junta’s seven-step roadmap to democracy.

While articles in privately owned journals are mostly written by authors unrelated to the Burmese regime, the journal, as per the junta’s law, has to go through the censorship board, which conducts a thorough check of the contents.

Occasionally, Burma’s military junta forces private journals to publish articles and commentaries written in favour of the junta, which the editors of the journals cannot refuse to publish as the consequences could cost their license to run the publication.

Burma Newscasts - Article in private journal attacks Burma Campaigners
Monday, 05 October 2009 22:33

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Ostensible verdict against Aung San Suu Kyi

by Tint Swe

Mizzima News - If a ruling of a court is called a verdict, it has to be called a legal judgment and the judgment has to be made by a judge. So far it seems ostensibly fine with the verdict announced on October 2 in Rangoon. However a judge is not a judge and the law is not law at all in military ruled Burma. A judge has to read out the pre-written decision from higher authorities. The law is what comes out of the mouth of military officers.

When Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal was rejected, no one was surprised. But the legal team of Daw Suu was disappointed because the legal argument read out by the divisional judge was contrary to the true sense of law. The court accepted the argument of non-existence of the 1974 constitution but referred to the 1975 provision which is based on that nullified 1974 constitution. The township level court’s decision of last month was said to be partly wrong according to the divisional court. But the divisional judge said it was partially right. So the legal system in Burma is partial and prejudiced.

The entire month before the news regarding Burma showed of different tones by allowing Americans to visit and meet two top leaders – one none-other-then the Senior General himself and one the icon of pro-democracy struggle Aung San Suu Kyi. The professional staff of the Congressmen met NLD representatives. The foreign minister was also allowed to visit from New York to Washington, DC and a minister met senior US officials from the State department. All followed by the release of an American intruder who was obviously guilty.

The guilt-ridden foreigner was freed and innocent citizen of the country were unjustly punished. The punishment for an innocent person is an additional example of the regime showing tolerance to foreigners while it is total fanaticism for the people of its own country. It was not in accordance with the law but purely a political decision.

Since General Ne Win who governed Burma for 26 years and gave birth of dictatorial rule by the Burmese Army was portrayed as a xenophobic. Now this regime becomes obsessive to foreigners and clinically it is termed as a bipolar disorder.

The substance or lesson from this episode is that underestimation of the true nature of the regime should not be repeated by the international community.

The rejection of appeal came about a couple of days after Aung San Suu Kyi wrote an important letter to the Senior General, the sole decision maker Than Shwe. Her letter was a request cum proposal on how to deal with western sanctions. The sanctions are what the junta desperately wanted to be lifted. In 2007, the General hinted that he could engage in dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi if she dropped calling for sanctions and abandoning confrontation. As a matter of fact Aung San Suu Kyi has been calling for national reconciliation. Now she officially and publically said she was serious about lifting the sanctions.

But the Rangoon divisional court was ordered to turn down the appeal. So it is evident that the regime wants neither sanctions nor Aung San Suu Kyi. Meanwhile the regime will float the sanction issue. But they will not make any serious change to be able to lift sanctions. As the section of the west is too theoretical rather than practical, the junta may collect some aid. However small, it is just fine for them. For the military rulers the assistance from World Bank, IMF and ADB are not real wants like the successful roadmap.

The United Nations, the Secretary General, the General Assembly, the Security Council continued annual routine calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Habitually Russia and China continued blocking the strong statements at the UN. The ASEAN bloc stepped back from letter writing campaign for her release.

The UN diplomats politely commented that the junta missed the opportunity to prove its commitment in holding inclusive elections next year. In fact, for generals, it was not regarded as opportunity but the hurdle to overcome as in a military training. They are also prepared to pass through all hurdles before 2010 election. As long as all veto powers at UNSC do not change their minds, as long as neighbours maintain controversial non-interference and if the oppressed people of Burma can’t flex its muscles though feeble, dictatorial control will remain as it is.

(The author Dr. Tint Swe is the elected Member of Parliament and the Information Minister of the exiled government National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma or NCGUB)

Burma Newscasts - Ostensible verdict against Aung San Suu Kyi
Monday, 05 October 2009 13:00

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Thaw in US-Burma ties

By Chua Chin Hon
The Straits Times

The unexpected thaw in US-Burma ties in recent months has raised a host of intriguing questions.

The most obvious are perhaps the trickiest: Why do Burma's military rulers want to engage the Obama administration in dialogue, and why now? What do they hope to gain?

Diplomats familiar with the issue say it is futile to try to second-guess the thinking of the secretive military junta. Yet, the answers to these questions will shape the negotiation strategies of the United States.

At first sight, there does not seem to be any urgent or compelling reason for Burma's generals to engage their biggest critic, Washington. After all, they have successfully weathered all the criticisms and economic sanctions that the US and other Western countries have imposed since the 1990s.

And Burma's growing importance in providing resources and energy for regional powers like China and India will ensure that foreign investments continue to roll in. So why bother?

Experts who track Burma, however, say that it is wrong to assume that the junta is satisfied, or completely assured, by the status quo. They add that a combination of domestic and external factors probably prompted the generals to seek talks with Washington.

For starters, next year, Burma will hold its first election in two decades, a move widely seen as an attempt by the military to legitimise its rule. Much remains unclear about the participation of the opposition in the elections, and whether international election monitors would be admitted.

Even the date for the election has not been officially announced. But what would be abundantly clear to the junta is that any attempt to garner international recognition would be futile without some level of acceptance from the US, experts say.

"I do think that the (Burmese government) is very anxious to have international recognition and some sort of legitimacy," says Dr Bridget Welsh, a Southeast Asia scholar with the Singapore Management University (SMU).

"And when people talk about the issue of acceptance, they are really referring to this recognition from the US."

The question of whether bilateral talks - and election assistance should Burma request it - could lend legitimacy to the junta-run elections could become a political hot potato for the Obama administration, given the nature of US politics. Hence, US diplomats have hedged their recent contacts with Burmese officials with numerous caveats.

"We will continue to stress to the (Burmese) authorities the baseline conditions that we consider necessary for any credible electoral process," US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told a Senate hearing last Wednesday.

"They include the
release of political prisoners,
the ability of all stakeholders to stand for election,
eliminating restrictions on media, and
ensuring a free and open campaign."

Campbell met U Thaung, Burma's minister of science, technology and labour, in New York last week in what was termed the highest level contact between the two sides in nine years. The negotiators did not set a date for a second set of talks, but Campbell said he sensed from the Burmese officials "a very clear determination that dialogue was possible".

Beyond the search for international acceptance, experts say Burma's willingness to engage the US could also be prompted by the rapidly changing international environment, particularly since President Barack Obama came into office.

Obama's approach to foreign policy has been markedly different from that of his predecessor, George W. Bush, who refused direct contact with countries deemed to be rogue regimes.

It would not have escaped the attention of Burma's military rulers that other countries on Washington's blacklist - Iran and North Korea - have all had increased contact with the new US administration lately. There is little strategic value in being the odd man out in what is already the small and unpopular club of rogue nations.

But the bigger strategic issue on Burma's radar is likely to be the growing ties between the US and China, experts say. Whereas it could play one against the other before, that is no longer a given, as the two global powers see a growing convergence in their interests.

And despite Burma's close economic ties with China, the relationship is not necessarily problem-free.

"On China, we have to remember that the present army leadership grew up fighting the Communist Party of Burma, a well-armed Chinese-supported insurgent force that once threatened huge parts of the eastern uplands," historian Thant Myint-U told Wednesday's Senate hearing.

"Many see their present dependence on China as an anomaly, a tactical move that needs correction."

With all these shifting plates in motion, Burma likely has to recalibrate its position.

Said Dr Welsh of SMU: "They have to find a new configuration...and dialogue is the first step in that process."

For the US, the impetus for the talks goes beyond its traditional concerns about human rights, civil society and the imprisonment of democracy-icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

Burma's growing ties with North Korea and the uranium deposits in the central and northern parts of the country have raised fears that the junta will try to play a similar game of nuclear brinkmanship as Pyongyang has done since 2003.

So far, there has been no smoking gun evidence of Burma contemplating such a move. But that is not likely to assure Washington, which already has its hands full dealing with Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

Said Campbell: "Let me be clear: we have decided to engage with (Burma) because we believe it is in our interest to do so."

Burma Newscasts - Thaw in US-Burma ties
5 October 2009

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Regional implications of US policy on Burma

Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation (Thailand)

The carefully crafted 490-word US policy on Burma is aimed at all players in the region and afar, directly and indirectly, involved in the Burmese quagmire. Coming as it did at this juncture, the policy will be used as a new benchmark to gauge Rangoon's genuine desire for dialogue and openness. It also seeks to rejuvenate international engagement with regional dynamics. This represents another much-needed effort to break the current impasse that the regime can take after Australia made the first attempt—with a long list of demands-at the 1994 Asean ministerial meeting in Bangkok.

Washington realises now that the new approach is likely to be "slow and incremental." In other words, it will be a step by step process. This time a more concerted international effort is required to ease the Burmese crisis after decades of sanctions. The Obama Administration should be lauded for seizing this unique opportunity to formulate a new policy that some regional players can identify with.

The US softer approach has short and long-term objectives. In the next 15 months, pressure on Burma would be a step up building on existing progress accomplished since August including increased US-Burmese high-level meetings and dialogues, as well as ongoing communications between General Than Shwe and the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi on ways to loosen up sanctions. After the US completed its policy reviews, Suu Kyi reiterated her readiness again to help end sanctions against the regime, which she first outlined two and half years ago.

Washington also wants to lay groundwork for inclusive, free and fair elections next year in Burma. Judging from the tone of US senior officials, any positive response from the junta on Suu Kyi's unconditional release or electoral process in coming weeks or months would immediately help to build up mutual confidence and widen the communication channels between the two capitals. Cooperation on counter-narcotics, health, environmental protection, and the recovery of World War II-era missing-in-action (MIAs) could be new incentives.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell made clear that lifting or easing sanctions at the outset of a dialogue without meaningful progress on the US concerns would be a mistake. "We will maintain our existing sanctions until we see concrete progress, and continue to work with the international community to ensure that those sanctions are effectively coordinated," he told a Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs last week.

In the medium and long term, the US policy seeks to break up the twin influence of China and India over Burma. In the policy statement, the US says it will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with the UN, Asean, the EU, China, Japan, India, Australia, the Burmese opposition and others. In reality, the US targets China and India—the two key players which have propped up and strengthened the military junta. The US new positions are more or less closer to those held by key players which prefer more contact,with sanctions still intact, or backing easing of sanctions with more humanitarian assistance.

Since Cyclone Nargis, the EU has picked humanitarian options for the Burmese people albeit growing criticism that it would benefit the regime. For decades, Japan has limited its assistance aid to humanitarian and human resource development, especially in economic planning. Australia also tried without much success to increase awareness on human rights and democracy inside Burma.

With the US new policy, Asean will find it easier to work with the US on Burma—a new element under the Obama administration and Asean. Asean opposes sanctions against Burma, since it was admitted into the grouping in 1997. Apart from sharing common objectives of seeing a united, prosperous and democratic country, now the two sides are moving closer on sanctions. Asean argues sanctions must stop as it hurts the Burmese people.

Ironically, the Asean-US closer cooperation on Burma effectively put an end to the Aseanisation process of Burmese conundrums that began in earnest in Luxembourg in 1991, fuelling the longstanding feud between EU and Asean over Burma. Even before the country joined the grouping, Asean leaders believed they could handle the Burmese issue better than the outsiders through peer pressure and the Asean way. The polarisation reached its peak in 1997 when Burma was admitted to Asean with strong support from former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammad and Indonesian ex-President Suharto.

The US-led "internationalisation" process could overtake the Asean-initiated or even the UN framework, if Burma responds positively to Washington's overtures in a timely manner. In that case, Rangoon has lots of explaining to do for its Asean colleagues and international community. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya's decision to give up the joint Asean appeal on Suu Kyi's freedom, citing the existing international efforts, confirmed this inevitable trend. Like it or not, Asean future positions on Burma would have to take in broad-based international sentiments.

The first US-Asean summit in Singapore, scheduled on November 15, will include Burmese Prime Minister Thien Sein. It was no longer a taboo for the leaders of US and Burma to meet. The summit—whether it is institutionalised-would further deepen the US role played in regional issues. With its Asean ambassador in residence in Jakarta (the first in Asean) to be announced soon, Washington will also have a senior official follow up on this issue with the Asean Secretariat. Later this month, at the Asean summit in Cha-am, Asean expects to see more positive signs from Burma related to the electoral process and relations with the opposition partners.

Closer to home, the US policy will impact on the porous Thai-Burma border. Issues related to attacks on minorities, drugs and human smuggling would be placed high on the US watch lists. More than before, both Thailand and Malaysia—not to mention China over the Kokang conflict- have all suffered from the influx of Burmese refugees.

Recent attacks on minorities along the Thai border by the Burmese troops again displaced thousands of minorities inside the Thai territory.

In years ahead, the US policy serves to enhance Thailand's position vis-a-vis Burma over its nuclear ambition. US senior officials have reiterated the UN Security Council's resolution 1874 (as well as 1718 during testimonies) which deals with nuclear proliferation as part of the Burmese policy gist. Washington has been very concerned about the nature and extent of Burma's nuclear ties with North Korea. During recent testimony, Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana continued to question Burma's motives in dispatching hundreds of its officials to Russia for nuclear technology training. He pointed out the number of persons travelling to Russia for specialised training seemed to be far beyond the number needed for the eventual operation of a nuclear reactor for medical research purposes, intended to be built by the junta with Russian government assistance Thailand has yet to treat with seriousness this explosive issue.

Except for selective army intelligence officials working closely with Australian and American counterparts, the rest of Thai society has been kept in the dark on Burma's nuclearisation program and its implications on the country's future security. The Thai policy makers, in particular the National Security Council, tend to view Burma's quagmire and security concerns through myopic bilateral prisms, which immediately mitigate any serious strategic evaluation of potential nuclear threats to Thailand.

Burma Newscasts - Regional implications of US policy on Burma
5 Oct 2009

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Beijing and Burma no longer best of friends

by Larry Jagan

Bangkok (Mizzima) - There is a growing rift between the two close allies and neighbours, China and Burma over their border problems, with relations at an all-time low. The Burmese junta have cooled towards their main benefactor, Beijing, with increasing public signs of their dissatisfaction. Beijing has even issued some unusually forthright criticism of their neighbour in the past few weeks.

China has also reacted with a diplomatic flurry of activity – in Beijing, Naypyidaw and New York. The Chinese are so concerned about the clouds over their relationship, that they dispatched one of their most seasoned negotiators, the vice-minister for foreign affairs, Wang Yi to Burma on a secret mission within the last ten days, according to senior Burmese officials.

The first signs of the cracks in the relationship appeared when the Burmese army launched an offensive against the Kokang ethnic rebels who have had a truce with the regime for twenty years. Thousands of refugees fled across the border for safety, raising fears of a fresh civil war along Burma’s northern border and alarming China. Beijing’s attitude to Burma has also been compounded by concern over the junta’s future relations with the United States – Beijing is wary of Washington’s offer to the junta of a dialogue.

“Beijing has been taken aback by the Burmese junta’s cavalier approach to their normally strong relationship,” said Win Min, a Burmese academic based at Chiang Mai University. “But it is likely to prove to be a hiccup, rather than a major shift in relations.”

China has several major concerns, including their massive economic investment in the country, especially the planned oil pipeline, pumping oil from the Arakan Sea off the west coast of Burma into China’s southern province of Yunnan. But Beijing is also concerned about the growing unrest along their common border, and the safety of the Chinese living in Burma. Around a quarter of a million Chinese have crossed the border and sought work and economic opportunities in northern Burma in the last ten years.

Concerns are now mounting for their safety with the deteriorating situation in the border areas. Last weekend a government-controlled provincial television channel, which is based in Kunming – the capital of Yunnan -- broadcast a Chinese government announcement advising all Chinese citizens in eastern Burma to return home quickly.

This followed a formal complaint from China to Burma days earlier over the way Chinese citizens living in a border region had been treated during recent clashes between the Burmese army and the ethnic Kokang militia last month. In statement issued last week, China's Foreign Ministry said the recent conflict with the Kokang, in a north-eastern Burmese region bordering China, had "harmed the rights and interests of Chinese citizens living there." It also said the Burmese government should make sure similar incidents do not happen again.

Burma insists that peace has been restored to the area in question, and most of the refugees who fled to China had returned. But there has still thousands seeking refuge across the border, not just from the Kokang areas, according to residents living in China along the border with Burma. Nearly forty thousand refugees, many of them Chinese businessmen fled into China when the fighting erupted. They were housed in makeshift camps provided by the Chinese authorities. Officially these refugees have since been dispersed, and returned to Burma. “The Kokang capital Laogai, remains a ghost town,” a recent foreign visitor there told Mizzima. Most of the main cities and towns are also empty, including the main border city in the east of Shan state, he added.

Right along the border, from the Kachin areas in the west to the Shan areas in the east, people have fled into China for fear of renewed fighting between other ethnic rebel groups, especially the Kachin and the Wa and the Burmese army, according to Indian entrepreneurs who travel along this area doing business. “Everyone fears that the twenty-year old ceasefire agreements have been torn up by the Burmese generals, and a return to fighting is imminent,” said a Kachin student living in the Chinese border town of Ruili.

“At moment it does not look as though the Burmese army is about to attack any of the other ethnic rebel groups that have ceasefire agreements, though there is a lot of posturing going on,” said Win Min. “There is no doubt that the regime means to have all the ethnic rebel armies disarm before next year’s elections and become part of the border guards under the control of the Burmese army.” The ceasefire groups told Mizzima that they have until the end of October to comply with the government order to disarm, and join the Border Police Guard under the control of the Burmese military, and take part in next year’s planned elections.

Earlier this year the junta sought the assistance of the former intelligence chief and prime minister, General Khin Nyunt – who was deposed in October 2004 and is now under house arrest in Rangoon – to help negotiate with these rebels groups, especially the Wa. Khun Nyunt had mater-mined these ceasefire agreement some twenty years ago, and was still trusted by many of the ethnic leaders. He agreed on condition that his men – some 300 military intelligence officers who were jailed in the aftermath of Khin Nyunt’s fall – be freed.

The government refused to accept his condition, and turned to the Chinese – who have extremely close relations with the key ethnic groups along the border – the Kachin, Kokang and the Wa. The Chinese reluctance to help has angered the Burmese junta’s leaders.

It is now increasingly evident that a significant rift exits between the two countries that could have crucial implications for other countries in the region, and any approach the international community may take to encourage the Burmese military regime to introduce real political change.

The implications of this growing divergence could have significant affects on the border region, as the most of the ethnic groups – especially the Kachin, Kokang and Wa – in this area have ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta, but also have traditionally close ties with the Chinese authorities. Economically and culturally the area is certainly closer to China than the Burmese regime.

Many of these ethnic leaders go to Chinese hospital across the border for medical treatment and send their children to school in China. The Chinese language and even the Chinese currency the Renminbi is used throughout the Kokang and Wa areas in northern Shan state.

Anything which forces Beijing to choose between their ethnic brothers inside Burma—the Kokang are ethnically and the Wa, a Chinese ethnic minority -- and the central government will cause the Beijing immense problems. And in the end will bring into sharp focus the real nature of the Burma-China axis.

Beijing is now more worried about Burma’s longer-term allegiance. The junta has been a China’s key ally and strategic partner in south-east Asia in the past few years. So the current overtures between Washington and Burma have dismayed the Chinese leaders, who remain suspicious of the US interest in re-engaging with the region and increasing its influence – also fearing it is a return to the old US strategy of containing China. The region is seen by Beijing as its back-yard, and any competition for influence is far from welcomed.

China fears that its influence in south-east Asia is waning. Vietnam has never been a strong supporter, and as far as Beijing is concerned, for sometime Hanoi’s main interest has been to cosy up to Washington. Recently Cambodia and Thailand have strengthened their ties with the US, increasing China’s strategic concerns.

Now its rock-solid ally has begun to flirt with improving relations with Washington. “China will react with measured nervousness to this unwelcomed encroachment into Burma,” Justin Wintle, a British expert on Burma and biographer of Aung San Suu Kyi told Mizzima.

Beijing’s current concerns stem from the unstable basis of their bilateral relationship. The Chinese government remains suspicious of the Burmese military junta. “When we meet the Thais, they look Chinese and speak Chinese, but when we see the Burmese leaders, they don’t speak Chinese and they look South Asian,” said a senior Chinese government official.

‘Burma and China are not ‘real’ friends – as with Thailand for example,” he said. “It’s a Machiavellian relationship: we are in for what we can get out of it, and they are also in it, for what they can get out of it,” he said.

So according to Chinese diplomats, it is a relationship that could shift easily. “But it is not likely to become antagonistic anytime soon,” said Win Min. “Burma is far too economically dependent on China for the government to really consider ditching Beijing as its main ally.”

More than ninety percent of direct foreign invest in Burma last year was Chinese. While the western-led sanctions remain in place, that is unlikely to change in the near future. Sanctions of course now more than ever rankle with the regime.

"Sanctions are being employed as a political tool against Myanmar and we consider them unjust," the Burmese prime minister, General Thein Sein told the UN’s annual General Assembly meeting in New York last month. Undoubtedly Burma’s interest in a dialogue with the US is motivated by the regime’s main concerns, to have sanctions lifted, for international humanitarian and development assistance to flow into the country, and to attract foreign investment.

“Though generals are certainly unhappy about being too dependent on one supporter, and will be trying to balance Chinese influence with better relations with the US as well as other countries –like ASEAN and India, they will not be looking to cut the umbilical cord with China in the near future,” said Win Min.

But there is no escaping from the fact that Burma’s military leaders are upset with Beijing. The Chinese embassy put on a lavish reception for the massive 60th anniversary of the founding of the Peoples’ Republic of China. The coverage in the official New Light of Myanmar the next day paid scant notice to the importance of the occasion or the ambassador’s address, Instead it noticeably focused on Secretary One’s attendance. This comes after the Myanmar Times recently was allowed to refer to the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama when he visited Taiwan, last month. Both these incidents are clearly signs that the junta wants to rebuke China.

But thinks may already be on the mend after the Chinese envoy’s secret mission to see Than Shwe recently. China is desperately trying to mend fences with the junta. One example of this is the diplomatic initiative China took at the UN Security Council to make sure Burma is not on its agenda – at least this month.

It looks like the trouble between Burma and China maybe on the wane. Nevertheless Beijing will be watching with growing concern, any further overtures between Burma and the US. So far it seems to have been a spat between two close partners – siblings or even husband and wife, according to Asian diplomats who have also been following the situation closely.

But in the end it is Burma that may hold the upper hand. China’s economic, trade and military involvement in Burma gives the junta the upper hand rather than making them more subservient to Beijing. The issue now is how far will the junta leaders go in flexing their muscles.

Burma Newscasts - Beijing and Burma no longer best of friends
Sunday, 04 October 2009 18:05

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Peace in Name only

By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
The Irrawaddy News
OCTOBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.7

War and refugees will remain a fact of life in Burma as long as the root causes of conflict in the country’s borderlands remain unaddressed.

The rout of the ethnic Kokang militia, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, in northern Burma in late August has brought into stark relief what millions of people live with in Burma every day: conflict between the central state and non-state armed militias. For decades, clashes between the Burmese regime’s army and its myriad enemies have been forcing people into hiding or across borders. What is different about the recent fighting is that it involved China—not usually a country that tolerates refugees from Burma or instability along its borders.
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The cause of the latest outbreak of hostilities is the decision of Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to pressure cease-fire groups to transform their armies into border security guard forces before next year’s election. Under the SPDC plan, which was first proposed in April, the militias would be split up into battalions consisting of 326 soldiers, mostly from ethnic militias, but with a number of Burmese government army troops and officers. The deadline for a response to the plan was June, with training to begin in October.

Many groups have refused, and with good grounds. How could an armed group such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), with an estimated 20,000 soldiers, practically accept such a demand under such a tight timeframe? The Kachin Independence Organization seems to have diplomatically rejected the junta’s demand by conditionally agreeing to it, but other groups have declined outright, leading to fears of a resumption of armed conflict.

Yet as negative as the potential consequences of the SPDC’s demands are, the status quo is equally bad, not just for national political reforms, but also for civilian protection. Burma’s hinterlands have for most of the past 20 years been ordered into a network of semi-autonomous cease-fire zones, run by politico-military armed groups often financed by investments in the narcotics trade, illegal logging, smuggling, transport and casino capitalism. From Mon State up the eastern borderlands and around Shan State to Kachin State, a string of “special regions” has emerged, often in an uneasy coexistence with central state forces based on verbal agreements with Burmese military leaders.

For the cease-fire groups, the dividends of this arrangement included some form of autonomy in future constitutional changes, as well as national and international development assistance. In return, they agreed to stop fighting. This pact has paid off handsomely for the leaders of the various groups, many of whom have amassed substantial fortunes. But for many of their “constituents,” the cessation of active conflict has only produced a tenuous peace.

Paradoxically, the number of armed groups in Burma has actually increased since the cease-fires, because of factionalism and local security requirements.

Burma has been through all of this before. In the 1960s, the Tatmadaw created Ka Kwe Ye (Home Guard) units, sometimes called “anti-insurgency forces,” from the private armies of local warlords. Pyithu Sit (People’s Militias) have also increased, especially in Shan State, where, as local motley bands of militia under the direction of Tatmadaw battalions, they often exist as the bottom feeders of the Burmese drug trade, acting little better than modern dacoits.

The Kokang showdown was preceded in a more peaceful, if not more productive, format, in early 2005, when the SPDC forced the surrender of the Palaung State Liberation Party. According to the Palaung Women’s Organization, the surrender dramatically increased suffering among the civilian population.

Two years later, in 2007, the small Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization split into three factions as a result of intensified pressure from the SPDC to surrender their weapons. One of their military leaders who broke the cease-fire and returned to active hostilities, Col Hkun Thu Rein, said, “We got nothing from the cease-fire. Even when international development agencies came to our area, the SPDC warned us not to tell the truth.”

The one seemingly avid convert to the border guard scheme, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), was not surprising, marking the group’s gradual transformation from a splinter faction of the Karen National Union with some genuine political and social grievances to a snarling criminal gang with somewhat unconvincing appeals to nationalism. The DKBA’s growing business empire along the Thai-Burmese border shows the economic returns of cooperation: agro-business, people smuggling, illegal car importation, cattle smuggling, mining, transportation concessions, and local methamphetamine production and trafficking. In return, the DKBA has continued to attack Karen communities inside Burma, and now acts as little more than a willing auxiliary of the SPDC.

Non-state armed groups such as the DKBA are being primed by the SPDC to act as border militias under a future civilian government, and if recent fighting is any indication, many groups could act with the same ferocity and disregard for civilian protection as the Burmese army.
Weapons seized from Kokang rebels are displayed by the Burmese police in laogai on Sept. 8.

War has displaced millions of civilians in Burma. Currently there are nearly half a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Burma alone. Around 150,000 refugees live in nine camps along the Thai-Burmese border, even though more than 46,000 have been resettled to third countries since 2005. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Shan struggle for survival in northern Thailand, unregistered and unrecognized as anything more than migrant workers. India has more than 50,000 ethnic Chin refugees and thousands more Burmese refugees in Mizoram and New Delhi. Some 28,000 Rohingya Muslims from Arakan State live in dire conditions in camps in Bangladesh, with about 200,000 more living in surrounding areas. Burmese refugees also live either as migrant workers or UN-recognized asylum seekers in Malaysia, Singapore and scores of other countries around the world.

The fate of the displaced varies vastly, depending on a host of factors. Sometimes even groups that are located in close proximity to each other can be worlds apart in terms of their access to assistance.

Take, for example, the camp for Shan IDPs across from Mae Fah Luang in Thailand. Home to nearly 3,000 civilians, the village of Wan Loi Saw Nien is made up of assorted Shan, Lahu, Akha, Palaung and Chinese from throughout eastern Shan State who were displaced by more than 10 years of fighting between the Shan State Army-South and the UWSA and Tatmadaw. Much of the fighting started because the UWSA forced some 100,000 civilians from its northern area to resettle along the Thai border to create a new enclave called Mong Yawn, basically to provide a civilian cover for intensified methamphetamine production.

This disastrous experiment in mini-state creation also produced the UWSA-controlled town of Yawngkha, just 9 km from Wan Loi Saw Nien. However, the experiences of the two towns couldn’t be more different. Yawngkha receives UN assistance, funding from Thailand’s Mae Fah Luang Foundation, and visits from Western academics in Tatmadaw helicopters. Wan Loi Saw Nien, on the other hand, is shunned by UN and international relief agencies because the UN doesn’t “do” borders. This could, however, change if the SSA signs a cease-fire agreement with the regime.

Abuses against civilians in conflict areas and around cease-fire zones have been exhaustively documented in the annual internal displacement surveys of the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), as well as by several grassroots documentation organizations, such as the Karen Human Rights Group and the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, among others.

Although there is some truth to the argument that there are fewer human rights violations in ethnic areas as a result of decreased hostilities, it is more accurate to say that the patterns of human rights violations have changed.

While horrific numbers of abuses were perpetrated by all sides in the conflict during active hostilities, many civilians living in or near cease-fire zones must now bear the burden of heavier militarization, with the attendant demands for forced labor, food and anything else that Burmese government forces “living off the land” require. Meanwhile, other abuses normally associated with open conflict, such as rape and summary executions of civilians, continue, as evidenced by the recent attacks in the Kokang region and central Shan and Karen states.

Under the Second Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention, attacks against civilians, the destruction of things indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food, crops and water supply, and the forced removal of civilians unless it is for their own safety or for imperative military reasons, are prohibited. Furthermore, parties to the conflict must facilitate immediate and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.

The Tatmadaw and its proxy forces have blatantly violated these principles of customary international humanitarian law for years. In a remarkable and rare public denunciation in June 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cited what it called “major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law” by the “Government of Myanmar” against civilians in eastern Burma between 2000 and 2005.

The only thing more remarkable than the ICRC’s highly unorthodox public statement was the apathy with which it was received by the international community. It was as if the world shrugged and thought, “Heard it all before.”

Well, in fact, the world has heard it all before, and refused to act. The recent report by the Harvard Law School Human Rights Clinic, “Crimes in Burma,” used United Nations documents to demonstrate that since 2002, crimes in conflict areas have been widespread and systematic, especially in regards to forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. And yet, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon refused to discuss the matter either within the UN Security Council or during his fruitless visit to Burma in July this year. Ban did give a strong speech (at the Rangoon Drug Eradication Museum, of all places) on Burma’s deplorable human rights record, but the UN has done precious little to address it.

The willful refusal to acknowledge the scale of human rights violations in Burma’s conflict zones is absolutely inexcusable. And yet, a muttering cabal of academics, international relief workers and erstwhile Western investors is seeking to roll back years of documentation proving the extent of the suffering in IDP and refugee zones. Some even preface these exhaustively documented human rights violations with the word “alleged,” as if there were any doubt about the atrocities being committed in the name of Burma’s “national reconsolidation.”

Much of the new wave of denial is linked to an endorsement of next year’s planned elections, which some see as an opportunity to create a small opening for change inside Burma. Yet one layer of these reforms—the long postponed incorporation of ethnic armed groups—suddenly looks to be in jeopardy after two decades of relative stasis.

For the international media, the recent Kokang fighting has evoked comparisons to Darfur, the Congo, Sri Lanka and other countries that have disintegrated into war zones of disorder. But the best guide to Burma’s future is its own past: if the cease-fire areas descend into conflict again, they will resemble the situation before the cease-fires of 1989. That was a period of intense warfare on several fronts throughout the country, with dozens of armed groups of varying legitimacy. At the time, human rights documentation was rudimentary and refugees spilled across borders unheeded, or were pushed back mercilessly.

Should war resume in parts of Burma’s borderlands, the country will simply return to its pre-1989 situation, and the challenges of national reconciliation and local sustainable development will begin again.

David Scott Mathieson is the Burma Researcher for Human Rights Watch.

Burma Newscasts - Peace in Name only
OCTOBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.7

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Burma’s 2010 elections to test new US policy

by Brian McCartan

Mizzima News – The United States is seeking to more actively engage with Burma’s military rulers, but made it clear they will not repeal sanctions unless the regime shows that it is taking concrete steps to address American concerns over human rights and democratic reform. A key test of this policy will be elections scheduled for next year.

The United States neither endorsed nor dismissed the electoral process in Burma in its policy announcement. Instead, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged countries to “take a measured approach” until electoral conditions are assessed and it becomes clear whether opposition and ethnic groups will be allowed to participate.

In effect, the US is asking the regime to make concessions to the opposition and ethnic political organizations to allow them to actively engage in the election process rather than the token participation that many observers expect. Most Burma analysts believe that the military has already worked out the percentage of seats to award the opposition and ethnic groups in the final vote tally, expected to be nowhere near enough to influence policy in the ensuing parliament.

Attempts by ethnic leaders to put forward changes to the constitution were ignored by the regime during the constitution drafting National Convention which concluded in 2007. A nationwide referendum held in 2008 approved the constitution, but was widely condemned as rigged. The political opposition and ethnic leaders have called for the constitution to be amended before the vote is held next year, but the government insists that can only be done after elections. Activists argue that any amendment to the constitution after the elections will be impossible due to the military’s heavy role in any new government.

Ethnic ceasefire organizations are currently under heavy pressure to join the electoral process and hand over control of their military wings to the government as part of a new Border Guard Force. Yet, the groups contend that without their troops they will have no bargaining power against a government that regularly uses force to impose its will. Several groups such as the New Mon State Party and the Kachin Independence Organization have allowed members to resign in order to form political parties.

Junta pressure was backed up by action in August when Burmese Army troops attacked Laokai, the headquarters of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), routing the Kokang-based ceasefire group. Although fighting has largely subsided, tensions are high in Shan and Kachin States. The deadline for acquiescence to the junta’s border force demand is only days away and there is a genuine fear that fighting could erupt across the region.

A government offensive, and the inevitable corresponding human rights abuses, would surely run counter to American demands of ending ethnic conflicts and putting a halt to gross human rights violations in ethnic areas. Fighting in the area in the 1970’s and 1980’s resulted in thousands of casualties and the displacement of tens of thousands of villagers. Human rights groups accuse the government of using various forms of forced labor, including portering supplies for government troops and using civilians as human minesweepers, during current counterinsurgency operations in Karen State and southern Shan State.

The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has said that it will not participate in the elections until amendments are made to the constitution that gives the military less of a controlling role. The junta’s insistence that amending the constitution is impossible until after the election has virtually shut down dialogue between the NLD and the regime.

The US, however, has made it clear in its policy announcement that it wants to see engagement not only between itself and the regime, but also between the regime and the political opposition and American representatives and the opposition. Suu Kyi, herself, seized on this theme in a statement made through her lawyer welcoming US intentions to diplomatically engage the generals, but restated that the opposition should also be consulted. A letter written by her to Senior General Than Shwe has asked for permission to meet with ambassadors from foreign countries to get their opinions on sanctions and what can be done to end them.

The NLD’s other main precondition for joining the electoral process is the release of all political prisoners and their participation in the electoral process. The US has similarly identified the freeing of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, as one of its “core concerns.” A prisoner amnesty two weeks ago included 128 political prisoners among the 7,114 released, however key leaders including Suu Kyi, NLD chairman Tin Oo, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy leader U Khun Tun Oo and 88 Generation Student leader Min Ko Naing, still remain in prison or under house arrest. Most observers believe the junta intends on keeping political leaders in detention until after the elections are finished to remove any chance of their serving as rallying points for the opposition.

Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said on Monday, “We are skeptical that the elections will be either free or fair, but we will stress to the Burmese the conditions that we consider necessary for a credible electoral process.” For most observers of the Burmese regime, it is doubtful that they will be willing to make the concessions to the political opposition or ethnic groups needed to make the elections credible in the eyes of Washington.

Unless the generals are serious about reaching out to the US, then the whole exercise risks becoming simply another of the junta’s diversionary tactics aimed at drawing attention away from other issues in the lead-up to the all-important elections. The same tactic has been used with the UN on numerous occasions to deflect criticism until international attention shifts elsewhere. The generals have spent decades consolidating their hold on power and are not likely to be willing to accept any compromise that may weaken their grip.

Burma Newscasts - Burma’s 2010 elections to test new US policy
Friday, 02 October 2009 12:33

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Rejection of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal ‘legally flawed’: Defence lawyer

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyer on Friday said the Rangoon division court’s decision to reject the appeal against her sentence is “legally flawed” as the court arrived at its verdict on a constitution that it acknowledges being non-existent.

Kyi Win, a member of Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal team, said the divisional court acknowledged that the 1974 constitution is no longer in effect, but said the 1975 law, which is based on the constitution, is still in effect and under which the lower court’s verdict on August 11 is legally binding.

“It is a serious legal fraud. If the constitution is no longer in effect, the law based on that constitution cannot be alive, and thus Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be detained,” Kyi Win told Mizzima on Friday.

According to the law enacted in 1975, Aung San Suu Kyi had been deprived of her fundamental rights, which are stated in the 1974 constitution.

The district court in Rangoon’s Insein prison on August 11 sentenced the Nobel Peace Laureate to three years, on charges of violating her detention regulations, which is prescribed in the 1975 law.

Despite the argument by defence lawyers that the 1974 constitution is no longer in vogue, the district court did not acknowledge it and handed down the verdict, Kyi Win said.

Following the sentence, the defence team appealed to the divisional court, citing mainly that Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be sentenced and must be acquitted as the law, under which she was charged is no longer in effect.

“It is bizarre. I am a high court lawyer and I have also served as a judge but I do not understand how the 1975 law can restrict the fundamental rights prescribed in the 1974 constitution, which is no longer in effect,” Kyi Win said.

He added that the defence will continue appealing to the high court and will focus on the flaws of interpreting the law and the constitution.

After independence from the British, Burma had its first constitution in 1947, but following a military coup led by General Newin in 1962, the constitution was scrapped. Under the Newin regime, a new constitution was drafted and approved in 1974. But in 1975, the Newin regime promulgated a set of laws based on the constitution.

“The division court’s argument is that though the 1974 constitution is dead, Aung San Suu Kyi is charged with the 1975 law,” said Kyi Win.

Burma Newscasts - Rejection of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal ‘legally flawed’: Defence lawyer
Friday, 02 October 2009 20:10

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US embassy to put up lawyers for detained citizen

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – The US embassy in Rangoon has got in touch with lawyers to defend its detained citizen, Aung Kyaw Zaw, arrested on arrival in the former Burmese capital’s international airport on September 3.

Kyi Win, a high court advocate, on Friday told Mizzima that he was contacted by the US embassy to defend Aung Kyaw Zaw (alias) Nyi Nyi Aung, currently detained in Rangoon’s notorious Insein prison.

“The embassy contacted us to defend him and offered us a fee equivalent to the amount paid to the lawyer they had hired for John William Yettaw. But we said we are willing to provide ‘Pro Bono’ [free of charge] service,” Kyi Win said.

Kyi Win said the embassy had contacted him and his colleague Nyan Win, with whom he teamed up to defend detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to take up Nyi Nyi Aung’s case.

Both Kyi Win and Nyan Win are advocates practicing in the high court.

“I don’t know if Nyi Nyi Aung has been charged yet. I am yet to receive a reply from the embassy,” Kyi Win said.

While it is still not clear whether he has been charged and on what grounds, a report in the state-run media the New Light of Myanmar newspaper last week accused Nyi Nyi Aung of trying to instigate civil unrest in cahoots with underground activists inside Burma.

The report also accused Nyi Nyi Aung of working together with several Burmese organizations in exile including the Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB), the Student and Youth Congress of Burma (SYCB) and alleged that he had provided financial assistance to activists inside the country.

Nyi Nyi Aung was a student activist and was involved in the 1988 student-led uprising. He along with several other students fled to Thailand in the wake of the military crackdown on protesters. Later he was resettled in United States from Thailand and was naturalized as a US citizen.

Nyi Nyi Aung holds a valid US passport and had a legal social visit Visa to Burma. He flew from Bangkok to Rangoon on September 3 on a TG flight.

Since his arrest, Nyi Nyi Aung was taken to several interrogation centres, where he allegedly endured torture. He was finally taken to the Insein prison. The US embassy spokesman said, Nyi Nyi Aung had complained of ill-treatment during their meeting.

Burma Newscasts - US embassy to put up lawyers for detained citizen
Friday, 02 October 2009 21:28

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ENC wants ethnic groups to contest 2010 elections

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - A group of Burma’s ethnic political organizations in exile – the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) - has urged US Senator James Webb not to condemn the junta’s 2010 election before it takes place but to call for more inclusiveness and for it to be free and fair.

In a letter to Sen. Webb, a strong advocate of engagement with the Burmese regime, two days before he hosted a Congressional hearing on Burma, the ENC urged the Virginian Senator that the US can best help by “Not condemning the 2010 elections before they are held.”

“But instead call for a more inclusive election process that will be free and fair. Electoral assistance can be offered either directly or indirectly through neighbouring countries,” said the letter dated September 28, 2009.

The letter, a copy of which is in Mizzima’s possession, was sent to Senator Webb in appreciation for his interest in the Burma issue and as an explanation on the nature of the complex problems of Burma’s diverse ethnic minorities.

Webb on Wednesday hosted a Congressional hearing on Burma where four experts gave their testimony on what should be the policy of the US towards Burma and the potential role that the US can play in bringing change in the military-ruled Southeast Asian nation.

The letter signed by Saw David Thaw, General Secretary of the ENC, states that ‘in principle’ ethnic nationalities in Burma cannot accept the junta’s 2008 constitution and does not believe that the 2010 elections will lead to democracy.

But the ENC argues that since the ethnics are left with little or no choice, they will have to participate in the elections, because “If there are no opposition parties, the military’s candidates will win by default. The military (and the majority ethnic ‘Burman’) candidates will then become the “elected representatives” of the seven ethnic states.”

Besides, the ENC said, if the ethnic armed ceasefire groups refuse to participate, they will be forced to revert to armed struggle, which will then cause further complications.

Burma under the current administration has seven states, which are home to seven major ethnic groups, and seven divisions, which have no particular attachment to any ethnic groups but are mostly known as habitats of the majority Burmans.

In view of the ENC’s policy of ethnic groups having a voice in Burma’s national politics, participating in governance and development of their homelands, the letter urged Senator Webb not to condemn the 2010 elections until it takes place but to urge the Burmese junta to make it more inclusive and free and fair.

The letter also states that the US can best help the people of Burma by providing assistance in civic education on elections and helping civil organizations that are educating potential political candidates on how to run for office and on democratic governance. And also to support groups that are educating the people about their rights and preparing local organizations on how to monitor the forthcoming elections.

The letter, which for the first time reveals ENC’s policy, states that ENC’s short-term policy is to support eligible ethnic groups in running for office in the 2010 elections.

It also said the ENC’s long-term policy is to develop a robust civil society that will be capable of holding an elected government accountable to the people.

“While the Burmese military will remain in control after the 2010 elections, it is our hope that representatives elected by the people will be able to help hold the military accountable to their own constitution,” said the letter.

“It is also our hope that the new government will be more open to negotiating a political solution with the ethnic groups that are still engaged in armed struggle,” added the letter.

In contrast to the ENC’s policy, the Committee Representing Peoples’ Parliament (CRPP), a group formed with 1990 election winning parties, said unless the regime amends the 2008 constitution, the elections would be meaningless and the CRPP would not contest.

Aye Thar Aung, Secretary of the CRPP, told Mizzima on Friday, “Without amending the 2008 constitution, the ethnics can do nothing even if they participate and are elected. They would just end up as puppets of the junta.”

He said the CRPP as well as Aung San Suu Kyi’s party – the National League for Democracy – have both demanded that the junta release political prisoners, amend the 2008 constitution, and recognize the 1990 election results.

“Unless these demands are met, we the CRPP and the ALD, will not participate in the elections,” Aye Thar Aung, who is also secretary for the Arakan League for Democracy, said.

“And without the junta fulfilling these demands, I would like to urge ethnic groups and others not to participate in the elections,” he added.

The CRPP, formed in September 1998, is an alliance of ethnic political parties that won elections in 1990, which the junta refused to honour. Its members include the NLD, ALD, Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) and Zomi National Congress (ZNC).

Burma’s military rulers, as the fifth step of its seven-step roadmap to democracy, said it will hold general elections in 2010, that will elect a semi-civilian government based on the 2008 constitution, which according to the junta was approved by over 90 per cent of voters in May last year.

Critics said the junta’s roadmap is to buy-time and to cement the role of military in Burma’s future politics.

Burma Newscasts - ENC wants ethnic groups to contest 2010 elections
Friday, 02 October 2009 23:31

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Burmese-American Tortured in Prison: AI

By KO HTWE
The Irrawaddy News

Amnesty international has issued a statement of grave concern about Burmese-American activist Nyi Nyi Aung (aka Kyaw Zaw Lwin), who it says has been tortured and suffered other ill-treatment while in detention in Insein Prison in Rangon.

Nyi Nyi Aung, who has dual citizenship, was arrested in Rangoon on Sept. 3 after returning from exile.

While in detention he has been tortured including beatings and kicking, lack of food for seven days, no sleep and denial of medical treatment for injuries sustained while tortured, said the report.

The New Light of Myanmar, the state-backed newspaper, reported in detail on Thursday on Nyi Nyi Aung’s arrest. The report included photographs of Nyi Nyi Aung, explosives and a satellite phone he was alleged to have had in his possession.

The story described underground activities allegedly undertaken by Nyi Nyi Aung and connections between dissidents inside and outside Burma.

Nyi Nyi Aung’s mother, San San Tin, is severing a 5-year prison sentence and his cousin, Thet Thet Aung, is serving a 65-year prison sentence for participating in the anti-government demonstrations in September 2007.

Meanwhile, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) released a statement on Thursday that welcomed the amnesty of prisoners and noted reports of torture undergone by some detainees during interrogation and imprisonment.

The AHRC said torture and abuse of prisoners is endemic across Burma and singled out Myo Yan Naung Thein, Bo Bo and Aung Myint as having been tortured after their arrest and imprisonment followed by a lack of appropriate medical treatment.

The statement called on the junta to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit detention facilities in Burma without further delay.

Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia) issued a statement criticizing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) silence on Burma at the recent UN Human Rights Council meeting and called on Asean to stand with victims of human rights abuses in Burma.

Yap Swee Seng, the executive director of Forum-Asia, said “While we appreciate the efforts of some governments to make a joint appeal of the Asean at the General Assembly for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, we deeply regret that the same effort has not been taken at the Human Rights Council nor has any Asean member country spoke out on Burma in its own national capacity.”

Burma Newscasts - Burmese-American Tortured in Prison: AI
Friday, September 25, 2009

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Engaging Naypyidaw

By AUNG ZAW
The Irrawaddy News

If the United States believes engaging the repressive regime in Burma will change the behavior of the generals, I would just like to say, “Good luck, but I’m afraid that leopards don’t change their spots!”

In fact, the “new” US policy on Burma comes not so long after the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act 2008, the US’s attempt at a strong-arm policy on the generals.

The 2008 act has three aims:
1) to impose new financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the leaders of the junta and their associates;
2) to tighten the economic sanctions imposed in 2003 by outlawing the importation of Burmese gems to the US;
3) and to create a new position of special representative and policy coordinator for Burma.

The proposed US special envoy would have the task of working with Burma’s neighbors and other interested countries, such as those within the EU and Asean.

The envoy’s mission would also involve developing a comprehensive approach to the Burma crisis, including pressure, dialogue and support for nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian relief to the Burmese people.

It remains to be seen if the Obama administration is going to appoint the special US envoy to Burma anytime in the near future.

Burmese dissidents and observers by and large think that the generals in Naypyidaw may be more receptive to a US envoy than someone from the UN or EU—after all, we all witnessed how generously Snr-Gen Than Shwe treated US Senator Jim Webb in August.

In any case, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act was a mixture of sanctions and engagement. Unsurprisingly, the new US policy on Burma is a mixed bag of sticks and carrots.

In her most recent statement, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “Engagement versus sanctions is a false choice in our opinion.

“Going forward we will be employing both of those tools,” Clinton said, but added that lifting sanctions would send the wrong signal.

On the surface, the substance of the policy is to encourage credible, democratic reforms and the immediate release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and serious dialogue with opposition and ethnic minority groups.

Speaking on behalf of detained democracy leader Suu Kyi, party spokesman Nyan Win said that she accepted the concept of engagement by the new US administration.

In fact, the Nobel Peace Prize winner’s message to the US is clear and well-calculated.

“She said she has always espoused engagement,” Nyan Win said. “However, [she] suggested that engagement has to be done with both sides—the government as well as the democratic forces.”

The statement forces the US to ponder whether it can be seen to betray or abandon the pro-democracy camp in Burma and the issue of human rights.

In any case, several pundits and scholars have voiced their opinions on the “new US policy”; however, I think it is important to listen to Burmese who continue to live under the regime.

I believe the main skeptics of the new US policy are the oppressed Burmese citizens, and political dissidents and Buddhist monks who remain in prison.

On the international front, the generals’ powerful allies China, India and Russia will be carefully eyeing the US’s new approach.

I believe an extra dimension to the Obama government’s new engagement policy is the issue of China.

China remains the junta’s major arms supplier and trading partner. It offers security guarantees at the United Nations Security Council, investment and trade links, as well as development assistance.

However, Beijing was displeased by the instability on its border when the Burmese government forces attacked ethnic Chinese and the Kokang ethnic rebel group recently.

China’s repeated requests to solve the issue peacefully went ignored. Beijing must have seen this as a breach of their fraternal relationship and time to reassess its own Burma policy.

In a rare move by China, the foreign ministry spoke out urging Burma to “properly handle domestic problems and maintain stability in the China-Burma border region” and to “protect the security and legal rights" of China’s citizens in the country.

“The insular and nationalistic generals do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing,” said Robert Templer, International Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director.

Regarding China-Burma relations, Templer warned: “By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead in solving the problem, a workable international approach to Myanmar [Burma] will remain elusive.”

The ICG also said that the West should emphasize to China the unsustainable nature of its current policies and continue to apply pressure in the Security Council and other fora.

The joke among Burmese dissidents is that Beijing has been left broken-hearted after seeing Washington’s move on Naypyidaw.

China definitely doesn’t want to be left out in the cold, but, simultaneously, it should feel some form of victory as it has for years pushed the US and its allies not to punish or isolate the Burmese regime.

Common ground between the US and China would appear to lie in their approach to the 2010 election in Burma.

“The Burmese election should not be dismissed at this time,” said Clinton in New York. “At the same time, we should continue discussions with the Burmese authorities to emphasize that the international community will only recognize the planned 2010 elections as a positive step to the extent that the Burmese authorities allow full participation by members of Burma's opposition and ethnic minority groups.”

To sum up, the US and China may both be repositioning and trying out new policies with Burma. And both will know that while they may not have suffered a defeat, they most certainly have had to make concessions.

The intransigent, stubborn, brutal regime in Naypyidaw, however, maintains its grip on power and does not need to make a concession to anyone.

Burma Newscasts - Engaging Naypyidaw
Friday, September 25, 2009

READ MORE---> Engaging Naypyidaw...

Arrested Dissident Accused of Terrorist Intentions

By SAW YAN NAING
The Irrawaddy News

The Burmese regime’s official newspaper The New Light of Myanmar accused arrested dissident Nyi Nyi Aung on Thursday of being a terrorist and planning to create unrest.

Nyi Nyi Aung (aka Kyaw Zaw Lwin) was arrested in early September after returning from exile in Thailand. A second Thailand-based dissident, Ko Htut, was also arrested after crossing separately into Burma.

Nyi Nyi Aung aka Kyaw Zaw Lwin

The New Light of Myanmar reported in detail on Thursday on Nyi Nyi Aung’s arrest. The report included photos of Nyi Nyi Aung, explosives and a satellite phone he was alleged to have used.

The report described underground activities allegedly undertaken by Nyi Nyi Aung and connections the paper said existed between dissidents inside and outside Burma.

The arrests of Nyi Nyi Aung and Ko Htut were followed by crackdowns on Burmese dissidents in Burma and Thailand.

Shortly after the two were taken into custody, 16 ethnic Arakan youths were arrested—seven in Rangoon and the others in Sittwe, capital of Arakan State. They were accused of maintaining links to the Thailand-based All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress (AASYC).

Activists belonging to Generation Wave and Best Manure, members of the opposition National League for Democracy and several Buddhist monks were arrested in the crackdown.

In neighboring Thailand, the offices of several Burmese exile groups were raided by Thai police— including the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, where Ko Htut used to work.

In Chiang Mai, 10 Burmese women activists were arrested and held in custody for several days. Other dissident groups closed their offices, and several remain shut in the Thai-Burmese border towns of Mae Sot and Sangkhlaburi according to dissident sources.

Sources reported that staff of Burma’s Bangkok Embassy are photographing activists attending demonstrations and other functions in Thailand.

Win Min, a Chiang Mai-based Burmese analyst, said a Burmese military attaché in Bangkok is active in requesting Thai security officials to harass Burmese opposition groups in exile.

Burmese opposition groups last faced close Thai scrutiny during the administration of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Many offices closed for several weeks, fearing official crackdowns.

Burma Newscasts - Arrested Dissident Accused of Terrorist Intentions
Thursday, September 24, 2009

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At least 104 political prisoners released

(Mae Sot – Thailand) -The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) (AAPP) can confirm that so far 104 political prisoners have been released from 22 different prisons in Burma.

The 104 released include 37 members of the National League for Democracy, including 3 MPs; 18 women; 11 former political prisoners; 4 monks; 4 journalists; 9 members of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters Network; 6 members of the 88 Generation Students; and 1 lawyer.

On the evening of September 17, 2009 in Rangoon, state-run MRTV carried a news bulletin announcing that 7,114 prisoners were to be released “on humanitarian grounds.”

The list of political prisoners released will be continually updated at our web site www.aappb.org as AAPP receives more information. In alphabetical order:

1. Angaelay (Mandalay prison) - student
2. Aung Gyi (Insein prison) - student
3. Aung Gyi @ Aung Thwin (Shwebo prison) – journalist, former political prisoner, 88 Generation Students
4. Aung Ko Oo (Tharawaddy prison) - student
5. Aung Lwin (Thandwe prison)
6. Aung Myint (Myaungmya prison) - NLD member; Human Rights Defenders and Promoters member
7. Aung Myo (Shwebo prison) – NLD Township Organiser
8. Aung Naing (Insein prison) – NLD member
9. Aung Swe (Shwebo prison) - NLD member
10. Aung Tun (Tharawaddy prison) – student; member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions
11. Aye Min (a) Aye Min Min (Tharawaddy prison) – private tutor
12. Ba Chit (Tharawaddy prison) – Ex-captain in the army
13. Ba Min (Kale prison) – NLD member
14. Bo Bo (Myingyan prison)
15. Bo Gyi (Pegu prison)
16. Cho Mar Htwe, (Female) (Moulmein prison) – NLD member
17. Eimt Khaing Oo, Female (Insein prison) – journalist; Cyclone Nargis volunteer
18. Hlaing Aye (Kale prison) - NLD MP, Former Political Prisoner
19. Hla Shein, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
20. Htay Win (Thayet prison) – NLD Township Organizer
21. Khaing Kaung Zan, (Thayet prison) – Arakan League for Democracy in exile member
22. Khin Khin Lay (a) Khin Lay, (Female) (Pegu prison) – NLD member
23. Khin Maung Chit (Meiktila prison) - NLD Local Secretary
24. Khin Maung Thein (Shwebo prison) – NLD member
25. Khin Moe Aye (a) Moe Moe (Female), (Myingyan prison) – 88 Generation Students member; former political prisoner
26. Kyaw Kyaw Thant (Insein prison) – journalist; Cyclone Nargis volunteer
27. Kyaw Lwin, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
28. Kyaw Maung (Myitkyina prison) – NLD MP
29. Kyaw Thu Htike (Taunggyi prison)
30. Kyaw Win (Tharawaddy prison) – All Burma Students Democratic Front
31. Kyi Kyi Min, (Female) (Insein prison) – NLD member
32. Kyi Lin (Myintkyina prison) – NLD member
33. Ma Ei (female) (Paungde prison)
34. Ma Htay (a) San San Myint, (Female) (Insein prison)
35. Ma Mi Mi Swe (female) (Henzada prison)
36. Maung Maung Htwe (Shwebo prison)
37. Maw Si (Shwebo prison) – NLD Youth member
38. Mi Mi Sein, (Female) (Insein prison) – NLD Township Joint-Secretary
39. Michael Win Kyaw (Kale prison) – 88 Generation Students member; former political prisoner
40. Min Min (a) La Min Tun, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
41. Min Min Soe (Myingyan prison) – 88 Generation Students member
42. Moe Hlaing (Moulmein prison)
43. Moe Kyaw Thu (a) Bo Bo (Mandalay prison)
44. Moe Lwin (Moulmein prison) – individual activist
45. Monywar Aung Shin (a) U Aye Kyu (Insein prison) - Member of NLD and poet
46. Mya Sein, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
47. Myint Oo (a) Ni Ni (Mandalay prison) – NLD Township organizer; former political prisoner
48. Myint Oo (Thayet prison) – NLD Township Joint Secretary
49. Myo Min Lwin (Moulmein prison)
50. Myo Yan Naung Thein (Thandwe prison) – 88 Generation Students member, former political prisoner
51. Nay Win (Myintkyina prison) – NLD Township Organizer
52. Nine Nine (Insein prison) – NLD MP, Former Political Prisoner
53. Nu Nu Swe @ Pauk Pauk (female) (Myaungmya prison)
54. Nyi Nyi Min (Buthidaung prison) – NLD member
55. Nyo Mya (Kale prison) – NLD member
56. Pe Tin (Pegu prison) – NLD member
57. Pyae Phyo Aung (a) Hnan Mue (Pa-An prison)
58. San Pwint (Kale prison) – NLD member; teacher
59. San Ya (Tharawaddy prison) – NLD member
60. Sandar Min (a) Shwee, (Myaungmya prison) – 88 Generation Students, Former Political Prisoner
61. Sandar, (Female) (Myingyan prison) – NLD member
62. Saw Myo Min Hlaing @ James (Thaton prison) - Private Tutor
63. Saw Taw Kyi (Thayet prison) – Karen National Union member
64. Shin Sandaw Batha, Monk (Insein prison) – All Burma Monks’ Alliance
65. Shwe Thar (a) Tin Win (Tharawaddy prison) – Karen National Union member
66. Soe Han (Lashio prison) – lawyer; Chair of the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) legal advisory body
67. Soe Wai (a) Than Zaw (Myitkyina prison)
68. Than Min (a) Tin Tun Aung, (Taungoo prison) – NLD member
69. Than Than Htay, (Female) (Insein prison) – student
70. Than Than Sint, (Female) (Insein prison)
71. Than Tun (Shwebo prison)
72. Than Zaw Oo (Tharawaddy prison) – NLD member
73. Thar Cho, (Thayet prison) – NLD Township Organizer
74. Thein Zaw (Tharawaddy prison)
75. Thet Oo (Taungoo prison) – Human Rights Defenders and Promoters member
76. Thet Zin (a) Maung Zin (Kale prison) – journalist; former political prisoner; member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions and the Democratic Party for a New Society
77. Thin Min Soe, (Female) (Insein prison) – labour activist
78. Thura Win @ Thura Lin (Buthidaung) – Student
79. Tin Mar Swe (female) (Mandalay prison)
80. Tin Maung Nyunt (Shwebo prison) – NLD Township Organiser
81. Tin Mya (Insein prison) - National League for Democracy Township chairperson, Former Political Prisoner
82. Tin Myint (Insein prison) – NLD member
83. Tin Myint (Tharawaddy prison)
84. Tin Myo Htut (a) Kyaw Oo (Insein prison) – Generation Wave; former political prisoner
85. Tin Tin Myint, (Female) (Insein prison) – third year chemistry student
86. Tin Tun (a) Kyaw Swa (Tharawaddy prison) – UN Development Program staff (New Era journal distributor)
87. Tun Hla (Tharawaddy prison)
88. Tun Oo (a) Ngar Kalar (Taungoo prison)
89. Tun Tun Nyein, (Thayet prison) – NLD Youth member
90. Tun Tun Oo (a) Nanda Malar (Taungoo prison) – monk
91. Tun Tun Oo (Thandwe prison)
92. U Han Sein (Tharawaddy prison) – NLD member
93. U Myint, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
94. U Pannita (a) Myint Aye (Taungoo prison) – monk; Human Rights Defenders and Promoters member
95. U Peter (Loikaw prison)
96. U Win, (Hinzada prison) , Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
97. U Zawana (a) Soe Myint (Taungoo prison) - monk
98. Win Myint (Insein prison)
99. Wunna Soe (Pa-An prison) – Democratic Party for a New Society member
100. Yan Aung Shwe (Thayet prison) – All Burma Students Democratic Front member
101. Yan Naing Min (a) Nan Wai (Mandalay prison) – student
102. Zaw Htet Aung (Kale prison) - student
103. Zaw Tun (Taungoo prison)
104. Zin Mar Aung (female) (Mandalay prison) – student; NLD member

-ENDS-

For media interviews please contact:

Tate Naing, AAPP Secretary +66(0)89-899-7161
Bo Kyi, AAPP Joint-Secretary +66(0)81-324-8935
19 September 2009 18:45 Thailand Standard Time

Burma Newscasts - At least 104 political prisoners released
as at 19 September 2009

READ MORE---> At least 104 political prisoners released...

Don’t Let the Junta off the Hook

The Irrawaddy News - Editorial

On the eve of the 21st anniversary of the bloody coup that crushed the 1988 student-led pro-democracy uprising, Burma’s junta announced plans to free 7,114 prisoners. MRTV, the state-owned television station, announced on Thursday night that the prisoners were being released on “humanitarian grounds.”

Previous mass releases have mostly involved petty criminals, with just a handful of political detainees among those freed. No details were provided about the identities of the prisoners included in this latest amnesty, so it is difficult to even confirm if the regime has actually released the number of prisoners it said it would. But according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 87 political prisoners have so far been set free, while other sources estimate that the total could reach as high as 250.

This is good news for the prisoners and their families, and we should welcome it. However, we should also note that this apparent act of magnanimity comes as Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein prepares to travel to New York to attend this year’s United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, it has been widely expected for several months. In July, Burma’s ambassador to the UN, Than Swe, promised the Security Council that his government would grant an amnesty to an undisclosed number of political prisoners to allow them to participate in democratic elections scheduled for 2010.

Thein Sein will be the highest-ranking Burmese official to attend a UN meeting in over a decade, so it should come as no surprise that the regime decided to do something to deflect criticism of its abysmal human rights record ahead of his visit. Releasing some of the country’s estimated 2,100 political prisoners was an obvious course of action, as there are growing concerns over the dramatic increase in the number of activists detained since the monk-led Saffron Revolution was crushed almost exactly two years ago. Human rights watchdogs estimate that the political prisoner population has doubled since late 2007, when Burma witnessed its largest anti-regime protests in nearly two decades.

Conspicuously absent from the list of those released so far are the names of some of Burma’s most prominent activists. Far from considering leniency towards these prisoners, the regime appears to be intent on making their lives as miserable as possible. U Gambira, one of the leaders of the All Burma Monks Alliance, the group that spearheaded the 2007 uprising, has been moved to a remote prison, making it harder for his family to visit him. Other prisoners, including Shan ethnic leader Khun Tun Oo, activist-comedian Zarganar, labor activist Su Su Nway and 88 Generation Students group leader Min Ko Naing, are also suffering from physical and mental health problems due to their mistreatment, according to AAPP.

Political prisoners have always been treated like pawns in the junta’s political game. The regime continues to insist that there are no political prisoners in any of the country’s 43 prisons and more than 50 labor camps, but the fact is that the generals do not hesitate to imprison anyone who speaks out openly against their brutal misrule. Even as the junta makes a show of releasing some prisoners, it continues to round up new ones, including several democracy activists and monks who were arrested just last week.

With this in mind, the international community must continue to confront the regime and demand the release of all political prisoners in Burma, including pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Until this happens, and until all activists are allowed to participate freely in the country’s political process, we can only assume that the generals’ occasional release of political prisoners is just part of a cynical game.


Burma Newscasts - Don’t Let the Junta off the Hook
Saturday, September 19, 2009

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More Political Prisoners Released: AAPP

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

At least 87 political dissidents were among the more than 7,000 prisoners released by Burma’s ruling junta on Friday, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners—Burma (AAPP).

The AAPP announced on Saturday that it had confirmed the release of 87 political dissidents from 16 prisons across Burma. They include 36 members of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) and six members of the 88 Generation Students group. Three of the NLD members were elected to serve in parliament in 1990.

According to the AAPP, there were 15 women, four monks, four journalists and one lawyer among the released prisoners.

Bo Kyi, joint-secretary of the AAPP, told The Irrawaddy on Saturday that the release of the prisoners, though welcome, still falls far short of international demands.

“It is still too early to say that this signifies any real change in Burma,” he said, noting that some of the political prisoners who had been released had nearly finished their prison terms.

“We continue to call for the immediate release of all the more than 2,100 political prisoners still behind bars,” he added.

Critics of the regime say that the latest prisoner release is little more than an attempt to deflect international criticism ahead of trip to New York by Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein, who will attend the UN General Assembly next week.

Thet Zin, the editor of the Myanmar Nation weekly, was one of four journalists released on Friday.

He was arrested in February 2008 for possessing a video of a crackdown on pro-democracy protests in September of the previous year, as well as a report by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN special rapporteur for human rights in Burma.

Shortly after receiving a seven-year prison sentence in November 2008, he was transferred from Insein Prison in Rangoon to a remote prison in Kele, Sagaing Division.

When the Burmese state-run media announced an amnesty for 7,114 prisoners on Thursday evening, his family was hopeful that he would be among those released. Late Friday evening, he called them from Kele Township to let them know he had been freed.

“We are very happy to know that he has been released,” said one family member, adding that Thet Zin was now on his way back to Rangoon to be with his teenage daughter and son.

Another released political prisoner is Moe Kyaw Thu, also known as Bo Bo, who was serving a 20-year sentence for anti-junta activities at Mandalay Prison.

“When we heard that he was released, the whole house was noisy with happiness. His son was very, very happy about his father’s release,” a family member told The Irrawaddy on Saturday.

“When he was arrested, his son was just a few months old,” she said. “I am very happy to see that they will finally be reunited after nearly 12 years apart.”

On Friday, a high-ranking official of Burma’s Corrections Department told reporters at a press conference at Insein Prison that about 250 political prisoners would be released. However, so far only 87 political prisoners are confirmed to have been among the 7,114 prisoners included in the amnesty.

The junta has announced several mass amnesties in the past, but usually includes only a small handful of political prisoners among those granted early release. In February, 6,313 prisoners were released for “humanitarian reasons” and to enable them “to participate in fair elections to be held in 2010.” only 31 were political prisoners.

In September 2008, the regime freed 9,002 prisoners, saying it wanted to “turn them into citizens to be able to participate in building a new nation.” But only nine political prisoners, including Win Tin, a prominent NLD leader, were included in the amnesty.

In an amnesty in November 2007 to mark the conclusion of the National Convention, the junta released 8,585 prisoners. Twenty political prisoners were among them.

“Release of political prisoners is good. But many other political dissidents, including ethnic leaders, are still in prison. For national reconciliation, all of them must be freed,” said NLD spokesperson Nyan Win, speaking to The Irrawaddy on Saturday.

Meanwhile, as some families celebrate the release of loved ones, many others were disappointed to learn that their relatives remain behind bars.

One girl whose father was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 2002 said she was saddened to see that he was not on the list of released prisoners.

“I am sad that my father did not receive an amnesty, but I am happy for the other political prisoners who were released,” she said.

Burma Newscasts - More Political Prisoners Released: AAPP
Saturday, September 19, 2009

READ MORE---> More Political Prisoners Released: AAPP...

Tensions slightly easing on the Sino-Burma border

S.H.A.N.- The siege by joint Wa-Mongla forces to the Burma Army garrison at Mongyang, 260 km north of Maesai since 26 August, was lifted on 9 September last week following a number of official requests by the Burma Army, according to sources on the Sino-Burma border.

People who had fled from Panghsang (the Wa capital), Mongyang and Mongla, as a result, are slowly trickling back since. “The transport fare between Tangyan (west of the Salween) and Panghsang, up to K 120,000 ($120) the previous week, is almost back to normal (K 40,000),” said a local official in Panghsang. “Now about 50% of those people have returned.”

The siege was prompted by the disappearance of 3 Burma Army officers and men who were found moving suspiciously around Khosoong, the border between Wa and Mongla late last month. “Maj Kyaw Soe Aung, the 2IC (second-in-command) of IB 279 (based in Mongyang) was reported to have demanded the immediate release of his men or else,” said an informed source from Mongla.

The Burma Army’s Kengtung-based Triangle Command officers and Lt-General Ye Myint, Naypyitaw’s chief negotiator on the controversial Border Guard Force (BGF) plan, had in person and by letter to Mongla, requested the released of the said three saying the latter had no cause for worry about an impending attack.

While it wasn’t clear if the Wa and Mongla were convinced about the Burma Army’s intentions, both had finally decided to call off the siege, said the source. “I believe China must have a hand in the alliance’s decision,” commented a Burma watcher from Thailand.

A 15 member Chinese delegation had visited Panghsang on 8 September, the day before the lifting of the siege.

Thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops backed by armored vehicles and artillery were seen in Meng Lien (Monglem), opposite Panghsang, according to a source who was recently visiting the Wa territory. “ ‘We will fight to the last man or woman,’ the Wa was reported to have told the delegation,” he said. “But it wasn’t clear how the Chinese representatives had responded.”

Peng Jiasheng, the deposed Kokang leader, who was reported by Global Times to be taking asylum in the Wa State, is believed to have left it, according to a reliable source in Panghsang. “He’s not in Mongla, where his daughter and his son-in-law Sai Leun are, either,” he said. “To both the Wa and Mongla, he’s a Ho Hsang (the Brahma head, meaning too hot to handle). The farther he’s away from them, the better it is for him and themselves.”

The Burma Army had earlier demanded his extradition, to which the Wa replied he had not been seen since 30 August, a day after the fall of Qingshuihe, the Kokang stronghold.

Burma Army forces laying siege to the Wa territory since late last month, meanwhile, have so far remained in place. “So despite the lifting of the siege Mongyang, the alert is still on,” said another source close to the leadership.

The UWSA has deployed 3 divisions plus supporting units for the defense, he added: the 318th commanded by Bao Ai Roong in the north; the 418th, commanded by Zhao Saidao in the west; and the 468th, commanded by Sai Hsarm in the South.

Along the Thai border, the UWSA’s southern 171st Military Region command has 5 “divisions”, commanded by Wei Xuegang, according to a UWSA publication: 772nd (Mong Jawd), 775th (Hwe Aw), 778th (Khailong), 248th (Hopang-Hoyawd) and 518th (Mongyawn).

Burma Newscasts - Tensions slightly easing on the Sino-Burma border
Monday, 14 September 2009

READ MORE---> Tensions slightly easing on the Sino-Burma border...

Opposition-backed Constitutional Amendments will be Difficult

By KAY LATT
The Irrawaddy News

"If a girl is short, she just needs to wear high heels." Those are the well-known words of Kyi Maung, the late leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in a press conference just after the elections in 1990 responding the needs of constitution for transfer of power proclaimed by the military junta.

The NLD prepared a temporary constitution to be used during the transitory period to take over power from the ruling military government, but the military government then led by Snr-Gen Saw Maung did not accept the temporary constitution.

In the absence of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, Kyi Maung, a de facto NLD leader, said that the constitution could be amended in response to the military leaders' claim for the necessity of a new constitution before the transfer of power.

Any efforts to amending the constitution would be a challenge since ethnic nationalities wanted to change the form of the Union to that of a federation.

The late dictator Ne Win made a coup d'état in March 1962 while contending that he was saving the Union from disintegrating, when ethnic nationalities, various political parties and U Nu, then the prime minister, agreed to amend the 1947 Constitution.

In the 1947 constitution, any provision could be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. After an amendment bill had been passed by each of the chambers of Parliament, the bill had to be considered by both chambers in joint sessions. And then the bill could be passed by both chambers in joint sittings with votes in favor of not less than two-thirds required by members of both chambers.

Therefore, the constitutional problems of the 1947 constitution could be solved within the framework of negotiations among stakeholders.

In the 1974 constitution, some provisions could be amended with the prior approval of 75 percent of all the members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament) in a nation-wide referendum with a majority vote of more than half of eligible voters. The rest of the provisions could be amended only with a majority vote of 75 percent of all the members of the Pyithu Hluttaw. No major amendment had been made to the 1974 constitution.

Before Kyi Maung made his quip, Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the United States, said in a letter to Samuel Kercheval, written in July, 1816, "I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind."

He continued, "We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors," clearly reflecting the need to interpret a constitution in light of changing circumstances.

Constitutions can generally be classified as “rigid” or “flexible.” A rigid constitution provides difficult procedures to modify at least some part of the constitution. A flexible constitution allows simple procedures to amend its provisions.

The US constitution is rigid. It requires a supermajority in the amendment process. The most common method of amendment is for a bill to pass both houses of the legislature by a two-thirds majority in each body followed by ratification by three-fourth of the states.

This is the method used for all current amendments. Nevertheless, 27 amendments have been made to the U.S constitution over a 200-year period. An interesting point is that the president has no role in the formal amendment process.

In Switzerland, it requires a majority vote in a national referendum to approve an amendment of the federal constitution proposed by the legislature or by a petition of 100,000 citizens. Then it requires ratification by a majority of voters in each of a majority of the cantons. The Swiss constitution has been amended significantly over the years.

The United Kingdom’s constitution is flexible. Its constitutional institutions and rules can be modified by an act of Parliament.

The great majority of countries have rigid constitutions. Nevertheless, a rigid constitution does not by itself guarantee the stability and continuity of a country’s constitutional law.

The constitution of South Africa is also flexible and can be amended by an act of Parliament by introducing a bill amending the constitution in the National Assembly. Most amendments must be passed by an absolute two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly. However, amendments of some important provisions must be passed by the National Council of Province with a supermajority of at least six of the nine provinces.

Although the amending process in the United States is difficult, it is easier than the process in other countries with rigid constitutions. Provisions of a rigid constitution are over time subject to interpretation by the courts or by the legislature or the executive.

Pro-election groups in Burma are advocating a process of embracing the constitutional system and proposing gradual change by amendments to unfavorable provisions in the constitution.

“The military presumably wants to use the elections to ensure its continued dominance, but this is the most wide-ranging shake-up in a generation,” said Jim Della-Giacoma, Southeast Asia project director of the International Crisis. “The government, opposition, neighboring countries and the wider international community must all prepare for the possibility of change they may not be able to control.”

The 2008 constitution requires careful study of the process of amendment to assess whether it is rigid or flexible, and whether there are any loopholes in the constitution that could result in positive or negative consequences.

According to constitution, it requires 20 percent of the members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, (Union Parliament or the two houses combined) to submit a bill of amendment with approval requiring a vote of more than 75 percent in favor.

For important provisions such as basic principles, state structure, qualifications for the presidential and vice presidential candidates and the National Defense and Security Council and a state of emergency, it further requires a nationwide referendum with more than half of eligible voters in favor.

It is clear that the 2008 constitution is rigid requiring difficult procedures to amend its provisions.

In the present constitution of Indonesia, the country which the Burmese military once looked to as a model for the dominance of the military, it requires only a simple majority for any proposed amendment in the People's Consultative Assembly with two-thirds of its members in support.

Suharto, who officially became president in 1968, did not allow any changes to the constitution. Under the rule of Suharto, it required a nationwide referendum with a 90 per cent turnout and approval of 90 percent of the voters to change the constitution.

With the fall of Suharto and the New Order regime in 1998, the amendment process was simplified in order to make it more democratic. The People's Consultative Assembly made constitutional amendments a flexible procedure and as a result, only 11 percent of the original articles remain unchanged from the earlier constitution.

In the 2008 Burmese constitution, the military is given 25 percent of the seats in every state legislature and both national assemblies. The constitution requires more than 75 percent of all the representatives of Union Parliament to amend the constitution important provisions.

To amend the constitution would require the support of all civilian representatives plus the support of at least one military representative in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.

Because of the rigidity of the constitution, there appears to be little chance for opposition members of parliament to look to the amendment process as a way to influence the future course of government. As a result, a theory of gradual change through the constitution also appears unrealistic.

Kay Latt can be reached at kaylatt((@)gmail.com

Burma Newscasts - Opposition-backed Constitutional Amendments will be Difficult
Monday, September 14, 2009

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Beijing’s Influence on Junta ‘Overstated’: ICG

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

A leading political think tank, the International Crisis Group (ICG), said on Monday that although many believe China is the key to pushing the Burmese junta toward political reform, its influence is overstated.

In a new report covering Sino-Burmese relations, the Brussels-based NGO said that Beijing’s influence on the Burmese junta is clearly limited, a fact highlighted by the Burmese government forces’ invasion of the Kokang region, an act that caused some 37,000 refugees to flee to China.

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, left, holds a welcoming ceremony in honor of Gen Maung Aye, right, vice-chairman of Burma’s ruling junta at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 16, 2009. (Photo: www.english.cpc.people.com.cn)

Titled “China’s Myanmar Dilemma,” the ICG report was written by ICG staffers in Beijing, Jakarta and Brussels.

“Simply calling on Beijing to apply more pressure is unlikely to result in change,” the ICG report said. “The insular and nationalistic leaders in the military government do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing.”

It said that “after two decades of failed international approaches to Myanmar [Burma], Western countries and China must find better ways to work together to push for change in the military-ruled nation.”

The Kokang conflict highlighted the complexity of China’s relationship with Burma, and that Beijing was unable to dissuade the Burmese generals from launching their bloody campaign, said the report.

It also noted that the relation between Beijing and Naypyidaw is “best characterized as a marriage of convenience rather than a love match.”

ICG, which is frequently contracted to advise world bodies such as the UN, the EU and the World Bank, said that while China sees major problems with the status quo [in Burma], particularly with regard to economic policy and ethnic issues, Beijing’s preferred solution is a gradual adjustment of policy by a strong central government, not federalism or liberal democracy, and certainly not regime change.

The ICG noted in its report that unstable Burmese factors on the Chinese border, such insurgency, drugs and diseases, affect China’s interests in the country.

It said that Beijing’s interest in Burma was mainly economic.

However, to highlight the close ties, the report said that from 2003 to June 2009, leaders of the Chinese government and the Burmese junta met 30 times, 15 of which were after the Burmese regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in September 2007.

ICG has published two reports regarding Burma within the last two months. A report titled, “Myanmar: Towards the Elections” was released on August 20. It said the 2010 elections are likely to create opportunities for generational and institutional changes despite major shortcomings.

However, it questioned whether the elections could solve the conflict in Burma, including the clashes at the Sino-Burmese border.

Burma Newscasts - Beijing’s Influence on Junta ‘Overstated’: ICG
Monday, September 14, 2009

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Chinese Blood on Burmese Soil

By Tom Kramer
The Irrawaddy News

Peng Jiasheng is the Kokang leader whose residence was raided by government troops on August 8, setting off a regime offensive and leading to the loss of the Kokang region to junta troops. He was interviewed by The Irrawaddy on the reasons for the offensive, the role of China, the allegations of illegal drug trafficking, the borders guard force and the future of ethnic minorities in Burma.

Question: How would you describe the current situation in the Kokang region?

Answer: The incident on August 8 was the junta’s excuse. It wanted to do away with the local ethnic minority army a long time ago. A larger nationality wants to eliminate a smaller one. This is typical nationalistic chauvinism. This was a massacre.

Peng Jiasheng (Photo: Tom Kramer)

In order to avoid further harm to the Kokang people, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) retreated. This is not what we wanted and also it is not what the people in the international community who support our people would like to see.

Now the situation in Kokang is even more complicated. Currently, the situation is very bad.

The government troops took over the Kokang area for about 10 days, but there were many reported cases where their soldiers committed robbery, rape and killed civilians. Many people are still afraid to go back home. Most of the shops owned by Chinese businessmen were either destroyed or robbed. This is a calamity. The prosperous environment of Kokang of only a few months ago no longer exists. People are living in deep distress.

This conflict has brought great trauma to the Kokang people. The war will be long. It will be impossible to end soon.

Q: The ceasefire agreement you signed with the regime in 1989 has collapsed. What do you believe was the motive behind the offensive and the regime’s attempt to arrest you?

A: In March 1989, the Kokang people agreed to peace and development. In the same year, 17 other local ethnic armed forces also started peace talks with the junta. This brought to an end the large scale of armed conflict in the country.

The alliance army is also one of the legal ethnic armed forces that were recognized by the military government. Over the past 20 years of peace and development, the Kokang was the first group in the country to promise the international community that we would stop drug production. We enforced the ban on poppy cultivation in 2002 in our area. The anti-drug production effort and success were recognized by the UN and the international communities.

With help from the World Food Programme, the Chinese government and other international aid agencies, we implemented a lot of poppy substitution projects, mainly to grow sugar crane, tea, walnuts and other crops. We achieved very good progress in the poppy substitution.

Step by step, the people in our area began to work their way up from poverty. This can be seen by everybody. However, as the military government wants to achieve their goal of controlling the whole country, it felt it needed to take action against the peace and the ceasefire groups.

Q: Soon after the government troops captured Laogai, the state-run-media repeatedly accused you of involvement in illegal arms factories and drugs. How do you respond to those allegations?

A: Burma is still a country without a real government. The army cannot represent the government. After the election in 1990, the junta usurped power in the country. Ever since then, there has been no proper government in our country. The international community has never officially acknowledged them as the government. Burma is currently a country managed by a temporary council that was set up by the junta. It was called the State Law and Order Restoration Council and was later changed to the State Peace and Development Council. The government army is also an ethnic armed force, so it can not represent this country.

In 1989, for the sake of the peace and welfare of the country, the Kokang people took the initiative to approach the junta-controlled council. This was to protect peace in the country, and to let the people live in peace. Over the past 20 years, we trusted the junta and have been respectful of them. Our political proposition is always the same: support the central government, take the road to peace and development, maintain nationality unification, guard national unity and strive for the autonomous rights of the Kokang people. We never wanted to separate from the country; we only wanted a recognized position for the Kokang people among all of Burma’s nationalities.

Q: How many people were killed in the latest conflict?

A: In this conflict, the Kokang people suffered great loss. We had 14 alliance army soldiers killed in battle, but what we do not know is the number of civilians killed. For example, some na?ve young people joined with the traitor Bai Suocheng and his army. In the battles, they were to be used by the government troops to fight against us. These young people refused because they were Kokang and could not kill their own people. The government troops took their weapons away and shot them with machine guns. On Aug. 27, 27 Kokang youth were killed together.

Q: Why did the junta decide to single out your group? Was there any reason other than the regime’s allegation of your involvement in opium and illegal drugs?

A: A lot of things happened over the past month that we never thought could happen. The Kokang alliance army is one of the legal armed forces in the country. All our weapons are old and the ammunition is left over from the days of the Burmese Communist Party. Many of these weapons are in need of repair. It is reasonable to have a factory to repair weapons. This factory is well known by all the SPDC officials in Kokang. They have visited it before. But now they used it as an excuse to take action against us.

The motivation behind this is obvious. They want to eliminate the Kokang and other ethnic armed forces and achieve their goal of a junta-managed “unified” country. It goes without saying that the junta will not stop with the Kokang.

They will take the war to other groups with all kinds of excuses. If you want to condemn something, you can always find a charge. The government army is the strongest in the country. It can crack down on whichever ethnic groups it wishes. It can accuse any ceasefire group of drugs, or weapons…anything. The current situation on drugs, for example, in the four special regions in Shan State is that there is no poppy cultivation, according to investigations by the international agencies. However, in SPDC-controlled areas, there is more than 250,000 mu [Chinese land unit: 667 square meters] of poppy cultivation. This is the work of the junta, and this is how it behaves.

Q: Several ethnic ceasefire groups including the MNDAA rejected the junta's proposal for a Border Guard Force (BGF). Why did you reject the BGF plan?

A: We are not really against the idea of transferring the army to a BGF, but the terms and conditions were too rigorous. For example, all the officers above 50 would be forced to retire and find their own livelihood. The key leaders of the local government and the commanders of the army would also be appointed by the junta. These proposals are not acceptable to any of the ceasefire groups. It is also not acceptable to the local people. Our requirements were simple: we want to have a high level of national autonomy to protect the interests of the Kokang people.

Q: The Kokang and other ethnic groups are unhappy with the 2008 constitution. What do you see as its faults?

A: Regarding the constitution proposed by the junta in 2008, it is all about the power and interest of the junta. We do not believe that any rights and interests of the minorities are ensured in the constitution. How can we accept such a constitution that does not represent the people of the country? on the approval of this constitution, there are things that happened that few people know about. For example, in some of the Kokang villages, the junta sent people to vote in the referendum. The local people did not want to participate, so the junta officials themselves wrote [out] all the votes. There were villages where about 100 people voted No, but on their ballots it was reported that more than 3,000 people voted Yes. This is how it was approved.

Q: You merged with the CPB in the past and led the successful mutiny in 1989. You went to Beijing and you were closely associated with Chinese officials in the past. Today, China is the closest ally of the regime as well as a good friend of ethnic groups along the Sino-Burmese border. What was China's role in the recent conflict in the Kokang region?

A: During the Aug. 8 incident planned by the junta and the armed conflict afterwards, the Chinese government did not give us assistance. We could not talk to the Chinese government about protection and asylum. However, as the Kokang are in fact Chinese, when the refugees fled to China the local authorities took very good care of them. That we really appreciate.

Q: What is your message to Chinese leaders who plan to build a gas pipeline through the Kokang region?

A: What I want to say here is no matter what happens in Burma, we are ethnic Chinese and our roots are in China. This we will never forget. For the sake of the rights and position of the Chinese in Burma, we will continue our struggle.

Q: How do you see the future of Burma and the ethnic minorities?

A: Regarding the future of the ethnic minorities in Burma, this is a complicated issue. If Burma does not set up a democratic government that is elected by the people and therefore really represents the people, the future of the minorities in Burma will get worse.

Q: Did you receive any political backing or military support from other ethnic groups along the border? Are they united in their goals?

A: All the minority ceasefire groups along the China-Burma border areas have good relations with each other and have supported each other over a long period of time. Our fate and experiences are the same. But due to certain difficulties, our alliance is not as strong as it should be. Therefore the junta had its opportunity, and now the Kokang area is under junta control.

Q: Are you worried about losing your personal property and your businesses in Burma and China?

A: Currently, all my personal property has been confiscated by the junta. My property in China was also taken away by the relevant department of the Chinese government. This is a problem that I can not solve by worrying about it.

Q: Please describe the refugee situation. There were reports of government officials and soldiers attacking Chinese nationals? Was the recent attack designed to demonstrate that the government is not a puppet of China?

A: I think the reason why the junta attacked the Kokang is because of the following:

First, the junta wanted to develop better relationships with America, India and some Western authorities, in particular with America. In order to improve the relationship with America, the junta is eager to prove that the junta is not a puppet government supported by the Chinese government. That is why the junta chose the Kokang to fight against.

They also wanted to test the response of the Chinese government. The Kokang and the Chinese have a blood relationship. The Kokang people are basically Chinese; they are part of the Chinese family. The Chinese in Burma were not officially recognized by the Burmese and therefore for centuries they lived in a very low economic and social position. Only after the meeting in Ninakan in 1947, after the national government’s recognition, were the Chinese living in these areas called Kokang. But as a matter of fact, the Kokang people are Chinese. We are the descendants of the Yellow emperor. The anti-Chinese movement in 1967 in Burma feels like yesterday.

Even today, many Chinese living in Burma still do not dare to declare that they are Chinese. In 1989, when the Kokang Alliance Army was established, all the Chinese in Burma looked at the Chinese armed forces as the “lighthouse.” Now the ‘”lighthouse” has gone off.

The second reason I think is that the SPDC forces were already in Kokang for more than 10 years, and they understood the situation in Kokang, including the relationships among the Kokang leaders.

They therefore bought off the traitors Bai Suocheng and Wei Chaoren. This resulted in an internal split in Kokang before the war broke out. Bai Suocheng and Wei Chaoren betrayed their people and surrendered to the junta.

Now the junta has taken over the Kokang area, and it is clear about the response of the Chinese government. So their next step will be to reinforce the policy of cracking down on other minority groups along the border. The junta will act recklessly and become more unbridled.

Q: Where are you living now?

A: For many years, I worked in Kokang. I never had a chance to travel to the big cities in Burma. Now that I have more time, I am travelling in the big cities in Burma. I really feel that my country is beautiful, and it deserves a government that can represent the people by building and developing the country. I currently have no plans to go back to Kokang.

Burma Newscasts - Chinese Blood on Burmese Soil
Monday, September 14, 2009

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Crackdown on Burmese Dissidents in Chiang Mai

By THE IRRAWADDY

Thai police officers on Sunday raided the offices of several exiled Burmese opposition groups including the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, the Burmese Women’s Union and the National Health and Education Committee.

A Burmese source confirmed that 10 Burmese women from the Burmese Women’s Union who were attending a capacity-building workshop in Chiang Mai were apprehended and are now in custody.

The police came with information and photos of the locations of Burmese offices. The arrests took place on Sunday when many offices were closed for the weekend.

The offices of several Chiang Mai-based Burmese opposition groups and media organizations have remained temporarily closed on Monday. The motive for the arrests and the reason why Burmese human rights workers and dissidents have been targeted is not yet known.

Several exiled Burmese and foreign groups have opened NGOs and advocacy offices in Chiang Mai in recent years.

Burmese groups faced the most repressive times under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s administration in the early 2000s. Many offices were shut down for several weeks due to fears of intimidation and crackdowns.

International human rights groups and Western governments expressed concern for the safety of exiled Burmese dissidents living in Thailand at the time.

Under the current Thai government, Burmese groups in Thailand have enjoyed relative freedom without any major harassment.

According to diplomatic sources, Western embassies in Bangkok are closely watching the situation.

Burma Newscasts - Crackdown on Burmese Dissidents in Chiang Mai
Monday, September 14, 2009

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Retired Military Personnel to Form Political Party

By AUNG THET WINE
The Irrawaddy News

RANGOON — The Myanmar War Veterans Organization (MWVO) will meet on Oct. 6-9 to form a political party to field candidates in the 2010 general election in Burma.

Members will reportedly be selected to run campaigns in every division and state, said sources in Naypyidaw, the capital.

Sources said that those selected are likely to be high-ranking retired officers, such as retired generals and colonels.

MWVO has more than 3,800 members who are former officers, more than 80,000 from lower ranks and more than 50,000 auxiliary members.

The MWVO has divisions devoted to politics, national defense and security, economics, social welfare and welfare.

The meeting will focus on preparing for the election and will be attended by retired Burmese officials who have represented states or divisions, according to sources.

“After the meeting, a list of retired officers who could contest elections will be released,” said a retired Burmese official in Rangoon.

Also, the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) will meet in late October to iron out preparations for the 2010 election, including the selection of candidates, said sources.

The junta will form numerous proxy parties to increase their chances of sweeping the election, said a Rangoon journalist.

The Burmese people have both positive and negative perspectives on the upcoming election. Some view it as the beginning of positive change in Burma while others see it as an extension of military rule.

A resident in Pegu said, “We were forced to vote ‘Yes’ in the national [constitutional] referendum. If we look at the example of the referendum, there is no way that the election will be fair.”

Ethnic ceasefire groups also have different perspectives on the election. Some Kachin and Mon leaders have already formed political parties field candidates while others say they will not take part in the election.

Burma Newscasts - Retired Military Personnel to Form Political Party
Monday, September 14, 2009

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China’s Failed Foreign Policy

By NYO OHN MYINT/MOE ZAW OO
The Irrawaddy News

The recent breakdown of a two-decade-old ceasefire between Burma’s military junta and ethnic militias in the country’s north demonstrates the failure of China’s outdated foreign policy, according to Burmese political analysts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has aggressively pursued a path of rapid economic development as the surest way to avoid a similar fate. Although it has dramatically expanded its trade ties with the rest of the world, the principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

However, as the situation in Burma attests, this principle may no longer be sufficient to protect China’s national interests.

Beijing certainly enjoys the economic benefits of being the Burmese junta’s best friend. Since 1989, China has been the regime’s most important supplier of military aid, providing jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels, as well as extensive training to Burmese military personnel. In exchange, it has been given access to Burma’s abundant natural resources.

A joint statement on “Future Cooperation in Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Federation of Myanmar,” issued in June 2000, indicated the future direction of Sino-Burmese relations, which were to be based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the consolidation of mutual relations for wider regional stability and development.

Despite Beijing’s willingness to be more direct in persuading Burma to enhance its economic reforms and to push for political reconciliation at home, China still regards Burma’s poor human rights record as an “internal affair.”

At the same time, the United States has continued to denounce the Burmese generals’ human rights records and refusal to honor the 1990 election results. Washington’s harsh criticism, especially during the Bush administration, gave the Burmese generals no other choice but to turn to the Chinese government for support. In 2003, when the US imposed tougher sanctions against the regime under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Beijing was highly critical of the move.

China’s foreign policy is completely divorced from the harsh realties of life under military rule in Burma. Without taking this suffering into consideration, Beijing has used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions designed to push Burma toward genuine political reform. This has allowed the junta to simply move forward with its efforts to orchestrate a political transition from an absolute dictatorship to a faux democracy within the framework of a militarized constitution.

China has continued to back the Burmese regime as part of its policy of extending its influence within the region. However, Burma’s long history of ethnic conflict and political dissent presents serious challenges to Chinese policy, which may not be viable in the long run.

Another problem facing Beijing is that the Burmese regime is deeply distrustful of China. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Burma’s armed forces fought hard against the Burmese Communist Party, which was backed by China’s ruling Communist Party. This experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Burmese generals and continues to affect the thinking of the current military leadership.

China’s current dual-track policy of supporting both the junta and the ethnic groups living along the Sino-Burmese border has helped to keep these memories alive. It has also raised the specter of renewed conflict with China. In a 2006 quarterly report, Burma’s ruling military council said that it needed to brace for an invasion from the northeast—obviously referring to China.

According to a reliable source, officials from China’s Yunnan Province have recognized the significance of developments inside Burma and are seeking to minimize the negative impact of Beijing’s policy. However, China can’t change its foreign policy within a few years; it will take decade, said a high-ranking diplomat from Beijing.

However, other China watchers have argued that Beijing is less interested in dealing with the Burmese junta since it purged Gen Khin Nyunt, the former intelligence chief, in 2004. Chinese leaders know that the current rulers in Naypyidaw have little interest in engaging with the outside world, but believe that the generals would not dare to turn their guns against China.

China may also feel that it is paying too high a price for backing Burma politically. Some analysts suggest that Beijing could move away from its long-held position on Burma in international forums to protect its broader geopolitical interests. China realizes that defending Burma may have triggered a more aggressive US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is carefully observing the current US administration’s reengagement in the region to decide whether Burma should be a center of China’s foreign policy.

China is aware that regional countries have supported a new Burma policy by the US government in terms of their constructive engagement and economic interests. China could be isolated by its Burma policy, proving its policy is still inferior to that of the US.

In the post-Cold War era, China should have more pro-active and tangible fairness to the citizens of the region, rather than putting its emphasis on ruthless authoritarian rulers. Beijing’s ignorance may have impacted the understanding of the Burmese generals. All the socialist states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are willing to yield to the US political engagement while they enjoy China’s limited favor in economic prosperity.

In recent years, Burma has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan within Asean shows a shift in Burma’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China.

Chinese analysts closely observed the Kokang incident in August and questioned whether the Sino-Burmese relationship was really impacted. In line with the 2008 constitution, the regime was attempting to ensure the stability of border areas by neutralizing armed forces that are independently standing outside the framework of the constitution.

“They (the Burmese military) don’t always heed China’s advice. China has so little leverage against them because China, in some sense, depends on them,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

Chinese officials were not only extremely upset over the lack of forewarning about the border clash but were also worried about the future political consequences.

China-Burma relations may be at a crossroads. Only demanding ethnic rights and showing concern about the situation at the border cannot reflect China’s foreign policy in terms of its status in the international arena. China should bring the role of Aung San Suu Kyi and a settlement of the general political crisis to the forefront of its Burma policy in order to show China’s role in finding a solution along with the US and the international community.

Nyo Ohn Myint is a chairperson and Moe Zaw Oo is secretary of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs Committee.

Burma Newscasts - China’s Failed Foreign Policy
Thursday, September 10, 2009

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China and West need coordinated approach on Burma: ICG

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - With Beijing having limited influence over Burma’s military rulers, the West needs to find a way to work together with China to push for changes in the Southeast Asian nation, the International Crisis Group (ICG) said in a new report.

The ICG, a non-profit group working in conflict areas around the world, in a new report “China’s Myanmar Dilemma” said Beijing’s influence over Burma is often overstated while it is limited, and may not be able to deter the junta from attacking ethnic armed rebels along its border with China.

“The insular and nationalistic generals do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing,” said Robert Templer, ICG’s Asia Program Director, in a statement on Monday.

“By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead in solving the problem, a workable international approach to Myanmar will remain elusive,” Templer added.

The ICG also warned that China, which is known to have influence over Burmese generals, might not be able to deter the junta from launching yet another attack on ethnic armed rebels long its border with China.

The late August offensive against the Kokang rebels in Burma’s North-eastern Shan State, which resulted in the influx of about 30,000 refugees into China, according to the ICG, is an indication of the limited influence of China on the Burmese junta.

“Beijing was not even forewarned about the late August raid against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Kokang ceasefire group,” the ICG said.

Should the junta launch attacks against the Wa and the Kachin rebels, China would have to deal with another humanitarian crisis on its border, and “yet it is unclear whether Beijing will be able to dissuade the generals from undertaking further offensive,’ the ICG said.

“Both Chinese and international policies towards Myanmar [Burma] deserve careful reassessment,” said Donald Steinberg, ICG’s Deputy President for Policy in the statement.

“An effective international approach also requires a united front by regional actors as well as multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the UN,” he added.

Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, North East Asia Project Director of the ICG, in an email interview with Mizzima said, the Burmese junta balances the influence of China as well as other countries with its non-alignment foreign policy and multilateralism.

“It is not a matter of simply using one country to check the influence of another. The [Burmese] government uses this relationship just as it uses its ties with other Asian countries - to prevent any one country from gaining too much influence,” Kleine-Ahlbrandt said.

But in the absence of coordinated regional or UN response, Kleine-Ahlbrandt said, the stalemate will continue and “from China's perspective, not only is instability on the border a serious concern, but if this situation continues, it will certainly negatively impact Yunnan’s trade and economic development.”

While China shares the aspiration for a stable and prosperous Burma, it differs from the West on how to achieve these goals. The ICG said, in order to bring Beijing on board, the international community will need to pursue a plausible strategy that takes advantage of areas of common interest as well as China’s actual level of influence.

“The West should emphasise to China the unsustainable nature of its current policies and continue to apply pressure in the Security Council and other fora,” the group said, adding that at the same time, international pressure should not exclude other regional states pursuing their own narrowly defined self interests in Burma.

Burma Newscasts - China and West need coordinated approach on Burma: ICG
Monday, 14 September 2009 20:20

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Offices of Burmese groups in Thailand raided

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Unprecedented security checks has led to Thailand’s police raiding the offices of some Burmese opposition groups based in northern Thailand’s Chiang Mai city on Sunday, opposition members said.

The police, according to Burmese opposition members, came with a list of addresses of Burmese offices and took photographs.

“Since there was only our office worker in our office, we did not have any problem, but the police took photographs of the office,” a Burmese activist, whose office was also among those visited by the police, told Mizzima.

While Thailand’s Royal Police could not be reached on Monday for comment, a Burmese activist said, “This is the first time in many years that this kind of widespread search and interrogation has been made. I believe there is something behind this. “It is a targeted search, because it has been carried out only on Burmese organizations. It could be politically connected,” he further speculated.

The Thai police have often raided the offices of Burmese organizations in the past. But the source said it was never conducted in such a widespread manner.

“They have the list of most of the Burmese groups including some of the media offices in exile,” said a Burmese activist, who requested not to be named for security reasons.

Aung Myo Myint, Director of the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB), whose office was also among those searched, said interrogating a human rights office is in violation of the basic rights of the people and condemned the action of the police.

“We are working to promote human rights and coming to our office and interrogating us is violating our basic rights,” he said.

According to the Migrant Assistant Program (MAP) and other NGOs, currently Thailand hosts about two million Burmese migrant workers and about 140,000 refugees in nine camps along the Thai-Burma border.

Burma Newscasts - Offices of Burmese groups in Thailand raided
Monday, 14 September 2009 16:46

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China’s Failed Foreign Policy

By NYO OHN MYINT/MOE ZAW OO
The Irrawaddy News

The recent breakdown of a two-decade-old ceasefire between Burma’s military junta and ethnic militias in the country’s north demonstrates the failure of China’s outdated foreign policy, according to Burmese political analysts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has aggressively pursued a path of rapid economic development as the surest way to avoid a similar fate. Although it has dramatically expanded its trade ties with the rest of the world, the principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy. However, as the situation in Burma attests, this principle may no longer be sufficient to protect China’s national interests.

Beijing certainly enjoys the economic benefits of being the Burmese junta’s best friend. Since 1989, China has been the regime’s most important supplier of military aid, providing jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels, as well as extensive training to Burmese military personnel. In exchange, it has been given access to Burma’s abundant natural resources.

A joint statement on “Future Cooperation in Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Federation of Myanmar,” issued in June 2000, indicated the future direction of Sino-Burmese relations, which were to be based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the consolidation of mutual relations for wider regional stability and development.

Despite Beijing’s willingness to be more direct in persuading Burma to enhance its economic reforms and to push for political reconciliation at home, China still regards Burma’s poor human rights record as an “internal affair.”

At the same time, the United States has continued to denounce the Burmese generals’ human rights records and refusal to honor the 1990 election results. Washington’s harsh criticism, especially during the Bush administration, gave the Burmese generals no other choice but to turn to the Chinese government for support. In 2003, when the US imposed tougher sanctions against the regime under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Beijing was highly critical of the move.

China’s foreign policy is completely divorced from the harsh realties of life under military rule in Burma. Without taking this suffering into consideration, Beijing has used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions designed to push Burma toward genuine political reform. This has allowed the junta to simply move forward with its efforts to orchestrate a political transition from an absolute dictatorship to a faux democracy within the framework of a militarized constitution.

China has continued to back the Burmese regime as part of its policy of extending its influence within the region. However, Burma’s long history of ethnic conflict and political dissent presents serious challenges to Chinese policy, which may not be viable in the long run.

Another problem facing Beijing is that the Burmese regime is deeply distrustful of China. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Burma’s armed forces fought hard against the Burmese Communist Party, which was backed by China’s ruling Communist Party. This experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Burmese generals and continues to affect the thinking of the current military leadership.

China’s current dual-track policy of supporting both the junta and the ethnic groups living along the Sino-Burmese border has helped to keep these memories alive. It has also raised the specter of renewed conflict with China. In a 2006 quarterly report, Burma’s ruling military council said that it needed to brace for an invasion from the northeast—obviously referring to China.

According to a reliable source, officials from China’s Yunnan Province have recognized the significance of developments inside Burma and are seeking to minimize the negative impact of Beijing’s policy. However, China can’t change its foreign policy within a few years; it will take decade, said a high-ranking diplomat from Beijing.

However, other China watchers have argued that Beijing is less interested in dealing with the Burmese junta since it purged Gen Khin Nyunt, the former intelligence chief, in 2004. Chinese leaders know that the current rulers in Naypyidaw have little interest in engaging with the outside world, but believe that the generals would not dare to turn their guns against China.

China may also feel that it is paying too high a price for backing Burma politically. Some analysts suggest that Beijing could move away from its long-held position on Burma in international forums to protect its broader geopolitical interests. China realizes that defending Burma may have triggered a more aggressive US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is carefully observing the current US administration’s re-engagement in the region to decide whether Burma should be a center of China’s foreign policy.

China is aware that regional countries have supported a new Burma policy by the US government in terms of their constructive engagement and economic interests. China could be isolated by its Burma policy, proving its policy is still inferior to that of the US.

In the post-Cold War era, China should have more pro-active and tangible fairness to the citizens of the region, rather than putting its emphasis on ruthless authoritarian rulers. Beijing’s ignorance may have impacted the understanding of the Burmese generals. All the socialist states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are willing to yield to the US political engagement while they enjoy China’s limited favor in economic prosperity.

In recent years, Burma has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan within Asean shows a shift in Burma’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China.

Chinese analysts closely observed the Kokang incident in August and questioned whether the Sino-Burmese relationship was really impacted. In line with the 2008 constitution, the regime was attempting to ensure the stability of border areas by neutralizing armed forces that are independently standing outside the framework of the constitution.

“They (the Burmese military) don’t always heed China’s advice. China has so little leverage against them because China, in some sense, depends on them,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

Chinese officials were not only extremely upset over the lack of forewarning about the border clash but were also worried about the future political consequences.

China-Burma relations may be at a crossroads. Only demanding ethnic rights and showing concern about the situation at the border cannot reflect China’s foreign policy in terms of its status in the international arena. China should bring the role of Aung San Suu Kyi and a settlement of the general political crisis to the forefront of its Burma policy in order to show China’s role in finding a solution along with the US and the international community.

Nyo Ohn Myint is a chairperson and Moe Zaw Oo is secretary of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs Committee.

Burma Newscasts - China’s Failed Foreign Policy
Thursday, September 10, 2009

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Kokang Crisis Disrupts Border Trade

By KYI WAI
The Irrawaddy News

Rangoon — The conflict in the Kokang area near the Sino-Burmese has disrupted border trade and caused shortages of Chinese goods in markets as far away as Rangoon and Mandalay.

The shortages will lead to price rises, according to local traders.

A shopkeeper who sells popular brands of Chinese-made snacks at Rangoon’s Yuzana Plaza in Rangoon said: “If we don't get fresh supplies by the end of this month, prices will jump.”

Other major Rangoon markets such as Mingala, Nyaung-bin Lay and Thein-gyi also report shortages of Chinese goods. One trader said supplies of food, medicine and electronic equipment had dropped in the past 10 days by one-third.

A Chinese trader in Nyaung-bin Lay market said supplies of Chinese-made formula milk powder, biscuits and dry noodles had run out. Suppliers were reluctant to travel to the Kokang area, he said.

"No one dares to go to the border, because we are still receiving information that the situation in that area is still not good,” said a Mingala market trader. “So, there are no new imports. We are buying supplies from other local traders from Muse and Mandalay. I am sure prices will rise.”

In Mandalay, a trader said 70 percent of the consumer goods in local markets came from China.

"We still have some consumer goods in storage to last the next two or three months,” he said. “But we don't know when we can get fresh supplies. So, we have to sell things very carefully."

The trader also thought prices were bound to rise.

Some traders with long experience of market conditions fear that the Kokang conflict could have long-term effects on the Burmese economy.

One Mandalay trader said the Kokang crisis was being followed with concern by Burmese-born Chinese.

"If the Wa group gets involved in this conflict, it will get much worse,” he said. “My relatives in Lashio live in fear, because Burmese government troops are collecting people at night and forcing them to be army porters. Half the population in Lashio are Kokang and Wa.”

The trader said government forces in Northern Shan State are selectively conscripting only Chinese, Kokang and Wa people as porters to be used in the front line.

Meanwhile, the state-run newspaper Myanma Alin reported on Thursday that the Kokang area is now peaceful and stable. The refugees who fled into neighboring China are returning and 14,253 had so far crossed back into Burma, the newspaper said.

Myanma Alin also reported that the authorities are selling chicken and fish cheaply to residents of Laogai, the Kokang capital. Local stores, shops and market are open for business as usual.

The newspaper said government troops were digging new drains and working on other municipal projects for Laogai.

Burma Newscasts - Kokang Crisis Disrupts Border Trade
Friday, September 11, 2009

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The Junta’s Twin August Offensives

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

After more than four decades of rule, the Burmese military government is confronting the two main centers of domestic opposition to its power in a bid to increase security and prolong military rule before the elections next year.

Having effectively kept pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi out of the elections by sentencing her to a further 18 months of house arrest, the military regime’s forces broke the ceasefire with ethnic groups by seizing the Kokang capital of Laogai on August 24.

Since the military regime’s attack, instability has been reverberating through Kachin State, Shan State and the towns along the Sino-Burmese border in China’s Yunnan Province.

Other ceasefire groups in northern and northeastern Burma, such as the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Army and the eastern Shan State-based National Democratic Alliance Army have been building up defenses against a potential attack by regime troops.

“The [Burmese] government would like to assert more authority over the ethnic minorities in the highlands, leading to the problems of the past few days,” said Michael Charney, a Burma expert from London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies, in an email to the The Irrawaddy. The ceasefire agreements between the ethnic groups and the junta left potentially volatile situations in place, he said.

According to journalists and political observers in Rangoon, the junta is not yet ready to promulgate the election law, though the elections are scheduled to be held in 2010. With only three months remaining this year, time is running out.

If the junta wants to hold elections under the 2008 constitution, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, it has to demonstrate that there is only one commander-in-chief and that the regime’s army is the only armed force in Burma, observer’s say.

“We can see that by sentencing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on August 11, the military regime made sure there would be no worthy political challenger in the 2010 elections. After removing her from the picture, the generals turned on their other main enemies,” said Chan Tun, a veteran politician from Rangoon.

The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Suu Kyi, and the Wa, Kokang and Mongla ethnic ceasefire groups have called for the constitution to be reviewed before the elections.

In 2005, Wa, Kokang and the Mongla delegates to the National Convention called for full autonomy and separation from Shan State, as well as guarantees that their armed militias would remain under their control.

At the end of the fourteen-year-long national convention process in 2007, however, the junta ignored all their demands when the handpicked Constitution Drafting Committee finalized the constitution.

“After the junta ignored their demands at the national convention, the ethnic groups knew a showdown had to come soon,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a former communist who observes Burma military affairs from China’s Yunnan Province.

“But ceasefire groups, particularly the Kokang, failed to prepare properly, which is why Laogai fell to regime troops so easily,” he said.

The junta generals, meanwhile, must be wondering whether the simultaneous offensives against urban political opposition and ethnic ceasefire groups have been wise.

“I wonder why the regime is risking conflict with the ethnic militias now. They may want to get control before the elections—but the junta could destabilize the whole country,” said Mikeal Gravers, a Burma expert from Aarhus University, Denmark.

Charney said the Burmese junta will face many similar problems in the coming year, because the generals want ethnic and political stability in order to hold elections and conclude the domestic problems that are bringing so much international attention.

Burma Newscasts - The Junta’s Twin August Offensives
Friday, September 11, 2009

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