Thursday, March 5, 2009

Speaking out on the future of Burma

Special to The Japan Times

As Burma heads toward its 2010 elections, Jeff Kingston asks political observers about prospects for reform

These are tough times for the people of Burma. They have endured decades of economic mismanagement, low living standards and brutal political oppression under an incompetent and negligent military junta that shows no signs of relinquishing its grip on power.
Indeed, as the country approaches elections in 2010, the regime has cracked down on its opponents, imposing prison terms of 65 years on relief workers, comedians, writers, intellectuals, monks and others.

Aung Zaw, editor of Irrawaddy in Burma JEFF KINGSTON PHOTOS

No challenges to the junta are allowed and thus those who joined peaceful demonstrations in the Saffron Revolution of 2007 or tried to help the survivors of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 were targeted by the regime for sentences that in many cases ensure the imprisoned will die behind bars. The number of political prisoners has more than doubled since 2007 and stands at 2,100.

The junta has sent a message to prodemocracy activists that they should not confuse the upcoming 2010 elections with an opportunity to build democracy in Burma. Unlike in 1990 when the military was embarrassed by a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, a result it has steadfastly ignored, this time around the results will be rigged.

The model for this sham-in-the-making is the constitutional referendum staged in May 2008 when an unbelievable 92 percent of voters approved a document that almost nobody had seen. There were widespread and credible reports of gross irregularities and there is a consensus that the referendum was not remotely free or fair.

As a result, the new constitution imposed by the regime that preserves political power for the military and excludes Suu Kyi has zero credibility, further undermining the legitimacy of a government that is overwhelmingly despised by it citizens.

And why wouldn't they despise it? In cracking down on the Saffron Revolution in 2007 — a monk-led, grassroots response to dreadful and declining living standards — the military murdered, imprisoned and tortured many monks, a transgression that trampled cultural taboos, triggering outrage and a smoldering resentment. People were seething at the sheer brutality of the junta, but were totally unprepared for the government's mind-boggling response to Cyclone Nargis.

In early May 2008, Cyclone Nargis ripped through the Irrawaddy Delta region, claiming an estimated 138,000 lives, displacing some 800,000 survivors and leaving some 2.5 million people desperately in need of food, shelter and medical treatment. Any government would be hard-pressed to respond effectively to such a massive natural disaster, but instead of focusing on relief efforts the government prioritized the constitutional referendum. As a result, the government was slow to respond and even impeded relief efforts by international agencies by withholding approval of visas for relief specialists.

Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst based in Chiang Mai, Thailand

The world looked on in disbelief as the junta devoted scarce resources to a sham referendum while ignoring the needs of survivors.

In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, there has been renewed debate about how the international community should respond and whether punitive sanctions and isolation are working to promote reform. Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has indicated that the United States is reviewing its hard line policies toward the regime.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) provides in-depth analysis of conditions in Burma, but is often criticized for being overly solicitous of the military junta. The principal author of the ICG reports, Morten Pedersen, argues that the current strategy of imposing sanctions and isolating the military junta is not working, creating a stalemate that shows no signs of resolution. He asserts that sanctions and isolation actually strengthens the junta's grip on power, allowing them to pose as defenders of the nation. In his view, the military leaders will not bow to pressure for political reform and are well insulated from economic sanctions, especially with rising LNG revenues.

The problem is that the people of Burma are not insulated from the usual problems of endemic poverty — the United Nations estimates that 30 percent of the population faces acute poverty — and many are swept up in a gathering humanitarian crisis. Yet, despite appalling conditions, international aid to Burma is only about 5 percent per capita of what comparable developing nations typically receive. The ICG advocates broader, sustained engagement and a sharp increase in aid to fund "sustainable humanitarian development."

Win Min, a Burmese political commentator, also based in Chiang Mai

Pedersen acknowledges the brutality and venality of the military regime, but does not think that regime change is a viable option because government institutions have withered during four decades of military rule, meaning across-the-board capacity deficits that amplify the difficulties of coping with Burma's staggering challenges. The military is the strongest institution in a country known for its pervasive disfunctionalities and as such, he asserts, must continue to play a key role in any transition scenario.

In October 2008, the ICG issued a report arguing that the Nargis experience demonstrates the need to normalize aid relations and suggests a way forward out of the stalemate. The ICG points out that after the initial fumbling response, a normal relief operation was apparent by July 2008 and goes on to argue that the donor community now has an opportunity to build on this enhanced cooperation to transform and expand the aid agenda.

Credit for this turnaround goes to the Trilateral Core Group (TCG), a problem-solving task force that has one representative each from the Burmese government, the U.N. and ASEAN. The TCG, according to the ICG, proved effective in addressing operational problems and cutting through red tape, allowing aid organizations to conduct their projects as they would in any similar situation and monitor how development aid was used.

Yuki Akimoto, director of Burma Info in Tokyo

Yuki Akimoto, director of Burma Info in Tokyo, is more skeptical about the TCG and disputes the ICG's assessment, arguing, "The TCG has a built-in limitation in that one of the three parties is the military regime. The ICG assessment lacks credibility because it misrepresents the reasons why Burma is suffering socio-economically and not receiving development assistance. It is one thing to advocate for increased engagement with the regime, but it is an entirely different matter to defend the military regime, as the ICG assessment effectively does.

"ICG avoids holding the military regime accountable for the situation the regime itself has caused through its brutally self- interested actions and policies, which have enriched the generals and their cronies while impoverishing the nation."

Thant Myint U, former U.N. diplomat and currently a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, believes that the Nargis relief operations have helped build a better working relationship between the junta and international donors, saying, "The Nargis relief efforts have led to a big shift in attitudes. Now many in the government understand that there is no great danger in providing access to international aid workers, while on the reverse side many donors see the possibilities of working in Burma while meeting international standards of transparency and accountability."

The ICG, in calling for normalizing aid as a strategy for promoting change, maintains that the TCG can be the model for broader engagement elsewhere in the country, presenting it as a task-based, problem-solving approach that nurtures capacity-building, transparency and accountability. The ICG also argues that, "aid cannot be used as a bargaining chip, but should be seen as a valuable instrument in its own right for improving governance and promoting socioeconomic change."

Thant Myint U is less optimistic about copying the TCG model for expanded aid efforts elsewhere in Burma: "What is certain about the TCG is that it has been an invaluable mechanism for delivering emergency aid to affected people in the Nargis-affected areas. The international aid community has been given unprecedented access and it appears that space for ongoing relief and recovery operations can be sustained. Whether it can be expanded to other parts of the country is unlikely. We need creative solutions and shouldn't be tied to the TCG model. What's important is not the mechanism per se but finding ways to deliver aid in a way that meets basic international norms."

In early February one of the ministers who served as Burma's leading representative in the TCG was transferred, and some analysts see this as a sign that the junta is withdrawing its support from the TCG. However, a senior diplomat (who like several others interviewed for this story did not wish to be named) suggests that this speculation is off the mark: "His promotion should not be seen as the junta pulling back from the process. Rather, his promotion to the ministerial level will make it easier for him to act and push the process."

Bertil Lintner, a journalist who has covered Burma for more than two decades

Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist who has written numerous articles and several books on Burma since the mid-1980s, is one of the most eminent critics of the ICG analysis. He told The Japan Times at the end of 2008 that the ICG report shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the military and Burma, rejecting as "naive in the extreme the proposition that adopting a more respectful tone toward the junta, understanding their worldview and not making an issue of past misdeeds will make it more likely to act rationally and engage in substantive dialogue."

According to Lintner, "The generals are not listening. They are doing what they want and ignore pressure, sanctions and engagement. Neither isolation or engagement have worked and there is no reason to believe that engagement and expanded aid will change their ways. They are happy to have the ICG doing their bidding. In Burmese they have a derogatory word for such people; they are not taken seriously."

In Lintner's view, the TCG does not offer a promising model for expanded engagement elsewhere in Burma, a point supported by several Burmese exiles in Thailand.

Aung Zaw, editor of Irrawaddy, the leading source of critical information about Burma, called it an "ivory-tower perspective written for people who want to increase aid programs. In reality it won't work and advocates should be ashamed of themselves for looking for any excuse to work with an authoritarian regime. But let them come and [Senior General] Than Shwe will teach them a lesson just like the Red Cross. He is good at using and manipulating international organizations and they are good at fooling themselves. He created a small opening in the delta, but can shut them down anytime he wants."

Zaw also scoffs at the ICG's assertion that the junta is able to exploit sanctions to portray itself to the public as defenders of the nation against foreign enemies, suggesting that the ICG has a condescending and inaccurate view of how gullible the people are. He acknowledges that Burmese do suffer from the sanctions and isolation, but says they see them as symbolically important, boosting people's morale because they know the junta is humiliated and that other countries care.

A U.S.-trained Burmese economist points out that the TCG was effective because there were only three ministries involved and each had talented representatives: "There is limited competence in the government and this makes it impossible to see how the TCG model can be expanded elsewhere. And, the government has made sure to insulate the rest of the country from the TCG opening. There is no political backing for an expanded TCG process, it is only for the delta. I can't imagine, for example, the government allowing such a process in Chin state where there is a famine and desperate need for relief."

Dr. Lian Sakhong, an ethnic Chin who is general secretary of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), also doubts the government will allow relief operations in his homeland and thinks the TCG process will not be extended to any of the ethnic areas where development aid is urgently needed. In his view, the regime is interested in pacification and assimilation, trying to impose a mono-ethnic, centralized model that fails to recognize Burma's rich ethnic diversity.

The military remains allergic to a federal model, but Sakhong, winner of the Martin Luther King Prize in 2007, insists greater autonomy is the only way to create lasting stability in a nation where ethnic groups constitute 40 percent of the population living in 60 percent of the land area.

Win Min, a Burmese political commentator based in Chiang Mai, notes that the ICG has developed cozy relations with midlevel officers and bureaucrats, but doubts this will lead to political reform because there is no top level political backing for reform. He thinks that the ICG is being manipulated and worries that expanding engagement and aid "is unlikely to lead anywhere while conferring legitimacy and stature on a regime that deserves neither."

In contrast, Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst also residing in Chiang Mai, says "possibilities exist only for programs that don't threaten the military. I agree with the ICG about a long-term gradual process of opening and reform and it's worth trying.

"The problem is that Burmese political culture tends toward extremes. There are no quick solutions and the problem is that the government and opposition have become mirror images of each other, unwilling to compromise.

"Sanctions have prevented change because the regime sees the West standing behind Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. These are targets they can hit. What you have to understand is that many military officers do want better relations with the U.S. They want to have a modern military and know they cannot rely on China."

"After the 2010 elections," he says, "Burma will need and seek lots of help. This is an opportunity for the West. Not just throwing money at the opposition, but in terms of capacity building across the board. The nitty-gritty of training programs is the basis for long-term engagement that will help the people."

A Burmese economist, fresh from running a project management workshop for Burmese monks, also suggests an engagement strategy that emphasizes technical assistance programs aimed at capacity building. He notes that monks play a critical role in filling gaping holes in providing social welfare services in Burma, including running orphanages and clinics. In his view, the Nargis response exposed just how inefficient and weak the government is.

Dr. Lian Sakhong, general secretary of the Ethnic Nationalities Council and winner of the 2007 Martin Luther King Award

"International disaster relief specialists who arrived found just how little institutional infrastructure there is to mount an effective operation," he says. "The lack of capacity is endemic and a major obstacle to raising living standards." Over the last 20 years, he observes, living standards have improved throughout Southeast Asia, except in Burma.

In his view, more happened in terms of engagement and capacity building in the second half of 2008 than in the past six years combined. He suggests building on this with a brick-by-brick approach, using technical assistance projects as a basis for incrementally ramping up capacity while raising living standards. Expanded technical assistance programs, he believes, would help shape the internal dynamics of the junta and improve prospects for the post-Than Shwe era.

When it comes to the 2010 elections, Byo Kyi, cofounder of Burma's Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, expects little and argues that if the junta is serious about democratization they can start by releasing all of the prodemocracy activists they have rounded up. He contends that "the military does not want to listen to the will of the people because they know it is against them."

David Scott Mathieson, Human Rights Watch's Burma expert, argues that the recent crackdown on dissidents was a mistake because it undermines the credibility of the elections: "Apart from being incredibly brutal, the regime was incredibly stupid in sentencing more than 300 dissidents to long prison sentences. Had they not done so, it might have been able to present this sham process as a legitimate, disciplined approach to democracy, giving the outside world grounds for working with it. Under the circumstances, HRW will not endorse the elections because they offer no glimmer of change. They are a dead-end."

His fear, shared by many other observers, is that several governments are eager to use the elections, even if deeply flawed, as a fig-leaf justifying resumption of normal ties. Mathieson believes, however, that major donors will now find it much harder to "ignore the absurdity of the elections."

Michael Green, a professor at Georgetown University and former director of Asian Affairs on the National Security Council during the Bush Administration, warns, "The junta has been adept at sowing division and exploiting the lack of coordination."

He worries that the elections have high potential for dividing the international community even if they are a sham, because they would provide cover for some countries eager to normalize relations with Burma. Given this risk, Green asserts it is crucial to quickly clarify and build an international consensus on what is minimally required for the elections to be recognized as legitimate by the international community.

A prominent Burmese observer suggests that forging this consensus will be difficult because the U.S. emphasis on human rights and democracy is at odds with the Indian and Chinese emphasis on maintaining stability in border regions. He also has a slightly more optimistic view about the elections: "In 2010 the junta will do as it says, hold elections and allow for the creation of a new government by the end of 2010. This will not represent a clean break with the past and the new government may well include some of the current leadership. But it is important not to underestimate the significance of this transition.

"There will be a generational change in the political leadership and there will be a slight broadening of the political base of the government as it attempts to bring more people and groups under its tent."

He worries less about the elections providing an excuse to engage than as a reason to continue isolation: "It may well turn out that the elections are deemed unacceptable by some Western donors and this would lead to a continuation of current policies and the stalemate. It would also mean a decline in Western involvement and influence in shaping outcomes in Burma and this would be regrettable for the Burmese."

"If there were free and fair elections," he adds, "any party led by Suu Kyi would win a sizable vote and probably a clear majority."

Alas, nobody thinks she will get this opportunity; thus the Burma tragedy will persist unless various stakeholders think creatively about exploiting opportunities the elections may create.

Jeff Kingston is director of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan campus.

READ MORE---> Speaking out on the future of Burma...

U Kyaw Min: An Imprisoned : Rohingya MP without Citizenship

By Ahmedur Rahman Farooq

Burma, a resource-rich country of 678,500 sq. km and 57.6 million people which the military rulers have turned into a secret state of terror during its 47 years of unbroken despotic rule and where a Nobel Peace Laureate like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and many other elected members of parliament are languishing in detention or jails years after years, the issue of U Kyaw Min can not usually make a story.

But the case of U Kyaw Min alias Master Shamsul Anowarul Hoque deserves special attention as it is different in nature from legal point of view and it carries a different perspective which is related to the fate of 3.5 million Rohingya ethnic minority of inside and outside Arakan, Burma.

U Kyaw Min is a Rohingya by ethnicity. He has been sentenced to 47 years imprisonment and at the same time his wife Daw Tiza, his two daughters Kin Kin Nu and Way Way Nu and his son Maung Aung Naing have also been sentenced to 17 years imprisonment respectively. Now all of them have been passing a nightmarish life in the jail in Burma. The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) which is serving as a government in exile with its headquarter in Washington D.C., states about him:

"U Kyaw Min(age 54), the representative-elect (MP) of Butheetaung Township constituency (1), belongs to the National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPHR) and a member of the CRPP, was detained on 17 March 2005, A statement was released by CRPP on last Union Day, in which U Kyaw Min took in active part. Besides, he met with ILO delegation, which visited Burma on 21st to 23rd of February 2005.

He was sentenced to 47 years imprisonment on 29 July 2005. His wife, two daughters and a son were also sentenced to 17 years respectively. The junta banned the NDPHR under order No. 8/92 on 18 March 1992, and at that time U Kyaw Min was a member of the party's Central Executive Committee. U Kyaw Min received a Bachelor of Economics degree from the Rangoon Institute of Economics in 1968, and in 1969 he began working as a teacher. In 1983, he received a Diploma in Education and served as the Deputy Head of Buthidaung Township Educational Department. In 1985 he became a middle school principal but was dismissed from the position in 1989 because of his involvement in the August 1988 uprising. U Kyaw Min received 30,997 valid votes or 74 % in the 1990 elections." (Source: National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma)

U Kyaw Min was born in the village "Mikyanzay" under Buthidaung Township in Arakan State of Burma in 1944. In 1988, he led anti government democratic uprising as the chairman of "Democracy Fighting Committee" of the Mayu Division and at the same time he was the executive member of Arakan State Peace Commitee whose chairman was the then Head Monk of Arakan State and which was maintaining the law and order situation in the whole Arakan State during the two months of chaotic and volatile period of 1988 when there was virtually no governance in Burma. He was also the adviser to the " 88 Generation of Mayu Division".

However, after the landslide victory of U Kyaw Min in the general election of 1990, the military rulers took it as a big dust on their eye. In 1992, he was put in detention for 3 months in the custody of the military intelligence during operation "prataya".

He was again put in detention for 15 days when a senior official of the UN visited Buthidaung in Arakan State. In 1994, an insurgent group launched several offensives in western Arakan, then the military intelligence again put him in detention for 45 days eventhough he has never supported any separatism or armed struggle and has continuously raised his voice for the communal harmony and peaceful coexistence of all communities of Arakan particularly the Rohingyas and Rakhines under the Union of Burma. Finally, in March 2005, he was arrested from his residence in Rangoon and was charged under Section 18 Citizenship Law 1982 and section 5(j) Anti State Emergency Law.

Mentionably, after he joined the CRPP (Committee Representing the People's Parliament) in 1998 at the invitation of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to represent the Rohingya ethnic minority, the main pro-regime party"NUP" (National Unity Party) invited him to join NUP to support military backed national convention and to resign from CRPP. But he did not agree and this has caused serious wrath of the military rulers and the ultimate consequence was the handing of 47 years imprisonment.

From February 21 to 23.2005, a high power delegation of ILO (International Labor Organization) has visited Burma and they have held an exclusive meeting with him and after the visit of that delegation, Burma was suspended from ILO and then the military rulers suspected him to have played an active role in the suspension of Burma from the ILO.

However, the imprisonment of U Kyaw Min under the allegation of not being the citizen of Burma, is a part of systematic persecutions of Rohingya ethnic minority of Arakan. U Kyaw Min has got his graduation from the Rangoon University on the subjects of Bachelor of Economics. As per the Burmese law, this subject is not allowed to study for foreigners. For 18 years, he has held a number of different positions in the government job, which is not allowed for someone who is not the citizen of Burma. It is also true that the Election Commission of Burma never allows a foreigner to participate in a general election. But despite the Election Commission knew it very well that he is a Rohingya, he was allowed to run the election after scrutinizing his nationality status.

Mentionably, an amendment to the Burma citizenship law in 1982 deprived the Rohingyas of citizenship, suddenly making them illegal immigrants in their ancestral motherland where they have been living centuries after centuries and whose presence in the region can be traced back to the 7th Century. However, this amendment has reduced them to the status of a Stateless Gypsy Community of the world.

The Burmese military rulers do not want to know and let others know that the Rohingyas have a long history, a language, a heritage, a culture and a tradition of their own that they had built up in Arakan through their long history of existence there and in order to garner support among the Buddhist majority Burma, the military rulers have continuously run their criminal propaganda against the Rohingyas to such a level that many people still believe that Royhingyas are foreigners and that they do not belong to Burma.

Particularly since the takeover of General Ne Win in 1962, the Burmese military rulers have been continuously stepping up their systemic program to ethnically cleanse the Rohingyas from their ancestral homeland and they have been altering the demography of the region through extermination and displacement of the Rohingya population, demolition and confiscation of Rohingya properties and construction of Pagodas and monasteries on the demolished sacred sites of the Rohingyas to obliterate the identity of the Rohingyas.

In Arakan there is a vast number of written and unwritten discriminatory rules which govern the lives of Rohingyas. They are subjected to severe restrictions of movement, which affect their ability to trade and to seek employment as well as limit their access to health care and education. The Rohingyas must apply for written permission to travel out of their home villages, and another permission document to sleep overnight in another village.

Akyab (Sittwe), the capital city of Arakan, is totally off limits to them. Marrying without permission – and permission is often denied or delayed – can bring hefty fines and prison sentences and turns children of such "illegal" marriages into stateless non-persons. For the decades-long downtrodden and poverty-stricken Rohingyas, complying with the myriad restrictions requires an onerous and mostly unofficial payment every step of the way. Arbitrary confiscation of land without compensation continues, either to provide land for new Buddhist settlers or to build and enlarge military camps, including plantations to grow crops for the military for their own food as well as for commercial purposes.

Since the promulgation of the new Burma Citizenship Law 1982, the Rohingya students are denied their basic rights to education outside Arakan. It is important to point out that all professional institutes are situated outside Arakan. Thus, the Rohingya students are unable to study there because of such travel prohibition. In recent years, the Rohingya students are prohibited from even going to Akyab (Sittwe) to attend Sittwe University for their studies. These draconian measures barring Rohingyas from attending universities and professional institutes are marginalizing them as the most illiterate section within the Burmese population. They are forced to embrace a very bleak future for them.

Traditionally, the Rohingyas are a farming community that depends on agricultural produce and breeding of cattle and fowls. Unfortunately, they are forced to pay heavy taxes on everything they own: cattle, food grains, agricultural produce, shrimp, tree, and even roof of their homes. Even for a minor repair of their homes, they are forced to pay tax. They are required to report birth and death of a livestock to the authority while paying an arbitrary fee. Extra-judicial killing and summery executions, rape of women, arrest and torture, forced labor, forced relocation, confiscation of moveable and immoveable properties, religious sacrileges, etc., are regular occurrences in Arakan.

As a result, severe poverty, unemployment, lack of education and official discrimination are compelling the Rohingyas to lead an inhuman life, causing a negative affect to each Rohingya, especially its youths and workforces.. The future of the community remains bleak and exodus into neighboring Bangladesh and other countries like Thailand or Malaysia has become a recurrent phenomenon. The new arrivals unfortunately often face arrests and/or pushback from the Bangladesh security forces. And there is no international agency to look after the interest of these stateless Rohingyas. Because of their lack of legal identity, they are not allowed to work or hold work permit by any name. To survive, many work as illegal workers in different countries of the world where in many places they and their children are deprived of basic human rights.

However, in response to the efforts of the UNHCR to facilitate the survival of Rohingyas, the military rulers have agreed by middle of 2007 to issue Temporary Registration Certificate (TRC) for a limited number of Rohingyas, enabling them to inland travel from township to township or to apply for marriage permission. The UNHCR is present in northern Arakan state for the past 15 years, monitoring the welfare of more than 230,000 Rohingya former refugees who returned from next-door Bangladesh from 1992 onwards.

Nevertheless, after the resignation of the rest three Rohingya MPs under the pressure of the military regime, U Kyaw Min who proved to have the courage to stare at the eye of death, remained the only elected member of parliament among 3.5 million Rohingya Community to represent the political future of the Rohingyas in the National Parliament of Burma, in different strata of the state level of Burma and also to represent the Rohingya community in the UN and other World Bodies. He is a visionary leader and an illustrious son of the soil of Arakan. His ideal remains a luminary for the Rohingyas to build up a future even standing in the debris.He inspired hundreds of thousands of Rohingya youths to think as to how to emancipate the stateless Rohingya community from their decades-long sufferings.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyie is regarded by the people of Burma as well as Rohingyas as the icon of peace and liberty and at the sametime U Kyaw Min is regarded by the Rohingyas as the ray of hope as well as the crown of their respect which has been reflected in his landslide victory in the 1990 General Election and which has been recognized as a significant landmark for representation and which came after 26 years of military dictatorship. In fact, it was the first time when the people of Burma got an opportunity to vote for a government of their choice. It was one of the free and fair elections that had taken place in the South-East Asia region at that decade. He made unprecedented contributions for the cause of emancipation of the whole Rohingya community and as a great Rohingya scholar, he has shown the Rohingya community the road to emancipation through the restoration of communal harmony between Rohingyas and Rakhines under the Union of a democratic government of Burma.

U Kyaw Min tried his level best to inject the spirit of brotherhood among all communities of Arakan particularly the Rohingyas and Rakhines to work shoulder in shoulder for the build up of a prosperous future. He lives with dignity in the hearts of tens of thousands homeless Rohingyas. By imprisoning him on the charge of being an alien, the military rulers will not be able to wipe out his name from hearts of Rohingyas as well as other democratic forces of Burma. They have rather set with it another example of forcefully snatching away the rights of Rohingyas to citizenship and thus to compel them to born, live and die in this world without having the basic rights as stipulated by the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

- Asian Tribune -

READ MORE---> U Kyaw Min: An Imprisoned : Rohingya MP without Citizenship...

Recent Posts from Burma Wants Freedom and Democracy

Recent posts from WHO is WHO in Burma


The Nuke Light of Myanmar Fan Box
The Nuke Light of Myanmar on Facebook
Promote your Page too