Retired Military Personnel to Form Political Party

By AUNG THET WINE
The Irrawaddy News

RANGOON — The Myanmar War Veterans Organization (MWVO) will meet on Oct. 6-9 to form a political party to field candidates in the 2010 general election in Burma.

Members will reportedly be selected to run campaigns in every division and state, said sources in Naypyidaw, the capital.

Sources said that those selected are likely to be high-ranking retired officers, such as retired generals and colonels.

MWVO has more than 3,800 members who are former officers, more than 80,000 from lower ranks and more than 50,000 auxiliary members.

The MWVO has divisions devoted to politics, national defense and security, economics, social welfare and welfare.

The meeting will focus on preparing for the election and will be attended by retired Burmese officials who have represented states or divisions, according to sources.

“After the meeting, a list of retired officers who could contest elections will be released,” said a retired Burmese official in Rangoon.

Also, the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) will meet in late October to iron out preparations for the 2010 election, including the selection of candidates, said sources.

The junta will form numerous proxy parties to increase their chances of sweeping the election, said a Rangoon journalist.

The Burmese people have both positive and negative perspectives on the upcoming election. Some view it as the beginning of positive change in Burma while others see it as an extension of military rule.

A resident in Pegu said, “We were forced to vote ‘Yes’ in the national [constitutional] referendum. If we look at the example of the referendum, there is no way that the election will be fair.”

Ethnic ceasefire groups also have different perspectives on the election. Some Kachin and Mon leaders have already formed political parties field candidates while others say they will not take part in the election.

Burma Newscasts - Retired Military Personnel to Form Political Party
Monday, September 14, 2009

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Cracks in the Castle Wall

By MIN ZIN
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Loopholes in the new Burmese constitution could be exploited by opposition groups to win influence after next year’s election

In politics, a direct, frontal attack is rarely wise; co-opting the opponent’s game plan for one’s own purposes is a more powerful ploy. Opponents of Burma’s military junta should bear this in mind as they consider their strategy for dealing with next year’s election.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism. A longer version of this article is available on www.irrawaddy.org

Most mainstream opposition groups, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced that they will not take part in the 2010 election unless the constitution is revised and the political process is made more inclusive. They say they can’t accept the constitution as it stands because it denies fundamental ethnic rights and allows the military to seize power again “if there arises a state of emergency.”

A closer examination of the junta’s constitution reveals, however, that it is not the impregnable fortress that it at first appears to be. There are a number of weaknesses in the castle battlements that opposition groups can exploit if they are prepared to take a multi-pronged approach.

The first vulnerability lies in the fact that after the 2010 election, there will be two power centers, the military and the government, which will inevitably be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. No matter who pulls the strings, this new power arrangement will lead to either a serious internal split or the inefficiency of the ruling body.

Another Achilles’ heel is the constitution’s de facto demotion of regional military commanders. Although the constitution enshrines ultimate power in the commander in chief of the military, it fails to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities. As key pillars in the military regime’s power structure, the regional commanders are like warlords in their domains. However, under the new constitution, they are under the control of the chief ministers of the regions or states, who in many cases may be civilians. This could result in a situation where regional commanders oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw’s control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the 75 percent of seats not reserved for the military, a non-military candidate could become president. Failing this, non-military parties could gain control of the legislative agenda, giving them influence over everything from defense and foreign affairs to the economic and social sectors. Thus Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who leads the ruling junta, appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party based upon the membership of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass organization formed by the junta in September 1993.

Snr-Gen Than Shwe votes in the referundum election on the new constitution.

However, this leads to the fourth problem facing the regime. As a political party, the USDA’s existing nationwide organizational structure (and its thuggish reputation, which could be used to intimidate voters) would give it a great advantage in the 2010 election. The problem is that the new constitution bars parliamentary candidates from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it would run afoul of the regime’s own constitution if it sought to field candidates in the election. Therefore, if the military wants to create a new political party or parties, it must ensure that they do not bear any resemblance to the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or intimidating power.

Perhaps these concerns are the reason the regime keeps delaying the promulgation of the electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year: Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power. Meanwhile, however, the credibility of the election and the legitimacy of the new power arrangement it is intended to put in place have already been hurt by the likely non-participation of the NLD and the refusal of several ethnic ceasefire groups to disarm or participate.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage by remaining outside the regime’s election process while opening a new proxy front within the regime’s game plan. Even if opposition groups don’t take part in the election using their current organizational identities, they could set up proxy political parties to participate in the 2010 election. Through these proxy parties, the opposition could attempt to maximize civilian control of the post-election parliament.

At the same time, opposition groups such as the NLD, the New Mon State Party and others must stand strong in opposing the “illegitimate” constitution and election and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 election will help prevent a split within the opposition groups. Otherwise, policy disagreements between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. Proxy tactics could also help bring new recruits to the opposition movement.

However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxy parties in the 2010 election will spark a magical power shift to civilian control. That will happen only if there is sufficient public pressure to challenge the military-dominated status quo, forcing the military to negotiate with the opposition, which would then be in a position to push for a genuine transition to democratic rule.

Another factor that could determine the success or failure of the approach outlined here is the ability of non-military MPs to maintain a sense of common purpose. There is a danger that parochial interests will blind non-military MPs to broader issues, or that self-interest will lead them to compromise their reform agenda. Non-military MPs would not necessarily form a monolithic bloc or be unanimous in their approach to the military’s domination. Vote rigging and intimidation in the election could further undermine the chances of a genuine opposition presence in the parliament.

That said, however, the contradictions embedded in the constitution will provide unprecedented opportunities for those who seek to break the military’s hold on power. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. In the event of mass demonstrations on the streets, proxy parties will be well-placed to play a role.

The opposition should be creative in opening a new proxy front as part of a multi-pronged strategy to exploit the cracks in the junta’s fortress.

READ MORE---> Cracks in the Castle Wall...

Without constitution amendment elections cannot herald change: NLD

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Unless Burma’s military regime releases political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and amends the 2008 constitution, the 2010 general elections will be meaningless and will not usher in any kind of change, the National League for Democracy has said.

The 2010 general election, proposed by the ruling junta, is based on the 2008 constitution, which enshrines the role of the military. It cannot provide an opportunity for change unless the regime considers reviewing the constitution, Dr. Win Naing, a spokesperson for the NLD said.

“The 2010 elections cannot be an opportunity for change in Burma unless the junta reviews and amends the constitution,” he said.

It has been 20 years now, and the junta is aware that it cannot continue ruling the country in an illegitimate manner. Since the junta is not prepared to make any kind of drastic reforms, it drafted the constitution to legitimize its role, he added.

Dr. Win Naing’s remarks came in response to the recent report released by the International Crisis Group, which urged all stake holders in Burmese politics to prepare to seize an opportunity of change that is likely to be a fall out of the 2010 elections.

The ICG in its report released on Thursday said the 2010 election is an opportunity for change and urged the international community, the Burmese opposition including the NLD, the military government and other stake holders not to squander the opportunity.

“All stakeholders should be alert to opportunities that may arise to push the new government towards reform and reconciliation,” the report, titled “Myanmar: Towards the Elections”, said.

The report also argues that boycotting or opposing the election would only push things into the hands of the military as it would not prevent the elections from taking place.

But Dr. Win Naing said if the elections take place without any consideration for the opposition’s demands, it would only produce a result that is predictable – continued military rule – and the only difference this time would be “a legitimized military rule”.

“We don’t see it as an opportunity. The conditions before the elections are important and if nothing changes and if the junta goes ahead with its plans, it is predictable,” he added.

But he did not criticize the ICG report stating, “It is their view and we appreciate it for expressing such ideas. It does not matter whether we agree with it or not.”

But functioning within a rigidly controlled environment, Dr. Win Naing said, people living in Burma understand the military’s mentality and need to assess the situation before taking any decision.

“As we have mentioned in our ‘Shwegondine Declaration’ (see below a copy of the declaration) if the ruling government does not implement our proposals, we would be forced to re-think how we should go about the 2010 election,” he added.

On August 11, the NLD’s general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to a further 18 months in detention, which is widely believed by observers as a move to keep her away from the 2010 election scenario.

Similarly, members of the NLD in Rangoon have been harassed and tortured for their political activities.

25 August 2009

READ Report here

or Full report
at my Scribd
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at ICG web

NLD Shwegondine Declaration
20090429_NLD Shwegondine Declaration

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Time for Decisive Action

By AUNG MOE ZAW
The Irrawaddy News

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is guilty and her sentence is three years hard labor. That was the judgment handed down by a court in the compound of the notorious Insein Prison on August 11th, 2009. As a result, the military regime in Burma may believe that it has fulfilled its aim of excluding her and the pro-democracy forces from the country's political process.

There should be no doubt that Snr-Gen Than Shwe and the junta have no intention of reconciling with either Suu Kyi or any of the pro-democracy movement and ethnic forces for the interest of the various peoples or the nation.

They have made that blatantly clear time and time again, and now, this latest verdict is a loud resounding "No!" to domestic and international calls for reconciliation and an inclusive political process.

The National League for Democracy (NLD), the leadership of the pro-democracy movement, has decided to appeal the court decision. While exposing the absence of an independent judiciary and the rule of law is crucial to understanding the current state of Burma, is it really possible for a legal case to reform the judiciary system?

When the charges are trumped up, when the verdict is ridiculous and the when the sentence is politically manipulated, is it remotely possible for an appeal to successfully secure the release of the Nobel Peace Prize laureate?

Than Shwe has already given us his answer when he intervened to put his stamp of recognition of the courts' verdict and colluded with the court to sentence her to 18 months house arrest. However, he did not use his omnipresent power to intervene for her release.

His intervention can only be interpreted as a sign that the regime refuses to reconcile with Suu Kyi or to move toward national reconciliation and democratic transition.

It may be that the leadership of our movement has a strategic plan to bring about positive change through taking on the judiciary system and, indeed, in the face of such injustice, it is of course absolutely necessary to fight in the court.

The trial may also encourage international sympathy and support for the movement and contribute to raising public awareness, fueling discontent with the regime’s wily ways.

However, one can't help but worry that the legal battle will divert the NLD's direction away from mobilizing the public, which is surely the most critical challenge at this current juncture; critical because the response to the looming challenge will define the future of the country's political process. This challenge is the 2010 election.

The forthcoming election—which will exclude all democrats from the nation's political process—will soon be accomplished, just as the referendum was accomplished, unless pro-democracy groups can change Than Shwe and his military clique’s minds.

The election result will be just as rigged as the referendum's—unless, of course, the pro-democracy groups can change the rules of game beforehand.

The election will activate the military constitution, but will otherwise go nowhere except to legalize military rule in Burma.

The NLD proposed to the regime through its ''Shwe-Gone-Taing Declaration'' that it would consider participating in the election if certain conditions were met. Two vital conditions are the release of its leader, Daw Aung san Suu Kyi, and all other political prisoners, and the review and revision of the 2008 constitution. The NLD has indeed offered some middle ground to break t the country's political deadlock.

Again, Than Shwe has said “No” by transferring Suu Kyi to Insein Prison and bringing yet more charges against her.

In my opinion, in the face of all these refusals, the leadership of the pro-democracy movement is left with no choice but to oppose the elections in 2010 and must state so urgently and without diversion.

This is the right moment for them to bring all political forces on board to boycott the elections.

Time is running out for the leadership of the pro-democracy movement. The place for today's strategic battle is in the political arena, supported by the people. It is time for the leadership to take decisive action to prepare and mobilize for a mass boycott of the 2010 elections.

Aung Moe Zaw is chairman of the Democratic Party for a New Society, an opposition group based in exile.

READ MORE---> Time for Decisive Action...

In Burma, Webb Pursues A Mission for Change

By Christian Davenport
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. Sen. James Webb has explored Southeast Asia as a Marine Corps infantryman, a novelist, a journalist and a business consultant, and as a politician who has criticized America's foreign policy and urged for greater involvement.

He has had a particular interest in Burma, whose people, he wrote, "need our assistance and our strong involvement in order to have the kind of future that we claim is our objective in the first place."

Now in the midst of a two-week, five-country tour in which he became the first member of Congress to visit Burma (also known as Myanmar) in a decade, his objective has been to reach out to a country, and a region, that he says the United States left isolated.

But he suddenly found himself in a different role: politician-cum-diplomat. With the conviction of a U.S. citizen there last week, Webb had another issue to deal with as he became the first U.S. leader to meet with the Burmese leader, Gen. Than Shwe.

That meeting led to the release Saturday of John Yettaw, 54, of Falcon, Mo., who was sentenced last week to seven years' hard labor for swimming to the home where Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi was being detained. Webb (D-Va.) was also granted a rare meeting with Suu Kyi, a pro-democracy opposition leader who has spent 14 of the past 20 years under house arrest. Her sentence was extended 18 months for harboring Yettaw.

For Webb, Yettaw's release was the culmination of a career spent largely focused on a region that many Americans know little about, and it accomplished what Webb, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's East Asia and Pacific Affairs subcommittee, has been attempting to do since he took office last year: thrust Burma's struggle, and its relationship with the rest of the world, into the spotlight.

Although he is a political maverick who is often uncomfortable on the campaign stump, the highly decorated Vietnam War veteran was well-suited to sit across the table from a reclusive military junta leader and secure Yettaw's release, officials and colleagues said.

What the Burmese see in Webb "is someone who has been to the region many times and is trying to do it right and do it differently," said former Nebraska senator Bob Kerrey. "He has tremendous credibility. And the thing about the trip is it won't be his last. He's got a sustained interest in the region."

In a statement, Webb said he was "grateful to the Myanmar government for honoring these requests. It is my hope that we can take advantage of these gestures as a way to begin laying the foundation of goodwill and confidence-building in the future."

For years, Webb has blasted U.S. policy for not more fully engaging Burma. In his book "A Time to Fight: Reclaiming a Fair and Just America," which was released last year, he recounted a 2001 trip to the country and lamented how Burma, which after World War II was "thought to be the country with the most promising future in the region, was now ruled by an autocratic, at times ruthless military regime."

U.S. trade sanctions, he argued, only deepened Burma's isolation. As U.S. interests in the country dissipated, China's grew, and Burmese citizens "are now in near-total isolation form the Western world."

He was particularly critical of the U.S. response to the 2007 protests against the military regime, saying the American response was "little more than a hopeless shrug." The reaction of Congress, he wrote, "was to hold a couple of self-important, didactic hearings."

Webb's against-the-grain approach on Burma is nothing new for a man who went from being a Democrat to Republican back to Democrat again. The former infantry officer and Navy secretary has been withering in his criticism of the Iraq war. And he famously snubbed George W. Bush when the president asked about Webb's son, who was deployed to Iraq as a Marine.

Webb's trip to Southeast Asia, which includes stops in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in addition to Burma, was an independent one, administration officials said last week, and although he was briefed by the State Department, he was "not carrying a message from the administration." The Obama administration has shown signs that it would be more willing to engage with Burma and ease sanctions.

Several dissident groups criticized Webb's meeting with Shwe. The U.S. Campaign for Burma, a Washington-based dissident group, faulted Webb for seeking to improve ties with Burma at a time when its government is stifling political opposition and waging a brutal campaign against ethnic minorities. "It is a setback to the democracy movement in a major way," said Jeremy Woodrum, the group's director.

Webb's relationship with the region solidified during the Vietnam War, when as an infantry officer he was awarded the Navy Cross, a Silver Star, two Bronze Stars and two Purple Hearts. Shortly after the war, his book "Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980s" was published. It was followed in 1978 by a Vietnam War novel, "Fields of Fire."

Several years ago, Webb gave journalist Tom Brokaw a tour of the region. On Sunday he is scheduled to accompany Yettaw out of Burma on a military aircraft headed to Bangkok.

Staff writer Joby Warrick contributed to this report.

Burma Newscasts - In Burma, Webb Pursues A Mission for Change
Sunday, August 16, 2009

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UNSC Meeting on Burma Remains Inconclusive

By LALIT K JHA
The Irrawaddy News

WASHINGTON— An emergency meeting of the powerful United Nations Security Council convened on Tuesday afternoon at the request of France to discuss the situation in Burma in the aftermath of the fresh sentence against pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

However, the meeting ended without conclusion because of sharp differences among its members.

Emerging from the closed-door meeting, the Security Council president for the month of August, Ambassador John Sawers from Britain, said the 15-member UN body would meet again on Wednesday.

A draft statement was circulated by the United States among the member countries, which, among other things, condemns the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi and calls for her immediate release and ability to participate in the political process.

When asked about Russia and China, the two members that have asked for more time to consider the draft statement, Deputy French Ambassador to the UN Jean-Pierre Lacroix said “I mean, everybody pretty much knows the dynamic within the Council, but we are in the midst of a discussion now and, as I said, we will do our best to try and achieve the kind of outcome that we are looking for.

“The draft statement has been circulated by the US delegation. We support that initiative, we support that draft. Some members of the Council have asked for some time to communicate this draft to their capital, and we respect that. But it is our firm position that there has to be a speedy and firm reaction of the Security Council,” he said.

“It has been our longstanding position, but also one of the [UN] secretary-general, that if there is to be an inclusive and fair electoral process in Burma, it cannot be without the participation of all relevant political players, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi. That is why we think there has to be a reaction by the Security Council. The verdict is in clear violation and breach of the request made by the Security Council,” he added.

Talking to reporters, the US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, said: “We recognize that other members of the Council may take different views on this, and we think it is important nonetheless to have a discussion and a debate and to seek as a matter of principle and policy a statement by the Council in accord with the principles of the Charter and the principles of democracy and respect for human rights that we are committed to.”

Earlier in the day, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his deep disappointment over the verdict and deplored the decision.

“The secretary-general urges the [Burmese] government to immediately and unconditionally release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and to engage with her without delay as an essential partner in the process of national dialogue and reconciliation,” said a statement issued by his spokesperson.

“Unless she and all other political prisoners in Myanmar [Burma] are released and allowed to participate in free and fair elections, the credibility of the political process will remain in doubt,” the statement said.

Ban also spoke to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown after Suu Kyi was sentenced to another 18 months of house arrest.

Meanwhile, however, China urged the international community to respect Burma's judicial sovereignty, reacting to the regime's decision to prolong the pro-democracy leader’s house arrest, according to Agence France-Presse news agency.

"The international community should fully respect Myanmar's judicial sovereignty," foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said.

Meanwhile Malaysia's foreign minister called for an "urgent meeting" of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) after the verdict was announced.

"I think there is a need for Asean foreign ministers to have an urgent meeting to discuss this issue, which is of grave concern," Foreign Minister Anifah Aman said.

"With this sentence there is no possibility for Aung San Suu Kyi to participate in the general election next year which should be free, fair and inclusive," he added.

READ MORE---> UNSC Meeting on Burma Remains Inconclusive...

Than Shwe’s ‘Mercy’ is Meaningless

By KYAW ZWA MOE
The Irrawaddy News

The notorious Insein Prison court sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi to three years imprisonment with hard labor around noon on Tuesday. Hold your anger. Mercy then dropped from above. Her captor, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, interfered with the court’s harsh decision by halving her sentence and allow her to return home. Thank God. Oh no! Thank Than Shwe.

As soon as the court read the verdict, Home Minister Maj-Gen Maung Oo entered the courtroom like the Deus ex Machina of classical Greek drama and announced that Than Shwe, head of the ruling junta, had ordered the sentence cut to 18 months. Than Shwe said in his statement, read to the court by the minister, that he had issued the order for four reasons—Suu Kyi is the daughter of Aung San, Burma’s independence hero, in the interests of the country’s peace and stability, and for the absence of grudges and to avoid obstacles on the way towards democracy.

Apart from halving her sentence, said the minister, Than Shwe had ruled that she would serve the 18 months at home, under house arrest. But the merciful gestures didn’t stop there—Maung Oo said Suu Kyi could expect an amnesty if she complied with the disciplines the government would set up during that time.

Under the terms of this new house arrest order, Suu Kyi can receive visits from her doctor and other guests, watch state-run TV and read approved newspapers.

Two of Suu Kyi’s women companions were also recipients of Than Shwe’s benevolence. The two members of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, who were also convicted of giving shelter to the American intruder John W Yettaw, had their sentences halved. Yettaw wasn’t so lucky—he was sentenced to a total of seven years hard labor.

Than Shwe’s intervention in the trial indicated that he and his regime want to counter international criticism of their treatment of Suu Kyi by cultivating an image of a constructive and merciful leader, even though their kangaroo court had condemned an innocent person.

Despite her innocence, Suu Kyi—who has spent 14 of the past 20 years under house arrest—is seen by the generals as the most dangerous person on earth, capable of destroying their planned election in 2010.

When she went on trial in May, Suu Kyi faced a possible prison sentence of five years. The minimum sentence for her “crime” was three years, and most observers expected this would be her punishment.

Basically, the generals wanted to keep Suu Kyi locked up until after the 2010 election. A sentence of 18 months served their purpose and gave an aura of clemency to the court.

The junta had anyway inserted in the constitution approved by a referendum in 2008 a provision excluding Suu Kyi from the highest public office. The Article 59—Qualifications of the President and Vice-President Article—states: “The President of the Union himself, parents, spouse, children and their spouses shall not owe allegiance to a foreign country, nor be subject of a foreign or citizen of a foreign country.”

That article automatically bars Suu Kyi from any leadership role as she is the widow of a British scholar and mother of two sons who are not Burmese citizens.

However, that is not enough for the generals. Her conviction now on a trumped-up charge actually bars her from participating in the political arena for ever.

The constitution’s Article 121 states that a person serving a prison term or having been convicted for an offence shall not be entitled to be elected to parliament. That clearly means that Suu Kyi can never stand for election.

Than Shwe seems to be saying: “Suu Kyi, see you after our election.” He could add, however, “But we’ll never see each other in the political arena.”

READ MORE---> Than Shwe’s ‘Mercy’ is Meaningless...

Kokang Thwart Burma Army Drug Raid

By LAWI WENG
The Irrawaddy News

Tension is high between the Burmese military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a Kokang ceasefire group, following an attempted drug raid by some 70 Burmese troops on the house of the Kokang group’s chairman on Saturday, according to sources in the area.

Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese analyst based at the Sino-Burmese border, told The Irrawaddy that the Burmese army stood down after a standoff that lasted five and a half hours.

The MNDAA chairman, Peng Jiasheng [Burmese: Phon Kyar Shin], reportedly ordered 300 of his soldiers to block the route in anticipation of the Burmese army attempting a raid. The Burmese were encircled by Kokang insurgents while negotiations took place, said Aung Kyaw Zaw.

Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng poses for a photograph with Kokang children at a local festival on February 3. (Photo: www. kokang.net)

Peng reportedly told the Burmese army that they could search his home if they entered unarmed. Otherwise, he reportedly said he would order his troops to open fire on them. With no solution in sight, the Burmese army retreated.

Meanwhile, about 10,000 Kokang residents in Laogai Township fled to the Chinese border on Saturday in fear of clashes between the two armies, according to the sources.

Tensions escalated further on Sunday when Peng Jiasheng refused to meet Maj-Gen Aung Than Htut, the northeastern regional commander, according to the border sources.

The Burmese regional commander allegedly wanted to meet his Kokang counterpart regarding the Kokang ceasefire group’s recent rejection of a Burmese military proposal to transform the MNDAA battalions into border guard forces.

Mai Aik Phone, who is close to several ceasefire groups in the area, told The Irrawaddy on Monday that more Burmese troops have been deployed in the region following the MNDAA’s rejection of the proposal.

“It is obvious they [the Burmese army] are threatening the Kokang people and their army by dispatching more troops into the area,” he said.

However, the two analysts estimated that the Burmese military will not take strong action against the Kokang group at the moment because of Aung San Suu Kyi’s ongoing trial and the fact that the country is due to hold general elections next year.

According to various sources at the Sino-Burmese border, the Burmese military has established a Regional Operations Command (ROC) with seven infantry battalions in Kokang territory in recent months.

The ethnic Kokang army was originally assigned status as an autonomous region of northern Shan State after the Kokang and the Wa army defected from the Communist Party of Burma in 1989.

Along with the Wa, the Kokang are believed to be involved in the drug trade, according to international anti-narcotic agencies. However, Kokang leaders have claimed their territory has been drug-free since 2003.

Meanwhile, the Burmese military has reportedly deployed more troops around ethnic armed ceasefire groups’ areas in the wake of the groups’ refusals to transform to border guard duties.

In recent months, the junta has pressured Burma’s ceasefire groups to participate in the forthcoming election in 2010. The junta has reportedly encouraged them to give up their arms in the post-election period.

READ MORE---> Kokang Thwart Burma Army Drug Raid...

What to do with The Lady

By Larry Jagan

Delays in the trial of Burmese democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi have fuelled the rumour mill about what the secretive junta is really up to as elections draw closer

(Bangkok Post) -The delay in the trial of Burma's democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has fuelled intense speculation about why the military junta is dragging out the court ruling and what its real agenda is. As Burma's top general Than Shwe has often told subordinates, international pressure "is like an elastic band" - when it's pulled tight nothing should be done as it only makes matters worse. When the elastic band is relaxed "we proceed with our plans".

There is no doubt that the international pressure is very taut at the moment, and the delaying tactics appear to fit neatly into Than Shwe's strategy of dealing with the opposition leader's continued detention. But he must know that the campaign in support of Aung San Suu Kyi will not subside.

The democracy icon is poised to learn her fate on Tuesday when the judges reconvene their secret court inside Insein prison. She is on trial for allegedly breaking the conditions of her house arrest, when she gave food and shelter to an uninvited American who swam to her lakeside residence. If found guilty, she faces a maximum of five years in jail.

The verdict was originally scheduled to be announced more than a week ago, but the court postponed its decision on the grounds that it needed more time to consider the legal arguments in relation to the 1974 constitution - which Aung San Suu Kyi's lawyers insist is no longer relevant.

There is no doubt that one of the regime's main concerns is the possibility of street protests when the verdict is announced. The state-run media warned the public against protesting for several days before the scheduled court verdict last week. They particularly wanted to avoid the Aug 8 anniversary of the mass pro-democracy movement which toppled the previous military ruler, Ne Win.

Benjamin Zawacki, Amnesty International's Bangkok-based Burma researcher, said the delay could be a tactic to "bait any potential demonstrators or activists anticipating a guilty verdict to identify themselves, and then switch the date of the verdict so there is enough time to crack down on them".

At least 30 National League for Democracy (NLD) activists were arrested in Rangoon and other towns on the eve of the original verdict hearing, although many have since been released.

Some Burma watchers say that Aung San Suu Kyi being found guilty is a fait accompli.

"These charges are a complete and crude fabrication, a pretext to keep Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in detention," the former UN human rights rapporteur for Burma, Professor Paulo Pinheiro, told Spectrum.

British ambassador to Burma Mark Canning, who completed his posting there last month, said: "The trial has been entirely scripted and the end already decided before hand," he said after a rare occasion when he was allowed to attend the court hearing.

Public sentiment echoes that of the diplomats. "No one is in any doubt about the outcome," said Moe Moe, a taxi driver in the country's main commercial city.

"Those men in green in Naypyidaw [the new capital] know she is the people's hero and the real leader of this country."

But is it as cut and dried as the diplomats would have us believe, or is Than Shwe unsure of how to handle the case with one eye on next year's election and the ongoing problem Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters would present him with after a transition to his homegrown version of "democracy"?

Than Shwe plans to announce the formation of an interim government that will hold administrative power for at least one year, until the elections are staged, according to senior military sources in Naypyidaw.

He and other senior generals around him, especially Maung Aye, plan to stand down when the time is right, after the elections planned for next year. New houses are being built for them near Maymeo. The regional commander has confiscated large tracts of land there and new residences for the top military brass are already being built, according to Burmese military sources.

All government ministries have been told to complete all their outstanding work by the end of August, especially the preparation of statistical information.

Aung Thaung, the minister and a close confidant of Than Shwe's, recently told his deputies that there would be a new government soon, and he may no longer be the minister. Most of the current crop of ministers have also told their staff they will no longer be ministers by the end of the year. It is understood that members of the interim government will not be allowed to run in the elections, which is why the ministers will resign their posts and not take part in the pre-election administration.

"According to Than Shwe's plans, all the current ministers will have to resign, if they are to join a political party and fight the forthcoming elections," said the independent Burmese academic, Win Min.

Many analysts believe Than Shwe has been waiting for the verdict to further marginalise Aung San Suu Kyi before proceeding with his plans for a a civilian administration ahead of the elections. "The whole country will really be surprised to see how power is handed over," he reportedly told a high-ranking visiting foreign official.

So far there have been no hints as to who will be in the interim administration. Some analysts speculate that it may even include a senior member of the NLD - which would then preclude them from running for office in next year's elections.

This would also be one way of giving this body credibility - both nationally and internationally. It is possible that Than Shwe wants Aung San Suu Kyi herself to participate in the interim administration, a senior government official recently told Spectrum.

For Than Shwe, there is another major consideration - what to do with Aung San Suu Kyi after the elections. While it may be relatively easy to keep her locked up until then, the problem is that releasing her afterwards would only ensure she would be an enormous thorn in the side of any civilian government.

So Than Shwe's plans must involve finding a way to neutralise her and at the same time give her freedom. That is the key issue Than Shwe now has to grapple with, and until he decides what to do with her, she will remain in detention.

The timing of the election is crucial to what happens next week. All indications are that it is likely to take place towards the end of next year. So the further away it is, the more likely it is that the process will be drawn out - first a verdict, then another delay before sentencing, and appeals to the high court.

If Than Shwe is considering ways to co-opt Aung San Suu Kyi, then there must be secret talks or contact between the two. Leading opposition figures in Rangoon, including her lawyers, categorically dismiss these suggestions. Diplomats are equally sceptical.

"But if there were such talks I wouldn't tell diplomats - and certainly not journalists," a western diplomat in Rangoon told Spectrum. After all, it took months for news of the regime's secret talks with Aung San Suu Kyi to emerge, when she was under house arrest in 2000. Those, brokered by the UN envoy Razali Ismail, led to her release in May 2002.

"Whatever happens, Aung San Suu Kyi will be freed before the elections take place," claimed a senior government official with close links to Than Shwe.

READ MORE---> What to do with The Lady...

Suu Kyi warns junta on 2010 elections

(DVB)–Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has again warned the ruling junta in Burma that without national reconciliation prior to next year, the 2010 elections would be futile.

The government has penciled in March next year for the first general elections since Suu Kyi’s opposition National League for Democracy party won a landslide victory in 1990 that was never honoured.

The opposition leader was speaking to her lawyer Nyan Win on Friday during what should have been the final day of her trial.

“Daw Suu said the upcoming elections in 2010 would not be credited as legitimate unless national reconciliation has been carried out before that,” said Nyan Win, adding that she had urged the United Nations to warn the junta about the necessity of reconciliation.

Today is expected to be the final day of Suu Kyi’s trial, which was delayed on Friday by the prosecution team failing to testify.

Critics claim the trial is a ploy to keep her in detention beyond the 2010 elections, although Burma’s revised constitution which was ratified two weeks after cyclone Nargis last May bars her from running for office.

Earlier this month the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Burma in an attempt to kick start dialogue between the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and opposition groups, as well as push for the release of Suu Kyi.

Nyan Win said that Suu Kyi’s comments reflected the general feeling within the party, and this had been stressed to Ban Ki-moon during his visit.

Prosecution lawyers are today expected to give their final statements in the trial in which Suu Kyi has been charged with breaching conditions of her house arrest.

It is unclear when a verdict is likely to be given. If, as is widely expected, Suu Kyi is found guilty, she could face a sentence of up to five years.

A number of delegates attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum last week independently called for her release, while a joint communiqué issued following the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting said her release was a necessary prerequisite for free and fair elections next year.

Reporting by Thurein Soe

READ MORE---> Suu Kyi warns junta on 2010 elections...

UN must stipulate national reconciliation before 2010 elections

UN must stipulate National Reconciliation before Burma's 2010 elections

Immediate Release:

United Nations must demand junta to do national reconciliation first

26 July 2009

Burma’s elected legitimate leader, Aung San Suu Kyi said on 24 July 2009 that “United Nations should demand the military regime that “2010 election will be lack of credible and un-fair before facilitating to take place the national reconciliation”.

Read More...

READ MORE---> UN must stipulate national reconciliation before 2010 elections...

Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

By MIN ZIN
The Irrawaddy News

In politics, direct and frontal attack is rarely wise. Occupying the flank by co-opting the opponent's game plan for one's own purposes is a powerful ploy.

Co-option strategy, however, is a double-edged sword. It presents the risk of being swallowed by the dominant establishment, or at least having one’s reputation damaged, but it also conceals great power and maneuverability.

It depends on how one manages to play it right in a relatively conducive political environment. If well managed, it will become strength. In any case, never rule out this option in exchange for, or fixing solely on, the honor fight when the time is not ripe. To the advantage of oppositions in Burma, a multi-pronged strategy is always called for.

Mainstream oppositions, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the military allows a constitutional revision and inclusive political process. Instead of bringing about a much-needed state-building process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard, Burma's constitution conceded 25 percent of legislative seats to the armed forces and denied protection of fundamental ethnic rights in a multi-ethnic nation.

More importantly, the constitution allows the military virtually to run the country with the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), and even to stage a coup d’état "if there arises a state of emergency." The opposition's principled stance of refusing to endorse the military's constitution and contest the 2010 elections, therefore, deserves understanding and support.

However, it does not mean that there is no gap in the castle wall. The opposition should also look at the situation from a power perspective. By dissecting the junta’s constitution, the opposition will find the devil lies in the details over which Snr-Gen Than Shwe should lose sleep.

First of all, the new post-2010 election power arrangement will create two power centers—military and government. These two power centers will nonetheless be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. Even within the single power center, the Burmese military has repeatedly mired itself in purges resulting from battalion forces versus the intelligence faction, and other rivalries.

Now, after the elimination of the intelligence faction, various reports confirm that there are serious animosity and tension between the military personnel and the thuggish Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members regarding the latter's interference with the military's administrative mandate and other issues of self-interest.

The election, so long as it demonstrates a relatively competitive nature, can make elite rivalry become public issues. The government's operation with two centers of power—no matter who pull the strings—could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.

Secondly, the constitution carries destructive seed for the military to grow into a center-versus-periphery conflict. Though Than Shwe enshrined ultimate power for the commander-in-chief of the military in the constitution, he failed to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities, who are key pillars in the military regime's power structure.

The constitution requires the president to seek approval from the commander-in-chief in all major issues at least via NDSC procedure, but it does not guarantee any special power to regional commanders. Constitutionally, regional commanders are under the control of Chief Ministers of the Regions or States, who could well be civilians in most cases.

Even if the president appoints military Members of Parliament or retired army officials as Chief Minister of the Region or State, the regional commander who is so used to being a warlord in his domain will find it hard to accept constitutionally the prescribed power of the Chief Minister. This may in turn lead the regional commanders to oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw's control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the remaining seats (aside from the 25 percent reserved seats for the military), a non-military candidate can become president or at least non-military parties can control the legislative agendas. According to the constitution, parliament has the right to enact a long list of laws ranging from defense and foreign affairs to economic and social sectors. Thus, Than Shwe appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party.

However, this leads to the fourth problem—another self-defeating clause of the constitution. Than Shwe may want to see his USDA members seizing most of the remaining seats. Transforming the USDA into a political party and contesting the 2010 election will give the junta a great advantage because this thuggish group can exploit the existing nationwide organizational structure and also presents a constant reminder that it’s a fearful power that can intimidate the public to vote for its members. But it is not likely to happen because the constitution clearly states that "Civil Services personnel shall be free from party politics." This clause will invalidate a majority of the 24 million USDA members, who are public servants, if the group turns itself into party.

The constitution also forbids political parties and candidates for parliament from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state, including the use of state property and money. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it runs afoul of the regime's own constitution. If the military wants to create a new political party or parties, they will not carry any resemblance of the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or and intimidating power.

These are some causes of grave concern for Than Shwe. Perhaps that's why he has kept delaying the promulgation of electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year. Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power.

The opposition, for its part, is not likely to take part in the 2010 election unless the regime concedes constitutional reform. However, it is not clear if a political party that does not contest the election will be deregistered. The constitution vaguely states that a party must "accept and practice a genuine and discipline-flourishing multi-party democracy." But if the election law forbids a party such as the NLD to have legal existence for its refusal to participate in the election, the same law will have to impact on ethnic ceasefire parties such as the United Wa State Party, Kachin Independence Organization and New Mon State Party. Most ethnic ceasefire groups have two wings—a political party and the army. It will be a tough choice for Than Shwe to make.

Aside from this principle stance, the practical power implication suggests that the credibility and legitimacy of an election and new power arrangement will be greatly hurt so long as ethnic ceasefire groups refuse to disarm and Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD does not take part in the election. With the new constitution and elections, the military thus cannot expect to minimize the cost of conflict. The most visible costs will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage not only by being outside the regime's election process, but also by opening a new proxy front within the regime's game plan. Constitutional reform is still the most important policy demand, but the opposition should not shut their eyes to the 2010 election.

While the opposition does not take part in the elections representing the NLD, UWSP and NMSP, they must set up proxy political parties to engage in the 2010 election. Through proxies, the opposition must attempt to seize the mainstream platform in order to maximize civilian control of the regime's game. At the same time, the opposition groups such as NLD, NMSP and etc must stand strong outside the reins of an "illegitimate" constitution and election, and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. If history were any guide, the total dissociation of the Communist Party of Burma and the Karen National Union from post-independence mainstream politics made the two strongest forces gradually recede from the center stage of politics, and the power of the both groups also dwindled over time. The opposition, including both democracy forces as well as ethnic groups, should not overlook the reality of basic maturity in politics—that you cannot always get your own way, especially when one group in the conflict maintains an asymmetric power advantage.

Thus far, the KIO, other Kachin ceasefire groups and some representatives of civil society set up the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) in June 2008 to contest the 2010 elections and has reportedly already begun campaigning, while the KIO remains determined not to surrender arms. This is a wise and proactive move since it will allow Kachin to control the Kachin State parliament and be represented in the national parliament. NLD and other ethnic groups should follow suit.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 elections will help preventing a split within the opposition groups. Otherwise, the policy disagreement between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to actual and open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. By setting up proxies, the opposition can create dynamic and diverse tasks and responsibilities within its own leadership and the rank and file.

It could also help bring so-called "neutral," "politically non-engaged professionals," “intellectuals, retired civil/military officials and others who believe in Track Two diplomacy" into the given "legally viable" political arena. No matter whether one agrees or disagrees with the prevailing so-called "Third Force" who mostly opposes Western economic sanctions and criticizes Suu Kyi and her party, the best way to compete with them is to create one's own proxy.

However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxies in the 2010 election will spark a magic power shift to civilian control. It could happen only if the military-dominated status-quo is challenged by public pressure and a negotiated settlement is reached with the military.

The regime's constitution will not lead to a genuine political transition and democratization without broad-based public actions and reconciliation. The aforementioned loopholes in the constitution may not necessarily offer much maneuverability and leverage to the civilian MPs in the first term of the post-2010 power arrangement. Without any balance of power in the state institutions, the military can simply ignore or veto these loopholes.

Moreover, non-military MPs are not necessarily monolithic and unanimous in their approach to the military's domination. They may not necessarily be willing to view their control of majority seats in parliament as a means of determining winners and losers vis-à-vis the military. Parochial interest can also blind non-military MPs to appreciate a broader vision, and self-interest can even corrupt them to compromise their reform agenda. All in all, the election can also be marked by vote rigging, intimidation and bullying attacks orchestrated by the regime and its affiliates against opposing candidates.

However, the seeds of foundational contradiction are embedded in the constitution. The gaps in the castle are built-in. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. Or when mass action takes place on the streets, proxies in the given political process may play a role.

Than Shwe, reportedly a big fan of boxing, must know that strength does not lie in the punches the boxer throws but in the balance and support of the boxer. In other words, it is the legs that matter, the foundation that holds the boxer up can also make him fall. With this loophole-ridden constitution, Than Shwe knows that his opponents could weaken his legs and he could easily reel and stagger.

The opposition should be creative and devious in opening a new proxy front, as a part of their multi-pronged strategy, to exploit the crack in the fortress.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

READ MORE---> Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight...

Extortion Increases in Arakan's Rambree

Rambree (Narinjara): Extortion in Rambree Township in Arakan State has been on the increase, particular extortion committed by the township chairman, said a retired school headmaster from Rambree.

He said that Township Chairman U Aung Kyaw Zaw has extorted taxes from many businessmen in Rambree Township with threats of not providing them permits for future business operations.

U Aung Chit Than, who owns and operates the Rangoon-Rambree bus route, gave 100,000 kyat to the township chairman recently after being threatened with having his operation permit withdrawn.

U Tun Wai, who is also a bus owner from Sapar Ton Village under Lay Daung Village Tract in Rambree, gave 100,000 to the chairman in June after being similarly threatened.

U Nyo Win, a tractor owner from Ward One in Rambree, had to pay 100,000 kyats to U Aung Kyaw Zaw after he failed to meet the chairman when he was summoned.

U Than Kyaw, chairman of Ward Five in Rambree, and Ko Than Min Naing, a rickshaw puller, each had to give 5,000 kyats to the chairman. They were forced to pay after their tractor and rickshaw respectively crossed in front of the township chairman's motorbike when he was traveling in Rambree.

According to a source, the extorted money was transferred to him through the bank account that was opened at the government bank in the name of the township chairman fund.

Many high government officials in Arakan, including army and navy officials, have extorted money from the public recently because they believe they will lose this privilege after the 2010 election.

After the 2010 election, it is believe that the new government that comes to power will change the government administration system. Because of that, the government officials currently in power are taking advantage of the current situation to extort as much money as possible from the public, the retired teacher said.

READ MORE---> Extortion Increases in Arakan's Rambree...

Tycoons close to junta to disburse agri loans

Burma's new banking system
"Cronies' Agricultural Investments
we lend you the money,
we own your land
a new development instructed by Junta" -- Jeg's quote

Rangoon (Mizzima) – The Burmese military junta has instructed 25 companies owned by top business tycoons, close to the regime, to disburse agricultural loans to farmers.

Businessmen, known to be cronies of the junta’s generals, dealing in rice have been asked to provide agricultural loans of Kyat 50,000 [approximately USD 50] to 100,000 per acre to farmers in Irrawaddy and Pegu Division at 2 per cent of interest rates per month.

According to the Myanmar Rice Producers’ Association, top businessmen like Zaw Zaw of Max Company, Chit Khaing of Aden Construction Works, Khin Shwe of Zay Kabar Company are leading the consortium of companies, businessmen and farmers in providing the loan.

A businessman, who is a partner of Gold Delta Company specializing in rice, led by Aden Chin Khaing said that they were assigned to provide production costs, technology and farm implements to rice producers on behalf of the junta.

“Of these 25 companies, some are owned and run by a single person. Some are in partnership with two or three companies,” he added.

“Gold Delta comprises 21 companies. Almost 30 local businessmen and farmers from Dahnuphyu are among them. We will start our business with a total paid up capital of Kyat 10 billion,” he said.

But some companies such as Htoo Trading and ‘Union of Myanmar Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry’ (UMFCCI) Chairman Win Myint are into the business as sole traders with their own capital, the businessman said.

Htoo Trading Co. Project Director Ye Min Oo said that their company has invested Kyat 3 billion in the business. Local businessmen from Bogale invested Kyat 2 billion in the business and will provide agricultural loan of Kyat 50,000 per acre.

Gold Delta Co. headed by ‘Aden’ Chit Khaing invested Kyat 10 billion and will provide loans of Kyat 100,000 per acre to the farmers in about 500 villages.

Following the foot-step, several other businessmen have began setting up companies with names such as Kyaiklat Rice Producing Co. owned by Dagon International Co. in Kyaiklat Township, Irrawaddy Agricultural Development Co. owned by ‘Yuzana’ Htay Myint in Pyapon Township, Max Myanmar Co. owned by Zaw Zaw in Yekyi and Ah Thote Townships, Shwe Nagar Min Co. owned by Win Myint in Myaungmya Township, a company owned by Wady in Maubin.

But a few businessmen in Burma views the new initiative as the junta’s effort to soothe the anger of farmers, who have accused the government of failing to provide assistance, and to allow a few businessmen, whom the junta has selected as candidates for the 2010 election, to be able to campaign for the election.

Most of the businessmen involved in the consortium are blacklisted in the US and EU economic sanctions against Burma. US have announced the names of over 100 businessmen, whom they called are providing financial lifeline to the junta, under the list.

In the wake of the brutal crackdown against peaceful demonstrators in the 2007 September saffron revolution led by monks, where scores of protesters were killed and thousands of activists arrested, the US and EU imposed targeted sanctions against State owned enterprises, the top echelon of the junta, protégés of the junta and their business networks.

Following the devastating Cyclone Nargis, which destroyed paddy fields and inundated many more with sea water, farmers find low yields in their work. While some farmers have welcomed the loan programme, many worried that they might be asked to payback with their paddy products at a reduced price.

Farmers said, they have bitter experiences in the past, where they took loans from businessmen, local army units and even local authorities in exchange for their paddy products. But they were forced to give their products at a much lesser rate then in the market.

In some cases, famers who are unable to repay their loans and do not have a good yield of paddy, they are forced to surrender their land for the loan they have taken.

Farmers from Thakan village tract on Bogale-Pyapon highway said that some of the farmers in their areas dare not take loans even at cheap interest rates.

But a project director at ‘Htoo’ Trading Co. told Mizzima, “The businessmen are doing this because they have been directed by the State. We don’t expect any economic benefits from the farmers. Two per cent interest rate is nothing for us.” (JEG's: of course 2% is nothing to cronies as they are taking the land which is worth a lot more)

Sources at the Ministry of Economics and Commerce said the government have instructed the companies dealing in rice, that they could export rice only after deducting the amount allotted for sales in the region.

A former executive committee member of the UMFCCI told Mizzima, “We are doing this mainly because of pressure from seniors [junta’s high officials]. We have no intention of extracting profit from the farmers. Our main concern is free export of rice. In this country, authorities, if we follow their instructions usually give us other business opportunities.”

He said, besides, farmers would be thankful to the businessmen for providing loans and could gain their support, which could serve as a campaign for the upcoming 2010 election. (JEG's: elections campaign aha?...)

Sources at the Myanmar Rice Traders Association said Burma set the target of rice export at maximum 1.5 million tons for the this fiscal year - April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010. Burma was able to export over 658,000 tons of rice in the 2008-09 fiscal year.

While Burma’s export quality rice contains about 25 per cent of broken rice, it cost about USD 320 per ton in the export market. Over 80 per cent of Burma’s exports in rice goes to African countries.

READ MORE---> Tycoons close to junta to disburse agri loans...

Patrols recalled following clash

SHAN- All Burma Army units patrolling the countryside in Southern Shan State have been withdrawn leaving the Shan State Army (SSA) ‘South’ free to roam all areas outside heavily barricaded towns and villages, following a 7-hour fight between the two sides last week.

Col Yawdserk (photo)

Reasons for the surprise move by the Burma Army could only be speculated at present, according to SSA South commanders:

• Security in towns in anticipation of Martyrs Day (19 July) commemorating the event in 1949 when Aung San and 8 others, including the popular Shan prince Sao Sam Tun, were assassinated

• Security in towns in preparation for the 2010 elections

• Preparation for a new offensive

“We are definitely on the lookout,” said Col Yawdserk, the SSA leader. “I have instructed all units to be twice on alert.”

The fight on 15 July in Kehsi township had resulted in 11 killed, 1 captured and 5 assorted weapons seized on the Burma Army side. Only 14 reportedly got away, some wounded. “Since 21 May (Shan Resistance Day), we have killed more than 30 and seized more than 20 weapons,” an officer in the field told SHAN matter-of-factly.

The Burma Army in Shan State is said to be preparing for a military showdown with either the SSA South or the ceasefire armies including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) with which it has been on an increasingly sour relationship since last year.

Related report: 11 soldiers killed in rebel ambush, 17 July 2009

READ MORE---> Patrols recalled following clash...

Indonesia leads Asean Burma fears

(BBC-UK) -Indonesia's foreign minister has said Burma's elections cannot be free and fair unless detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is free.

Hasan Wirayuda was speaking as regional foreign ministers gathered in Thailand for an Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) Regional Forum.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is on her way to the security forum.

Asean has a policy of non-interference in members' affairs, but Burma has provoked widespread censure.

Indonesia has led Asean concerns about Burma, telling correspondents that the group has become frustrated at the lack of progress on democratic reforms.

Mr Wirayuda said the recent trial of Ms Suu Kyi had dashed hopes of a meaningful election scheduled for next year.

A new human rights body created by Asean, lambasted by regional activists as lacking any enforcement power, was almost scuttled over the weekend when an increasingly assertive Indonesia sought to strengthen its provisions.

Inclusive

"We have been saying to them [Burma] directly that the process must be inclusive for all groups in society ... including Aung San Suu Kyi," Mr Wirayuda told The Associated Press in a reference to Burma's planned poll.

"We should see whether from now until 2010 they develop a credible process leading to truly democratic elections acceptable to the international community," he said. (JEG's: what if Burma don't)

He said the "big test" will be whether the regime's promised elections next year are truly "multiparty, meaning inclusive in nature, but also whether the process is a democratic one."

He said Asean has been "able to develop a more open, frank discussion" with Burma, while admitting it was hard to see if all the talk made any difference inside the country.

He was speaking after United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a fruitless trip to Burma, during which he was not allowed to visit Ms Suu Kyi.

Clinton in Thailand

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said six months ago that the US was reviewing its policy towards Burma as sanctions did not appear to be successful in forcing change.

However, on this, her first trip to an Asean meeting, analysts have noted that there has been no hint of a new policy.

Instead, the talks are expected to focus on finding ways to push North Korea back to the negotiating table.

Six-party talks aimed at ending the North's nuclear programmes stalled last year, and since then the North has set off nuclear and missile tests amid questions over the leadership as Kim Jong-il's health has worsened.

Asean leaders have expressed satisfaction that a figure as senior as Mrs Clinton is at last gracing the regional forum with her presence. In recent years, more junior officers have been sent, leaving the delegate from China, a growing influence in the region, to be the key figure at the talks.

Mrs Clinton will meet Thai Prime Minister Abhisist Vejjajiva and the Thai foreign minister in Bangkok before joining the forum in Phuket.

Another challenge at the regional talks will be for Thailand - it has had to cancel regional summits twice since December due to domestic political turmoil.

READ MORE---> Indonesia leads Asean Burma fears...

Junta under siege on two fronts

by Mizzima News

The SPDC – Burma's ruling junta – in preparing to switch to a puppet parliamentary democracy manipulated and controlled by the Army, faces two daunting political hurdles. The first obstacle is the global outcry to release political prisoners including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who the junta wants to marginalize from forthcoming political developments. The other issue concerns attempts to transform ethnic armed groups presently under ceasefire agreements into Border Guard Forces or militias under the command of the Burmese military. Clearly, this is a challenging time for the junta.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon himself recently visited Burma in an attempt resolve the long-time political stalemate, but the Burmese generals responded to this pressure through a delaying tactic in announcing the forthcoming release of some political prisoners – without providing any specifics.

The three main objectives of Ban's visit to Burma, made on the 3rd and 4th of this month, were (1) to secure the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners (2) initiate a dialogue between the military and opposition forces aimed at national reconciliation, and (3) to create an atmosphere conducive for a free and fair general election in 2010.

Yet, he didn’t even get a chance to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is being held in Insein prison, instead only receiving an assurance from the junta that there will be a free and fair general election. Who can imagine the junta will cheat and engage in vote rigging during the upcoming election?

However, concerning the generals, to think international pressure will ease following the release of some select political prisoners, out of a total of 2,100 currently being detained and certain not to include Daw Aung San Suu Kyi – who would easily win over people’s hearts and adoration immediately upon receiving her freedom, is a pipedream.

But the question of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not the only seemingly insurmountable hurdle facing the junta, as they have also thus far failed to overcome the problem of integrating armed ceasefire groups into the national fold.

According to the new constitution, which was drafted by the generals' handpicked representatives and approved via massive vote rigging and cheating in a constitutional referendum, there must be one and only one armed force, operating under the central command of the state.

But, resorting to their typical delaying tactics, the junta, following the signing of ceasefire agreements with armed ethnic groups, abstained from working toward a viable political solution, arguing such matters are best left to be discussed later on with an elected civilian government. (JEG's: not later, before elections...)

As a result, at least seven ceasefire groups are resisting the junta’s plan of transforming their forces into people’s militias. Among them are included formidable fighting outfits such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army-North (SSA-N).

The inability, then, to force their Border Guard Force plan onto ceasefire groups, in combination with the lack of any viable approach to address the issue of political prisoners – and most prominently the case of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, risks exposing the Army and its leadership to a good deal of humiliation.

Until these two issues are adequately addressed, any plans the generals wish to impose on Burma's populace with the holding of next year's general election remain is serious jeopardy.

READ MORE---> Junta under siege on two fronts...

Kachin Reject Border Guard Force Second Time

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

One of biggest ethnic ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) again rejected the military junta’s border guard force plan and called for autonomy in Kachin State, according to a KIO report.

The meeting between the KIO and Burmese military officials led by Maj-Gen Soe Win, the commander of the Northern Regional Command and head of the transformation committee of the border guard force for the Northern Regional Command, took place in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State and the headquarters of the regional command, on July 8.

Representatives of the KIO told the Burmese that the KIO wanted to keep its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), under its current status and rejected having Burmese military commanders in its ethnic armed forces.

It is estimated that the KIA now has 4,000 to 5,000 men forming five brigades and one infantry division. KIA troops are stationed in both Kachin State and northern Shan State.

The KIO said that it wanted KIA troops to form a Kachin Regional Guard Force but not a border guard force in the future.

Apart from the border guard force issue, the KIO also called for autonomous power for the KIO in Kachin State by demanding “direct involvement” in the state’s executive, legislative and judicial powers after the 2010 election.

The KIO also rejected a junta proposal for the organization to become a political party for the 2010 elections.

The KIO said it is has been the sole Kachin people’s organization representing the Kachin for five decades, and it would difficult and confusing for Kachin people if the KIO were suddenly transformed into a political party for the election.

The KIO signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese military in 1994.

The July 8 meeting was the second attempt by the Burmese military to persuade the KIO to accept the border guard force plan.

At the end of April, Burmese army officials met with leaders of ethnic ceasefire groups, including the KIO, and explained the junta’s blueprint for transforming the armed forces of ethnic ceasefire groups into border guard forces ahead of the 2010 elections.

The KIO and other ceasefire groups voiced their disagreement with the plan at that time.

In June, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, who is secretary of the junta’s Border Guard Force Transformation Committee, visited controlled areas of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) or the Kokang Army, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) to convince them of the border guard force plan.

The northern Shan Sate based UWSA, which is the biggest ceasefire group in Burma, the MNDAA and the NDAA rejected the plan a second time.

Analysts say the plan is to incorporate armed ethnic ceasefire troops into the Tatmadaw (Burma’s armed forces) with the aim of weakening ethnic armed groups in the future.

Under the plan, one border guard battalion would have 326 troops including 18 officers. There would be three commanders with the rank of major. Each battalion would have two majors drawn from ceasefire groups and one major drawn from the Tatmadaw in charge of administration.

Each battalion would have a general staff officer and quartermaster with the rank of captain drawn from the Tatmadaw. Company commanders in each battalion would be drawn from ceasefire groups.

Twenty-seven soldiers in other ranks, such as company sergeant majors, sergeant clerks, nurses, etc., would be drawn from Tatmadaw forces.

The deadline for the ceasefire groups to accept the plan was on June 30.

Related article: The Path of Pen or Sword?

Multimedia show from The Irrawaddy published on 4 February 2009.

READ MORE---> Kachin Reject Border Guard Force Second Time...

Will Shwe Mann Become Mr President?

By THE IRRAWADDY

Snr-Gen Than Shwe has reportedly endorsed Burma's No 3 ranking general, joint chief-of-staff Gen Thura Shwe Mann, to become Burma's new president.

The move came during a recent cabinet meeting in Naypyidaw, according to sources.

"You are going to be president," Than Shwe reportedly told his subordinate.

Burma's No 3 ranking general, joint chief-of-staff Gen Thura Shwe Mann. (Photo: Getty Images)

According to sources close to the military elite, Shwe Mann, 61, will be nominated by the representatives of the military in the future Senate and House, to be formed after the planned 2010 elections.

The military will receive 25 percent of the seats at the village, township, state, regional and district levels in the new governing body, according to the 2008 Constitution.

There will be three nominees for the presidency—

one from the military contingent, (JEG's: but this is the winner :-) .. )
one from the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Assembly or Senate) and
one from the members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Assembly or House).

The Senate and the House will then vote to choose the president.

Shwe Mann, a protégé of Than Shwe, has a reputation of being down to earth and a good listener, but he has yet to show his teeth with regard to a broad range of social, economic and political issues. His vision of Burma’s future is unknown.

Perhaps wisely, Shwe Mann has not shown any clear political or social views since he is still under the influence of two senior generals: Snr-Gen Than Shwe and Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye. In fact, Shwe Mann and his wife are close to Than Shwe’s family on a personal basis, such as flying together to Singapore for shopping trips, sources said.

"To deal with issues of national politics and the macro-economy, Shwe Mann would not dare make any final decisions without Than Shwe and Maung Aye," a source said. "Recently, he was officially invited to visit China. But in order to signify it was a very important visit, Napyidaw assigned No 2, Maung Aye, instead of him to go there."

Recently, Shwe Mann was the subject of extensive news coverage which focused on his secret mission to North Korea in November, which was leaked to The Irrawaddy. Since then he has had a low profile in Burma’s official press except for photo-opts of meeting with state guests such as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Singapore senior minister Goh Chok Tong.

Meanwhile, Shwe Mann oversees regular meetings on political and security affairs with high-ranking military officials in Rangoon and Naypyidaw.

According to the Constitution, one of the duties of the new president will be to head the National Defense and Security Council, which has the power to declare a state of emergency and nullify the Constitution.

Sources said that Shwe Mann will issue a state order that Than Shwe, Maung Aye and the remaining members of the ruling junta all be named patrons or advisers to the National Defense and Security Council after the 2010 election.

Speculation is rife that the junta leaders and their close associates are deeply involved in preparations for the 2010 election and beyond.

READ MORE---> Will Shwe Mann Become Mr President?...

Prisoner amnesties only offer false hope

By Alex Ellgee

(DVB)–As Burma’s UN ambassador finished his brief interjection to the Security Council earlier this week, news headlines leapt on the pledge that Burma was due to release political prisoners in lieu of the 2010 elections.

The news sent a glimmer of hope across the world that Burma’s ruling generals had finally given in to international pressure. World leaders have said that an amnesty for the country’s 2,100 political activists currently behind bars is the only way to gain legitimacy before next year. Had Ban Ki-moon’s quiet diplomacy really stirred the hard-line generals into rethinking their old ways?

It is evident that the Burmese government fears the UN – Senior General Than Shwe is notoriously fearful of being brought to the International Criminal Court - yet it is unlikely that the junta leader would derail even slightly from his ‘roadmap to democracy’.

Releasing political prisoners is too much of a threat to the government’s planned election, which observers say is set to cement the continuation of military rule in Burma. The dissidents that remain behind bars are democracy fighters and leaders who could once again inspire the nation to reject the government’s sham elections and take to the streets in revolt.

The government’s indifference to the suffering of its opposition is palpable. Over 130 political prisoners in Burma urgently require medical treatment. Denied access to doctors, many are in life threatening conditions and forced to languish in prisons far from their families. It was only last month that the 140th political prisoner died in prison as a result of denied access to proper medical treatment. Salai Hla Moe was a prominent National League for Democracy (NLD) member and sometime security officer for Aung San Suu Kyi. His family was not informed about his death until their end of month visit when they learnt that he had been denied a traditional Christian burial.

Since November last year, 230 political prisoners have been transferred to remote prisons, unable to receive necessary medical treatment from their families. The objective is to silence them through both isolation, and more worryingly, death. If the government is serious about allowing prisoners to participate in the elections then these potential political leaders need to receive proper medical treatment immediately.

Perhaps most tellingly, the ambassador did not use the phrase ‘political prisoners’ during his speech. Burma has always denied that it holds political prisoners, instead that its only detainees are common criminals. Opposition groups and critics of the government are therefore dubious about whether any political prisoners will be released. The NLD spokesperson Nyan Win suggested that “the amnesty is not in response to Ban Ki-moon’s suggestions” and is “irrelevant to what was recommended”.

If it does turn out that political prisoners are released it is equally unclear as to what level they will be able to participate in the elections, especially so given that the election laws are yet to be announced. Free and fair elections require freedom to form political parties, but “participation”, in the words of the ambassador, could merely imply power to vote.

Over the last five years, four prisoner amnesties have released around 37,900 prisoners - only 120 of them have been political prisoners. The latest, in February this year following a visit by UN human rights envoy to Burma Tomas Ojea Quintana, saw the release of 6,313 prisoners, again supposedly on “humanitarian grounds” so that prisoners could participate in the 2010 elections. However, only 31 political prisoners were released, most of whom were already coming to the end of their sentences.

Prisoner amnesties have always coincided with increasing international pressure on the regime, and this time is no different. Ban Ki-moon expressed “deep disappointment” with his trip to Burma earlier this month, and suggestions have been made that China’s confidence in its neighbour is waning. Fear of Security Council action, which would see Burma enduring the same UN resolutions that North Korea has accumulated over the years, may have caused it to attempt mild appeasement. Indeed, following his statement, Than Swe told the meeting that “no Security Council action is needed”.

If the current political stalemate in Burma endures, there is no chance that Aung San Suu Kyi will be released in time for the 2010 elections. She is the junta’s most feared political leader and they know that her freedom could be the end of the constitution. Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma, stated that “The release of Aung San Suu Kyi would be the first step to show the world that [the SPDC] is serious about releasing all political prisoners.”

History shows, however, that amnesties are nothing more than a currency used by the generals to buy time and deflect international pressure. Yet one lesson can be learned from this – it is in the Security Council that Burma’s stubbornness starts to waver. The world should stop buying into false promises, and instead hit them when they are vulnerable. But for the time being, the longer the UN lets the generals play their mind games, the more political leaders will be allowed to die in Burma’s prisons.

READ MORE---> Prisoner amnesties only offer false hope...