Without constitution amendment elections cannot herald change: NLD

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Unless Burma’s military regime releases political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and amends the 2008 constitution, the 2010 general elections will be meaningless and will not usher in any kind of change, the National League for Democracy has said.

The 2010 general election, proposed by the ruling junta, is based on the 2008 constitution, which enshrines the role of the military. It cannot provide an opportunity for change unless the regime considers reviewing the constitution, Dr. Win Naing, a spokesperson for the NLD said.

“The 2010 elections cannot be an opportunity for change in Burma unless the junta reviews and amends the constitution,” he said.

It has been 20 years now, and the junta is aware that it cannot continue ruling the country in an illegitimate manner. Since the junta is not prepared to make any kind of drastic reforms, it drafted the constitution to legitimize its role, he added.

Dr. Win Naing’s remarks came in response to the recent report released by the International Crisis Group, which urged all stake holders in Burmese politics to prepare to seize an opportunity of change that is likely to be a fall out of the 2010 elections.

The ICG in its report released on Thursday said the 2010 election is an opportunity for change and urged the international community, the Burmese opposition including the NLD, the military government and other stake holders not to squander the opportunity.

“All stakeholders should be alert to opportunities that may arise to push the new government towards reform and reconciliation,” the report, titled “Myanmar: Towards the Elections”, said.

The report also argues that boycotting or opposing the election would only push things into the hands of the military as it would not prevent the elections from taking place.

But Dr. Win Naing said if the elections take place without any consideration for the opposition’s demands, it would only produce a result that is predictable – continued military rule – and the only difference this time would be “a legitimized military rule”.

“We don’t see it as an opportunity. The conditions before the elections are important and if nothing changes and if the junta goes ahead with its plans, it is predictable,” he added.

But he did not criticize the ICG report stating, “It is their view and we appreciate it for expressing such ideas. It does not matter whether we agree with it or not.”

But functioning within a rigidly controlled environment, Dr. Win Naing said, people living in Burma understand the military’s mentality and need to assess the situation before taking any decision.

“As we have mentioned in our ‘Shwegondine Declaration’ (see below a copy of the declaration) if the ruling government does not implement our proposals, we would be forced to re-think how we should go about the 2010 election,” he added.

On August 11, the NLD’s general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to a further 18 months in detention, which is widely believed by observers as a move to keep her away from the 2010 election scenario.

Similarly, members of the NLD in Rangoon have been harassed and tortured for their political activities.

25 August 2009

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NLD Shwegondine Declaration
20090429_NLD Shwegondine Declaration

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Saboi Jum brothers to deliver KIO's message to Naypyitaw

by KNG

Kachin State civilian-peace mediator Rev. Dr. Lahtaw Saboi Jum and his younger brother Lahtaw Hkun Myat will deliver a clear message from the Kachin Independence Organization’s (KIO) to the Burmese ruling junta in Naypyitaw, the new jungle capital of the country, said KIO sources.

The two brothers had also helped to achieve a ceasefire agreement between the KIO and the ruling junta in February 24, 1994.

The KIO’s message, without mincing words, states that the "ambition of self-determination of the state" is not on the agenda of the junta-proposed transformation of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed-wing of the KIO, to a Border Guard Force (BGF), a KIO official in Laiza headquarters on the Sino-Burma border in Kachin State said.

It is unusual for the KIO to try and make direct contact with the military junta brass in Naypyitaw, by passing the Northern Regional Commander Maj-Gen Soe Win. The Commander has been assigned to talk to KIO delegates on the issue by the junta military hierarchy, said KIO officials in Laiza headquarters on the Sino-Burma border in Kachin State.

The KIO said the peace mediators will meet the junta’s Lt-Gen Ye Myint, Chief of Military Affairs Security (MAS) and other military leaders in the capital. They will pass on the message of the KIO's ambition of self-determination of the state, said sources close to the two mediators.

The reasons behind despatching peace mediators to Naypyitaw are that KIO wants to put across its stance and political ambitions to the junta and send the message that both parties and civilians will suffer if there is unexpected military conflict between the KIO and the junta, said a KIO officer in Laiza headquarters.

Earlier, the KIO proposed to the ruling junta through the Northern Regional Commander Maj-Gen Soe Win that the KIA could transform to a Kachin State Security Force (KSF) or a Kachin Regional Guard Force (KRGF). But neither the ruling junta nor Commander Soe Win responded to the KIO's proposal, said KIO sources.

The KIO is increasingly under pressure by the Kachin people in the country and abroad to reject the proposal of transforming KIA into a Border Guard Force (BGF).

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Kachin Reject Border Guard Force Second Time

By WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy News

One of biggest ethnic ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) again rejected the military junta’s border guard force plan and called for autonomy in Kachin State, according to a KIO report.

The meeting between the KIO and Burmese military officials led by Maj-Gen Soe Win, the commander of the Northern Regional Command and head of the transformation committee of the border guard force for the Northern Regional Command, took place in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State and the headquarters of the regional command, on July 8.

Representatives of the KIO told the Burmese that the KIO wanted to keep its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), under its current status and rejected having Burmese military commanders in its ethnic armed forces.

It is estimated that the KIA now has 4,000 to 5,000 men forming five brigades and one infantry division. KIA troops are stationed in both Kachin State and northern Shan State.

The KIO said that it wanted KIA troops to form a Kachin Regional Guard Force but not a border guard force in the future.

Apart from the border guard force issue, the KIO also called for autonomous power for the KIO in Kachin State by demanding “direct involvement” in the state’s executive, legislative and judicial powers after the 2010 election.

The KIO also rejected a junta proposal for the organization to become a political party for the 2010 elections.

The KIO said it is has been the sole Kachin people’s organization representing the Kachin for five decades, and it would difficult and confusing for Kachin people if the KIO were suddenly transformed into a political party for the election.

The KIO signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese military in 1994.

The July 8 meeting was the second attempt by the Burmese military to persuade the KIO to accept the border guard force plan.

At the end of April, Burmese army officials met with leaders of ethnic ceasefire groups, including the KIO, and explained the junta’s blueprint for transforming the armed forces of ethnic ceasefire groups into border guard forces ahead of the 2010 elections.

The KIO and other ceasefire groups voiced their disagreement with the plan at that time.

In June, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, who is secretary of the junta’s Border Guard Force Transformation Committee, visited controlled areas of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) or the Kokang Army, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) to convince them of the border guard force plan.

The northern Shan Sate based UWSA, which is the biggest ceasefire group in Burma, the MNDAA and the NDAA rejected the plan a second time.

Analysts say the plan is to incorporate armed ethnic ceasefire troops into the Tatmadaw (Burma’s armed forces) with the aim of weakening ethnic armed groups in the future.

Under the plan, one border guard battalion would have 326 troops including 18 officers. There would be three commanders with the rank of major. Each battalion would have two majors drawn from ceasefire groups and one major drawn from the Tatmadaw in charge of administration.

Each battalion would have a general staff officer and quartermaster with the rank of captain drawn from the Tatmadaw. Company commanders in each battalion would be drawn from ceasefire groups.

Twenty-seven soldiers in other ranks, such as company sergeant majors, sergeant clerks, nurses, etc., would be drawn from Tatmadaw forces.

The deadline for the ceasefire groups to accept the plan was on June 30.

Related article: The Path of Pen or Sword?

Multimedia show from The Irrawaddy published on 4 February 2009.

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Addressing ethnic grievances the key to Burma’s future

Vientiane (mizzima) – The imperative of addressing longstanding grievances held by a multitude of ethnic groups in Burma is the critical obstacle to overcome if the country is to stand any chance of a peaceful and stable transition to democracy, according to a new study by an international think-tank.

The Dutch-based Transnational Institute (TNI), in a July 2009 report entitled ‘Neither War Nor Peace’, argues that democracy is likely to remain elusive for all of Burma’s citizens as a result of the lack of political development and pervasiveness of corruption in ethnic regions.

Examining the situation on the 20th anniversary of the initial ceasefire agreements reached between the Burmese military and ethnic insurgents, author Tom Kramer argues “The single most important factor to achieve peace in Burma is the need to find a lasting political solution for the repression and lack of ethnic rights.”

The issue is said to be of pivotal importance at present as Naypyitaw attempts to persuade the various ceasefire groups, seventeen by official tally, to accept a role as “border guards” in a reconfigured Burma following the scheduled 2010 general election.

However, concludes the study, ceasefire groups are likely to remain highly skeptical of the scheme as long as the prevailing environment is perceived as being characterized by an increasing Burmanization of ethnic areas, a lack of input in the political decision making process and insufficient development.

The report is mildly critical of popular sentiments expressed by the Western media and pro-democracy activists, including the debunking of the Panglong Agreement as a missed opportunity for national unity.

Instead, Kramer prospers that in its non-inclusive form and ill-defined statutes, the Panglong Agreement of 1947 actually abetted in paving the way for the eventual ethnic hostility that has come to ravish the history of modern Burma.

Additionally, ethnic parties are said to be wary of the main pro-democracy leadership in the form of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy, while remaining appreciative and supportive of her general line.

“[T]hey [ethnic groups] feel that her [Aung San Suu Kyi’s] party doesn’t see the ethnic issue as a central element to the political future of Burma, and has failed to formulate appropriate policies to address the issue,” TNI summarizes.

However, the ceasefire groups are themselves not spared partial blame for the ongoing state of affairs, with Kramer asserting “few have developed a clear political vision for the future,” a sentiment seen both as a reflection of poor leadership and an effect of persistent government harassment.

Though opportunities for economic development were central in the formulation of ceasefire agreements, of which only the Kachin Independence Organization is in possession of a written document, TNI nevertheless puts forth that the “real problem in post-ceasefire economies is a lack of economic opportunity.” It is a situation said to be exacerbated by the perceived necessity of all parties to then turn to illicit or short-sighted economic undertakings such as drugs and unsustainable logging.

Despite the ceasefire agreements having failed to meet political grievances and inadequately addressing development concerns, the study does point to relative gains in ceasefire zones in the areas of armed violence, human rights violations, travel and the nurturing of civil society organizations.

Kramer points out that the Metta Foundation, a post-ceasefire civil society organization founded in Kachin State, was one of the few organizations able to effectively operate in a timely fashion in the country’s devastated delta region following the cyclone of May 2008.

The fall of the Communist Party of Burma at the close of the 1980s, in conjunction with the wider collapse of communism, along with the removal of former Prime Minister Kyin Nyunt in 2004 are detailed as critical events in the history of ceasefire agreements; with the former ushering in the first opportunities for Rangoon to reach such understandings with armed ethnic groups and the latter removing the principle architect of the ceasefire agenda from the scene.

And though the author goes to some length to highlight the extensiveness of division and difference across Burma’s ethnic kaleidoscope, he nonetheless reaches a similar conclusion to the longstanding argument that the country’s political imbroglio can essentially be broken down into three components: the Burmese army, the National League for Democracy and the country’s ethnic groups – maintaining that despite the many fissures “their [the ethnic groups] main goals are similar.”

Ultimately, TNI finds that little will change in Burma in terms of peace and security in the wake of the 2010 general election, with ethnic grievances remaining unaddressed and hostilities continuing to simmer under a veneer of ill-stipulated political relationships.

Any renewed fighting between government and ethnic forces is assessed to most likely result from the activities of youth and splinter groups to the prevailing ceasefire outfits.

Approximately 40 percent of Burma’s overall population is believed to be comprised of ethnic minorities.

READ MORE---> Addressing ethnic grievances the key to Burma’s future...

The Future of the Cease-fire Agreements in Burma

This year 2009, marks the twentieth anniversary of the first ceasefire agreements in Burma, which put a stop to decades of fighting between the military government and a wide range of ethnic armed opposition groups. These groups had taken up arms against the government in search of more autonomy and ethnic rights.

The military government has so far failed to address the main grievances and aspirations of the cease-fire groups. The regime now wants them to disarm or become Border Guard Forces. It also wants them to form new political parties which would participate in the controversial 2010 elections. They are unlikely to do so unless some of their basic demands are met. This raises many serious questions about the future of the cease-fires.

Report produced by:
Transnational Institute
can be obtained here
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Burma: Cease-fire Agreements

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Shan candidates running on junta ticket warned

S.H.A.N.

Shans who are considering invitation by the country’s ruling military council to contest the upcoming elections must see to it that they obtain prior consent of the people in their respective constituencies, a leader of an armed opposition group recently told SHAN.

He was speaking in response to SHAN’s query: “Some prominent Shans who have been approached by junta officials to enter elections in the yet-to-be-formed party’s banner have expressed concern. If they don’t accept the invitation, they will run risk of being included in the junta’s blacklist and if they do, they will run another kind of risk – ostracism by their own Shan community, and worse, termination by the armed movements such as yours. What do you suggest they do?”

“We won’t bother anyone whom the people are willing to vouch for,” he promised. “But no responsibility shall be taken for anyone who fails to seek the people’s approval first. Whatever happens to them, they have only themselves to blame.”

Halfway through 2009, there is no indication of an impending announcement on the election law by the country’s military rulers. However, since official go-ahead was given to the junta-drafted constitution in May 2008, government officials, government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) officials and those from the National Unity Party (NUP) that was formed by the military in 1988 have already been busy canvassing for popular support.

Shan, the biggest state in the Union, has several armed groups. Those that enjoy ceasefire agreement with Rangoon include United Wa State Army (UWSA), and Shan State Army “North” to name a few. Non-ceasefire groups include Shan State Army (SSA) “South”, PaO National Liberation Organization (PNLO) and Wa National Organization (WNO).

READ MORE---> Shan candidates running on junta ticket warned...

Impunity bars justice for Burmese ethnic groups

By Aung Htoo

(DVB)–While the world has remained rapt by the trial of Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi, the ongoing crisis over rights for ethnic minorities in the country has received little international attention.

Burma’s ethnic minority groups constitute one-third of the population. This population has borne the brunt of the government’s well-documented and widely condemned human rights violations. Ethnic children have been forcibly recruited into the army, some to act as minesweepers for troop patrols, while rape of ethnic women has been labelled by human rights groups an attempt to dilute the ethnic diversity of Burma. Their situation is being compounded by a culture of impunity in Burma It is only when greater international attention is focused on government impunity and on rights for ethnic minorities that Burma will be able to achieve peace.

This was an argument put forward by Professor Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, former UN special rapporteur to Burma from 2000 to 2008, in an article published last month in the New York Times. The article highlighted the grievances and loss of rights of the ethnic minority in the country, with whom he worked with for eight years.

While the plight of Burma’s ethnic groups has been sidelined by the Suu Kyi trial, the Burmese government has focused greater attention, albeit highly cynical, on transforming armed ethnic groups into political tools for the convenience of next year’s elections. One key issue that many observers have ignored is that if they accept such government proposals, they will effectively be complicit in supporting government impunity for crimes committed by the state army against their own people.

According to agency reports, a delegation of government officials lead by the junta’s chief of military affairs security, Lieutenant-General Ye Myint, has met with the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) ceasefire group as part of a series of discussions with ceasefire groups across the country. It is understood that the government tried to persuade the Shan group to form a political wing to contest the upcoming elections, in return offering them an opportunity to retain their armed status by transforming into a government militia.

Rather than committing themselves to military rule, ethnic ceasefire groups should take this opportunity make demands about their status in the country and to speak out about their loss of rights.

‘License to Rape’, a 2002 report by the Shan Women’s Action Network that gained attention from the international community, highlighted details of rape cases against Shan women by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) army. But the SSA-N never made significant calls for international action against the SPDC’s crimes either against Shan people or other ethnic minorities. Similarly, the SSA-N stayed silent about the government’s manipulation of Burmese law under which their leader, Colonel Hso Ten, was in 2005 imprisoned for 106 years.

If the SSA-N bows to government persuasion and forms a political party to enter the elections, they would automatically be placed in a position where they accept the 2008 constitution. Buried within the constitution is section 445 of the penal code, which grants the government an amnesty for crimes committed by the army during the State Law and Order Restoration Council era from 1988 to 1997. This would effectively mean the group supports an ongoing culture of impunity in Burma. Pinheiro documented a case where a Burmese soldier last December abducted, raped and killed a 7-year-old Karen girl. Authorities refused to arrest the soldier; instead, officers threatened the parents with punishment if they did not accept a cash bribe to keep quiet.

This culture of impunity is becoming a huge problem for Burma, and is compounded by the country’s failing legal system. But pure political thinking which aims to bring a solution merely to arguments about the constitution or the election will not solve the current situation. We need to build a new approach by restoring law and order under a framework in which whoever commits a crime can be punished.

If Burma continues with the current 2008 constitution, people whose basic human rights were violated by the government will be denied their right to seek justice under legal terms of the abuses suffered. Furthermore, it would encourage such abuses to continue free of punishment. Since 1990, the United Nations’ special rapporteur has made 37 visits to Burma while the international body’s General Assembly and the Human Rights Council have passed over 35 resolutions regarding Burma. The UN Security Council, however, is yet to pass a single resolution.

Pinheiro points out the international community’s “diplomatic efforts [have] failed to bear fruit” and “the country’s domestic legal system will not punish those perpetrating crimes against ethnic minorities”. In this context, he says, “it is time for the United Nations to take the next logical step”.

Were this to happen, a possible indictment by the International Criminal Court could be on the horizon. This, Pinheiro argues, would have the dual effect of bringing greater attention to impunity in Burma, and deterring future crimes against humanity. If the ceasefire groups do not consider these facts and instead join hands with the government, whilst ignoring crimes being committed by them, they will, as the Burmese saying goes, be hiding from a lightning strike under a palm tree.

Aung Htoo is general secretary of the Burma Lawyers' Council

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Largest Mon political party attends secret meeting with Burmese general

Mon Son, Rai Maraoh

(Mon News) -Officials from the largest Mon political group have recently concluded discussions with Burmese government military commanders. Details could not be confirmed, but recent visits by Burmese government officials to ethnic ceasefire groups have dealt with transforming ethnic armed groups in to border guard forces in advance of the 2010 election.

On June 7th, New Mon State Party (NMSP) chairman Nai Htaw Mon, Joint Secretary Nai Chan Toi, Central Executive Committee Nai Htar Wara, Major General Jeya, and Central Executive Committee (CEC) member Nai Tala Nyi met with South East Command General That Naing Win at about 9 am at the South East quarter in Moulamine in Mon State.

“It is a secret meeting with the South East Commander, and we can’t say what we talked about in the meeting. We don’t want to announce about that,” said Nai Tala Nyi, the CEC member from Moulemin.

In early March NMSP chairmen and vice chairmen met with Lt. Gen. Ye Myint at the Southeast Command headquarters in Moulmein.

Lt. Gen. Ye Myint is chief of Military Affairs Security, an agency that has succeeded the previous military intelligence program after its chief, Khin Nyunt, was purged in closing the program in 2004. Before his departure, Khin Nyunt brokered ceasefires with over a dozen ethnic armed groups, including the NMSP in 1995.

At this time IMNA cannot confirm any topics of discussion between NMSP administration and South East Command General That Naing Win at the June 7th meeting. However discussions are being held throughout the country between Burmese government and ethnic groups over how to respond Burmese government pressure to form a Border Guard Force (BGF). General That Naing Win, according to an article from the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) on May 28th, assisted in the negotiations of forces from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Karen Peace Force (KPF) in becoming part of the new BGF.

The BGFs are intended to be battalions whose support will come from the Burmese government as training and weapons. At the same time according to Burmese government instruction, the BGF battalions must also discontinue the use of ethnic nationality based names, and must incorporate into its structure, soldiers and officers from the regular Burmese army.

The status of Burma’s armed groups is a sensitive question for Burma’s central government. Before it can continue its 7-step “road map” to “disciplined democracy” and the 2010 election, the Burmese government must first resolve the status of ethnic armed groups who, after ceasefires were signed in the 1990’s, maintained a relative degree of autonomy.

A variety of ethnic groups remain unresolved about the issue of forming BGFs. The NMSP has not yet been asked to form a BGF, according to MNSP party spokesman Nai Oung Mange, in an IMNA article published in late May. However the Irrawaddy news source has already reported that the NMSP has rejected Burmese government pressure to form a BGF. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), has not yet respond to the SPDC offer to become a border guard force. However a group of Kachin people posted an open letter to the KIA forces to turn down the Burmese government offer, according to the Kachin News Group website.

According to the Shan News agency and the Irrawady, both the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the KoKang group, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), met with General Ye Myint on June 7th and June 5th respectively, and have rejected the overtures of the SPDC to become a border guard force in the north.

READ MORE---> Largest Mon political party attends secret meeting with Burmese general...