A legacy of mismanagement: the state of Burma's economy

If the money's not going to infrastructure development and rural credit systems, where is it going? How much is being spent on military hardware?


A Legacy of Mismanagement Jul09

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Unified international approach needed for Burma

by Htet Win
Mizzima News

United Nations intervention on the Burma front, supported by regional countries, is desperately needed to implement an inclusive process directed at cracking the existing political impasse, as the ruling junta and opposition groups have yet to be able to chart a path forward themselves.

Mainly because of their own wrongdoings, the ruling generals are frightened of their own people as well as of Aung San Suu Kyi, increasingly feeling insecure about their future and believing in no one.

The junta has already created a state within the state, selfishly misusing the country's natural resources. It is an approach that has found favor with China which, like a vulture, has feasted off a country victimized by its ruling generals for more that four decades. Beijing has said it will not interfere with the country's affairs, observing that events in Burma should be decided by its own people. But how irresponsible and unreasonable is such a stance?

The main barrier to the country's progress is the military government, whose life is primarily supported by the Chinese government, another notorious authoritarian regime. China's long-term interest in Burma is access to the Indian Ocean, through which it is expecting such strategic benefits as a military presence and enhanced trade.

The government-to-government interests of Beijing and Naypyitaw are well matched on the basis of self-interest, resulting in a deadlock in Burma's political progress and a lack of domestic economic opportunities. Exploiting Burma's natural resources such as gas, timber and minerals, Beijing has provided options for the military rulers of its impoverished neighbor.

Burma has become a vassal state of China, realpolitik dooming Burma to existence within the Chinese sphere of influence. The generals understand this and play the China card very well.

The natural wealth of Burma is a curse on the civilians. If Burma were an economic basket case bereft of all natural resources, no country would bother to come in and the military would not be able to fund itself to buy off the loyalty of rank and file soldiers.

The monolithic structure of the Army, which is maintained by Machiavellian-styled generals, rewards the loyal and mercilessly punishes dissenters. For the soldiers, the Army is their benefactor, without which they are like fish out of water. For them it is a case of hanging together or being hanged separately.

Time and again soldiers have fired on opposition elements, including monks, while China, India, ASEAN and all neighboring countries keep on standing by them, hiding behind the political fig leaf of not interfering in the internal affairs of Burma.

Meanwhile, in the capacity of alternate ASEAN chairmanship, Thailand’s recent statement is welcomed as a “policy of engagement with the ruling military." The statement expressed "grave concern" over Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial, also noting that the trial is testing the honor and credibility of the military regime.

But the junta lashed out at the statement, retorting that Thailand was meddling in its internal affairs. It is apparent that the military dictatorship is like a dying man who is unresponsive to any voice or touch, starkly rejecting even international overtures of constructive engagement. It also fears the international community.

Wresting power from military dictators, no matter how corrupt and hated, is a messy thing, and rarely if ever can be successfully pulled off without some form of support from governments abroad.

According to a Burma critic, “It is even more difficult when the rulers are willing and able to use brutal force. Unfortunately, Burma falls squarely into this situation.”

At the end of the day everything lies in the willingness of the ruling clique to enter into talks with the civilians, regardless of their political or ethnic composition.

As long as the soldiers think they alone know what is best for the country and are mired in their fear of retribution, nothing will move forward.

The military is expected to accept civilians as fellow countrymen and not as enemies bent on stringing them up from the nearest lampposts. The biggest obstacle block is the ingrained mentality of the soldiers who see the whole political process in Burma in black and white terms.

Although vocal in exile, the actual strength of the opposition lies inside Burma. However, they need a rallying point and cause for hope.

The best hope lies in trying to get zealous "Young Turk", reform-minded military officers to come around and start to think there is a way, a peaceful and more inclusive way, out of the present structural crisis.

Aung San Suu Kyi is perhaps the only person who can instill this group with the idea that we can all work together for a better tomorrow.

The message should be: “Talk to us. We are not here to destroy you [the generals]. We want you to be involved and be part of building a new nation out of these ashes.”

A recent statement by the U.N. Security Council is also noteworthy, “The future of Burma lies in the hands of its entire people.” However, the people need the practical support of their neighbors as well.

The time is now for Burma's neighbors to fully support the U.N.’s positive intervention – such as Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s planned visit – in the Burma issue.

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The brief charade of an open trial

By Francis Wade

(DVB)–Yesterday, as diplomats and journalists caught a rare glimpse into the notoriously secretive Burmese judicial system, there was the briefest glimmer of hope that international pressure had finally worked its way to the heart of Burma’s ruling junta.

With growing numbers of world leaders, including the normally reluctant Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc, adding their voices to calls for an open and fair trial for opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, it seemed the generals’ stubbornness had momentarily wavered.

In a surprise announcement yesterday, 10 journalists from both domestic and international agencies were allowed to enter Insein prison, accompanied by 30 foreign ambassadors. To add a further lick of paint, three ambassadors were then allowed to meet with Suu Kyi in person following the close of hearings.

Few outsiders are permitted to enter such bastions of Burmese military autocracy as Insein prison, let alone witness the trial of such a high-profile political prisoner in Burma. Newspapers across the world tentatively heralded what they saw as the results of mounting pressure on the regime, which had thus far brushed off repeated accusations of a “bogus” trial and a “mockery” of judicial law and kept the door firmly shut.

Yet one of the diplomats allowed inside the courtroom, Britain’s Mark Canning, took no time in quashing expectations.

"The access we had today was welcome, but doesn't change the fundamental reality," he told the BBC yesterday.

"All the paraphernalia of the courtroom was there, the judges, the prosecution, the defense. But I think this is a story where the conclusion is already scripted."

And the feedback received from yesterday’s observers would confirm this. Most of the 30 diplomats who observed the hour-long hearing were left twiddling their thumbs, with no-one present to translate what was being said. Only the US consuls were given language aid, while the Chinese, Japanese and North Korean officials had a basic grasp of the Burmese language. That left 25 forced to accept that they had fallen for the generals’ tricks. While their appearance no doubt gave the slightest of cosmetic lifts to the trial, the substance of their presence could only benefit those behind the controls.

According to reporters, Yettaw looked nervous as he sat alone in the courtroom. Suu Kyi on the other hand remained composed, the superficiality and futility of the situation all too familiar. At the close of hearings she thanked the observers for attending, and hoped that they would meet “in better days”.

Then came the next act in the generals’ diplomatic performance. Suu Kyi was ushered out at the close of court and into the company of three of the diplomats. That those chosen were from Russia, Thailand and Singapore, three of the handful of countries that remain close to the regime, signals the extent that Burma will go to answer to its critics.

A Thai foreign ministry official said on Tuesday that it “will not use strong measures or economic sanctions against [Burma] because it is not an appropriate resolution for the current problem”, despite expressing “grave concern” for Suu Kyi’s situation. In other words it will go no further than rhetorical condemnation: water off a duck’s back for the junta.

Singapore have been slightly more venomous in their condemnation of the trial, expressing “dismay” and warning of a setback to Burma’s national reconciliation, but as a key member of ASEAN, and therefore subject to its policy of non-interference epitomized by Thailand’s stance, it is unlikely to go further.

What must have been the ultimate kick in the teeth for Suu Kyi was the presence of Russia, one of Burma’s key allies and leading supplier of military equipment to those holding her in detention. The technology used by the government to monitor and charge members of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party is provided largely by Russia. Indeed, many government intelligence officials are graduates in Defense Electronic Technology at the Moscow Aviation Institute.

Little is known of the talks, and nothing seems to have been achieved. After this rare fling with the outside world, Suu Kyi, her two caretakers, and the US citizen John Yettaw are back behind closed doors, the gates to Insein once again barred.

One can safely assume that the conclusion of the trial is foregone: indeed the bulk of the script for this episode was written long before Yettaw arrived on the scene, decades ago when Suu Kyi channeled Burma’s discontent with military rule right to the voting booths. The junta will have found a way to keep her behind bars - the threat of not doing so too great for the paranoid generals - but Yettaw provided a perfectly tangible excuse, whether legitimate or not, to bring her to court.

A renowned former political prisoner at Insein and pivotal member of the NLD, Win Tin, summarised the charade that this trial has already, all too predictably, turned out to be.

“This [the diplomats allowed into the courtroom] doesn’t mean the trial has been transformed to be free and fair,” he said.

“This is merely a thing the government does similar to when they invite foreign diplomats to events where they destroy confiscated drugs.

“It’s a gesture to convince them they are doing things properly.”

READ MORE---> The brief charade of an open trial...

Foreign Companies in Burma Must Review Their Involvement

By YENI
The Irrawaddy News

As the Burmese regime brutally increases its isolation of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the US and countries of the European Union remain steadfast in applying their pressure on the junta. US President Barack Obama formally extended his administration’s sanctions, while the EU is considering whether to step up its own measures.

Burma's stubborn, thuggish military leaders can shrug off Western pressure, however, knowing they can rely on support from such friendly and powerful neighbors as China and India. While neither Beijing nor New Delhi has officially commented on the latest moves against Suu Kyi, many Southeast Asian countries, some of whom have significant trade and investment links with Burma, are also inclined to follow a live-and-let-live policy towards the regime.

However, both camps—supporters of sanctions and proponents of engagement— acknowledge failure in their efforts to influence Burma’s military leaders. That is why US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in February correctly said that sanctions applied by the US and the European Union, as well as the policy of constructive engagement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and Burma’s neighbors, were not working.

So the question remains: who can influence the Burmese generals to listen to world opinion?

Many observers agree that a start could be made on at least ending ongoing human rights abuses if oil and gas companies operating in Burma use their influence with Burma's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

Current investors in Burma’s oil and gas industry include companies from Australia, the British Virgin Islands, China, France, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Russia and the US.

Those companies are funding the Burmese dictatorship. At the height of the monk-led demonstrations in September 2007, Marco Simons, US legal director at EarthRights International, an environmental and human rights group with offices in Thailand and Washington, declared: "The oil and gas companies have been one of the major industries keeping the regime in power."

The concept of "corporate social responsibility" is often advanced by companies operating in Burma, although that’s usually just a shield behind which they campaign against international environmental and human rights regulations.

For instance, there have been documented abuses connected to the Yadana project operated by the French company Total and the US-based Unocal, including land confiscation, forced labor, rape, torture and killings within the communities along the pipeline. Compensation was paid to some victims after human rights groups filed legal actions against the companies before a federal court in the US.

Foreign investment in Burma’s oil and natural gas sector is significant. But there is no transparency in Burma about how much the government receives in oil and gas payments, nor clarity about how the funds are spent.

The military receives the largest share of the official budget and the Burmese regime allocates little to public sectors such as health and education. Instead, hundreds of millions of dollars disappear annually into the pockets of the ruling generals, their cronies and their pet projects, such as the new administrative capital, Naypyidaw, the cyber city, Yadanabon, and even a nuclear research reactor.

The latest action against Suu Kyi, following the regime’s criminal mismanagement of Cyclone Nargis relief and its crackdown on the September 2007 demonstrations should lead companies to search their consciences when contemplating deals with the regime.

ERI Project Coordinator Matthew Smith believes there are also business reasons to think twice about accepting Burma contracts. "Financing the Burmese regime in this way can only reflect poorly on a company’s reputation and that will ultimately affect their bottom line and ability to capitalize on deals in the future,” he says. “It’s simply bad business.”

Of course, good business must come with ethics, morality and responsibility. This is the time for shareholders of global and regional oil and gas companies operating in Burma not only to think about maximizing profits but also to face up to their responsibilities by evaluating the human rights impact and the criteria for continuing to invest there.

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The impact of the junta's latest gambit

by Swe Win
Mizzima News

The decision of the Burmese military junta to jail Aung San Suu Kyi on trumped-up charges is a clear indication that it will never loosen its absolute grip on power, dashing the faint hopes of those who want to break the political deadlock by participating in the planned 2010 election. The move has not only revealed the uncompromising stance of the junta’s chief, Senior General Than Shwe, but also further radicalized Burmese politics.

It is nothing uncustomary for the regime to jail political dissidents on charges shamelessly concocted out of non-political and trivial issues. A leading member of Aung San Suu Kyi’s party – National League for Democracy (NLD) – U Khin Maung Swe, who was released from imprisonment last year, spent 14 years behind bars on charges of distributing false news to the foreign media.

A fellow NLD member was jailed for allegedly possessing a fake national identity card while another was jailed for complicity in the illegal production of a [politically sensitive] music album. On every occasion, the regime paints the picture that its dissidents are punished not for their political activities, but rather under other irrelevant criminal codes--a ploy to support its claim that there are no political prisoners, only criminals.

Now it seems an American citizen, John Yettaw, who sneaked into Aung San Suu Kyi’s house by swimming across Inya Lake, has given Than Shwe a rare chance to use a similar tactic against Burma’s leader of the democratic movement.

Than Shwe’s latest gambit belittles the debates that have been raging among individuals and groups inside and outside Burma over the 2010 election. The strongest argument of those who favor the election is that instead of continuing fruitless confrontation with the regime, opposition forces should use the election as a chance to gain a certain political space which can be gradually expanded for further democratic changes.

The argument comes from a diverse group of people: some who are genuinely frustrated with the unending political deadlock and the ageing NLD leadership and thus welcome the election as “better than nothing”; some simply resentful of the political dominance Aung San Suu Kyi and her party have long occupied in Burma; and some mere opportunists who are eager to make a personal profit out of the election.

However, the mischievous act to incarcerate Aung San Suu Kyi has almost magically muted the voices of such arguments. It is now easier for Burmese people and the international community to discern that the military regime has no intention at all to budge even a bit further towards political transition and that the 2010 election will not change the political landscape of Burma.

This situation has also brought to an end the awkward political crisis facing the NLD over the election: participation means compliance with unjust provisions of the junta’s 2008 Constitution and being accused of lack of political maneuvering while non-participation can bring charges against party leaders for being recalcitrant with a disregard for the misery of Burmese people. Were it not for the latest incident, the regime’s refusal to accept the demands in NLD’s April 29th "Shwegonedaing Declaration", which calls for the release of all political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and a review of the controversial provisions of the 2008 Constitution, would still not have made it less challenging for the party to boycott the upcoming election.

However, regrettably, the regime's action has also silenced the voice of the people, including those from within the NLD leadership, who genuinely wish to seek middle ground and prepare to engage with the junta in order to bring some changes to the current stalemate. Now that it seems more prudent to be cynical towards the regime, we will see more hardliners taking control of the Burmese political stage, which is not good for the future of Burma – not to mention that of Than Shwe and his generals too.

Like the nervous pilot of a crashing plan, Than Shwe no longer cares to justify his actions even in the eyes of his military establishment. After killing monks and committing numerous heinous crimes against his own people, it seems he will not take any risks. In the coming weeks his regime will likely condemn Aung San Suu Kyi to a few years of imprisonment for breaking her house arrest terms by accepting the uninvited visit of an American man and will afterwards issue a statement through the state-run press that out of sympathy for her health she will be taken back to her home and placed under house arrest instead of being forced to serve out her sentence in prison.

After a short period in prison, Yettaw will also likely be released with a clause “in consideration of bilateral relations between Burma and the United States."

The military regime will move on with its roadmap, and the year 2010 will see millions of Burmese lifelessly marching to voting stations. But Burma will remain unchanged.

READ MORE---> The impact of the junta's latest gambit...

Lessons for Burma from Thailand Crisis

By PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN
The Irrawaddy News

What does Thailand’s protracted political crisis tell its neighboring countries? What are the lessons to be learned from the Thai experiences? And what is the most vital message for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), of which Thailand is a member, as the organisation moves toward a greater regional integration?

The current political stalemate in Thailand is the work of two competing networks; one that supports former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the other the old establishment.

Thaksin is represented by the red-shirt movement which comprises the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the poor in far-flung regions and underprivileged Thais. The old establishment is supported by Bangkok elite, part of the military and big business. Its notable agent is the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), whose members choose to wear yellow shirts that symbolise the king’s color.

The battle between the two political networks has been ferocious. The Pattaya incident and the Bangkok inferno signalled that at least one side of the network was willing to engage in a warlike fight to undermine its opponent. In the process, leaders of both networks claimed to act for democracy. But their brands of democracy have so far failed to untie the political deadlock.

The deep turmoil in Thailand reveals certain realities which have long existed in the region. Yet, leaders in the region have pretended not to see them. This time, as Thailand found itself on the brink of becoming a failed state, a few lessons could be learned by its neighboring countries.

First, continued crisis and escalating violence imply that democracy has remained a fragile commodity. A decade ago, Thailand was praised for its rapid economic development and progressive democratisation. Today, its political domain is transformed into a battlefield between two powerful forces possessing two different ideologies.

The Thai case shows that an elected government with excessive power, living on corruption and lack of respect for human rights, can be vulnerable; that traditional power-holders must face up to modern-day reality whereby the voice of the majority is the true voice of democracy; that the military has to be depoliticised for the sake of democracy; and that violent means employed to serve political purposes only further alienate democracy.

The rise of the red-shirt movement has the potential to lead a new opinion in certain Southeast Asian states where democratic rights have been taken away from the people. Not every member of the red shirts supports Thaksin. Some have participated in the rallies genuinely for the return of real democracy to the majority of Thais.

Second, although the power struggle is a part of Thailand’s democratic evolution and this proves that the country has come a long way since the political transition in 1932, its political drama does not necessarily encourage positive changes in certain parts of the region. It could send out the wrong message.

The message, for example, that anti-government activities must not be tolerated. The message that stability is more precious than changes, or even more than democratic rights, and that challenge in all forms to the ruling regime must not be allowed. And that Western democracy is not really compatible with Asian societies, as defended by Asian leaders for generations.

In other words, the Thai conflict could have compelled illegitimate regimes elsewhere, including Burma, to tighten their grip of power for fear of public disobedience and uncontrollable situations.

Third, Asean has been led to believe that the sole major obstacle to regional integration stems from the widening gap between the more and the less economically developed members. Unless Asean closes this economic gap, regional integration will remain largely elusive.

Yet, Asean leaders have overlooked the fact that a widening political gap, in terms of different levels of democratic development, has also affected the process of regionalism. The Thai political unrest has already delayed Asean gatherings. The political storm has held back the Thai leadership in Asean. The organisation has been operating on autopilot since last year. The slow response to the global financial crisis proved this point.

However, this is not Thailand’s problem alone. The gap in the levels of democratisation in the region has so far tarnished the good works Asean has achieved in other areas.

This existing political gap has produced different mentalities and attitudes among Asean leaders as they look ahead into the future. Some are enthusiastic about Asean’s newborn regionalism. Some are using Asean as merely a symbol of their pretentious embrace of international norms and practices.

Both Thailand and Asean have a long way to go until they meet their needed objectives. Crisis in Thailand can be used to remind its neighbours that true democratisation is an extremely arduous process. But its postponement would only make this exercise even more excruciating and troublesome.

The author is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. This commentary is his personal view.

READ MORE---> Lessons for Burma from Thailand Crisis...

The Spring before Khin Nyunt’s Fall

By AUNG ZAW
The Irrawaddy News
OCTOBER, 2008 - VOLUME 16 NO.10

For a while, the Burmese junta looked like it might be ready to meet the West halfway. The ouster of the regime’s spy chief ended all that

IN early 2000, Maj Aung Lynn Htut began his new assignment as the deputy chief of the Burmese embassy in Washington, DC, with a mission to improve ties with the incoming administration of President George W Bush.

It was not his first time in the US capital. In 1987, the graduate of the elite Defense Services Academy spent three months in Washington receiving training from the CIA.

Then Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt waves to the media while heading to a summit in Pagan in 2003. (Photo: AFP)

When he returned to the US in 2000, Aung Lynn Htut served as an officer in the counter-intelligence department of the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI). His boss was Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, secretary 1 of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and head of the junta’s powerful intelligence apparatus.

Khin Nyunt was also the architect of a series of ceasefire agreements with domestic insurgent groups that had strengthened the regime’s hold on power over the course of the preceding decade.

By the time Bush took office, Khin Nyunt appeared to believe that a détente with the junta’s staunchest international critic was also possible, according to Aung Lynn Htut.

“We waited until Bush came to power and then we started lobbying in DC,” said the former major.

In an extensive interview with The Irrawaddy, Aung Lynn Htut provided an inside look at this pivotal time in recent Burmese history, when the ruling regime seemed to be ready to turn a new page in its relations with the West.

As he revealed, however, it was also a period of intensifying rivalries within the junta.

Before Khin Nyunt could begin his experiment in reshaping ties with the US and other Western countries, he had to get a green light from the SPDC’s top leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe.

As the strongman who called all the shots, Than Shwe was an inveterate hardliner who did not always take kindly to Khin Nyunt’s conciliatory overtures. But the intelligence chief’s success in sidelining former insurgents had allowed the regime to focus on its war of attrition against democratic forces; so, in a nod to Khin Nyunt’s proven ability to neutralize opponents through guile, Than Shwe gave him the go-ahead to work his magic on Washington.

Aung Lynn Htut’s assignment to Washington was one of the first tentative steps towards ending the regime’s isolation from governments it had long regarded as hostile.

Another part of the charm offensive was the launch of a colorful English-language newspaper, The Myanmar Times, which would present a more sophisticated image of the regime than the stodgy, Stalinistic fare offered by the state-run press.

As a further step, the regime hired DCI Group, a Washington-based lobbying firm, in 2002. The firm was paid US $348,000 to represent the junta, which had been strongly condemned by the US State Department for its human rights record. US Justice Department lobbying records show that DCI worked to “begin a dialogue of political reconciliation” with the regime.

The firm led a PR campaign to burnish the junta’s image, drafting releases praising Burma’s efforts to curb the drug trade and denouncing claims that the regime had used rape as a weapon in its military campaigns against ethnic insurgents.

By this time, the regime was becoming genuinely concerned that Bush’s policy on Burma was getting tougher. “We thought we had to counter it,” said Aung Lynn Htut.

He and his senior officers gathered information about who they could approach to ask for help. Khin Nyunt’s office started to reach out to Burma scholars who were sympathetic to the regime and who disagreed with the US government’s sanctions policy. Disgruntled prominent dissidents were also approached in a bid to persuade them to switch sides.

The regime also invited senior UN officials to come to Burma.

Joseph Verner Reed, the UN undersecretary and special adviser to former UN chief Kofi Annan and now to Ban Ki-moon, arrived in Rangoon to attend an event marking United Nations Day in 2002.

The high-ranking UN official was known to be close to some senior officers of the Burmese regime. Interestingly, he was listed on the board of the U Thant Institute in New York. U Thant, a Burmese, was the UN secretary-general from 1961 to 1971.

In a speech to commemorate the founding of the UN, Khin Nyunt said that Burma had always considered the world body to be of fundamental importance for the preservation of international peace and security and for the promotion of the economic and social development of mankind.

Former intelligence officer Maj Aung Lynn Htut

“I wish to express our sincere appreciation and thanks to the United Nations and to the Honorable Under Secretary General Mr Joseph Verner Reed in particular for making this possible,” Khin Nyunt said in his speech, praising his special guest for attending.

But why did Khin Nyunt approach Reed in the first place?

“We gathered information that he didn’t like Aung San Suu Kyi,” Aung Lynn Htut, who acted as a liaison officer between Reed’s office and Khin Nyunt’s, said with a laugh.

In Washington, Burmese intelligence officers knew that it wouldn’t be so easy to find a sympathetic ear. They were up against US-based campaign groups and exiled Burmese activists who had considerable influence in forming US policy on Burma. They realized that it would not be easy to convince State Department officials, let alone Congress and the White House, that the regime was not as reprehensible as it had been portrayed.

Reports of forced labor, child soldiers and systematic rape committed by Burmese troops were thorny issues, and Khin Nyunt and his senior officers who handled foreign affairs realized that it would be an uphill battle.

Nevertheless, Khin Nyunt’s intelligence unit managed to reach a few US State Department officials with its message, including Matthew Daley, then head of the Southeast Asia Department. Daley once said that the US sanctions policy on Burma had failed and was not moving the country in the right direction.

Then, in May 2002, the regime took a bold step by releasing Suu Kyi. The Nobel Peace Prize winner was allowed to go on political organizing trips to the countryside. In return, she agreed to inspect the regime’s development projects.

That same month, despite a visa ban and active US sanctions, senior intelligence officer Maj-Gen Kyaw Thein was given a visa to enter the US to brief some senior government officials on the Burmese regime’s efforts to eradicate illicit opium production.

Meanwhile, as Suu Kyi began to travel around the countryside meeting her supporters, intelligence officers were engaging in behind-the-scenes negotiations with the opposition leader. Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, deputy head of OCMI, his deputy, Brig-Gen Than Htun, and Minister of Home Affairs Col Tin Hlaing were involved in the talks with Suu Kyi.

News of this “secret dialogue” was leaked to then UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail by Foreign Minister Win Aung, a loyal follower of Khin Nyunt. Razali, who played no part in facilitating this dialogue, released this information to the world, which welcomed the first signs of political progress to come out of the country in many years.

The “kinder and gentler” image of the junta was further enhanced by The Myanmar Times, which faithfully propagated the regime’s agenda. The newspaper gave extensive coverage to the regime’s fight against HIV/AIDS and its increased cooperation with the UN, and even highlighted a visit to Burma by the family of U Thant as evidence of a changing political climate.

As all of these developments were unfolding, Khin Nyunt gave briefings to Than Shwe to attempt to persuade the junta’s supreme commander to open up more space for international agencies such as the International Labor Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In his efforts to convince Than Shwe of the need for greater openness, Khin Nyunt often turned to the senior leader’s deputy, Kyaw Win, for help.

Kyaw Win was a specialist in psychological warfare who had served under Than Shwe since he was a junior officer in the army. It was known that he could freely enter Than Shwe’s office at any time. He often came late at night, offering tea or a massage, to talk about the need to allow more international agencies to operate in Burma and to tackle sensitive issues such as forced labor and the recruitment of child soldiers.

But it wasn’t easy. Than Shwe was stubborn and completely indifferent to the opinions of his foreign critics, said Aung Lynn Htut, who had met the top general on a number of occasions.

“He was a bulldog,” recalled the former major. “He didn’t really care about international pressure.”

On the child soldier issue, for instance, Than Shwe completely dismissed criticism, telling his subordinates, “Don’t worry. In two or three years, these kids will be adults.”

“He didn’t understand that this was a serious issue which we had to deal with at the UN,” said Aung Lynn Htut.

People who have worked with Than Shwe said that he is slow to make up his mind and rarely gives clear yes or no answers to questions, forcing officers to carefully decode his vague replies.

But if Than Shwe often seemed indecisive, he also had very definite ideas about what really mattered as far as world opinion was concerned. To his mind, the regime had no reason to worry about international pressure as long as Burma could maintain good relations with China, India and Russia.

What about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)? Aung Lynn Htut said that the senior general didn’t even take the regional grouping into consideration.

Even Thailand—the largest source of foreign investment in the Burmese economy—was powerless to influence the regime. Indeed, Than Shwe always insisted that Thailand’s dependence on Burmese gas and border trade gave the junta significant sway over Thai politicians.

But Than Shwe was not as complacent about other potential challenges to his hold on power. While the intelligence camp was making real headway with its overseas PR offensive, hardliners close to Than Shwe were growing increasingly wary of the influence of two people at home—Suu Kyi and Khin Nyunt.

Suu Kyi was considered the greater immediate threat. Her travels around the country had attracted huge crowds of supporters. The hardliners decided to strike back with a vicious attack on the pro-democracy leader’s entourage as they traveled near Depayin in May 2003. Suu Kyi was arrested and detained soon after the massacre, which claimed the lives of dozens of her followers.

According to Aung Lynn Htut, the intelligence unit, which had been tailing Suu Kyi’s motorcade around the country, had no forewarning of the attack.

“We knew they were planning something, but we didn’t know the real plan,” he said. (JEG's: last minute surprises..)

Suddenly, all of the regime’s PR gains were erased. The Bush administration stepped up its pressure on the junta and imposed tough new sanctions.

But Than Shwe wasn’t finished. Next he turned his attention to Khin Nyunt.

The senior leader was not alone in his mistrust of the intelligence chief. Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, the army chief, also saw a need to contain Khin Nyunt.

Than Shwe didn’t confront Khin Nyunt directly, but made some surprise moves at the Defense Ministry to undermine his influence. Most importantly, he brought in a few new faces: Gen Shwe Mann, Gen Soe Win, Gen Myint Swe and Gen Ye Myint.

Shwe Mann was being groomed to take over the commander in chief position and Soe Win was to take charge of the intelligence department. Khin Nyunt suddenly felt the heat. He was now accused of underestimating the potential threat of “the enemy”—Aung San Suu Kyi.

For the first time since 2001, when Than Shwe placed Khin Nyunt’s mentor, former dictator Ne Win, under house arrest after his daughter and grandson were accused of plotting a coup, Khin Nyunt found himself precariously close to becoming yesterday’s man.

Than Shwe’s next move was to name Khin Nyunt prime minister. According to former military intelligence officers, both Than Shwe and Maung Aye then urged Khin Nyunt to hand over control of the OCMI to either Myint Swe or Ye Myint. Khin Nyunt refused.

News of the SPDC’s internal conflict began to leak to the foreign press through senior military intelligence officers. Foreign Minister Win Aung hinted to his Asean counterparts that there was a bitter power struggle among the top leadership.

According to Aung Lynn Htut, strong business and personal rivalries added to the political tensions. Khin Nyunt’s wife and her circle of friends used to refer to Than Shwe’s wife, Kyaing Kyaing, and her closest friends as the “uneducated wives club,” he said.

Corruption was another key issue. Cases were being built targeting the spy chief. Several of his subordinates were arrested in northern Burma on corruption charges. Khin Nyunt’s name was also implicated when the authorities seized a fishing boat in Mergui with 500 kg of heroin on board.

After returning from a trip to Singapore in September 2003, Khin Nyunt had a heated argument with Than Shwe at the Defense Ministry and offered to resign. But Than Shwe told him he had a new assignment to offer him.

In October, Khin Nyunt called a secret meeting with his top intelligence officers and ordered them to provide documents as evidence of corruption against Than Shwe and top army leaders. Shwe Mann heard about the meeting and immediately informed Than Shwe.

On his way back from a trip to Mandalay, Khin Nyunt was arrested and charged with corruption and insubordination.

The regional commanders and army officers who believed that Khin Nyunt was building a state within a state hailed the purge. In fact, Than Shwe succeeded not only in consolidating his power base but also in gaining even more support within the armed forces.

“The army all hated us [the intelligence unit] because we had information about them, and even I, as a major, could reprimand a regional commander,” said Aung Lynn Htut.

The mission to win hearts and minds was over. Asean, China and Khin Nyunt’s allies in the West and the UN were disappointed to see the “moderate force” arrested and locked up.

Than Shwe did not want to release Suu Kyi, although secret negotiations between her and the regime were resumed just before the government revived its National Convention in December 2004. Suu Kyi, in a spirit of compromise, even sent a letter to Than Shwe to show that she bore no grudges over the Depayin ambush.

During these meetings, Suu Kyi and her party leaders agreed to return to the convention if the regime released her.

Aung Lynn Htut, who was still in Washington at this time, received daily phone calls from Rangoon. He was told that it was almost 95 percent certain that the NLD was going back to the convention. At the last minute, however, the deal fell through. Than Shwe did not keep his promise to free the iconic pro-democracy leader.

Ironically, it was Khin Nyunt who had announced, in August 2003, that the National Convention would be resumed as part of a seven-step “road map” to “disciplined democracy.” Now, however, he and his family were under house arrest, and most of his closest subordinates—with the notable exceptions of Kyaw Win and Kyaw Thein—were serving long prison sentences.

Four years after the removal of Khin Nyunt and his entire secret police department, many in the armed forces still believe that he had a plan to stage a coup against Than Shwe and wanted to become commander in chief of the armed forces.

For Aung Lynn Htut, his former boss’s downfall spelled the end of his career in military intelligence. In March 2005, he sought asylum in the US.

Since then, he has been an outspoken critic of Than Shwe. Through overseas Burmese radio stations, he has called on the junta leader to step down and urged soldiers to remove him from power.

Aung Lynn Htut said he believed that many senior intelligence officers who are now in prison felt the same way.

Referring to the pro-democracy movement, he said, “We wanted to see the revolution succeed.”

Also recorded at:
http://please-help-burma.blogspot.com/2008/10/spring-before-khin-nyunts-fall.html

READ MORE---> The Spring before Khin Nyunt’s Fall...