Suu Kyi Insists Her Trial Will Test Rule of Law in Burma

By SAW YAN NAING
The Irrawaddy News

Aung San Suu Kyi insisted after Tuesday’s final session of her trial before Friday’s scheduled verdict that the proceedings would show “whether or not the rule of law exists in the country,” according to her lawyer Nyan Win.

Suu Kyi made the comment to Nyan Win after the court announced a verdict would be announced on Friday. Suu Kyi is charged with breaking the terms of her house arrest order by giving refuge to an American trespasser, John Yettaw, and faces a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment if convicted.

Nyan Win, who is also a spokesman of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, told The Irrawaddy that his legal team had tried its best in accordance with the law.

Suu Kyi was innocent, Nyan Win insisted. “She [Suu Kyi] did not break the law. According to the law, it will be unlawful if the court even sentences her.”

During Tuesday’s two-hour morning session, a defense plea for more witnesses to be heard was rejected by the court, Nyan Win said.

Win Tin, an NLD executive leader who joined Suu Kyi supporters outside Insein Prison on Tuesday, said her two female companions and Yettaw also appeared at Tuesday’s session.

Suu Kyi’s companions Khin Khin Win and Win Ma Ma also face a charge of giving unlawful refuge to Yettaw. They are represented by Hla Myo Myint.

Nyan Win was one of four lawyers representing Suu Kyi at Tuesday’s session. The others were Kyi Wynn, Hla Myo Myint and Khin Htay Kywe, according to Khin Maung Swe, an NLD spokesperson.

Diplomats from Japan, Singapore, Thailand and the US were allowed to attend Tuesday’s session, according to an Associated Press report.

Last weekend, Suu Kyi told Nyan Win that she is unhappy with the continual delays in her trial, which she said gave the prosecution more time to prepare its final arguments. The trial began on May 18 and has been interrupted by several adjournments.

The proceedings against Suu Kyi have drawn wide international condemnation.

Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and several Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) foreign ministers called for the release of Suu Kyi and more than 2,100 other political prisoners during the Asean Ministerial Meeting and Asean Regional Forum at Phuket in southern Thailand.

The Burmese state-owned newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, carried an editorial last weekend saying that “demanding the release of Suu Kyi means showing reckless disregard for the law.”

The opposition leader has spent nearly 14 of the past 20 years under house arrest. Her latest term of detention began in May 2003, when she and her supporters came under attack by junta-backed thugs while traveling in central Burma.

READ MORE---> Suu Kyi Insists Her Trial Will Test Rule of Law in Burma...

Legally Suu Kyi is innocent: Defence lawyer

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – The over two-month long trial of Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi points to her innocence, legally and the verdict to be pronounced on Friday will put to acid test the rule of law in the military-ruled country, her lawyer said on Tuesday.

Nyan Win, one of Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers told Mizzima after the arguments put forward by the defence on Tuesday that testimonies of the witnesses, arguments of lawyers of both the defence and the prosecution have all proved that the Burmese pro-democracy leader is innocent.

“As far as I have analysed the trial, legally there is no evidence to convict her [Aung San Suu Kyi,” said Nyan Win, adding that it would surprise him and the other members of the defence team if the verdict pronounces her guilty.

On Tuesday Nyan Win submitted his clarification on the prosecution’s arguments stating that there are no grounds to charge the Nobel Peace Laureate and the charges filed by the prosecution are not valid as the 1974 constitution is no more in effect.

Fellow party member and one of the spokesperson of the National League for Democracy, Ohn Kyaing told Mizzima earlier that he believed legally there is no ground to charge and convict the Burmese democracy icon but expressed concern that the court might not independently take a decision.

“I think the court will convict her because that’s the junta’s plan,” he said.

Like Ohn Kyaing, observers and critics believe that the junta is using the incident of John William Yettaw’s visit to Aung San Suu Kyi’s home as an excuse to charge her and sentence her to yet another prison term, in a move to keep her out of the 2010 election scenario.

But Nyan Win said, the defence team has not given up, and is willing to go to any extent in trying to bring justice to the pro-democracy leader.

“Aung San Suu Kyi has agreed with us and has given us permission to continue fighting the case legally and we plan to take the case to higher courts if the verdict pronounces her guilty,’ Nyan Win said.

Opposition activists widely believe that the military has chalked out a plan to sentence Aung San Suu Kyi before the end of July to avoid the verdict coinciding with the ensuing anniversary of the 8.8.88 uprising on August 8.

But the junta, which initially thought of sentencing Aung San Suu Kyi in a short trial, is also taking into account the possible reaction – both international and domestic - that may erupt in the wake of her being sentenced.

Win Tin, a senior leader of the NLD and veteran journalist, earlier told Mizzima that pronouncing Aung San Suu Kyi guilty and sentencing her to a prison term could provoke peoples’ anger that could lead to yet another mass movement particularly in Burma’s former capital city Rangoon.

READ MORE---> Legally Suu Kyi is innocent: Defence lawyer...

Electricity supply improves in Rangoon

by May Kyaw

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – There has been a substantial improvement in electricity supply in Rangoon after severe shortage for months on end.

The townships in Rangoon (Yangon) in the City Development Committee (YCDC) area are divided into four groups -- A, B, C & H. The H group gets round the clock electricity supply daily.

The A, B and C groups are getting electricity from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. continuously and they get power alternatively and equally for the rest of the day.

Hospitals, CNG filling stations, police battalions, army units, cemeteries and Township Administration Offices in H Group get round the clock electricity daily.

But industrial zones are getting power for only nine hours during the daytime but do not get power at night. Power generation is not yet adequate to provide electricity at night.

Though the availability of power has improved to a large extent in Rangoon, people living in the town used to severe power shortages for a long time are still worried.

“Yes, electricity has become regular but it has been so for just a few days. We are not sure how long it will last,” a local resident of Rangoon told Mizzima.

Another local resident said that they are getting power regularly in the afternoon and alternatively at night and getting continuous electricity from 11 p.m. till morning.

But in Syriam, in the outskirts of Rangoon, they do not get power even alternatively.

“I don’t know whether the townships in Rangoon RCDC area are getting power regularly or not. In Syriam we are not getting electricity regularly. It is available off and on. Currently there is no power here,” a local resident of Syriam said.

The availability of power improved in Rangoon because of supplies from the China owned Ruili Hydropower Station, a staff from the Rangoon City Electricity Board said.

“The power situation improved because of supply from Ruili Station. Three Natural Gas Turbines are still under repair because of leaking gas pipes,” he said.

Previously power supply for Rangoon came from three off shore gas turbines in Thaketa, Ywama and Hlawga, on shore gas turbine in Ahlone and the state owned Hydro Electric Power Station.

Now Rangoon and Mandalay are buying power from the joint venture company, Ruili No. 1 Hydro Electric Power Station jointly owned by the Chinese company and Burma’s No. 1 Electric Power Ministry.

Rangoon City Electric Power Board Secretary Lt. Col. Maung Maung Latt recently told domestic news journals that they would supply Rangoon round the clock electricity within this month.

READ MORE---> Electricity supply improves in Rangoon...

FREE EAST TURKESTAN

PLEASE CIRCULATE

By Roland Watson
Dictator Watch Org
July 27, 2009

(Note: We recommend the history of China given in the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party.)

The Uyghur people in East Turkestan are restless. Throughout history, Chinese emperors and warlords has repeatedly invaded their land, only to be pushed back. In the modern era, China took control in the late 19th century. East Turkestan was renamed the "New Territory." Excepting two short periods when they again won their freedom, the Uyghur people have been under increasingly restrictive dictatorial rule ever since. Since 1949, they have been under the boot of the Communist Party of China (CCP).

As the name of their homeland implies, the Uyghur are a Turkic people. They share ethnic and language characteristics with similar peoples across Central Asia all the way to Turkey itself. But, whereas these other peoples now have their own nations, the Uyghurs, because they were conquered by the Chinese, do not. East Turkestan is a colony of China.

The CCP's policy has been to dilute the Uyghur population in East Turkestan and hence their argument that it is their land. Uyghurs have been sent to China as factory workers, and Han Chinese moved in. In both cases, the Uyghurs have been the victims of discrimination. In China, Uyghur workers must slave away under terrible labor conditions. In East Turkestan, they are denied good jobs, government posts, the right to be educated in their own language, and to carry on their cultural traditions.

A basic question is if the Chinese conquest of the Uyghur constitutes genocide. Historically, it was a land grab, no different from innumerable such conquests over the ages. In the modern context, the CCP has realized that East Turkestan is also valuable for it oil and mineral resources, its barren sections - which were used for China's atomic tests and now its space program, etc. The CCP is loathe to return the conquered territory, to prevent the loss of this plunder.

According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

"genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

It is difficult to argue that the CCP's treatment constitutes genocide, although it is guilty to some degree of the first four conditions. Rather, what the communists are doing in East Turkestan is equivalent to their actions in Tibet, which the Dalai Lama has described as Cultural Genocide. The Uyghurs, like the Tibetans, may survive, but their culture will not.

This year the CCP has been destroying the Old Quarter of Kashgar, one of the most important stopping points on the ancient Silk Road. The Party says that this is because of the risk to the Quarter from earthquakes, even though it has survived for thousands of years. The destruction of Old Kashgar is a cultural atrocity no less profound that the destruction in Afghanistan of the Bamiyan Buddhas. And, it is being accompanied by the forced relocation of 220,000 Uyghur people. The real reasons for the destruction are simple: cultural genocide combined with armed robbery of Uyghur property.

The Chinese say that the Uyghurs are ungrateful for "development." This development is really "theft."

The latest unrest in East Turkestan - the Uyghurs have protested numerous times in recent decades, only to be met with CCP massacres - followed the killing of Uyghur laborers in China. Some 3,000 Uyghurs protested peacefully in East Turkestan's capital, Urumqi, (videos of the march are widely available) only to be shot by CCP "security forces" when night fell (yet another massacre). The Uyghurs fled and some of the protesters turned their anger on Chinese immigrants. The Chinese then retaliated.

As also occurred with the Tiananmen Square massacre twenty years ago, the CCP has yet to give a truthful accounting of the events of the unrest and of the numbers of Uyghurs and Chinese who died. Instead, the CCP blamed the Uyghurs for everything, which is the classic propaganda strategy of "blaming the victim." Rapists blame the women who they rape, and the CCP blames everyone. (The Party never accepts any responsibility itself.) The actions of the Uyghur groups that attacked the Chinese were reprehensible, but as with all cases where both sides in a conflict commit atrocities, it is essential to recall how the problem began. The Uyghurs are upset because they were invaded by the Chinese. This began a more than one hundred year pattern of increasingly severe repression. It is the Chinese - since 1949 the CCP - that bears all the blame for the problems in East Turkestan.

The Chinese people have been conditioned by the CCP to view the Uyghurs as backward, if not savages. They are the enemy. When Chinese police confront protesters in China, they make arrests. With Uyghurs, they commit cold-blooded murder. Because of the conditioning, the Chinese people accept such extreme prejudice as completely justifiable.

This is consistent with the unprecedented brainwashing that has been perpetrated by the CCP on the people of China since the Party was formed. (The term "brainwashing" was coined to describe CCP "thought-reform" torture techniques.)

The CCP is based on the ideology of "struggle," specifically, class struggle against "class enemies." The people must fight and cleanse wayward social elements (the "black" classes) to establish a utopian state. The real goal of never-ending struggle, though, is (1) to justify the CCP's rule; (2) to purge elements within the Party and society at large that oppose its abuses; and (3) more generally to terrorize everyone through arbitrary persecution, and hence create the greatest possible conformity.

Starting under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the CCP blamed one group after another for China's perceived problems, and launched "movements" against them. There have been countless such movements. Their targets have included landowners and rich farmers in the countryside; capitalists in towns and cities; "reactionaries" and "counter-revolutionaries"; "rightists"; intellectuals (anyone well-educated); religious groups; etc.

(When the CCP targeted landowners and capitalists, including by banning private property, they effectively stole the entire nation of China, just as through invading East Turkestan and Tibet they stole these lands as well.)

Mao said that, "after chaos the world reaches peace, but in seven or eight years, the chaos needed to happen again." In other words, China required regular civil wars. In each such conflict, the CCP followed a 5%/95% formula. Five percent of the people were labeled class enemies, and who should be killed. The rest were designated "acceptable classes," and charged with doing the killing. This created a perpetual state of fear, which continues today, because you can never be certain that your class will remain acceptable.

Through this the CCP promoted the idea of "collective guilt." If you had an unacceptable class origin, you - and your entire family - were flawed, and fully deserving of capital punishment. Even the babies and the elderly in the black classes were killed.

The CCP, for six decades, has encouraged the Chinese people to kill each other. In the worst cases, such as during the Cultural Revolution, the murder became competitive, as a means to improve one's revolutionary standing.

This history has dehumanized the Chinese people. It has further caused Chinese society to be permeated by fear.

There have also been unspeakable atrocities. The use of public executions in some cases led to public displays of cannibalism, of the organs such as the heart and liver of the executed class enemies, and then to cannibalistic feasts. The last were even held in front - and with the participation - of children, many of whom became deranged.

Under CCP rule the Chinese people have suffered upwards of eighty million unnatural deaths, from murder, starvation, etc. The CCP's tyranny is without question the greatest crime ever perpetrated in human history, surpassing the crimes of Hitler and the Nazis, Imperial Japan, and Stalin.

This crime, or rather series of crimes, is also completely unpunished. The Chinese people, and the many other victims of the CCP, have yet to receive any justice.

Because of this, the CCP further is entirely unreformed. Its strategy has worked and it is still in power. While as mentioned people generally are no longer murdered publicly in China itself, millions have been unjustly sentenced to the Laogai (forced labor and reeducation camps), and where death is common. And, the enemy-creation movements continue, including against the students at Tiananmen; followers of the spiritual discipline, Falun Gong; the Tibetans; anyone who spoke up for human rights in the run-up to the Olympics: pro-democracy activists such as the signers of the Charter 08 document; and now the East Turkestanis.

For the Falun Gong, which the CCP despises because it promotes tradition and morality, the Party has killed a documented 3,900 practitioners, although the true number is many times this, because of the great number of practitioners who have simply "disappeared." Most of these murders involved torture, and of an extraordinarily wide variety (over 100 techniques have been identified), including beating of the genitals, electric shock, flaying of the skin and then being drenched with salt water, etc. Many women have been stripped naked and then thrown into cells with criminals to be gang-raped. And, once dead, the victims’ organs are stolen for transplantation.

In East Turkestan the CCP has launched a series of Strike Hard movements, against the so-called Three Evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism. Thousands of Uyghurs have been imprisoned, tortured and killed.

What is surprising about this history is that the Chinese people are for the most part ignorant of it. The CCP has the largest censorship and propaganda program in the world, including its Great Internet Firewall, which an army of technicians maintains (by blocking websites, censoring blogs, fabricating and disseminating lies, etc.). Moreover, the fear in China, even though it is now less publicly apparent, is still so strong under the surface that most people simply do not want to know.

The greatest recent development has been the international targeting of CCP propaganda at Chinese residents of other countries, the media, and foreign governments. For example, the propaganda has led to an explosion in ultra-nationalism, which was particularly evident with the harassment of Chinese CCP critics during the Beijing Olympics. (The height of all ironies is that the CCP fancies itself to be a new China Empire, and surely this is what Mao had in mind, even as he criticized, and destroyed the remnants of, former empires.) Similarly, many expatriate Chinese, particularly in the United States, have engaged in espionage on behalf of the Party back home.

Indeed, these developments raise an important question: What does it mean to be Chinese?

"Chinese" is a complex identity. You are Chinese, wherever you live in the world, if you are a member of the ethnic group. But, you are also Chinese if you are from China itself, even if you are a member of one of its other groups. Finally, in addition to ethnicity and nationality, there is a cultural identity as well, if you associate with and take pride in Chinese history and traditions. The CCP has destroyed traditional Chinese culture, and replaced it with Party culture. Further, an explicit goal of its propaganda campaign has been to get all ethnic Chinese worldwide to identify with this culture: with the new "Rising China," under the eternal leadership of the CCP.

The CCP is trying to create a global Chinese culture, where all ethnic Chinese people, wherever they may live, are loyal to the Communist Party.

The efficacy of CCP propaganda is also evident with other international parties, with the press and foreign governments, where the basic story line is that the CCP has been reformed, and that it is an acceptable partner in trade and diplomacy. These are lies as well, but for a variety of reasons they have achieved great traction.

For the press, and returning to East Turkestan, journalists have consistently reported the lies of the "State Media" about the events of early July, as if they were truth. They have presented the casualty count, and the breakdown between Uyghur and Chinese victims, as truth even though these figures are completely fabricated. One reason for this is that many journalists are sloppy, and accept the CCP's arguments and statistics as they are given. Another is that some journalists are willing to repeat the "party line," to preserve access.

It was extremely telling that during the unrest in Iran that followed the stolen election, most media qualified their reports by mentioning Iranian government restrictions on journalists and the Internet. Such disclaimers have been rare for coverage of East Turkestan.

Similarly, for foreign governments, China is now such an important economic factor that they appear willing to forgive the CCP virtually anything, if not work actively on its behalf. For East Turkestan, some neighboring states, notably Kazakhstan, have allied with the CCP even though the Kazaks are Turkic people as well (and with a long history of friendship with the Uyghurs). The Kazakh government recently signed a $10 billion deal with China. Identical relationships also exist with other members of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, including East Turkestan's neighbors Kyrgystan and Tajikistan. And finally, Western partners including the United States and Europe have also been silent on East Turkestan, not only the current repression but the entire history of Communist Party domination.

The communists believed that they had history on their side: that their socialist utopia was inevitable. They were wrong. The real historical imperative lies with democracy.

Ultimately, the CCP will relinquish power and democracy in China will flourish. As part of this, China will decolonize.

While the Communist Party will oppose the loss of its colonies with all its might (just as the buyers of the art looted by the Nazis have done everything possible not to return the art to its original owners or heirs), China one day will break up. East Turkestan will be returned to the Uyghurs and also Tibet to the Tibetans and Southern Mongolia to the Southern Mongolians. Communism is a defeated ideology, as is dictatorship more generally in all its different forms. Human rights will prevail. A basic right at the group level is the right of self-determination. The Uyghurs, Tibetans and Southern Mongolians will secure this right.

The people, governments and media of the world should support this right. It will be much easier to attain if they do.

When China, finally, is freed from the grips of the CCP, the people of the country will be able to confront their past, and seek justice for the wrongs that they have suffered. But, this should extend not only to the specific atrocities of the communists, but more generally to China's imperial, authoritarian tradition, which the communists publicly rejected but in practice simply reinvented.

The entire history of China has been based on the ideal of the unconditional acceptance of authority. (This is known as the “philosopher-king” or "benevolent dictatorship." Plato argued that it was the best form of government.) When rulers are good, this approach works: The society is at peace. But blind acceptance of authority also opens oneself to the risk of power-mad tyrants. There were bad emperors in China in the past, but no one has ever rivaled the likes of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and now Hu Jintao. The bad emperors were overthrown, and some day - soon - the communists will be so as well. However, it is only through rejecting the underlying authoritarian tradition that has governed China for millennia, that the people of the country will ever achieve – and preserve – their freedom.

READ MORE---> FREE EAST TURKESTAN...

U.S. POLICY ON BURMA: MORE STICK, LESS CARROT

By Roland Watson
Dictator Watch Org
July 27, 2009

Burma has been in the news a lot in the last month or two:

- The regime arrested Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and her long-delayed trial is about to conclude.

- United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a fruitless visit to Burma's dictator, Than Shwe, in an effort to win her release.

- As part of its plan to control the ethnic resistance armies, both ceasefire and non-ceasefire, the Junta forced its Karen proxy army, the DKBA, to launch a rainy season offensive against the Karen National Union.

- And, a North Korean cargo ship was dispatched to Burma, reportedly with a load of missiles, but after being shadowed by the United States Navy it reversed course and returned home.

Each one of these events is complex in its own right, and requires careful analysis to reach a proper understanding. Moreover, they are the most important elements of the larger picture of the struggle for freedom in Burma. They reveal the plan of the SPDC to stay in power, the actions of its allies and cronies in support of this, and the evolving policy of other nations, and the United Nations, which supposedly support the democratic aspirations of the Burmese.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

With only thirteen days to go before her illegal six year detention was potentially to end (not that anyone seriously expected this, and which detention followed the unsuccessful assassination attempt against her at the 2003 Depayin Massacre), Daw Suu was charged with violating her house arrest because her SPDC guards let in a visitor. (You have to hand it to Than Shwe, to dream up such a ludicrous charge.) Now, following Kangaroo Court proceedings, she is likely to be sentenced to formal imprisonment.

What is most revealing about this incident is the lack of influence on the Junta by the international community, including the U.N., U.S. and E.U. For the first, Ban Ki-moon did fulfill the request of the 680,000 people who signed the petition by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners of Burma, calling for him to travel to the country and secure Daw Suu's release. But, he left empty-handed. The reason for this is that he is still following the basic policy, set by his predecessor Kofi Annan, that the U.N. Secretariat is powerless – the belief that all U.N. power lies with the member states, most importantly the members of the Security Council. Even more, he has been unwilling to criticize the SPDC (and he certainly has this right, if not the obligation to do so), by openly rejecting its Roadmap, by calling for an end to its attacks on Burma's ethnic nationalities, etc. As Burma activists have come to recognize, the U.N. is useless, for a number of reasons, starting with the fact that the Secretary General views it - his own organization - this way.

For the U.S. and Europe, the lack of action is based on their desire to secure business opportunities in China. Burma is China's colony (like Tibet, East Turkestan, and Laos), so hands off. This position is underlined for the U.S. by Chinese extortion over its huge purchases of U.S. treasury bonds (currently over $800 billion). "Oppose us and we will stop buying your bonds and funding your deficit, and the United States Government will go bankrupt!"

Indeed, one can make the case that Than Shwe should also make large-scale purchases of U.S. bonds, using the proceeds of his energy sales to Chevron, Total, Daewoo, China and India. This would give him additional insurance against a U.S. intervention, even though pragmatically there is no such risk. When George Bush was President, the U.S. was preoccupied with Iraq, but there was still the chance that he would intervene. Even with the China card Than Shwe couldn't completely discount the possibility that he would act. Bush was a nut; you simply couldn't predict what he would do. (It was last summer, during Bush's final year, that unmanned drones were spotted by the Burma Army.) Obama, though, is rational, and - internationally - out of his depth. Than Shwe clearly understands that the threat from the U.S. has evaporated, hence the arrest of Daw Suu.

The only other high profile source of pressure for her release (we pro-democracy advocates are not "high-profile") has been from celebrities. God bless the celebrities. What would we do without them?

Celebrity "activists" are the masters of "forgettable campaigns." The AAPPB signature campaign was significant and powerful, even if Ban Ki-moon's personal weakness reduced its impact. The Not On Our Watch's "64wordsforSuu," or U2's ridiculous Daw Suu mask idea, while they did attract a tiny amount of press attention, were essentially worthless. Celebrities really only care about themselves. That's why they support "easy activism": non-controversial causes such as cancer, or imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winners. However, even for such causes they never make strong stands or commitments. The only outcome of their so-called activism is that they get a boost in their personal reputations, because "they care."

The Karen struggle

The SPDC has been attacking Daw Suu, and also the Karen National Union. This is not a coincidence. The two are the greatest risks to Than Shwe. Daw Suu has the power to instigate a popular uprising, and even though some parties, such as the Irrawaddy, would have us believe that the Karen are defeated, they are actually still a powerful military force, particularly in alliance with the other non-ceasefire groups, and also since the SPDC's situation with the large ceasefire groups is so tenuous. With the U.S. under control, and Thailand, surprisingly - since the Democrats are in power - also supportive, this was a good opportunity for Than Shwe to attack on both fronts.

For those who witnessed it, and this includes both SPDC spies and Thai intelligence agents, the KNU's 60th anniversary event must have caused alarm. Some 6,000 Karen came out for what was a combined Karen fair/memorial. If they could have emptied Mae La Refugee Camp, it would have been 50,000 people. It was clear even to the casual onlooker that the Karen people fully support the KNU and that the struggle is far from over.

The SPDC ordered the corrupt, drug-dealing leaders of the DKBA to attack the KNLA's 7th Brigade (the site of the anniversary). The Karen resistance withdrew, and the area is now a no mans land. The DKBA are afraid to occupy the empty camps. (They suffered over 100 KIA and 220 injuries in June alone.) And, it is now undeniable that the DKBA are traitors to the Karen cause, with the result that they are suffering large-scale defections.

Dictator Watch has said for years that the simplest solution to the Burma problem (other than a Predator drone strike against Than Shwe) is to offer inducements to desert to Burma Army soldiers and their ethnic allies such as the DKBA. With a little incentive, thousands and thousands of troops would be happy to flee. The floor would collapse under the SPDC generals, and this would cause disputes and then a coup by officers who are secret pro-democracy sympathizers. Burma would be free.

We couldn't get any money for a surrender initiative from the Bush Administration. It is also doubtful that Obama will help. Maybe we can ask the celebrities. They are billionaires. It wouldn't cost them that much: pennies in proportion to their total wealth. Plus, soliciting surrenders is a non-violent tactic. Perhaps some of the celebrities from the following list, the "pro-Burma celebrities," can be prevailed upon to become real activists.

George Clooney, Sec. Madeleine Albright, Wes Anderson, Drew Barrymore, David Beckham, Bono, Matthew Broderick, Sandra Bullock, James Carville, Michael Chabon, Daniel Craig, John Cusack, Matt Damon, Robert De Niro, Dave Eggers, Jake Gyllenhaal, Vaclav Havel, Helen Hunt, Anjelica Huston, Scarlett Johansson, Nicole Kidman, Ashton Kutcher, Norman Lear, Madonna, Mary Matalin, Sen. John & Cindy McCain, Rose McGowan, Orhan Pamuk, Sarah Jessica Parker, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Brad Pitt, Julia Roberts, Robert Rodriguez, Meg Ryan, Liev Schreiber, George Soros, Steven Spielberg, Meryl Streep, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Naomi Watts, Prof. Elie Wiesel, Owen Wilson.

Does anybody have the ability to get an answer to an email sent to Not On Our Watch?

The Kang Nam 1

Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, and also President Obama, said that the return of the Kang Nam 1 to North Korea was proof that the sanctions on the North worked. In this case they were referring to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which denies the North the right to sell arms to other countries, and which was passed following the atomic bomb test in May and the launching of a variety of ballistic missiles. Yet even with these sanctions North Korea continues to pursue both programs. Regarding the Kang Nam 1, the U.S. is trumpeting a small success, while the overall threat becomes even more severe, at great risk to America, its allies, and the rest of the world. There is no plan in place, none whatsoever, that will actually prevent North Korea from developing nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

To understand the Kang Nam incident, it is essential to track the actual series of events. The incident began when a South Korea television network (YTN) reported information from a South Korean intelligence source, which info in turn originated from U.S. intelligence, that the ship had a cargo of missiles, meaning ballistic missiles, and that it was being tracked by a U.S. Navy destroyer and was destined for Burma. While the following is speculation, subsequent events imply that South Korean intelligence was not authorized by the U.S. to disclose this information.

After the news was released, YTN made a series of retractions. The ship was not carrying missiles; rather, its cargo was small arms. Then, perhaps the shipment was not even weapons at all. However, the U.S. Navy continued to follow the Kang Nam. The obvious explanation is that U.S. intelligence complained to their South Korean counterparts: "Why did you leak the intel? Now we are on the spot. We have to do something. We can't allow the ship to reach its destination." (Previous voyages of the Kang Nam 1, a known weapons carrier, had terminated at Rangoon.)

An extraordinary behind the scenes diplomatic negotiation clearly then began, and which was refereed by China. While the ship was en-route, military envoys from the U.S.; the heir apparent of the North Korean regime; Thailand's Prime Minister (any ballistic missiles acquired by Burma are targeted at Thailand); and officials of Burma's junta all made trips to China.

Then the ship turned around

This "solution" meant that the U.S. did not have to board the Kang Nam, as called for by Senator John McCain; or direct it to a nearby port, most likely Singapore; or report it to the Security Council. The cargo was allowed to remain unconfirmed, and, significantly, the Burma link was completely dropped. (Also, when the story changed to "a cargo of small arms," as if this were a good thing, no one publicly expressed displeasure that such a cargo would be delivered to the SPDC, for use against the people of Burma.)

The Kang Nam incident speaks volumes about the Obama Administration's dearth of ideas on nuclear proliferation (we haven't yet mentioned Iran), and its lack of real concern for Burma.

The only positive outcome of the turnaround, other than that the SPDC didn't get more missiles, is the effect of its disruption on the traffickers themselves. The SPDC and North Korea are traffickers, in weapons, narcotics and people. They are gangsters. This was a deal between two different mafias, and it collapsed. Gangsters, such as the Columbian and Mexican drug cartels, do not like to see their shipments stopped. They get upset when they are. People get killed.

A major arms deal between the SPDC and North Korea failed. We don't know the terms of the deal, including what was being bartered or paid by the SPDC for the missiles, if such barter or payment had already occurred, and whatever else the Kang Nam might have had (nuclear components, perhaps even enrichment centrifuges?). In any case, there is likely to be significant fallout from the event, to resolve the transaction, and also to resume other deals that were agreed upon when SPDC General Shwe Mann visited the North.

Furthermore, Junta Foreign Minister Nyan Win's pledge to Japanese officials to comply with Resolution 1874 (not to do nuclear and missile business with North Korea) is a bald-faced lie. Secretary of State Clinton’s comment that the pledge was “a positive development,” was naïve.

United States policy

The United States policy on Burma is already weak. Now President Obama and Secretary Clinton seem determined to make it even weaker.

If the U.S. wants to free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, it should do it!!! The Administration should not just plaintively complain, again and again. This makes the United States appear pathetic, but it is actually a great power. It would be a simple task to free Daw Suu: just take out the SPDC with drone-launched Hellfire missiles and at the same time helicopter in special forces to the prisons where she and the other political prisoners are held. One well-planned operation could free her, and the country, in a weekend, and the fifty million people of Burma would be eternally grateful.

To hell with the Junta's patron, the Communist Party of China!!! Take a stand for Burma on principle, not geopolitical "reality"!

Similarly with the Karen, the United States has been accepting tens of thousands of Karen refugees. (The 50,000th refugee has now left the border camps in Thailand, although this includes some individuals from other ethnic groups.) This resettlement program actually helps the SPDC. The United States is completing the final stage of the Junta's plan to depopulate Karen State of Karen people. The SPDC drives the Karen from their villages to Thailand, and then the U.S. sends them to the other side of the world.

We shouldn't forget the Junta's bluster that in the future the only Karen will be in a museum in Rangoon. The update to this is: "or America."

Instead of spending millions of dollars to resettle refugees, the U.S. should give the money to the ethnic resistance groups to fight the SPDC. The refugees do not want to come to America. They want to go home. Help them do this!

A little noticed recent event illustrates the complexity - and immorality - of American policy: The United States sent forty tons of weapons to Somalia. Why on earth would it do such a thing: Somalia has no functioning government? The reason is that Somalia has al-Qaeda. Pity poor Burma, if only the country had al-Qaeda terrorists, it would get all the help it needs. Burma has terrorists, of course, the SPDC, but they are not the types of terrorists that Washington cares about.

Lastly, the U.S. should be be open and honest about the nuclear proliferation threat facing the world, including the SPDC's role therein. We are continuing our call for the State Department to publish the long-delayed Report on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma, as required by Section 10 of the Tom Lantos JADE Act, and also to appoint the Special Envoy for Burma as required by Section 7.

The JADE Act further originally called for tax provisions that would have forced Chevron to divest from the Yadana pipeline, but these provisions were removed at the behest of California Senator Dianne Feinstein. In their place Section 15 expresses Congress' meaningless and impotent "concern" about the at least $500 million that the pipeline gives the SPDC annually, and requests that Chevron withdraw voluntarily.

If you have not read the actual law, please visit the following link. (The JADE Act is potentially much more significant that the just renewed Burma Freedom and Democracy Act.) Section Ten is then given in its entirety.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ286.110.pdf

"SEC. 10. REPORT ON MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE AID TO BURMA.

• (a) In General- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing a list of countries, companies, and other entities that provide military or intelligence aid to the SPDC and describing such military or intelligence aid provided by each such country, company, and other entity.

• (b) Military or Intelligence Aid Defined- For the purpose of this section, the term `military or intelligence aid' means, with respect to the SPDC--

• (1) the provision of weapons, weapons parts, military vehicles, or military aircraft;

• (2) the provision of military or intelligence training, including advice and assistance on subject matter expert exchanges;

• (3) the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, capabilities, and technology, including nuclear, chemical, or dual-use capabilities;

• (4) conducting joint military exercises;

• (5) the provision of naval support, including ship development and naval construction;

• (6) the provision of technical support, including computer and software development and installations, networks, and infrastructure development and construction; or

• (7) the construction or expansion of airfields, including radar and anti-aircraft systems.

• (c) Form- The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex and the unclassified form shall be placed on the Department of State's website."

After we first publicized the report's delay, a journalist asked in a State Department press briefing, in general terms, if the government was obliged to follow the terms of the JADE Act. The spokesperson offered a similarly imprecise and bureaucratic response. It is unfortunate that the question was not specific to Section 10. Also, some people have speculated that perhaps the Act has not been funded. (Laws, even when passed, must receive a budget to be implemented, which is contained in another law - an appropriations bill.) But the JADE Act in part amends the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, which surely is funded. Also, how much can preparation of the report cost?

In any event, we have evidence that the report was prepared on schedule. It just has not been publicly disclosed.

Burma is a key player in the nuclear proliferation nexus involving North Korea, Iran, Russia and China. In part because the report has yet to be made public, this status is not being given anywhere near the attention that it deserves.

We have previously revealed many aspects of the SPDC's program, including its production of yellowcake uranium. Another aspect of the overall proliferation picture is that it is known that Iran has used up the bulk supplies (six hundred tons) of yellowcake that it purchased from South Africa in the 1970s. Iran is now running 5,000 centrifuges, with another 2,000 set to come online. Its program requires a lot of yellowcake. A logical source for this is Burma, and for which we and others have some confirmation.

(As with North Korea, the Administration has no plan to prevent Iran's Islamic theocracy from obtaining atomic bombs.)

Similarly, we have anecdotal word that the SPDC has begun its own enrichment program. It was disclosed earlier this month in a Security Council sanctions on North Korea enforcement announcement (by the U.S.) that the Junta has a business relationship with Nomchongang Trading, a North Korean company that has acquired Japanese-made centrifuge components.

These are only a few of the different pieces of the proliferation puzzle, of which we have no doubt that United States Intelligence is well informed, and which information should be disclosed in the Section 10 Report.

The Obama Administration is stonewalling. We do not understand why revealing all aspects of the nuclear threat, as John F. Kennedy did when the Soviet Union based nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba, is not the right thing to do.

The nuclear and missile threat from Burma is the best reason to discuss the country in the Security Council, and in a way that China and Russia would find difficult to sustain their vetoes on Council action. It is also a legitimate rationale for an intervention in Burma.

As a final note, to the people of Burma: If the United States continues its posturing but fails to act, when your country is free - and some day Burma will be free - you should never forget that for all the strong words, America was not really your friend.

Secretary Clinton was recently in Thailand. She made some seemingly strong comments, including that the U.S. is concerned about the North Korea-Burma nuclear connection. The U.S. has only become worried because it has been forced to appear worried. Dictator Watch and others have revealed the nuclear plot for years, but the Kang Nam incident, and mistake (the leak), forced the Administration to acknowledge the problem. Such public concern, though, does not mean that the U.S. will act.

Secretary Clinton also called on Asean to expel Burma if Daw Suu is imprisoned, but this is asking others to act.

Hillary Clinton follows Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, and Madeleine Albright: a more than ten year record of public concern by the United States for Burma, but with no accompanying decisive action.

READ MORE---> U.S. POLICY ON BURMA: MORE STICK, LESS CARROT...

Energy Meeting in Mandalay

By The Irrawaddy

Thailand’s Energy Minister Wannarat Charnnukul will emphasize his country’s strength as a regional hub of alternative energy at a meeting with energy ministers from Asian +3 and Asean +6 in Mandalay on July 29-30, according to a report in the Thailand-based news service The Nation on Monday.

Thailand will join the Asean energy action plan during 2010-2015, which highlights cooperation in seven areas including clean coal technology, the regional power transmission grid, gas pipelines, energy conservation, recycliable energy and nuclear power.

Minister Charnnukul also said that Thailand would also seek a bilateral talk with Burma on further cooperation in natural gas investment, according to the report.

According to a source close to the Thai ministry official, Thailand is concerned that Burma’s gas fields will be monopolized by Chinese state oil firms.

Thailand imports over 50 percent of Burma’s gas, which the French energy conglomerate Total extracts from the Yadana gas field in the Andaman Sea.

Total is one of the world’s six biggest so-called “supermajor” oil and energy companies and is the only large European business still operating in Burma.

In May, the French government said that if tougher trade curbs were introduced against Burma over the regime’s treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, it would have damaging repercussions for one of France’s biggest companies and possibly for Southeast Asia.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner also warned that any pullout by Total would have a limited effect because Chinese state oil firms would be quick to move in.

The EU has urged Burma’s neighbors—notably China and India—to also threaten sanctions to persuade the regime to halt its political repression.

The 25 EU countries are barred from importing timber, minerals, gems and metals from Burma, and prohibited from exporting weapons and weapons-related equipment. Various restrictions on junta members are also in place.

However, both India and China continue to expand their business interests with the Burmese junta and supply it with weapons.

READ MORE---> Energy Meeting in Mandalay...

Clinton’s myopia on Burma

by Enzo Reale

(Mizzima- Opinion) - Did you think they had a "policy"? Think again.

Since her first trip to Asia, last February, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been busy advertising the "new approach" to the region promoted by the Obama administration. Especially, regarding Burma, she announced a "policy review" in the months to come: "Clearly, sanctions haven't worked", she said, adding that engagement by the neighbouring countries also failed to bring change to the isolated nation.

Officially the "policy review" is still on and, apart from some vague statements from Clinton's aides, nobody at the moment can spell out its contents and its real purpose. But last week, at a press conference on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phuket, Secretary of State came up with quite a surprising proposal to Burmese rulers: "If she [Suu Kyi] were released, that would open up opportunities, at least for my country, to expand our relationship with Burma, including investments in Burma. But it is up to the Burmese leadership", Clinton said. In other words: ‘if you give me Aung San Suu Kyi, I'll give you money’. Unfortunately this isn't a policy, it's a gamble.

The attempt to buy Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom by the promise of new investments shows an amount of improvisation and naivety that should worry activists for democracy inside and outside Burma and, in general, all those who have always looked at U.S. as a force for democratic change in authoritarian countries. Instead of working to free Burma and its citizens, Mrs. Clinton chooses to concentrate U.S. efforts in pursuing a symbolic, popular and limited goal, the liberation of the Nobel Prize laureate. "What about reconciliation dialogue, the election in 2010 and ethnic issues? Don’t they know that they would detain her again?" veteran journalist and opposition leader Win Tin observed, when asked about Mrs. Clinton's remarks. But we could add: what about the other 2000 political prisoners? What about internally displaced people? What about forced and child labour? What about recruitment of children in the Army? What about refugees? What about the climate of intimidation and fear? What about Burma?

The Secretary of State's words are misconceived for many reasons. They can be interpreted as if the reality of misery and oppression of 55 million people could be reduced to the fate of a single, though important, democratic icon. If she could speak, I am sure Aung Sang Suu Kyi would reject this bargaining: she considers her freedom instrumental to the liberation of the Burmese people and not vice versa.

Moreover, Mrs. Clinton clearly underestimates the significance that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) attach to her detention. Senior General Than Shwe and his clique have always considered political prisoners a necessary tool for the survival of the regime in the present shape. They use them to threaten the population, to debilitate the opposition, to buy time with the international community, according to circumstances. They're not going to risk their political future by simply freeing Aung San Suu Kyi as a part of an undefined cooperation agreement.

Finally, the proposal underlines the weakness (or the nonexistence) of an American strategy about Burma. After Mrs. Clinton’s remarks the generals know better than ever that the U.S. government has no idea on how to deal with them. There's no plan, just a game of courtship and rejection, of carrot and stick they’re probably enjoying. Actually, it looks like the only tangible U.S. policy under Obama is the cohabitation with authoritarian regimes, in Asia and elsewhere: “normalization” is the keyword. For a further example, take the essence of Mrs. Clinton’s speech about North Korea: in exchange for giving up its nuclear ambitions, she promised Pyongyang “full normalisation of relations, a permanent peace regime and significant energy and economic assistance in the context of full and verifiable denuclearisation”.

In the past year the Burmese government has been able to shift the focus from its chronic mismanagement of the country’s resources to economic sanctions imposed by Western countries. A fundamental help in this rough manipulation has come from anti-sanctions and pro-engagement groups, mainly outside Burma. Burmese historian Thant Myint-U, well settled in his usual equidistance between dictatorship and the democratic camp, is a champion of this “development first” narrative. In its last edition, also The Economist seems to embrace the theory that blames the critical situation in Burma on the obstinacy of Western powers and on the same Aung San Suu Kyi for pursuing a policy of criticism and sanctions aimed at promoting democratic change, instead of engaging the regime with development aid and investments: “Worse, everyone from the UN down views Myanmar through the lens of democracy above all else—even development.

For a desperate country with shocking rates of disease and mortality such a priority is dubious, at best, shameful at worst”, an editorial observes. According to this school of thought, Burma’s destiny would depend in the first place on foreign countries will to abandon their isolation policy, as if the paranoid military government that has ruled the country with an iron fist for 47 years had little or nothing to do with its decay.

Of course, development and aid are essential tools in such a dramatic context. But it’s a big mistake to consider development and democracy as alternative options.

Before 1997 no Western sanctions against Burma were in place, at least not in the present form and extent. What kind of development did Burmese citizens enjoy? The sad answer is… more wealth in the strongboxes of Burma's tyrants. Today Naypyidaw is busily trading with its neighbours, mainly China, India, Thailand and Singapore: why aren’t they developing the country and improving people’s lives?

A slippery ground, isn’t it? While the debate about this subject is welcome, we should not forget that the main sanction against Burma is the military regime itself. For that reason, democracy and development are intimately connected and it’s impossible to promote any sort of real development if the national robbery managed by a ruthless and illegitimate government is going to continue. The only treatment for Burma’s illness is the end of dictatorship, not more money (Western money, again?) in the pockets of the generals.

So, Mrs. Clinton, free Burma and you will also free Aung San Suu Kyi.

Enzo Reale is a freelance journalist. He writes about South-East Asia issues for Italian online newspapers and magazines. He edits two blogs (http://1972.splinder.com and http://asiaedintorni.blogosfere.it).

READ MORE---> Clinton’s myopia on Burma...

Burma’s information ministry in new email campaign

Jeg has not received her email yet... she feels ignored :(
I'm happy to promote the generals anyway I could... :)

(DVB)–The Ministry of Information in Burma has begun emailing government-generated newsletters to exiled Burmese activists and journalists in an attempt to counter news-sharing by exiled opposition groups.

The website responsible for the emails is the Kyaymon online newspaper, run by the government’s Ministry of Information, which carries headlines such as ‘Shame on you Clinton’ and ‘America’s ugly failure in the ASEAN summit’.

When approached by DVB, the assistant editor of Kyaymon, Aung Kyaw Thwin, said that the action was entirely orchestrated by the government.

“We have been sending you newsletters under direction from our information minister and there is no personal motive behind this,” he said.

Burma’s information minister, Brigadier General Kyaw Hasn, has reportedly sent out instructions to all media workers in Burma that include statements such as “strive for realization of the seven-step Road Map through media” and “train better qualified press workers who favour the profit of the nation”.

A UK-based Burmese journalist, Bo Bo Lan Sin, said that the newsletters were actually a refreshing alternative to other more generic government news.

“[Kyaymon] newsletters are not that boring; the more news variety than the government blogs,” he said, adding that he had only recently found out who was sending the emails.

His comments were echoed by the secretary of the Burma Media Association, San Moe Wei.

“The whole thing is clear; they are sending out the newsletters because no one bothers to go on to their websites and read their news,” he said.

State-run media, such as the Myanma Ahlin newspaper, is loaded with news on ribbon-cutting ceremonies and editorials penned by pro-government journalists.

Burma’s media environment is amongst the most repressive in the world, with media watchdog Reporters Without Borders last year ranking it 170 out of 173 in its annual Press Freedom Index.

Media laws are very tough, and journalists inside Burma face severe punishment if seen to be criticising the government.

Media workers are often under strict surveillance, with internet café owners forced to take screen-shots of each computers every five mintues which are then sent to the Ministry of Information.

“It’s easy for them to get a hold of our email addresses; they surf through blogs and find out which internet user is ‘politically concerned’”, said Burmese blogger, Mr Thinker.

“The media in exile has been using this newsletter method to spread their information and now [the government] has begun to do the same thing.”

It is unclear how many people the government is targeting in this campaign, although the email received by DVB had been sent to around 400 other addresses.

Reporting by Ahunt Phone Myat

READ MORE---> Burma’s information ministry in new email campaign...

A chink may yet be appearing in Burma's obstinacy

By THANIDA TANSUBHAPOL

(Bangkok Post) -The Burma and North Korea issues have been in the spotlight at Asean meetings for more than a decade. The "issues" vary from meeting to meeting, depending on what is happening with these countries at the time.

Mostly, Burma would be brought up at the meetings because of its strong opposition to human rights within the country.

There seems to be no sustainable solution to the problems although the regime always tries to appease its Asean neighbours by releasing a number of political prisoners prior to the conferences.

The perennial barb, however, is the continued detention of the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now facing trial for an alleged violation of her house arrest rules after an American man swam across the river to her home.

Burma has given some hope to the international community by announcing a national reconciliation process and its peaceful transition to democracy, as envisaged in the seven-step road map to democracy, in particular the adoption of the State Constitution of 2008 by referendum which will lead to a general election next year. It will be the first national election after the regime refused the overwhelming victory of Ms Suu Kyi in 1990.

But without Ms Suu Kyi joining in the 2010 election, it will be worthless.

Asean's goal of becoming one community by 2015 is approaching and if the 2010 election in Burma fails, the hopes and dreams for all 10 Asean members to become a homogeneous community might remain just that - a dream.

A diplomat who attended the Asean meeting last week said the grouping's members conveyed to Burma that the atmosphere was not good and Burma had to do something to break its silence.

Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya said that in this meeting, Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win learnt that "his country is a major factor in moving Asean forward".

"It is the duty of Asean and Burma to push the grouping together to become a community," Mr Kasit said.

For the first time, Asean asked Nyan Win to convey the sentiment to the Burmese leadership.

The action came after Asean foreign ministers felt concerned that their joint call for changes in Burma might not reach the ears of the Burmese leader Snr Gen Than Shwe.

Nobody can tell how receptive the Burmese leaders will be to what the outside world has been demanding. Many demands were made in the past but no actions were taken by the regime.

The many joint communiques of Asean and the chairman's statement from the Asean Plus Three - Japan, China and South Korea - as well as ARF throughout the years reaffirm that the Burmese government must hold a free, fair and inclusive election in 2010 in order to lay down a good foundation for future social and economic development.

They reiterated their calls for the Burmese government to immediately release all political prisoners, including Ms Suu Kyi to pave the way for genuine reconciliation and meaningful dialogue involving all parties.

"Asean ministers were afraid that the Burmese leader might choose to acknowledge only the positive reaction from Asean such as its welcoming of the recent visit of UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon or the thanks for Burma's cooperation in allowing outsiders to help its people after Cyclone Nargis," said a source who attended the meeting.

The source admitted the atmosphere in the meeting rooms was better than the past year as there was not any pressure on Burma.

"The atmosphere was full of cogency and pertinent to the real reason [of the need for change in Burma]. There were more frank discussions than in the past," the source said.

This was reflected in the offer of Asean and members of ARF to work with Burma to promote democracy, human rights and the well-being of her people. At the same time, it was hoped that Burma would also be responsive to the international community's concerns, according to Mr Kasit.

Nyan Win, however, told his Asean counterparts on Monday that pressure from the outside world and economic sanctions were hampering Burma's democratisation and development efforts.

According to the same source, Asean was in the process of persuading Burma to change its situation.

"Having Asean to help Burma in its democratisation is better than fighting it," the source said. This message was released during the ARF meeting in which the US also participated.

Mr Kasit emphasised that Asean members wanted to help one another and resolve internal problems within the bloc's family without recourse to the international community.

Asean's new approach towards Burma at this meeting is its ministers have agreed to take turns to engage the Burmese leadership soon and if the Burmese government would allow outsiders to observe its elections next year, Asean should be the first grouping to do so, the source said.

Asean is expected to receive a positive response from Burma before the annual United Nations General Assembly in New York in September where all Asean foreign ministers will gather, the source added.

If Asean is a pull factor for Burma, the US is working as a push one.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Burma to release Ms Suu Kyi in exchange for direct investment from the United States.

"If she were released, that would open up opportunities at least for my country to expand our relationship with Burma, including investments in Burma," she said.

Pornpimon Trichote, a Burmese expert, said she was not surprised at the US shift as new US President Barack Obama used to hint that the US policy towards Burma might change.

"The US might change some approaches towards Burma but its principles would remain the same. However, I believe Burma might not be in a hurry to reciprocate on what the US has to offer as the relationship of both countries has been estranged for a long time," she said, adding that Burma never cared for the US as it is friends with other powers like China, Russia and North Korea.

If things go according to plan, these push and pull factors could eventually help create more space to deal with Burma after the election next year, she said. "The US might face an impasse as the sanctions have produced nothing for many years. If it has not changed its position, it has nowhere to go," she said, adding it was likely condemnation of Burma will be softer after this.

READ MORE---> A chink may yet be appearing in Burma's obstinacy...

Three Burmese Defectors Missing After Arrest in Bangladesh

Dhaka (Narinjara): Three Burmese soldiers that defected from the army have been missing since they were arrested by Bangladesh Rifles in the border area of southern Chittagong Hill Tract on 20 February, 2009, said a relative of one.

The three were identified as Maung Maung Than, Soe Thwe, and Than Htay Haing, from Light Infantry Battalion 538 based in Rathidaung, 20 miles north of Sittwe.

The relative said that he came to Bangladesh last week to inquire about them but received information that they were sent back to Burma in April 2009 by Bangladesh authorities along with other Burmese prisoners.

The soldiers were arrested by Bangladesh Rifles at Headman Maung Shwe Sein's village in southern Bandarban in February while they were looking for shelter in the area.

According to a local source, the three defected from the Burmese army after some of their ammunition magazines went missing during a trip with their column to inspect the border pillars.

The Burmese army severely punishes soldiers that lose ammunition or military equipment, so the three soldiers fled from their column to Bangladesh out of fear of punishment.

After their arrest, the Bangladesh authorities reportedly brought them to Dhaka for interrogation.

A Burmese refugee staying in Cox's Bazar said the three soldiers were reportedly handed over to Burma by Bangladesh authorities at the Maungdaw border point along with other Burmese prisoners during an arranged repatriation in April 2009.

He added that the Burmese military authority has never disclosed information in such cases. The military may have sentenced them to long prison terms or executed them without providing any information to their relatives.

The three soldiers are Arakanese nationals from Shwe Lon Din Village in Rathidaung Township.

The relative said, "We heard they were fleeing to Bangladesh from the Burmese army. Because of that I came to the border town of Teknaf to inquire about their situation but now they are not in Bangladesh."

The Burmese army has no procedure for relatives to inquire about soldiers if they defect from the Burmese army.

READ MORE---> Three Burmese Defectors Missing After Arrest in Bangladesh...

Ceasefire army on watch list

(SHAN) -The Military Affairs Security (MAS) branch in Lashio, capital of Northern Shan State, has been instructed to keep the Shan State Army (SSA) “North”, officially Shan State Special Region #3, under close watch, according to an informed source on the Sino-Burma border.

Maj Gen Hso Ten (photo)

Its top leader Maj Gen Hso Ten has been serving 106 year jail sentence in Khamti, after his participation in the Shan State Day reception on 7 February 2005 in Taunggyi. “Other leaders from now on must watch their own steps,” he warned. “The junta needs only a misstep from them to dump them on trumped up charges.”

The SSA “North” is led by major generals Loi Mao, Gaifa and Pangfa. It has 3 brigades: the First with approximately 3,000 men, the Third with 500 and Seventh with 1,000. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) has called it “the closest ally outside the Peace and Democracy Front (PDF)”.

The PDF is made up of 4 members: UWSA, Kokang or Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Mongla or National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA) and New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).

The SSA North’s units are positioned on the west bank of the Salween and any attack on the UWSA by the Burma Army coming from the west will have to negotiate stiff resistance by the SSA first.

It is also under suspicion of being hand in glove with the anti-Naypyitaw SSA “South” led by Col Yawdserk.

According to Network for Democracy and Development (NDD), 25 July 2009, 8 of the existing 13 ceasefire groups are against Naypyitaw’s plan to transform them into Border Guard Force (BGF) outwardly to be commanded by ceasefire officers but, to all intents and purposes, to be run by junta officers.

READ MORE---> Ceasefire army on watch list...

Forced labour persists at Karen refugee camp

(DVB)–Instances of forced labour, forced army recruitment and extortion are still being reported at the refugee camp in Burma’s eastern Karen state that was overrun by a pro-junta militia last month.

The Ler Per Har camp was a focal point of fighting last month between government troops, supported by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and opposition Karen National Union (KNU).

Around 4000 Karen civilians have fled across the border into Thailand, many of whom reported cases of being forced to act as porters for the army, and to walk in front of army patrols as minesweepers.

The Bangkok-based Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) last week said that while fighting had eased, reports of the forced labour, portering and exortion of money, food and livestock from villagers by the DKBA continued.

“These abuses continue to result in more people fleeing their villages and crossing to Thailand,” the TBBC statement said, adding that a further 200 people had crossed the border into Thailand in the 24 hours prior to the statement’s release.

The populous Ler Per Har camp accommodates internally displaced refugees inside Burma, although the Burmese government have said that KNU troops also reside there.

A source from the TBBC said that the DKBA were making the lives of villagers around the conflict zones “unbearable”.

“The DKBA come to villages and tell families that they want their sons in the army,” the source said.

“They come and ask for money; when the villagers cannot pay this, they ask for livestock.”

Pressuring the DKBA and Burmese troops to end forced labour and extortion is very difficult, said the TBBC.

There has been talk however of a long-term plan by the Thai government to negotiate with the DKBA and the Burmese junta for the safe return of the refugees currently holed up in various sites on the Thai side of the border.

According to the TBBC statement, around 2000 people have moved from temporary sites in and around Nu Poh village near to the Thai-Burma border to a new camp nearby.

The fighting between Burmese troops and the armed wing of the KNU, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), began on 2 June.

Since then, Burmese troops have taken two strategically important KNLA bases. It is unclear how many people have died in the fighting.

Fighting between the Burmese army and the KNU began in 1949, and is thought to be the world’s longest running internal conflict.

Reporting by Francis Wade

READ MORE---> Forced labour persists at Karen refugee camp...

US trying to ‘put ASEAN in its pocket’

(DVB)–State-run media in Burma has accused US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of interfering in the affairs of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after suggesting the bloc should expel Burma.

At the 27-state ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) last week, Clinton suggested that Burma should be expelled from the grouping if it failed to release imprisoned opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Yesterday the government mouthpiece New Light of Myanmar newspaper criticised Clinton’s comments, which allegedly amounted to the United States “trying to sound the ASEAN out and put it in its pocket”.

The US has long been the fiercest critic of Burma, and on Friday renewed its package of sanctions on the regime which include a ban on the import of Burmese goods to the US.

Clinton said however that there was potential for the US to engage with and invest in Burma if the junta released Suu Kyi and allowed her to compete in the 2010 elections.

The US has also expressed concern about the potential for North Korea and Burma to trade in information and material for nuclear proliferation, stemming largely from an incident in June in which a suspicious North Korean ship being tracked by the US navy appeared to be heading towards Burma, before turning around.

Speaking on the sidelines of the ARF, Burmese foreign minister Nyan Win reportedly told Clinton that it would abide by a UN resolution that requires member states to search suspicious North Korean cargo.

However, nothing more has been said on the issue, and the New Light of Myanmar article alleged that “it was not very strange for the US to try to influence ASEAN” given the history of US meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“[The US] is also trying to cause disunity in the region and trouble among the regional nations,” it said, adding that US military bases in Asia posed “a threat to the region”.

It also warned that if ASEAN abides by US suggestions for change in Burma, “it will come under control of the US”.

Clinton last week also called for the release of Suu Kyi, who is in court today on the final day of her three-month trial.

Her comments were echoed in a joint communiqué released following the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting last week which said that Suu Kyi’s release was a necessary prerequisite for “free, fair and inclusive” elections next year.

Reporting by Francis Wade

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Suu Kyi warns junta on 2010 elections

(DVB)–Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has again warned the ruling junta in Burma that without national reconciliation prior to next year, the 2010 elections would be futile.

The government has penciled in March next year for the first general elections since Suu Kyi’s opposition National League for Democracy party won a landslide victory in 1990 that was never honoured.

The opposition leader was speaking to her lawyer Nyan Win on Friday during what should have been the final day of her trial.

“Daw Suu said the upcoming elections in 2010 would not be credited as legitimate unless national reconciliation has been carried out before that,” said Nyan Win, adding that she had urged the United Nations to warn the junta about the necessity of reconciliation.

Today is expected to be the final day of Suu Kyi’s trial, which was delayed on Friday by the prosecution team failing to testify.

Critics claim the trial is a ploy to keep her in detention beyond the 2010 elections, although Burma’s revised constitution which was ratified two weeks after cyclone Nargis last May bars her from running for office.

Earlier this month the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Burma in an attempt to kick start dialogue between the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and opposition groups, as well as push for the release of Suu Kyi.

Nyan Win said that Suu Kyi’s comments reflected the general feeling within the party, and this had been stressed to Ban Ki-moon during his visit.

Prosecution lawyers are today expected to give their final statements in the trial in which Suu Kyi has been charged with breaching conditions of her house arrest.

It is unclear when a verdict is likely to be given. If, as is widely expected, Suu Kyi is found guilty, she could face a sentence of up to five years.

A number of delegates attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum last week independently called for her release, while a joint communiqué issued following the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting said her release was a necessary prerequisite for free and fair elections next year.

Reporting by Thurein Soe

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UN must stipulate national reconciliation before 2010 elections

UN must stipulate National Reconciliation before Burma's 2010 elections

Immediate Release:

United Nations must demand junta to do national reconciliation first

26 July 2009

Burma’s elected legitimate leader, Aung San Suu Kyi said on 24 July 2009 that “United Nations should demand the military regime that “2010 election will be lack of credible and un-fair before facilitating to take place the national reconciliation”.

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Charcoal kilns destroyed by Burmese government, citing fear of environmental destruction

IMNA - Burmese government forces are destroying charcoal kilns in Tenasserim Divison, citing concerns over ongoing and future damage to the coastal environment. Area Kilns use Mangrove wood, which is important to the region’s environmental stability.

The commander of the Burmese military Costal Region Command (CRC), Brig-Gen Khin Zaw Oo, has ordered the destruction of nearly 300 charcoal kilns in Kawthaung township, Tenasserim division which has caused problems for residents who using charcoal for their cooking. The loss of charcoal production facilities has dramatically decreased the availability of charcoal in the area, and driven up prices of remaining stockpiles.

Charcoal kilns in Kawthaung, Myeik , Pulaw, BaLauk and Bokpyin township have been destroyed. Owners of charcoal kilns that were destroyed have not received any compensation from the CRC.

Mangrove trees grow naturally in salty water along coastal regions. The trees and roots form dense shrubs and walls, which when submerged provide food, shelter and a breeding ground for fish. They also form a natural breakwater for tidal shifts.

Mangrove trees have been particularly popular to use in charcoal production. Sources close to charcoal kiln owners describe the product as being denser when made from Mangrove wood. One resident explained, “Charcoal made from mangrove trees is good for cooking and the it burns a longer time.”

Despite the environmental concerns, some charcoal kiln owners have been able to fend of the destruction of their facilities by paying a tax to the CRC. In a undersupplied market the remaining owners make a higher profit, and residents who were dependent on the charcoal for cooking, can continue to cook.

The order to destroy charcoal kilns in Tenasserim came from Nay Pyi Daw about one month ago. The reason given for the targeted destruction of costal charcoal kilns by the CRC is concern that Tenasserim division’s environment has been negatively impacted by the loss of Mangrove trees, specifically with a decreased in the number of fish and higher likelihood of erosion, mudslides, and flooding. Thus they cite loss of the trees as increasing the potential for damage from cyclones, like Nagris, according to a resident who is close to a charcoal factory owner.

According to the Burmese Flowers News journal, about 50% of the Mangrove forests in Tenasserim division and Arakan state have been destroyed. After cyclone Nargis, 60% of mangrove forest in Irrawaddy division was destroyed. According to an article published in May by Irrawaddy news, the mangrove forests provided protection against Nagris when the cyclone struck, but were heavily damaged.

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Myanmar criticizes Clinton following ASEAN meeting

YANGON, Myanmar (San Francisco Chronicle-AP) -- A Myanmar state-run newspaper on Sunday accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton of interfering in the affairs of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after she urged its members to press for more democratic reforms in the country.

Clinton, who attended the ASEAN Regional Forum last week in Thailand, also called on Myanmar to unconditionally release pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who is on trial for allegedly violating the terms of her house arrest and faces a possible five-year prison term.

"It amounts to interfering in the affairs of the ASEAN," according to a commentary in the state-run Myanma Ahlin daily. "If ASEAN complies with the instruction of U.S. Secretary of State, ASEAN will become the follower of United States."

Myanmar is one of ASEAN's 10 member countries.

The commentary also suggested that American calls for Suu Kyi's release were part of a long-term plan to place someone in power in Myanmar whom it can control.

Clinton saved some of her toughest criticism during the forum for Myanmar and North Korea, which is not an ASEAN member. She expressed concerns that North Korea, already a threat to its neighbors and the U.S. with its history of illicit sales of missiles and nuclear technology, is now developing ties to Myanmar's military dictatorship.

Clinton also offered Myanmar the prospect of better relations with the United States, but said that depended in part on the fate of Suu Kyi.

Myanmar state media rejected the criticism, accusing those calling for Suu Kyi's release of "interference" and "showing reckless disregard for the law."

Suu Kyi, 64, is charged with violating the terms of her house arrest by harboring an uninvited American man who swam to her lakeside home and stayed for two days in May.

Western diplomats in Yangon generally believe that Suu Kyi will be found guilty, with the verdict expected sometime next month.

The trial has drawn condemnation from the international community and from Suu Kyi's local supporters, who worry the ruling junta has found an excuse to keep her behind bars through elections planned for next year.

Myanmar, also known as Burma, has been under military rule since 1962.

Suu Kyi's opposition party won national elections in 1990, but Myanmar's generals refused to relinquish power. Suu Kyi has been under house arrest for 14 of the past 20 years.

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China thought we won't care for Hu

By Hamish McDonald

Stern Hu is not Schapelle Corby. The Chinese communist chief, Hu Jintao, and his secret police might not have been too familiar with how someone becomes a tabloid media victim-celeb.

But this was the sort of calculation running through their minds in July when the Ministry of State Security was given the green light to haul in Stern Hu, a Chinese-born Australian citizen who is the Shanghai-based iron ore marketer for Rio Tinto, and three of his Chinese colleagues.

The assumption was a Western country would not get very roused by the misfortune of a citizen who didn't have a white face, someone naturalised fairly late in life and working back in his country of birth. It's a mirror of a deep-seated perception among the Chinese themselves. Some people find it hard to keep ethnicity distinct from citizenship or nationality.

If you want to hit back at a foreign country or organisation, don't pick on the obvious foreigner with a greater chance of becoming a martyr back home, pick the Chinese face. Instead of everyone assuming innocence, as with Corby, people will wonder if it's not really guilty as charged.

Hu and colleagues are detained while State Security investigates allegations they improperly obtained inside information from the Chinese steel industry during negotiations for iron ore supplies. The suggestion is this was obtained by bribery, and State Security is said to be quizzing steel company executives about largesse from Rio Tinto (which flatly denies any practice of bribery).

The Chinese system runs on the oil of bribery, kickbacks and banqueting said to amount to tens of billions of dollars a year. Foreign companies tread a wavy line separating hospitality and "facilitation" from graft.

Only this week, the Communist Party's Propaganda Ministry had to order internet search engines to block all keywords relating to allegations a company making airport security screening devices, Nuctech, run by Hu Jintao's son, Hu Haifeng, had paid bribes to win a sale in Namibia.

Why make a case against Rio Tinto now? There has been speculation the arrests were a payback for the failure of Chinalco's bid to double its stake in Rio Tinto, and/or anger at the concerns about Chinese military power raised in Canberra's Defence White Paper.

The more that comes out in China, however, the more clearly the arrest is related to the iron ore negotiations, and a battle between State and Big Capital inside China itself.

Officialdom in the Commerce Ministry had been appalled at the way the three big global iron ore suppliers, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton from Australia and Vale from Brazil, had been getting massive price rises in annual contracts with big Chinese steelworks.

While the economy was running white-hot, the big steel firms worried more about supply than price, which they could always pass on to customers, or excess supply, which they could sell at higher spot-market margins to small Chinese steel foundries which weren't authorised to import.

This year, the ministry levered the China Iron and Steel Association into the negotiations, to present a united front to the big three miners and take advantage of the economic slowdown. It was likened to medieval China's six "warring states" coming together to fight an invader.

After Japanese and other steel customers agreed on a modest 33 per cent price cut, winning a better deal for China became the public goal of the association's chief, Shan Shanghua. "The price of iron ore should be reduced by more than 40 per cent, and return to 2007 levels," he insisted.

Instead, the negotiations were in stalemate beyond the expiry of the old contracts on June 30, with the spot price of iron ore far above what the Chinese would have got with just a 33 per cent cut. It can't be any coincidence that Stern Hu was arrested on July 5, just as this self-inflicted economic blow and humiliating loss of face for the officials became apparent.

A Chinese online newsletter, the Economic Observer, quoted a Baosteel source saying this was "just the start" , and that "the Rio Tinto affair is really a struggle between the market power of China's steel companies and the political power of China's government planners".

Stern Hu can look forward to up to 19 months' detention, by recent precedent in State Security cases, before he is brought to court. He is entitled under a bilateral treaty to monthly consular visits by Australian officials, but not to a lawyer. Nor can a lawyer engaged for him carry out any investigation to prepare a defence.

When the trial is held, family and media cannot attend, diplomats may or may not be allowed to observe, witnesses are not always called and the judges are subject to direction by a Party supervisor in the backrooms. Once charges are laid, an acquittal is unheard of: the best the convict can hope for is a lenient sentence for co-operation and an early deportation on "medical grounds".

What can be done? Not much use pointing out the failings of the Chinese legal system - best to convince leaders that their officials are inflicting massive self-damage. China's claim that its would-be overseas investors like Chinalco operate separately to the state has been shot to bits. Its steel industry is paying more for iron ore than Japan's or Korea's. The "dark side" of the Chinese system is being emphasised to the outside world, undercutting Beijing's "soft power" offensive.

Australian leaders have been soft-pedalling in public. In Shanghai, the West Australian Premier, Colin Barnett, wanted to talk about China's fantastic opportunities, not the Hu case. The Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, came out of a talk with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, saying they'd agreed the case should not "get in the way generally of the bilateral relationship".

Let's hope they're saying in private just how much damage this case can do, and how much it is costing China itself.

SMH

READ MORE---> China thought we won't care for Hu...

Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

By MIN ZIN
The Irrawaddy News

In politics, direct and frontal attack is rarely wise. Occupying the flank by co-opting the opponent's game plan for one's own purposes is a powerful ploy.

Co-option strategy, however, is a double-edged sword. It presents the risk of being swallowed by the dominant establishment, or at least having one’s reputation damaged, but it also conceals great power and maneuverability.

It depends on how one manages to play it right in a relatively conducive political environment. If well managed, it will become strength. In any case, never rule out this option in exchange for, or fixing solely on, the honor fight when the time is not ripe. To the advantage of oppositions in Burma, a multi-pronged strategy is always called for.

Mainstream oppositions, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the military allows a constitutional revision and inclusive political process. Instead of bringing about a much-needed state-building process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard, Burma's constitution conceded 25 percent of legislative seats to the armed forces and denied protection of fundamental ethnic rights in a multi-ethnic nation.

More importantly, the constitution allows the military virtually to run the country with the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), and even to stage a coup d’état "if there arises a state of emergency." The opposition's principled stance of refusing to endorse the military's constitution and contest the 2010 elections, therefore, deserves understanding and support.

However, it does not mean that there is no gap in the castle wall. The opposition should also look at the situation from a power perspective. By dissecting the junta’s constitution, the opposition will find the devil lies in the details over which Snr-Gen Than Shwe should lose sleep.

First of all, the new post-2010 election power arrangement will create two power centers—military and government. These two power centers will nonetheless be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. Even within the single power center, the Burmese military has repeatedly mired itself in purges resulting from battalion forces versus the intelligence faction, and other rivalries.

Now, after the elimination of the intelligence faction, various reports confirm that there are serious animosity and tension between the military personnel and the thuggish Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members regarding the latter's interference with the military's administrative mandate and other issues of self-interest.

The election, so long as it demonstrates a relatively competitive nature, can make elite rivalry become public issues. The government's operation with two centers of power—no matter who pull the strings—could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.

Secondly, the constitution carries destructive seed for the military to grow into a center-versus-periphery conflict. Though Than Shwe enshrined ultimate power for the commander-in-chief of the military in the constitution, he failed to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities, who are key pillars in the military regime's power structure.

The constitution requires the president to seek approval from the commander-in-chief in all major issues at least via NDSC procedure, but it does not guarantee any special power to regional commanders. Constitutionally, regional commanders are under the control of Chief Ministers of the Regions or States, who could well be civilians in most cases.

Even if the president appoints military Members of Parliament or retired army officials as Chief Minister of the Region or State, the regional commander who is so used to being a warlord in his domain will find it hard to accept constitutionally the prescribed power of the Chief Minister. This may in turn lead the regional commanders to oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw's control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the remaining seats (aside from the 25 percent reserved seats for the military), a non-military candidate can become president or at least non-military parties can control the legislative agendas. According to the constitution, parliament has the right to enact a long list of laws ranging from defense and foreign affairs to economic and social sectors. Thus, Than Shwe appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party.

However, this leads to the fourth problem—another self-defeating clause of the constitution. Than Shwe may want to see his USDA members seizing most of the remaining seats. Transforming the USDA into a political party and contesting the 2010 election will give the junta a great advantage because this thuggish group can exploit the existing nationwide organizational structure and also presents a constant reminder that it’s a fearful power that can intimidate the public to vote for its members. But it is not likely to happen because the constitution clearly states that "Civil Services personnel shall be free from party politics." This clause will invalidate a majority of the 24 million USDA members, who are public servants, if the group turns itself into party.

The constitution also forbids political parties and candidates for parliament from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state, including the use of state property and money. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it runs afoul of the regime's own constitution. If the military wants to create a new political party or parties, they will not carry any resemblance of the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or and intimidating power.

These are some causes of grave concern for Than Shwe. Perhaps that's why he has kept delaying the promulgation of electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year. Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power.

The opposition, for its part, is not likely to take part in the 2010 election unless the regime concedes constitutional reform. However, it is not clear if a political party that does not contest the election will be deregistered. The constitution vaguely states that a party must "accept and practice a genuine and discipline-flourishing multi-party democracy." But if the election law forbids a party such as the NLD to have legal existence for its refusal to participate in the election, the same law will have to impact on ethnic ceasefire parties such as the United Wa State Party, Kachin Independence Organization and New Mon State Party. Most ethnic ceasefire groups have two wings—a political party and the army. It will be a tough choice for Than Shwe to make.

Aside from this principle stance, the practical power implication suggests that the credibility and legitimacy of an election and new power arrangement will be greatly hurt so long as ethnic ceasefire groups refuse to disarm and Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD does not take part in the election. With the new constitution and elections, the military thus cannot expect to minimize the cost of conflict. The most visible costs will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage not only by being outside the regime's election process, but also by opening a new proxy front within the regime's game plan. Constitutional reform is still the most important policy demand, but the opposition should not shut their eyes to the 2010 election.

While the opposition does not take part in the elections representing the NLD, UWSP and NMSP, they must set up proxy political parties to engage in the 2010 election. Through proxies, the opposition must attempt to seize the mainstream platform in order to maximize civilian control of the regime's game. At the same time, the opposition groups such as NLD, NMSP and etc must stand strong outside the reins of an "illegitimate" constitution and election, and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. If history were any guide, the total dissociation of the Communist Party of Burma and the Karen National Union from post-independence mainstream politics made the two strongest forces gradually recede from the center stage of politics, and the power of the both groups also dwindled over time. The opposition, including both democracy forces as well as ethnic groups, should not overlook the reality of basic maturity in politics—that you cannot always get your own way, especially when one group in the conflict maintains an asymmetric power advantage.

Thus far, the KIO, other Kachin ceasefire groups and some representatives of civil society set up the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) in June 2008 to contest the 2010 elections and has reportedly already begun campaigning, while the KIO remains determined not to surrender arms. This is a wise and proactive move since it will allow Kachin to control the Kachin State parliament and be represented in the national parliament. NLD and other ethnic groups should follow suit.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 elections will help preventing a split within the opposition groups. Otherwise, the policy disagreement between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to actual and open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. By setting up proxies, the opposition can create dynamic and diverse tasks and responsibilities within its own leadership and the rank and file.

It could also help bring so-called "neutral," "politically non-engaged professionals," “intellectuals, retired civil/military officials and others who believe in Track Two diplomacy" into the given "legally viable" political arena. No matter whether one agrees or disagrees with the prevailing so-called "Third Force" who mostly opposes Western economic sanctions and criticizes Suu Kyi and her party, the best way to compete with them is to create one's own proxy.

However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxies in the 2010 election will spark a magic power shift to civilian control. It could happen only if the military-dominated status-quo is challenged by public pressure and a negotiated settlement is reached with the military.

The regime's constitution will not lead to a genuine political transition and democratization without broad-based public actions and reconciliation. The aforementioned loopholes in the constitution may not necessarily offer much maneuverability and leverage to the civilian MPs in the first term of the post-2010 power arrangement. Without any balance of power in the state institutions, the military can simply ignore or veto these loopholes.

Moreover, non-military MPs are not necessarily monolithic and unanimous in their approach to the military's domination. They may not necessarily be willing to view their control of majority seats in parliament as a means of determining winners and losers vis-à-vis the military. Parochial interest can also blind non-military MPs to appreciate a broader vision, and self-interest can even corrupt them to compromise their reform agenda. All in all, the election can also be marked by vote rigging, intimidation and bullying attacks orchestrated by the regime and its affiliates against opposing candidates.

However, the seeds of foundational contradiction are embedded in the constitution. The gaps in the castle are built-in. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. Or when mass action takes place on the streets, proxies in the given political process may play a role.

Than Shwe, reportedly a big fan of boxing, must know that strength does not lie in the punches the boxer throws but in the balance and support of the boxer. In other words, it is the legs that matter, the foundation that holds the boxer up can also make him fall. With this loophole-ridden constitution, Than Shwe knows that his opponents could weaken his legs and he could easily reel and stagger.

The opposition should be creative and devious in opening a new proxy front, as a part of their multi-pronged strategy, to exploit the crack in the fortress.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

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