China’s Failed Foreign Policy

By NYO OHN MYINT/MOE ZAW OO
The Irrawaddy News

The recent breakdown of a two-decade-old ceasefire between Burma’s military junta and ethnic militias in the country’s north demonstrates the failure of China’s outdated foreign policy, according to Burmese political analysts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has aggressively pursued a path of rapid economic development as the surest way to avoid a similar fate. Although it has dramatically expanded its trade ties with the rest of the world, the principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

However, as the situation in Burma attests, this principle may no longer be sufficient to protect China’s national interests.

Beijing certainly enjoys the economic benefits of being the Burmese junta’s best friend. Since 1989, China has been the regime’s most important supplier of military aid, providing jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels, as well as extensive training to Burmese military personnel. In exchange, it has been given access to Burma’s abundant natural resources.

A joint statement on “Future Cooperation in Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Federation of Myanmar,” issued in June 2000, indicated the future direction of Sino-Burmese relations, which were to be based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the consolidation of mutual relations for wider regional stability and development.

Despite Beijing’s willingness to be more direct in persuading Burma to enhance its economic reforms and to push for political reconciliation at home, China still regards Burma’s poor human rights record as an “internal affair.”

At the same time, the United States has continued to denounce the Burmese generals’ human rights records and refusal to honor the 1990 election results. Washington’s harsh criticism, especially during the Bush administration, gave the Burmese generals no other choice but to turn to the Chinese government for support. In 2003, when the US imposed tougher sanctions against the regime under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Beijing was highly critical of the move.

China’s foreign policy is completely divorced from the harsh realties of life under military rule in Burma. Without taking this suffering into consideration, Beijing has used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions designed to push Burma toward genuine political reform. This has allowed the junta to simply move forward with its efforts to orchestrate a political transition from an absolute dictatorship to a faux democracy within the framework of a militarized constitution.

China has continued to back the Burmese regime as part of its policy of extending its influence within the region. However, Burma’s long history of ethnic conflict and political dissent presents serious challenges to Chinese policy, which may not be viable in the long run.

Another problem facing Beijing is that the Burmese regime is deeply distrustful of China. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Burma’s armed forces fought hard against the Burmese Communist Party, which was backed by China’s ruling Communist Party. This experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Burmese generals and continues to affect the thinking of the current military leadership.

China’s current dual-track policy of supporting both the junta and the ethnic groups living along the Sino-Burmese border has helped to keep these memories alive. It has also raised the specter of renewed conflict with China. In a 2006 quarterly report, Burma’s ruling military council said that it needed to brace for an invasion from the northeast—obviously referring to China.

According to a reliable source, officials from China’s Yunnan Province have recognized the significance of developments inside Burma and are seeking to minimize the negative impact of Beijing’s policy. However, China can’t change its foreign policy within a few years; it will take decade, said a high-ranking diplomat from Beijing.

However, other China watchers have argued that Beijing is less interested in dealing with the Burmese junta since it purged Gen Khin Nyunt, the former intelligence chief, in 2004. Chinese leaders know that the current rulers in Naypyidaw have little interest in engaging with the outside world, but believe that the generals would not dare to turn their guns against China.

China may also feel that it is paying too high a price for backing Burma politically. Some analysts suggest that Beijing could move away from its long-held position on Burma in international forums to protect its broader geopolitical interests. China realizes that defending Burma may have triggered a more aggressive US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is carefully observing the current US administration’s reengagement in the region to decide whether Burma should be a center of China’s foreign policy.

China is aware that regional countries have supported a new Burma policy by the US government in terms of their constructive engagement and economic interests. China could be isolated by its Burma policy, proving its policy is still inferior to that of the US.

In the post-Cold War era, China should have more pro-active and tangible fairness to the citizens of the region, rather than putting its emphasis on ruthless authoritarian rulers. Beijing’s ignorance may have impacted the understanding of the Burmese generals. All the socialist states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are willing to yield to the US political engagement while they enjoy China’s limited favor in economic prosperity.

In recent years, Burma has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan within Asean shows a shift in Burma’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China.

Chinese analysts closely observed the Kokang incident in August and questioned whether the Sino-Burmese relationship was really impacted. In line with the 2008 constitution, the regime was attempting to ensure the stability of border areas by neutralizing armed forces that are independently standing outside the framework of the constitution.

“They (the Burmese military) don’t always heed China’s advice. China has so little leverage against them because China, in some sense, depends on them,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

Chinese officials were not only extremely upset over the lack of forewarning about the border clash but were also worried about the future political consequences.

China-Burma relations may be at a crossroads. Only demanding ethnic rights and showing concern about the situation at the border cannot reflect China’s foreign policy in terms of its status in the international arena. China should bring the role of Aung San Suu Kyi and a settlement of the general political crisis to the forefront of its Burma policy in order to show China’s role in finding a solution along with the US and the international community.

Nyo Ohn Myint is a chairperson and Moe Zaw Oo is secretary of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs Committee.

Burma Newscasts - China’s Failed Foreign Policy
Thursday, September 10, 2009

READ MORE---> China’s Failed Foreign Policy...

China’s Failed Foreign Policy

By NYO OHN MYINT/MOE ZAW OO
The Irrawaddy News

The recent breakdown of a two-decade-old ceasefire between Burma’s military junta and ethnic militias in the country’s north demonstrates the failure of China’s outdated foreign policy, according to Burmese political analysts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has aggressively pursued a path of rapid economic development as the surest way to avoid a similar fate. Although it has dramatically expanded its trade ties with the rest of the world, the principle of non-interference in other countries’ political affairs remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy. However, as the situation in Burma attests, this principle may no longer be sufficient to protect China’s national interests.

Beijing certainly enjoys the economic benefits of being the Burmese junta’s best friend. Since 1989, China has been the regime’s most important supplier of military aid, providing jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels, as well as extensive training to Burmese military personnel. In exchange, it has been given access to Burma’s abundant natural resources.

A joint statement on “Future Cooperation in Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Federation of Myanmar,” issued in June 2000, indicated the future direction of Sino-Burmese relations, which were to be based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the consolidation of mutual relations for wider regional stability and development.

Despite Beijing’s willingness to be more direct in persuading Burma to enhance its economic reforms and to push for political reconciliation at home, China still regards Burma’s poor human rights record as an “internal affair.”

At the same time, the United States has continued to denounce the Burmese generals’ human rights records and refusal to honor the 1990 election results. Washington’s harsh criticism, especially during the Bush administration, gave the Burmese generals no other choice but to turn to the Chinese government for support. In 2003, when the US imposed tougher sanctions against the regime under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Beijing was highly critical of the move.

China’s foreign policy is completely divorced from the harsh realties of life under military rule in Burma. Without taking this suffering into consideration, Beijing has used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions designed to push Burma toward genuine political reform. This has allowed the junta to simply move forward with its efforts to orchestrate a political transition from an absolute dictatorship to a faux democracy within the framework of a militarized constitution.

China has continued to back the Burmese regime as part of its policy of extending its influence within the region. However, Burma’s long history of ethnic conflict and political dissent presents serious challenges to Chinese policy, which may not be viable in the long run.

Another problem facing Beijing is that the Burmese regime is deeply distrustful of China. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Burma’s armed forces fought hard against the Burmese Communist Party, which was backed by China’s ruling Communist Party. This experience has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Burmese generals and continues to affect the thinking of the current military leadership.

China’s current dual-track policy of supporting both the junta and the ethnic groups living along the Sino-Burmese border has helped to keep these memories alive. It has also raised the specter of renewed conflict with China. In a 2006 quarterly report, Burma’s ruling military council said that it needed to brace for an invasion from the northeast—obviously referring to China.

According to a reliable source, officials from China’s Yunnan Province have recognized the significance of developments inside Burma and are seeking to minimize the negative impact of Beijing’s policy. However, China can’t change its foreign policy within a few years; it will take decade, said a high-ranking diplomat from Beijing.

However, other China watchers have argued that Beijing is less interested in dealing with the Burmese junta since it purged Gen Khin Nyunt, the former intelligence chief, in 2004. Chinese leaders know that the current rulers in Naypyidaw have little interest in engaging with the outside world, but believe that the generals would not dare to turn their guns against China.

China may also feel that it is paying too high a price for backing Burma politically. Some analysts suggest that Beijing could move away from its long-held position on Burma in international forums to protect its broader geopolitical interests. China realizes that defending Burma may have triggered a more aggressive US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is carefully observing the current US administration’s re-engagement in the region to decide whether Burma should be a center of China’s foreign policy.

China is aware that regional countries have supported a new Burma policy by the US government in terms of their constructive engagement and economic interests. China could be isolated by its Burma policy, proving its policy is still inferior to that of the US.

In the post-Cold War era, China should have more pro-active and tangible fairness to the citizens of the region, rather than putting its emphasis on ruthless authoritarian rulers. Beijing’s ignorance may have impacted the understanding of the Burmese generals. All the socialist states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) are willing to yield to the US political engagement while they enjoy China’s limited favor in economic prosperity.

In recent years, Burma has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan within Asean shows a shift in Burma’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China.

Chinese analysts closely observed the Kokang incident in August and questioned whether the Sino-Burmese relationship was really impacted. In line with the 2008 constitution, the regime was attempting to ensure the stability of border areas by neutralizing armed forces that are independently standing outside the framework of the constitution.

“They (the Burmese military) don’t always heed China’s advice. China has so little leverage against them because China, in some sense, depends on them,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

Chinese officials were not only extremely upset over the lack of forewarning about the border clash but were also worried about the future political consequences.

China-Burma relations may be at a crossroads. Only demanding ethnic rights and showing concern about the situation at the border cannot reflect China’s foreign policy in terms of its status in the international arena. China should bring the role of Aung San Suu Kyi and a settlement of the general political crisis to the forefront of its Burma policy in order to show China’s role in finding a solution along with the US and the international community.

Nyo Ohn Myint is a chairperson and Moe Zaw Oo is secretary of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Foreign Affairs Committee.

Burma Newscasts - China’s Failed Foreign Policy
Thursday, September 10, 2009

READ MORE---> China’s Failed Foreign Policy...

Clinton’s myopia on Burma

by Enzo Reale

(Mizzima- Opinion) - Did you think they had a "policy"? Think again.

Since her first trip to Asia, last February, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been busy advertising the "new approach" to the region promoted by the Obama administration. Especially, regarding Burma, she announced a "policy review" in the months to come: "Clearly, sanctions haven't worked", she said, adding that engagement by the neighbouring countries also failed to bring change to the isolated nation.

Officially the "policy review" is still on and, apart from some vague statements from Clinton's aides, nobody at the moment can spell out its contents and its real purpose. But last week, at a press conference on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phuket, Secretary of State came up with quite a surprising proposal to Burmese rulers: "If she [Suu Kyi] were released, that would open up opportunities, at least for my country, to expand our relationship with Burma, including investments in Burma. But it is up to the Burmese leadership", Clinton said. In other words: ‘if you give me Aung San Suu Kyi, I'll give you money’. Unfortunately this isn't a policy, it's a gamble.

The attempt to buy Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom by the promise of new investments shows an amount of improvisation and naivety that should worry activists for democracy inside and outside Burma and, in general, all those who have always looked at U.S. as a force for democratic change in authoritarian countries. Instead of working to free Burma and its citizens, Mrs. Clinton chooses to concentrate U.S. efforts in pursuing a symbolic, popular and limited goal, the liberation of the Nobel Prize laureate. "What about reconciliation dialogue, the election in 2010 and ethnic issues? Don’t they know that they would detain her again?" veteran journalist and opposition leader Win Tin observed, when asked about Mrs. Clinton's remarks. But we could add: what about the other 2000 political prisoners? What about internally displaced people? What about forced and child labour? What about recruitment of children in the Army? What about refugees? What about the climate of intimidation and fear? What about Burma?

The Secretary of State's words are misconceived for many reasons. They can be interpreted as if the reality of misery and oppression of 55 million people could be reduced to the fate of a single, though important, democratic icon. If she could speak, I am sure Aung Sang Suu Kyi would reject this bargaining: she considers her freedom instrumental to the liberation of the Burmese people and not vice versa.

Moreover, Mrs. Clinton clearly underestimates the significance that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) attach to her detention. Senior General Than Shwe and his clique have always considered political prisoners a necessary tool for the survival of the regime in the present shape. They use them to threaten the population, to debilitate the opposition, to buy time with the international community, according to circumstances. They're not going to risk their political future by simply freeing Aung San Suu Kyi as a part of an undefined cooperation agreement.

Finally, the proposal underlines the weakness (or the nonexistence) of an American strategy about Burma. After Mrs. Clinton’s remarks the generals know better than ever that the U.S. government has no idea on how to deal with them. There's no plan, just a game of courtship and rejection, of carrot and stick they’re probably enjoying. Actually, it looks like the only tangible U.S. policy under Obama is the cohabitation with authoritarian regimes, in Asia and elsewhere: “normalization” is the keyword. For a further example, take the essence of Mrs. Clinton’s speech about North Korea: in exchange for giving up its nuclear ambitions, she promised Pyongyang “full normalisation of relations, a permanent peace regime and significant energy and economic assistance in the context of full and verifiable denuclearisation”.

In the past year the Burmese government has been able to shift the focus from its chronic mismanagement of the country’s resources to economic sanctions imposed by Western countries. A fundamental help in this rough manipulation has come from anti-sanctions and pro-engagement groups, mainly outside Burma. Burmese historian Thant Myint-U, well settled in his usual equidistance between dictatorship and the democratic camp, is a champion of this “development first” narrative. In its last edition, also The Economist seems to embrace the theory that blames the critical situation in Burma on the obstinacy of Western powers and on the same Aung San Suu Kyi for pursuing a policy of criticism and sanctions aimed at promoting democratic change, instead of engaging the regime with development aid and investments: “Worse, everyone from the UN down views Myanmar through the lens of democracy above all else—even development.

For a desperate country with shocking rates of disease and mortality such a priority is dubious, at best, shameful at worst”, an editorial observes. According to this school of thought, Burma’s destiny would depend in the first place on foreign countries will to abandon their isolation policy, as if the paranoid military government that has ruled the country with an iron fist for 47 years had little or nothing to do with its decay.

Of course, development and aid are essential tools in such a dramatic context. But it’s a big mistake to consider development and democracy as alternative options.

Before 1997 no Western sanctions against Burma were in place, at least not in the present form and extent. What kind of development did Burmese citizens enjoy? The sad answer is… more wealth in the strongboxes of Burma's tyrants. Today Naypyidaw is busily trading with its neighbours, mainly China, India, Thailand and Singapore: why aren’t they developing the country and improving people’s lives?

A slippery ground, isn’t it? While the debate about this subject is welcome, we should not forget that the main sanction against Burma is the military regime itself. For that reason, democracy and development are intimately connected and it’s impossible to promote any sort of real development if the national robbery managed by a ruthless and illegitimate government is going to continue. The only treatment for Burma’s illness is the end of dictatorship, not more money (Western money, again?) in the pockets of the generals.

So, Mrs. Clinton, free Burma and you will also free Aung San Suu Kyi.

Enzo Reale is a freelance journalist. He writes about South-East Asia issues for Italian online newspapers and magazines. He edits two blogs (http://1972.splinder.com and http://asiaedintorni.blogosfere.it).

READ MORE---> Clinton’s myopia on Burma...

LAWLESS China shuts the door on diplomats

By Michael Sainsbury and Mark Dodd
The Australian

CHINA has rebuffed the Rudd government and may force Australian officials to wait a further month for a second visit to detained Rio Tinto iron ore executive Stern Hu.

As senior Australian ministers warned that China risked damaging its international trade relations over Mr Hu's arrest, reports emerged that Rio Tinto was seeking as much as $9 billion in compensation for breach of contracts from Chinese steel mills.

Foreign Minister Stephen Smith yesterday criticised Chinese efforts to communicate with the Rudd government over the Hu case.

"We would have preferred that much of the information we have gleaned would have come from Chinese officials in the usual and normal diplomatic way, rather than it coming from the public statements of the spokesperson from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and from an official Chinese government website detailing the advice of the Shanghai Bureau of State Security," Mr Smith said.

Chinese-born Mr Hu, the head of Rio Tinto's iron ore operations in China, and three other senior company officials were arrested in Shanghai by secret police and have been detained for a week without charge or legal representation.

Chinese officials have accused Mr Hu of espionage and stealing state secrets, sparking the most serious diplomatic challenge faced by the Rudd government since it came to office in November 2007.

It is now clear that the allegations against Mr Hu and his colleagues are directly related to prolonged and unresolved negotiations over benchmark prices for iron ore being sold by Australian miners to Chinese steel mills.

Chinese media reports said Rio - and possibly its one-time rival and new joint venture partner BHP Billiton - had been approaching Chinese steel mills in the past month, seeking compensation for broken contracts after the steel makers allegedly reneged on promises to buy certain volumes of iron ore.

"From the middle of June, Rio visited Chinese mills one by one, asking for compensation for contracts which were not fulfilled due to the financial crisis," the 21st Century Business Herald quoted an unnamed senior steel executive as saying.

"Rio calculated that they lost $5 billion in iron ore, and $4bn in shipments in the previous eight months due to the fact that Chinese mills postponed or even cancelled ships."

A Rio spokesperson declined to comment.

Mr Smith played down hopes of an early release for Mr Hu, warning that he was preparing for the "long haul".

"I am deliberately and advisedly making the point that under Chinese law and Chinese practice, Mr Hu is now subject to those processes," he said.

The month-long wait for another consular visit comes after Trade Minister Simon Crean, visiting Shanghai on Saturday, was granted access only to a mid-level official, Sha Hailin, the deputy secretary-general of the Shanghai government, to express his "strong concern" about the Hu case.

Mr Smith, asked if Mr Hu's detention could scare off foreign investors in China, said Beijing needed to "think very carefully about what implications, if any, it has for the international business community and the international investment community's view of China".

"I think one of the issues for the Chinese government to contemplate is the extent to which the circumstances of this case will cause the international business community any cause for concern," the Foreign Minister said.

The opposition continued to attack the government's response to Mr Hu's detention.
Opposition foreign affairs spokeswoman Julie Bishop said China had effectively "snubbed" Australia.

She accused Mr Smith of failing to act decisively with the Chinese and said he was now being treated with disrespect by Beijing.

"The government ministers must get personally involved and not just leave this to the bureaucrats and say that this is just a consular matter," she said.

Mr Smith defended the government's handling of the Hu case, saying it continued to press Chinese authorities for more information in a "firm but appropriately diplomatic way". The Foreign Minister admitted he had not called his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, but might do so in the future.

"I'll make a judgment about it if and when it becomes appropriate for me to raise this matter with my counterpart so will the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister made that clear last week," Mr Smith said.

In their first meeting with Mr Hu on Friday, Australian consular officials said the iron ore salesman was in good health.

China's 21st Century Business Herald reported that the evidence against Mr Hu included "an interior meeting memorandum provided by China Iron and Steel Association personnel".

Another source revealed that a senior executive at state-owned Shougong Steel, Tan Yixin, provided production information to Mr Hu.

Other Chinese news reports said executives from a raft of major steel mills across China, as well as executives from the CISA, which has been conducting the discussions, have been hauled in for questioning by authorities. As well as Shougang, Laigang and Jigang mills in Shandong, Baosteel in Shanghai and other mills in Hebei and Liaoning provinces are rumoured to be under investigation.

A senior executive of Baosteel, China's biggest steelmaker, has been reported to have been taken by police for interrogation. It has also been reported that the manager in charge of shipment at a large mill in Shandong as well as the executive of a large trader were also taken for interrogation.

Last year's iron ore contracts were struck at record prices of about $US90 a tonne, a 40 per cent lift on the previous year. China has been demanding a cut of between 40 and 45 per cent but Rio and BHP have insisted on a discount of only 33 per cent - the same agreed by Japanese and South Korean mills in May. The pricing of iron ore, the biggest input to the steel making process, has long been a delicate issue with China, which now consumes half of the iron ore mined each year and more than 60 per cent of seaborne volumes, which mainly come from Australia and Brazil.

Rio's iron ore chief Sam Walsh said at the weekend that the company remained surprised and concerned over the detention of its employees.

The company had still not been told by Chinese authorities of any charges against the employees.

Chinese lawyers who spoke to The Australian on the condition of anonymity said that, as no specific evidence against Mr Hu had yet been provided, it was not easy to judge what jail term he might face if found guilty. "Six months to 15 years, it depends on the evidence," one said. (JEG's: and if there is no evidence will there be a DASSK's casse here? without evidence will Mr Hu be charged?)

Additional reporting: Debbie Guest

READ MORE---> LAWLESS China shuts the door on diplomats...

Bangladesh PM inquires about Rohingya infiltration

Dhaka (Narinjara): The Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in a cabinet meeting at the Secretariat on Monday made inquiries from the Home Ministry about the contentious issue of Rohingya infiltration into Bangladesh, said an official report.

The Bangladesh premier made inquiries while she was chairing the cabinet meeting yesterday.

Home Ministry officials told her at the meeting that the infiltration is creating law and order problems in some districts bordering Burma.

The report said that Hasina wanted details about infiltration by Rohingyas into Bangladesh.

The Bangladesh government has directed the BDR, law enforcement agencies and district administration to initiate tough action to stop infiltration, the report said quoting an authorized official from the Home Ministry.

The Home Ministry also said it has directed the administration to take steps to push back infiltrators.

Many Burmese Muslims, widely known as Rohingya, from Arakan state, have been intruding into Bangladesh in recent months and many were reportedly pushed back to Burma.

After the information spread through the media, the Bangladesh Prime Minister made inquiries about the issue from concerned authorities of the Home Ministry.

At the cabinet meeting, the PM also directed the concerned ministries to take immediate steps to link Bangladesh with the Asian Highway Network (AHN) via Burma.

READ MORE---> Bangladesh PM inquires about Rohingya infiltration...